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N.M.: North Malukan; A.: Arabic; M.: Malay; J.: Javanese; D.:Dutch; E.: English; F.: 
French; P.:Portuguese; S.: Spanish  
 
 
alifuru (P.) a general term used for non-Christian and non-Muslim 
indigenous inhabitants of the interior of islands in Maluku  
anakoda (M.) captain, master of a vessel 
arumbai (N.M.) a transport vessel  for passengers and provisions in 
warfare. The hull is similar to a kora-kora but without 
outriggers. It is equipped with sail and oars. The roof was 
strong enough for drummers and tifa or gong players to sit on. 
It was about twenty-five metres long and three metres in the 
beam. It could carry twenty to forty crew plus five to twenty 
others (soldiers, musicians, and heads). (Van Fraassen, II, 1986: 
641-2) 
bahar (M. <Sanskrit bahãra, a burden, weight) a measure of weight 
widely used in South-East Asia, 1 bahar = 3 pikul = 550 
pounds. 
barkah (M.) fortune, blessing 
baru-baru  (N.M.) Sultan’s troops  
blokhuis (D.) Stone built fortress, two storeys high 
bobato (N.M.) ’those who give orders’, general term for traditional 
leaders, with the exception of the Sultan. There were two kinds 
of bobato or ‘state dignitaries.’ The Bobato dunia (profane bobato) 
was not only an official of the State but also a representative of 
the bala or common people. Bobato akhirat (religious bobato) 
dealt with Muslim religious matters.  
boekhouder (D.) bookkeeper 
boki  (N.M.) a title for a princess 
bondgenoot  (D.) ally 
burgher  (D.) free Dutch citizen 
country trader (E.) a term used for private European traders involved in the 
port-to-port trade east of the Cape of Good Hope. Because of 
the dominance of the English in this trade in the eighteenth 
century, the term became practically synonymous with 
‘English’ country trader (Andaya, 1993: 281) 
destar ngongare  (N.M.) a special costume, a long black flowing robe and a 
turban, denoting status as a representative of the power of the 
Sultan  
dopolo ngaruha  (N.M.) council of the four principal officers under the Sultan: 
jogugu, kapiten-laut, hukum sangaji, and hukum soa-sio 
ducaton  (F.) half ducat, silver coin formerly current in some European 
states, worth from 5 to 6 shilling Sterling 
Oost Ceram (D.) <E. East Seram > a common Dutch usage for the eastern 
end of Seram and its off-shore islands, including the Gorom 
and Seram Laut Archipelagos (Andaya, 1993:281) 
GLOSSARY xiii
extirpatie  (D.) <E. eradication> a term used to denote a policy by which 
the VOC forced the Malukans to uproot all spice trees outside 
Ambon and Banda in return for compensation paid to the 
ruler and the more important officials in the land (Andaya, 
1993:281)  
fala raha (N.M.) the four houses in Ternate which referred  to the 
families of Tomagola, Tomaitu, Marsaoli, and Limatahu 
fiscaal (D.) public prosecutor of the VOC 
Heren Seventien (D.) E. <Gentlemen Seventeen> the Board of Directors of the 
VOC forming the supreme decision-making authority, 
generally convened in Amsterdam 
gnatahoedij (N.M.) a vessel positioned as a pilot in a Dutch-led hongi 
expedition 
Hoge Regering (D.) E. <High Government> Governor-General and the 
Council of the Indies, supreme government of the VOC in 
Asia, stationed in Batavia 
hofdienst  (D.) principal compulsory labour, corvée 
hongi (N.M.) organized fleet consisting of kora-kora which was used 
in warfare among the indigenous groups before the arrival of 
the European forces. At the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, the VOC developed an important policy relating to 
the hongi and its interaction with its own subjects in the 
Ambonese Islands. 
hukum (M.) Initially referred to an Islamic judicial official and later 
became a prestigious position in the north Malukan courts. 
The term was also used for certain officials who served as 
representatives of the Sultans in outlying territories (Andaya 
1993:282) 
imam (M.) a leader in prayer chosen because of his age, social 
position, and knowledge of Islam, principally the Koran. 
inlandse  (D.) indigenous,  native 
jogugu (N.M. Ternate) (Tidoran, jojau) prime minister 
juru tulis (M.) a scribe 
kaicili (N.M.) a title for a princes 
kalaudi or mahimo  (N.M.) elders, head of a small settlement or village 
kalim or kalim mangofa (N.M.) Muslim religious leader in the Sultanate. It was a special title 
and position, denoting the highest rank in the religious 
community, reserved for one of the members of these royal 
families. 
kapitan laut (M.) <Portuguese, kapitan + M. laut, sea> Sea captain. A title 
used for a fleet commander. 
kapiten-ngofa and letnan-ngofa (P., N.M.) P. <capitan, captain + ngofa, …> military ranks 
accorded to Sultan’s sons. These princely officers also 
participated in such important State deliberations as the signing 
of treaties.  
karaeng (M.) a title of nobility in South Sulawesi 
kati (M.) <E. catty> a weight of 16 taels or 1 1/3 pounds  
khatib or hatibi  (A.) a leader of a mosque whose special duty is to deliver 
Friday sermons  
GLOSSARY xiv 
kimelaha (N.M.) or gimalaha. Tidore title for a village or district head 
(Andaya, 1993:282) 
klewang  (M.) a kind of machete, curved sword 
kolano (M.) <J. klono, a knight> in Panji tales the king from overseas 
and the worthy adversary of the Javanese ruler. A term for a 
ruler (Andaya, 1993:283) 
kora-kora (N.M.) a war vessel fitted with out-riggers, with a high arched 
stem and stern, like the point of a crescent moon. On the cross 
pieces which support the out-riggers, there were fore and aft 
planks, on which the people sit and paddled, supplementing 
those who sit in the vessel on the gunnels. It was steered with 
two commodities (broad paddles), not with a rudder. It was 
also used to sail on the high sea. The hull varied about 30 
metres long 2.5 to 4 metres in the beam. It could carry from 40 
to 100 men, equipped with small one to four canons. A roof 
was used for provisions. (Forrest, A Voyage to the New Guinea, 
p. 23; Van Fraassen, Ternate, II, pp. 641-2.) 
kroonslaven  (D.) or rumah dapur (M.) families in certain negeri those who had 
served the needs of the Sultan for generations. They were 
found not only in Maba and Weda, but also in Pajahe, Kayasa, 
and Maidi. 
leen (D.) a term usually used by the VOC in its treaties with 
Malukan kingdoms to indicate the political subordination of 
the latter (Andaya, 1993:283) 
leenman (D.) vassal, subordinate 
loeris  (D.) a member of the parrot family, a lorikeet, imported from 
New Guinea 
logie (D.) lodging, factory, trading post 
marinyo and kabo  (N.M.) royal palace guards  
marinyo kie  (N.M.) head of royal palace guards  
massoy (M.) Cortex Oninius, its outer bark of Cryptocarya aromatica 
used for an aromatic, a prominent commodity from the 
western coast of Papua  
mestizo   (P.) person of mixed European-Asian descent 
negeri  (M.) unit of settlement, village 
ngofamanyira (Mal.) a title of the head of a village or soa 
ngosa  (N.M.) messenger 
onderkoopman  (D.) junior merchant 
opperkoopman  (D.) senior merchant  
orangkaya (M.) in the context of Malukan polity, a title for trader/village 
leader 
overheerser  (D.) ruler, overlord, oppressor 
paduakang (M.) type of Makassarese vessel 
pancalang  (M.) type of Malay vessel, used by the VOC 
pennist  (D.) scribe, clerk 
perkenier (D. perk, bed or a place in garden) manager of a part of a 
nutmeg plantation in Banda  
pikul (J., M.) a man’s load, which is a measure of weight used widely 
in South-East Asia. 1 pikul = 100 kati = 125 to 133,3 pounds  
GLOSSARY xv 
pinnace (F. pinnase or pinace) a small, light, double-banked vessel, 20 
tons, usually two-masted and schooner-rigged; often employed 
as a tender, a scout, and so on 
prahu (J., M.) a boat, a ship 
predicant  (D. predikant) reverend, a Protestant clergyman 
raad van politie (D.) council at the provincial level 
rantaka (M.) South-East Asian type of swivel gun 
raja muda (M.) <Sanskrit, raja, king + M. muda, young> young ruler, the 
heir-apparent (Andaya, 1993:283) 
real (S. real de plata) an eighth of a dollar or 6 ¼ dinnaris (pence)   
recognitie penningen (D.) payment for acknowledged service. Compensation paid to 
the rulers and selected officials in Maluku for undertaking the 
policy of extirpatie, the eradication of spices. (Andaya, 
1993:283) 
rorehe (N.M.) a local prahu 
Rijksdaalder (D.) a coin. 1 rijksdaalder = 3 gulden (guilders, florin) = 60 
stuivers (Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, VOC-
glossarium) 
rondscherp  (D.) sort of ammunition, bullets 
sangaji (M.) <J. sang, the + aji, king> in Maluku a title awarded by the 
sultan to the most important heads of important settlements 
(Andaya, 1993: 283) 
sarong (M.) long cloth, worn around lower half of body 
serampore (?) a kind of Indian cloth 
schuts- en beschermheer  (D.) protector,overlord of a vassal 
sekretaris  (E.) personal scribe of sultan 
shahbandar (M. <Persian, shah, ruler + M. and J. bandar, harbour) a harbour 
master 
snaphaan (D. snappen, grasp + haan, cock) musket with a flint-lock 
mechanism  
soa sio (NM.) the nine soa. Equivalent to the uli siwa or the 
confederation of nine in the Ambon-Lease and Seram, referred 
in this period to the royal settlements in both Ternate and 
Tidore (Andaya 1993:283) 
soseba  (NM.) bearer of the royal sword, sirih-set, and other regalia 
totombo (N.M.) local products made of palm leaves used for thatch  
tripang (J., M.) sea cucumber, sea slug 
utusan (M.) the ruler’s representative or envoy in the periphery 
wapenbroeders  (D.) brother-in-arms, comrade / companion-in-arms 
warong (N.M) long nutmeg (Myristica argentea) available mostly in 
Gamrange, Raja Ampat and north coast of New Guinea 
mainland  
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This book revolves about the career of a remarkable man whose name was 
Nuku. Prince Nuku was the leader of a successful rebellion against the 
Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC) and its 
indigenous allies which lasted for more than twenty years. Born as a Tidoran 
prince between 1725 and 1735, he passed away as the Sultan of Tidore in 
1805.1 In 1780 he fled from Tidore seeking refuge in East Seram, 
Halmahera, and the Raja Ampat from where he launched the rebellion. In 
1797 he returned to Tidore with his allied forces and conquered the 
Sultanates of both Bacan and Tidore. During his exile, Nuku had to fight the 
forces of the three VOC Governments in Maluku: Ternate; Ambon; and 
Banda.2 Besides possessing better weaponry and equipment, the VOC could 
also mobilize its indigenous subjects, from such places as Ambon and 
Ternate as troops. In addition, the VOC often dispatched support forces 
such as ships, weaponry, and soldiers to Maluku from Batavia. In 1801, in 
close collaboration with the English, Nuku managed to defeat the VOC in 
Ternate and its indigenous ally, the Ternate Sultanate. 
Prince Nuku and his Tidoran adherents depended to a large extent on 
the support they received from various groups of Malukans and Papuans 
and the assistance of the English. It is intriguing to see what strategies he 
employed to maintain support among the Tidorans at home, his adherents 
in the periphery of Tidore, and even the English. This study describes and 
analyses how the rebellion was staged against the three obviously more 
                                               
1 See Chapter V. 
2 The term ‘Maluku’ is used here in a wider sense, referring to the Maluku today. It was 
initially derived from the term ‘Molucos’ used by the Portuguese to refer to five small 
islands Ternate, Tidore, Motir, Makian, and Kayoa. Gradually its meaning extended to 
almost all the eastern islands of which under Indonesian Republic was once called Provinsi 
Maluku. The term ‘Maluku’ refers to Halmahera and the islands adjacent to it, the Obi 
Islands, Buru, Seram with the islands off its southern extreme, Banda Archipelago, 
stretching to as far as Kei, Tanimbar and the islands adjacent to it. See also I. Mackenzie, 
Eastern Archipelago Pilot, III, (London: Admiralty Lords Commissioners, 1921), 3. 
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powerful Dutch Governments in Maluku, and who were the principal actors 
on both sides involved in this protracted struggle.  
 
 
Geographical and historical setting 
 
In the early sixteenth century, Maluku – known as the Spice Islands - 
became the target of European traders who were competing to obtain cloves 
and nutmegs. The Portuguese reached Banda and Ambon, and established 
themselves in Ternate in 1512. The Spaniards arrived in Tidore in 1521 but 
did not remain there very long. Thanks to their presence in Ternate and 
Ambon, the Portuguese enjoyed the lucrative spice trade in Maluku for 
almost a hundred years. When the Dutch arrived at the end of the century, 
the VOC almost immediately replaced the Portuguese in Maluku. Ambon 
was captured in 1605 and the Sultanate of Ternate welcomed the Dutch 
newcomers as allies in its fight with the Portuguese. Banda was colonized 
completely in 1621. After this comprehensive sweep, the spice monopoly of 
the VOC in Maluku was hardly challenged by any other European power.3 
Not until the third quarter of the eighteenth century, did English country 
traders peddling between India and China became more active in obtaining 
spices, and started meddling in the local politics especially in Tidore.4 
In the beginning, the rebellion centred on Tidore, a small island in North 
Maluku and the seat of a sultanate. Politically North Maluku was divided 
into three sultanates: Ternate; Tidore; and Bacan. Formerly, a fourth one, 
the Jailolo Sultanate, had been very strong but with the help of the 
Portuguese Ternate destroyed this Sultanate in 1551.5 Tidore Island is only 
five square miles but despite its diminutive size, the mountainous island rises 
some 1,770 metres (5,900 feet) above sea level.6 Its coastal strip is necessarily 
restricted in width. It has no swamps and consequently does not provide a 
suitable habitat for sago palms, so that this staple has to be imported from 
Halmahera and elsewhere. The island was however rich in cloves. The 
majority of the inhabitants of 6,332, including 2,221 slaves, were followers 
of Islam, which religion was introduced into North Maluku around the 
                                               
3 This topic is discussed extensively in Chapter II. 
4 This topic is discussed extensively in Chapters VIII and IX. 
5 Leonard Y. Andaya, The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993) pp. 130-1; Leirissa, Halmahera Timur and Raja 
Jailolo (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1996), 1. 
6 I. Mackenzie, Eastern Archipelago Pilot, III (London: Admiralty Lords Commissioners, 
1921), 62. See also A.R. Wallace, Menjelajah Nusantara, Ekspedisi Alfred Russel Wallace Abad 
ke-19 (Bandung: Rosda, 2000), 172. 
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fifteenth century. Most of these slaves had been brought from the Papuan 
islands, the New Guinea mainland, or certain other parts of the Maluku.7 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, under the Sultanate of 
Tidore the inhabitants on the island were organized in negeri, which consisted 
of a number of kampung or soa. According to Van Fraassen, the term soa 
refers to a unit of settlement.8 It also functions as an entity related to socio-
political organization. The seat of the Sultanate of Tidore was located in the 
main negeri Soa Sio. In front of the town Soa Sio there is a reef of rocks and 
stones. The anchorage is about 30 fathoms (54. 9 metres) with sand at less 
than 400 metres (two cables). There are tide-rips in the anchorage.9 Not far 
from the palace, a Dutch fortress called Tahula had been erected. During the 
reign of Sultan Nuku (r. 1797-1805), it was often used as his residence. 
Negeri Soa Sio, the palace excluded, was composed of eighteen compounds, 
two of which were Kampung Cina and Kampung Jawa (which was 
sometimes called Kampung Makassar). Besides Soa Sio, there were four 
other negeri: Jonganjili; Marieko; Toloa; and Gurabati. The total number of 
compounds of the four negeri was twenty-seven. There was one compound 
in negeri Gurabati in which most of the slaves of Sultan Tidore resided.10  
In spite of its wealth of cloves, the small island of Tidore would have 
meant nothing politically had it not counted a great many other islands 
which acknowledged its authority as a sultanate. Some of these subjects were 
located far away from the centre. The most important areas were Raja 
Ampat and Gamrange. In the Raja Ampat Archipelago four tiny kingdoms -
Salawati, Waigeo, Misool, and Waigama - were located. In Halmahera, the 
realm of Tidore covered the north-east peninsula, the central section, and 
the southern peninsula of this large island as far south as a line drawn 
between Dehepodo and Foya. The southern peninsular area included the 
important settlements of Gamrange—consisting of Maba, Weda, and Patani 
from which the Sultans of Tidore obtained vital support forces. The best 
port was in Maba, namely Bicoli.11 The islands of Gebe, Fau, and Ju off the 
east coast of Halmahera were always considered a part of Tidore.12 Before 
                                               
7 The population estimate is according to the census of 1807. See ANRI, Ternate 118, 
Expedition to Tidore 12 May 1807; Leirissa, Halmahera Timur and Raja Jailolo, 16-9; De 
Clerq, Bijdragen tot de kennis der residentie Ternate (Leiden: Brill, 1890), 68. 
8 Ch. F. Van Fraassen, Ternate, de Molukken en de Indonesische archipel (PhD Thesis: Leiden 
University, 1987), 142. 
9 Tide-rip is an area of rough water typically caused by opposing tides or by a rapid current 
passing over an uneven bottom. See Mackenzie, Eastern Archipelago Pilot, 62. 
10 Andaya, The World of Maluku, 130-1; Leirissa, Halmahera Timur and Raja Jailolo, 1. 
11 Corpus Diplomaticum, VI, 433; J.P.C. Cambier, “Rapport over Tidoreesch-Halmahera,” in 
BKI 19 (1872). 
12 W. G. Miller, ‘The Mollucas under the British’ (M.A. Thesis: University of Hull, 1974), 
5-6. 
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the cession in 1769, East Seram was also under Tidoran authority. The realm 
of Tidore extended as far as the coast of New Guinea.13 The British treaty in 
1814 mentions the specific settlements on the north coast of New Guinea 
more precisely.14 To be more exact, Van der Crab describes the realm as 
stretching from 1400 47’ on the north coast to 1410 on the south coast.15  
The communication between Tidore and its subjects at that time was 
maintained by sea transport. A voyage from Tidore to the ‘outer’ areas could 
take more than one month. Course had to be set all the way from Tidore, 
through Patinti Strait along southern Halmahera, and then turn eastwards 
across the sea to Salawati or the other islands of Raja Ampat. If the 
destination was towards Gamrange, after rounding the southern end of 
Halmahera, the vessel should turn north-eastwards. The time that it took to 
reach the destinations was much influenced by the weather, especially the 
monsoon winds. In other words the distance between the centre of power 
and its subjects was one important factor in the maintenance of authority 
and control. The Dutch and the Sultans of Tidore really underwent 
hardships and faced plenty of difficulties in reaching this area. Before the 
rebellion broke out in 1780, the Gamrange and Raja Ampat peoples 
happened to be relatively independent. Their raiding activities, which were 
forbidden by the Dutch authorities, mostly remained unpunished. During 
his rebellion Prince Nuku managed to subdue and to take over the control 
of these areas from the hands of the pro-Dutch Tidore Sultanate and the 
Dutch Government in Ternate, by establishing his headquarters in East 
Seram, more exactly in Waru. From Waru and nearby places the Prince 
organized the peoples in the area to fight against the Dutch, and the Tidore, 





A number of books and studies have been devoted to Nuku who is formally 
recognized as one of Indonesia’s national heroes. Elianus Katoppo16 is said 
that has ‘discovered’ Nuku when he was doing research for a book on Papua 
(Irian Jaya at that time) in the early 1950s. Before him few people in 
Indonesia knew or had even heard about Nuku. He was barely mentioned in 
                                               
13 This was recognized by the Dutch in the 1780 treaty with Patra Alam. See Corpus 
Diplomaticum, VI, 433. 
14 A. Haga, Nederlandsch Nieuw Guinea en de Papoesche eilanden, I, (The Hague: Martinus-
Nijhoff, 1884), 460. 
15 P. Van der Crab, De Molukse Eilanden; Reis van Z.E. den Gouverneur-Generaal Charles 
Ferdinand Pahud door den Molukschen Archipel (Batavia: Lange, 1862), 325. 
16 Elianus Katoppo, Nuku: Perjuangan Kemerdekaan di Maluku Utara (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 
1984). 
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the history text books written by the Dutch, Indonesians or others, but 
Katoppo found an abundance of information about Nuku in Haga's two 
volume magnum opus on Maluku – an almost forgotten work at the time - and 
he went to the archives to find the original documents. After the Negara 
Indonesia Timur, in which he was minister of education, had been dissolved 
in 1950, the Government assigned him to work at Arsip Nasional Republik 
Indonesia (ANRI) (at the time called Arsip Negara or State Archive). When 
Katoppo and Adrian Lapian visited Tidore to find Nuku's grave in the early 
1960s, they found out that Nuku was known only as Jou Barakati or Tuan 
Barakati (the Blessed Lord). Only after the first edition of Katoppo’s book 
in 1957, did Indonesian readers begin to know more about him, and later 
the people of Maluku proposed him as a pahlawan nasional or national hero, 
an honorific title which only much later was granted by the Indonesian 
Government.17 
Other books on Nuku in the Indonesian language are, for example, 
Perlawanan Nuku di Tidore (The Resistance of Nuku in Tidore) by Ohorela 
(1990) and Nuku Pahlawan Tidore yang Mengalahkan Belanda (Nuku: the 
Tidoran Hero Who Defeated the Dutch) by Dasuki (1976), both of which 
were meant to describe the struggle of Nuku as an Indonesian hero in very 
general terms.18 The latter piece was written for schoolchildren, therefore it 
is written in a very short version. Looking for a hero (pahlawan) and the 
greatness of Indonesian leaders in Indonesian history was a common 
pastime in Indonesia under the New Order Regime (1966-1998). The 
Indonesian historiography at that time was dominated by a nationalist 
perspective which served the needs of nation-building by the regime. 
Despite the nationalist hagiography, the events described in their works are 
based on the original sources in the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia 
(ANRI) in Jakarta. Even though the references and sources are not 
mentioned clearly, the three books show that most of the historical facts 
cited refer in the Dutch archival documents.  
Haga wrote his pioneering study Nederlandsch Nieuw Guinea en de Papoesche 
Eilanden as early as 1884. Its purpose was to investigate the rights of 
possession of the Netherlands to the mainland of New Guinea. In 
performing this duty, the author shed light on various events concerning 
Netherlands New Guinea and the political situation between Tidore and the 
Papuans over a long period of four centuries, from the sixteenth to the 
nineteenth century.  
                                               
17 Personal communication via email with Adrian B. Lapian, 2 January 2007.   
18 See Ohorela, G.A. Perlawanan Nuku di Tidore (1780-1805) (Semarang: Departemen 
Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Indonesia, 1990) and A. Dasuki. Nuku Pahlawan Tidore yang 
Mengalahkan Belanda (Bandung: Sanggabuwana, 1976). 
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In 1993 Leonard Andaya published The World of Maluku, a profound 
study which covers a long period of North Malukan history from the 
sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century. The central theme of this 
monograph is the confrontation between two ‘separate cultural realities’: the 
European culture on one side and the Malukan world, namely Ternate and 
Tidore, on the other. Andaya has made significant remarks on the changes 
over the three centuries. From the sixteenth century the Sultanates of 
Ternate and Tidore in North Maluku grew wealthier and more powerful as a 
result of the international trade in spices and expanded their power far 
beyond their territories proper. The coming of Islam in the fifteenth century 
and of Europeans in the sixteenth century was important factor in changing 
the power relations between the rulers and the lords of the land (bobato), and 
between the centre and the periphery. The rulers became stronger in their 
dealing with the lords of the land. The rebellion of Prince Nuku was, in 
Andaya’s perspective, a struggle contextualized in the restoration of the 
world of the ‘four pillars’ in Maluku.19 This discussion of the rebellion of 
Nuku is concentrated mostly on the political dynamics in Tidore. Other 
areas and their peoples who were involved in the rebellion are not part of 
the equation.  
The Moluccas under the British, a master‘s thesis by W. G. Miller (1976) is an 
important work on the history of British presence in Maluku at the end of 
eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century. The author 
has attempted to trace the sequence of events in Maluku between 
approximately 1780 and 1818 while focusing on the English presence in the 
area. He elaborates on the organization of the Tidore state, the political role 
of the country traders, and the policy of the British Government. This 
stimulating thesis encouraged me to discover more about the English role 
during Nuku’s rebellion. The way in which the spice monopoly developed 
during the English Interregnum in Maluku is depicted extensively in H. R. C. 
Wright’s article (1958) “The Moluccan Spice Monopoly, 1770-1824.” This 
contribution also throws new light on the rivalry between the English and 
the Dutch at the end of eighteenth century.   
Haga and Andaya based their research on the VOC archives available in 
the Nationaal Archief (NA) in The Hague. Katoppo made extensive use of 
the archives stored in the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI) in 
Jakarta. For most of his sources Miller relied on British documents in the 
British Library in London and a number of Dutch published sources. For 
this book, I spent almost two years, from 2003-2004, examining the VOC 
archival documents in NA in The Hague and ANRI in Jakarta. For the 
British sources, I spent about four months in British Library and National 
Library London. Besides these, a number of folk stories collected by Dutch 
                                               
19 Andaya, The World of Maluku, 240-4. 
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priests are also used. Therefore this book is written based on the combined 
sources in Jakarta, London, The Hague and Leiden.    
 
 
Theme and outline of this study 
 
The common question posed by all researchers is how and why Nuku and 
his supporters were able to maintain their struggle with such persistence for 
twenty years. Katoppo suggests that the Nuku’s prime mover was to fight 
the spice monopoly and extirpation policy which had caused such ‘chaos’ 
and poverty among the Malukans.20 Even though Dasuki21 does not 
explicitly indicate the causes of the rebellion, he implicitly emphasizes the 
grip of the Dutch spice monopoly, exacerbated by the greed and the cruelty 
of the Dutch towards the Malukans. Both writers focus on the central role 
of Nuku in the whole rebellion. The contribution of Nuku’s supporters is 
generally overlooked.    
Andaya has provided a different explanation of the phenomenon who 
was Nuku. His explanation runs as follows: 
 
Initial support in north Maluku for Nuku’s rebellion in the late eighteenth 
century came from those who shared his antagonism toward the Dutch, but 
the rebellion was sustained by those who believed that his promise to restore 
Jailolo would finally bring peace and harmony to Maluku. The adherence to 
common myths provided the basis for unity among the groups in Maluku, 
and the strength of the belief that this unity would continue to survive as long 
as ‘the four kingdoms’ were preserved became an important motivating 
principle in the cyclical view of Malukan history.22  
 
It would seem that this culturally deterministic conclusion is problematic 
as the sources do not provide sufficient evidence for such a statement. It 
threatens to create speculations which simplify the dynamics of the 
rebellion. The myths of the ‘four kingdoms’ which were once mentioned by 
Sultan Saifuddin in the seventeenth century do not explain whether the 
other Malukans in East Seram, Raja Ampat, or Halmahera, who were all 
deeply involved in the rebellion, shared the same myths and worldview 
about the ‘four kingdoms.’ Referring to the historical facts, this doubt may 
even apply to Ternate, one of the ‘four kingdoms.’ In 1551 Sultan Ternate, 
for example, destroyed the Jailolo Sultanate which should have been 
regarded as one of the four. If Ternate had been so committed to the 
preservation of the ‘four kingdoms,’ this step would never have been taken.  
                                               
20 Katoppo, Nuku, 32-41. 
21 Dasuki, Nuku, 16-21. 
22 Andaya, The World of Maluku, 244. 
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Andaya’s conclusion also overlooks the fact that every group supporting 
Nuku had its own particular reasons and interests which drove it to join the 
rebellion. Nuku and his Tidoran adherents had particular interests vested in 
the rebellion which were perhaps different from those of their allies from 
East Seram and Gamrange. Each faction of the rebels had in many ways a 
different historical context with respect to the particular local political 
dynamics and their relationship with the Europeans, especially the Dutch 
and the English. Therefore focusing on the power formation processes of 
the Company on the one hand and of the adherents of Nuku’s rebellion on 
the other may help us to understand the rebellion. This is the line followed 
in this thesis. 
 
Chapters II and III provide the historical context of European 
intervention in Maluku. Attention is paid to the strategies and the policy 
making of the VOC in the creation of three local Governments: Banda; 
Ambon; and Ternate. These chapters show how the Company maximized 
the use of its military power to build a ‘state’ apparatus, and came to 
dominate local power relations and trade in Maluku. From time to time, 
Tidore showed a tendency to resist the policies of the VOC, which 
invariably intervened in succession struggles and liked to flex its muscles as 
if to emphasize the control it exercised over its periphery. Against this 
background it is shown why the VOC relationship with local rulers (sultans 
and bobato), eventually created opposing groups and led to ‘rebellion’ in 
Tidore and its dependencies.  
Starting out with a description of the people, the leadership, and the 
structure of the Sultanate of Tidore, Chapters IV and V deal with the course 
of the rebellion of Prince Nuku of Tidore, from the Toloa attack in 1780 up 
to the death of Nuku’s successor, Zainal Abidin, in 1810. There is a 
discussion of the various ways by which Nuku pursued his rebellion together 
with his adherents in Tidore proper and those living far apart in East Seram, 
Gamrange, and Raja Ampat for almost twenty years. Comparison is also 
made between Nuku and the other princes and sultans of Tidore who chose 
to collaborate with the Dutch in order to underline explicitly the shrewd 
strategies and the complex personality of Prince Nuku.  
‘Papuan’ groups, especially Raja Ampat, namely: Salawati’; Misool; 
Waigeo; and the Waigama, and Gamrange peoples who made up Maba, 
Weda, and Patani, had been notorious raiders in Maluku since the 
seventeenth century. During the rebellion of Prince Nuku, their role in 
strengthening the rebel’s forces turned out to be decisive. In Chapters VI 
and VII these ‘Papuan’ groups are described, including their relations with 
Tidore and their raiding activities prior to Nuku’s rebellion in order to show 
that the raiding activities were an inherent feature of these communities. 
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Furthermore, the dynamics of the power relation between the Tidoran 
leaders, Prince Nuku’s rebel circle, and these peoples are explained. These 
relations were articulated by the rampant practice of raiding and trading 
networks which had been established in Maluku even before the arrival of 
Europeans. Other Halmaheran groups, such as the Gamkonora, who had 
been subjects of Ternate Sultanate, are also addressed because from 1791 
these peoples also joined the rebel force.  
Chapters VIII and IX deal with the traders and warriors from East 
Seram who chose to follow Nuku. The East Seramese had been trading 
throughout the area long before the arrival of the VOC, and understandably 
did all they could to subvert the Dutch policy restricting the westward 
movement of their vessels.  
Chapters X and XI narrate the involvement of the English, both the 
country traders and the English East India Company (EIC), in Prince 
Nuku’s rebellion. Taking note of the mounting interests of the English in 
Maluku and their intervention in Malukan politics as early as 1785, Prince 
Nuku strove to contact the English Government in Bengkulu and in Bengal 
and finally in 1801, the newly appointed English Resident in Maluku, 
Farquhar, decided to form an alliance and conquer Ternate. 
In the concluding chapter, XII, a balance sheet is drawn of the 
significance of the rebellion and the personality of Prince Nuku in the 







This chapter elucidates the creation of VOC power in Maluku1 which was 
manifested in the presence of the three Governments of Banda, Ambon, 
and Ternate. Driven by its ultimate goal of monopolizing the world trade in 
nutmeg and cloves, the VOC exploited its military superiority to expel its 
European competitors (the Portuguese, the Spaniards, and the English) and 
to deprive Asian and local traders of their freedom of action in the area. The 
Company built a ‘state’ apparatus, and dominated the power relations and 
trade in Maluku by virtually exterminating Bandanese society, subordinating 
a number of Ambonese negeri, and subjugating the three Sultanates of 
Ternate, Tidore, and Bacan.  
 
 
European presence before the Dutch 
 
The first Europeans who imposed radical change on the Malukans during 
the sixteenth century were the Portuguese and the Spaniards. After the 
conquest of Malacca in 1511, Alfonso de Albuquerque sent three small ships 
under the command of Captain Antonio de Abreu and his Deputy-
Commander Francisco Serrão to the Spice Islands in eastern Indonesia. The 
fleet which left Malaka sometime between November 1511 and January 
1512 sailed eastwards to the islands of Buru, Ambon, and Seram. After 
having visited Banda, Serrão’s vessel, loaded with cloves, nutmegs, and 
mace, ran into stormy weather and sank. Only the commander and six or 
seven of his crewmembers survived and were taken to Ambon by local 
fishermen. Kaicili Vaidua, brother of Sultan Abu Lais of Ternate, visited 
Serrão and informed him that the Sultan invited him to come to Ternate.2 In 
a subsequent letter, Sultan Abu Lais (r. 1500-1523) entrusted the Portuguese 
King, Dom Manuel, with ’his land and all in it’. Nine years later in 1521, not 
                                               
1 For the Gouvernement Moluccos, I use the term Government of Ternate or Oranje. When I 
refer to Ternate as sultanate, I use simply the term Ternate Sultanate. 
2 The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires (London: Hakluyt Society, 1944), 215. 
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to be outdone, Sultan Mansur of Tidore also welcomed the surviving 
Spanish ships of Magellan’s expedition around the world.3 
Soon after the death of Sultan Abu Lais in 1523, the building of a 
Portuguese fortress was completed on Ternate. The longstanding ‘dualistic’ 
rivalry between Ternate and Tidore flared up again, now involving the 
Portuguese on the Ternate side and the Spaniards on the side of Tidore and 
Jailolo. In 1524 Sultan Tidore’s settlement at Marieko was destroyed during 
a Ternate-Portuguese attack. The arrival of Spanish expeditions under 
Alvaro de Saavedra in 1528 and Ruy López de Villalobos in 1543 did not 
help to strike a counterbalance. Unfortunately for Tidore, the Spaniards left 
Maluku in 1565 because they decided to devote all their resources on the 
establishment of their colony in Luzon. As a result, Ternate enjoyed the 
most advantageous political development at the time.4    
The Jailolo Sultanate, which had been known as one of the most 
powerful in Maluku, was conquered by the Ternate-Portuguese alliance in 
1551. The strong fort and well-equipped troops were of little use when the 
castle’s water source was captured and the great Sultan Katarabumi of Jailolo 
was forced to surrender. The Jailolo ruler had to relinquish his title of Sultan 
and became a sangaji under Ternate and a vassal of the King of Portugal. 
Several days of looting denuded the palace of its riches and the Sultan fled 
to the mountains. After the defeat, Jailolo lost most of its population and its 
political influence in Maluku faded. The only remnant of its greatness was its 
symbolic participation in ceremonies requiring the presence of all four 
Malukan kingdoms held in Ternate.5  
Such conquests did not imbue the relationship between Ternate and 
Portuguese with peace and harmony. It started amicably enough but soon 
conflicts broke out. In 1527, for example, Captain Dom Jorge de Meneses 
arrested Kaicili Vaidua and insulted him by smearing bacon fat on his face. 
This same Portuguese also ordered his men to ‘forage’ around Ternate. He 
cut off one sangaji’s hand and had him pulled into the sea by dogs. The most 
important pro-Portuguese Ternatan leader, Darwis, the kapiten laut, and the 
hukum were also hanged on Meneses’ orders. This led to open hostility 
between Ternate under the leadership of the Queen Mother, Boheyat (r. 
1523-1535) and the Portuguese. The tensions continued under the 
leaderships of Vicente de Fonseca in 1531, Tristão de Ataide 1533, and 
Antonio Galvão in 1536. The worst incident occurred when Captain Duarte 
de Sá arrived in 1555. He appropriated the annual Makian clove harvest 
                                               
3 Leonard Y. Andaya, The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1993), 115-6; W.A. Hanna, Indonesian Banda: 
Colonialism and Its Aftermath in the Nutmeg Islands (Philadelphia: ISHI, 1978), 6-7. 
4 Andaya, The world of Maluku, 117-118. 
5 Ibid. 130-1. 
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destined for the Sultan of Ternate and even ordered the seizure of Sultan 
Hairun (r. 1535-1570), his brother, and his mother to guarantee the loyalty 
of the Ternatans. This conduct unified the pro- and anti-Portuguese factions 
within Ternate and led to an outright war against the Portuguese who were 
allied with the remaining force of Jailolo. Ternate’s force proved superior, 
the captain was removed and Sultan Hairun was subsequently restored. The 
enmity culminated in a fever pitch after the murder of Sultan Hairun by the 
Portuguese.  
Sultan Babullah (r.1570-1583) vowed to avenge the death of his father by 
chasing all Portuguese and other Christians from the Archipelago. His 
troops seized four sampans from Moro loaded with food for the Portuguese 
fortress. He then attacked the Christianized Moro from Galela, moving 
down to the east coast of northern Halmahera killing all Portuguese, mestizos, 
and native Christians he could find. The Christian population of Bacan was 
defeated in 1571. The Sultan also laid a long siege to the Portuguese fortress 
on Ternate. During the siege only four Portuguese ships from Goa and 
Malaka managed to reach Ternate, but they failed to liberate the fortress. 
Consequently about 500 people within its walls died from illness and 
starvation. When the fortress was surrendered on 26 December 1575, only 
400 of the garrison were still alive. Most of the Portuguese and native 
Christians expelled from Ternate resettled in Ambon. Sultan Babullah kept 
only a Portuguese captain, a factor, and twelve soldiers.6 
In Ambon Antonio de Abreu and Francisco Serrão were received with 
friendship and hospitality in the Hitu region in 1512. At the beginning these 
foreigners were not seen as a threat to the local situation.7 After a short stay, 
they left again for Ternate, Tidore, and Banda to collect spices. For the time 
being Hitu was merely a port of call at which to victual. Only in 1525 did the 
Portuguese receive permission to build a house on the north coast of Hitu as 
a reward for promised aid against a threatened attack from Seram. But 
things went wrong shortly afterwards. The Portuguese were felt to threaten 
the independence of Hitu because they wanted to build a fort and impose 
their own rules. Most of the leaders of Hitu opposed these plans and even 
advised the Portuguese to settle among their old enemies, the inhabitants of 
Leitimor.8 The Hituese went as far as to call in the help of the princes of 
                                               
6 Ibid. 131-4. See also Hubert Jacobs S.J., Documenta Malucensia, II:1577-1606, (Rome: Jesuit 
Historical Institute, 1980), 9. 
7 Z.J. Manusama, Historie en sociale structuur van Hitu (Utrecht: Moluks Historische Museum, 
2004), 64. 
8 The other reason for the conflict was the rivalry within the Four Perdana leaders of Hitu. 
Jamilu, one of them, was granted title capitão or Kapiten Hitu by the Portuguese. This 
shattered the principle of collegiality  between the Four Perdana. Consequently, Jamilu was 
expelled from Hitulama and he established a new group. Jamilu died in 1569 in the 
fortress of Duarte de Meneses. See Manusama, Historie en sociale structuur van Hitu, 64-5. 
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Jepara in Java and in 1539 they drove the Portuguese overland to the 
northern shore of the bay between Hitu and Leitimor.9  
In Leitimor the Portuguese were welcomed as allies by the inhabitants. 
The Portuguese Jesuit missionary Francis Xavier, who considered the 
inhabitants non-believers, immediately set to work to convert them to 
Christianity. A church was built on the beach and large crosses were erected 
in seven villages in Leitimor. In 1547 the first Jesuit priest settled 
permanently in Ambon and managed to baptize 600 people. But then the 
Islamic Hituese, who were afraid of the massive Christianization, attacked 
Leitimor and the Portuguese with the aid of Javanese auxiliaries and the 
expeditionary forces of Sultan Babullah of Ternate. This put the people in 
Leitimor in need of even more protection by the Portuguese who remained 
in Leitimor and continued their religious mission. Large numbers of people 
— whole villages on occasion - had themselves baptized together. One 
missionary father claimed to have converted 10,000 and in another report 
even 40,000 people to Christianity.10 
In 1575 the number of Portuguese in Ambon increased as a result of the 
expulsion by Sultan Babullah of most of the Portuguese from Ternate. A 
new Portuguese fortress was built in 1576. The Portuguese and the Christian 
Ambonese of Leitimor and Hatiwe were put under pressure by the Muslim 
allies of the Ternate Sultanate. In 1590 a fleet consisting of thirty kora-kora,11 
manned by 3,000 men, launched assaults on many Christian villages. The 
position of the Ambonese missions improved with the arrival of a large fleet 
under Admiral Andrea Furtado de Mendoza in 1602. In a very short time 
Hitu was conquered. The old Captain Hitu was executed and the leading 
chiefs fled to West Seram. But the authority of Portuguese was abruptly 
ended when the Portuguese commander, Caspar de Melo, surrendered his 
fortress to the Dutch under Steven van der Haghen without a fight in 1605. 
                                               
9 J. Keuning, ‘Ambonese, Portuguese and Dutchmen: the history of Ambon to the end of 
the seventeenth century,’ in Meilink-Roelofsz, Opstall, and Schutte (eds.), Dutch authors on 
Asian history (Leiden: KITLV, 1988), 368. 
10 Ibid. 368-9. 
11 “Korakora is a vessel generally fitted with out-riggers, with a high arched stem and stern, 
like the point of a half moon. They are used by the inhabitants of the Moluccan islands 
chiefly, and the Dutch have fleets of them at Amboina, which they employ as guarda 
costas. They have them from a very small size, to above ten tons burden; and on the cross 
pieces which support the out-riggers, there fore and aft planks, on which the people sit 
and paddle, beside those who sit in the vessel on each gunnel. In smooth water they can 
be paddled very fast, as many hands may be employed in different ranks or rows. They are 
steered with two commodities, (broad paddles) and not with a rudder. When they are high 
out of the water, they use oars; but, on the out-riggers, they always use paddles. Frequent 
mention is made of korakora in the history of Ambon.” See Thomas Forrest, A Voyage to 
the New Guinea and the Maluku, 1774-1776 (London: G. Scott, 1779), 23. 
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The Dutch were much too strong. This ended the Portuguese presence on 
the Ambon islands.12 
During the presence of the Portuguese in Ternate and Ambon, conflicts 
were the order of the day. The problems stemmed not only from conflicting 
interests between the Portuguese and the Ternatans and Ambonese about 
exclusive clove cultivation and trade, it also developed into a clash between 
Islam and Christianity when the Portuguese started to convert the local 
population to Christianity. These clashes were indubitably powered by a 
distinct gap in cultural worldview between them, but were fuelled by already 
existing local rivalries which further crystallized as a result of the 
introduction of Islam and Christianity. When the Portuguese were forced to 
leave Fortress St John on Ternate in 1575, they re-established themselves 
under the command of Captain Sancho de Vasconcelos in Tidore in 1578, 
accepting the invitation of Sultan Tidore Gapibaguna (or Iskandar Sani?) to 
do so. However the Portuguese fortress on Tidore was also abandoned after 
the joint attack on Tidore by Sultan Said of Ternate and the Dutch in 1605.13  
 
 
Establishing monopoly and the making of VOC power 
 
Fluctuating Portuguese supplies of pepper and spices in Europe during the 
late 1580s and the early 1590s coinciding with the withdrawal of the 
Portuguese merchants from Antwerp were an incentive for the Dutch 
merchants to undertake their early voyages to the Indies. The first voyage at 
least was more of a defensive nature than the outcome of what be termed a 
‘commercial strategy’. If the Dutch had not undertaken it and sought to 
compete with the Portuguese, the English might very well have done so 
instead.14 The sack of Antwerp by Spanish army in 1585, which was 
followed by the immigration of the southern Netherlanders with their capital 
to the Northern Netherlands, created a significant boost to the trade 
expansion of the Dutch Republic. It also allowed a relatively fast take-off of 
the Dutch trade to the East Indies. Knowledge of Asian routes was no 
longer the prerogative of the Portuguese thanks to the geographer Petrus 
Plancius and reports of those who had visited Asia in Portuguese service. 
                                               
12 Ibid. 370-1. 
13 Concerning the name of the Sultan, there is difference between Andaya who writes that 
in the year 1578 the Sultan was Gapibaguna but, according to De Clercq (1890: 150-187), 
the Sultan at that time was Iskandar Sani (r.1569-1586). Gapibaguna became Sultan later 
(r. 1586-1599). Jacobs does not mention the name. See Jacobs, Documenta Malucensia, 3, 9; 
Hanna and Alwi, Ternate dan Tidore, 12-15; Andaya, The world of Maluku, 114-132.  
14 F. Braudel, Perspective of the world (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 216; See 
also Valentijn, Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indiën, I, 78-81.   
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The Itinerario by Jan Huyghen van Linschoten, the former of the secretary 
of the Bishop of Goa did indeed serve as an itinerary to the Orient.15  
The first expedition of four ships of the Compagnie van Verre of 
Amsterdam to Asia under Cornelis de Houtman and Gerrit van Beuningen, 
which left in 1595 and returned in 1597, was not a profitable venture but it 
showed that trade with Asia was a promising proposition.16 In the years 
which followed, Dutch shipping to Asia developed tremendously. Within a 
decade sixty-five ships spread over fifteen fleets were sent out. During the 
same period, the Portuguese sent only forty-six ships.17 The Dutch had to 
contend with the Portuguese as well as the Spanish who were based in 
Manila and also active in the Maluku, hanging on to Tidore until 1663. Nor 
were these the only lurking commercial threat, the English tended to appear 
on the scene and follow the Dutch wherever they went, but without ever 
displaying signs of having any overall strategy. After Drake (1578) and 
Lancaster (1592) had circumnavigated the globe, the English created a 
chartered East India Company in 1600. The English initially focused on the 
Indian Ocean but also maintained trade factories in the Indonesian 
Archipelago. Last but not least, ethnic groups of such Asian merchants as 
Ottomans, Armenians, Javanese, Chinese, Bengalis, Arabs, Persians, and 
Muslims from Gujarat who were active in the Archipelago should be 
mentioned. Since the Portuguese dominated the Straits of Malaka, the main 
thoroughfare between the Indian Ocean and the China Sea, the Dutch set 
themselves the extremely difficult task of wrestling control of Malaka from 
the hands of the Portuguese. Notwithstanding the Dutch attacks against 
Portuguese positions in Asia, pepper and spices continued to be shipped 
directly to Lisbon in the 1630s. Only the fall of Malaka in 1641 dealt a 
mortal blow to the Portuguese empire in this part of Monsoon Asia.18 
The Early Dutch Companies could be termed one-off enterprises 
because they were set up for just one expedition, and hence accumulated 
capital for one expedition at a time. However, there was continuity in the 
boards of directors because the merchants in charge or the directors 
sponsored successive expeditions. The initiators and the directors collected 
the necessary capital, which was provided not only by themselves but also by 
other participants. In November 1601, the Secretary of State of the Dutch 
Republic, Johan van Oldebarneveld succeeded in convincing the directors of 
the already existing Dutch companies trading with Asia to found a ‘United 
                                               
15 E. van Veen, Decay of defeat? An inquiry into the Portuguese decline in Asia 1580-1645 (Leiden: 
CNWS, 2000), 142-6, 228; Femme S. Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company (Zutphen: 
Walburg Pers, 2003), 15-7. 
16 Braudel, Perspective of the world, 211-2. 
17 Veen, Decay of defeat?, 142-6, 228; Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, 15-17. 
18 Braudel, Perspective of the world, 214, 216. 
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East India Company’ with a special monopolistic charter for the trade East 
of the Cape of Good Hope issued by the States-General of the Netherlands. 
The Dutch United East India Company or Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie 
(VOC) was officially inaugurated on 20 March 1602. The initial idea was that 
the charter for the VOC should last twelve years. Two or three times a year 
the participating chambers chose representatives, who attended meetings 
lasting several weeks at a time in Amsterdam or in Middleburg in order to 
prepare the fleets and determine a central policy. Eight Amsterdam directors 
joined by four from Zeeland and one each of the smaller chambers sat in the 
meetings of the so-called Gentlemen Seventeen.19  
The VOC trade establishments in Asia were manned by Company 
servants whose number gradually increased to 16,000 in the course of the 
eighteenth century. More than half of the Company personnel was military 
and protected the various settlements. The High Government consisting of 
a Governor-General, seconded by the Council of the Indies, governed all 
possessions in Asia. Directly below this central administration: governors 
enjoyed certain territorial authority in the larger colonies such as Formosa, 
Ceylon, and Maluku; directors administered important trading offices; 
commanders were entrusted with the many military duties; residents and 
officers were in charge of smaller establishments. The central junction or a 
‘rendez-vous’ of this vast intra-Asian trading network was Batavia which had 
been founded in 1619 on the north-west coast of Java, located strategically 
close to the Sunda Strait, the other conventional thoroughfare between East 
and West Asia in addition to the Strait of Malaka. The High Government, 
the highest administrative body was lodged in Batavia Castle. The 
Governor-General and the Council were responsible for reporting all the 
activities of the Company in the so-called ‘generale missiven’ to the 
Gentlemen Seventeen in patria.20  
The Charter of 1602 permitted the VOC to build forts, appoint 
governors, billet soldiers, and make treaties with foreign powers in Asia - all 
in the name of the States-General of the Dutch Republic. It was meant to be 
a restricted mandate and the VOC was considered an executive instrument 
of the States-General in Asia. In practice, however, the States-General had 
little direct control: the instructions to the Governor-General had to be 
approved by the States-General and the highest VOC official swore an oath 
in the presence of the States-General, but these rules were very soon 
ignored; it was also expected that commanders returning from Asia would 
                                               
19 Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, 20-1; Idem, VOC Organization, www.tanap.net. 
20 Els M. Jacobs, Koopman in Azië: de handel van de VOC tijdens de 18de eeuw (Zutphen: 
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report on the situation in Asia.21 In actual fact, the High Government had a 
great deal of freedom and the late arrival of instructions from the Republic 
which took months to reach Batavia provided a ready-made excuse. 
Governor-General and Council had to take important measures and make 
decisions for the Company without having time to consult the authorities at 
home. Therefore, the smooth functioning of the Council of the Indies 
depended enormously on the personal quality of the members and their 
mutual relationships. The Council sent its instructions to the establishments 
where the local Policy Council (Raad van Politie) executed the assignments.22 
As fine spices and pepper were the primary reason for the Dutch to sail 
to Asia, they concentrated their attention on the Indonesian Archipelago 
where most of the spices originated. The first fleet of the VOC sailed on 18 
December 1603: twelve heavily armed ships under the command of Steven 
van der Haghen. The strategy of the VOC in Asia was clear. In 1603 the 
States-General advised the Gentlemen Seventeen to send fewer ships to the 
Indies ‘but sail with bigger vessels, well manned and armed, so that they 
cannot only trade freely, but also do damage to the enemy in those quarters 
and protect the people with whom they are trading …’23 Van der Haghen 
received an instruction from the Gentlemen Seventeen stating that: ‘We are 
obliged to take the offensive, in any manner whatsoever, against the 
Spaniards, Portuguese and their allies.’24 The term ‘allies’ could cover anyone: 
Ternatans, Ambonese, Bandanese, or Tidorans.  
In his monograph on the VOC, Gaastra argues that the aggression of the 
VOC was primarily directed against the Portuguese rather than the Asian 
peoples.25 For the directors, expansion in Asia was secondary to economic 
motives, but the ambitions of the ‘men on the spot’ sometimes surpassed 
this and as the power and prestige of the VOC in Asia grew, so too did the 
gap between the directors and their subordinates overseas.26 In my view, 
whether the expansion motive was primary or secondary was fairly 
immaterial as far as the Dutch impact on the Eastern Indonesians is 
concerned. Right from the outset the directors in Patria advised their 
subordinates to ‘do damage to the enemy’, not only the Portuguese and the 
Spaniards but also their allies. By 1605 the Dutch had captured the 
Portuguese fortress in Ambon, and were harassing Portuguese ships in the 
                                               
21 Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, 23; Valentijn, Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indiën, I [1862], 
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22 Jacobs, Koopman in Azië, 14; Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, 37-9. 
23 W. A. Hanna and D. Alwi, Ternate dan Tidore : Masa Lampau Penuh Gejolak (Jakarta: 
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25 Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, 37-9. 
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Malaka Straits.27 Later the Dutch virtually exterminated and expelled what 
remained of the Bandanese population from its incredibly spice-rich islands. 
In Banda, Ambon, and Ternate, confident in the superiority of their military 
prowess, the Dutch did not eschew violence in the imposition of their 
power at the cost of the local leaders and their people. 
Gaastra and Andaya have argued that, despite the superior Dutch 
weaponry, the local peoples knew how to take advantage of better local 
knowledge and more mobility on land, and they had a greater resistance to 
local diseases.28 However, particularly in Banda, Ternate, Tidore, and 
Ambon, it should be noted that most of political and trading power centres 
at that time were located in the coastal areas. Consequently naval power was 
more decisive than power on land. Even though the local populations had 
the advantage of being numerically superior, they were polarized in small 
social units and operated under restricted leadership. In short, mere 
numerical superiority did not make a significant difference as long as these 
people were not allied and acting under one supreme command. Therefore, 
by any standard, the superiority of Dutch weapons and its better 
organization allowed the Company to impose its will by hegemonic use of 





The Banda Archipelago consists of six islands, of which Lonthor and nearby 
Neira are the biggest. According to Tomé Pires, in the sixteenth century 
Javanese and Malay Muslim traders used to anchor in the roadstead of Neira 
to collect spices. Three other islands, Ai, Run, and Lonthor (Bomcagy), had 
no protected anchorages. The sixth island, Nailaka, did not have any 
commercial crop to trade but produced small amounts of sago. The 
inhabitants brought the nutmeg and mace to Neira in exchange for Gujarati 
clothes. At that time the population were estimated at only 3,000 people. In 
the sixteenth century, these islands produced about five to 600 bahars of 
mace and about 7,000 bahars of nutmeg every year. Cloves, imported from 
North Maluku and Amboina (a fortnight’s sail to the north), were also 
traded here, as were sago, birds of paradise and other products. At the 
beginning of the seventeenth century the islanders began to enjoy more 
                                               
27 Braudel, Perspective of the world, 213. 
28 Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, 37; L. Y. Andaya, ‘De militaire alliantie tussen de 
Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie en de Buginezen,’ in G.J. Knaap and G. Teitler 
(eds.), Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tussen oorlog en diplomatie (Leiden: KITLV, 2002), 289-
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wealth than ever before because of the rising price of spices.29 The 
Bandanese had no king, but were ruled by a kongsi of orangkaya and elders. 
When Serrão reached Banda in 1512, he obtained nutmeg and mace by 
trading them peaceably for cloth. When these were brought to the market in 
Lisbon, the Portuguese enjoyed at least a 1,000 per cent profit. In earlier 
times these spices had been locally purchased by Malay, Chinese, and Arab 
regional traders, reshipped to the Persian Gulf, carried by caravan to the 
Mediterranean, and distributed via Constantinople, Genoa, or Venice. 
Despite its treasure trove, for almost a century Banda enjoyed the relative 
indifference of the Portuguese merchants in East Indonesian waters, 
because the latter decided to settle on Ternate.30 In 1529 Captain Garcia 
attempted to build a fortress on Neira but soon abandoned his project 
leaving it unfinished. For supplies of Banda nutmeg and mace, the 
Portuguese relied on regional traders who carried these spices to Ternate 
and Tidore.31 
Winds of radical change began to blow in Banda when a Dutch ship the 
Geldria under Captain Jacob van Heemskerk carrying 200 merchants, 
soldiers, and sailors arrived on 15 March 1599. The ship belonged to the 
Dutch fleet under Admiral Jacob van Neck who had been instructed to 
circumvent the Iberian traders in the area. Van Heemskerk visited Ambon 
briefly and then proceeded to Banda.32 Despite adverse circumstances, he 
managed to gain the confidence of the Bandanese and built a lodge to store 
the spices and other trading goods. Twenty-two Dutchmen were left behind 
on Banda to collect spices.33 The price of spices rose immediately: nutmeg 
from 6.45 real per bahaar (525 Dutch pounds) to 9 real; mace from 60 to 95 
real. In 1600 Steven van der Hagen called at Banda briefly and then sailed on 
to Ambon. Soon the Dutch on Banda fell into dispute with the locals, not 
only over prices but also over women, religion, and weapons.34  
The first English expedition consisting of seven ships under Captain 
James Lancaster arrived in Banda 1601. Lancaster built small factories on 
both Banda and Ternate. In the Banda Archipelago the English chose to 
settle on the island of Run. Ten miles west of Neira, this factory was not in 
the immediate vicinity of hostile Dutch, Portuguese, and Asian traders. An 
outpost was also established on the island of Ai. In 1602, the Dutch admiral, 
Wolfert Hermansz, alternately bullying or ignoring the English, pressurized 
                                               
29 The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires (London: Hakluyt Society, 1944), 205-209. 
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32 Ibid. 36. 
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the Bandanese into granting the Dutch the exclusive rights to the purchase 
of nutmeg and mace. Intimidated, some orangkaya signed an irrevocable 
contract with him on 23 May 1602. In return the Dutch promised to provide 
protection from the English and the Portuguese. Hermansz left directly 
afterwards and there was no further enforcement of the contract. This time 
only ten Dutch men remained in Banda. In the space of three years this logies 
seems to have vanished.35 
The next Dutch expedition, a fleet of thirteen vessels and at least 1,500 
men under Admiral Steven van der Haghen, arrived in Maluku in 1605. Van 
der Haghen was instructed to expel both the Portuguese and the English 
from the Archipelago. He first seized the Portuguese fort in Ambon and 
then headed for Banda. Again a contract was drawn up with the Bandanese, 
renewing the one that Hermansz had concluded earlier. Van der Haghen left 
as many men as he could spare before leaving again for Ambon. The 
factories were re-opened and the trade was re-established but an effective 
monopoly was still a mirage.36 
In April 1609 Admiral Pieter Willemsz Verhoeff sailed to Banda with 
fifteen ships, carrying 1,000 sailors and soldiers, predominantly Dutch, but 
among them also some Japanese mercenaries. With this intimidating force, 
Verhoeff imposed his will on the orangkaya of Lonthor to sell nutmeg 
exclusively to the Dutch at a price lower than the English had offered.37 The 
arrival of the great Dutch force reminded the Bandanese of a prophecy 
which foretold the arrival of an army of fair-haired, light-skinned, fully clad 
strangers who would attempt to conquer the islands. To make matters 
worse, Gunung Api was spewing hot ash, which was taken as an evil 
portent. The prophecy was thought to have been fulfilled when Verhoeff 
forced Bandanese labourers to commence building a fort (called Nassau 
later) on Neira Island. Soon afterwards, determined to push the Dutch off 
their islands, the Bandanese laid an ambush and killed Verhoeff and thirty-
three of his companions.38  
The English Captain William Keeling who arrived in February 1609 with 
his ship the Hector stalked the Dutch in many ports. He was cordially 
received by the Bandanese on Neira and Lonthor.39 To avenge the killing of 
Verhoeff, Admiral Simon Jansz Hoen tried to retaliate by sending several 
punitive expeditions. Eventually he managed to blockade the Bandanese 
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coastal waters in order to obstruct the import of food stuffs and the escape 
by the sea by the islanders. On 13 August 1609 a number of orangkaya were 
forced to sign a contract regulating the delivery of nutmeg-mace and control 
over the islands,40 but on the very day it was signed, the Bandanese began to 
violate the contract. They diverted the nutmeg and mace to the English on 
Ai and Run who then shipped these deliveries on a fleet of pinnaces and 
chartered vessels to Makassar or Bantam.41  
On 17 July 1619 a treaty of co-operation was signed in London between 
The Netherlands and England, whereby the English would obtain one-third 
and the Dutch two-thirds of the spice trade. But matters worked out 
differently in practice. On 1 January 1621, when Governor-General Jan 
Pieterszoon Coen requested the English to assemble a one-third share of the 
ships for the final invasion of Banda, the English baulked. On 27 February 
1621, Coen arrived – without the English – at Fort Nassau in Banda with a 
fleet of thirteen large ships, three yachts, and thirty-six smaller vessels. His 
task force numbered 1,655 Europeans (no fewer than 150 died of illness 
during the voyage), to which he could add the 250 men of the Banda 
garrison. Coen also brought along with him 286 Javanese convicts to serve 
as rowers and porters, and about one hundred Japanese mercenaries. 
Everything was prepared to invade Banda and ‘punish’ the Bandanese.42  
Soon Coen’s soldiers began to wreak havoc on the Bandanese, who now 
tried to negotiate a peace. On Lonthor villages were razed and burned. Eight 
hundred and eighty-three inhabitants (287 men, 356 women, and 240 
children, of whom 176 died on board ship) were shipped off to Batavia 
where they were sold as slaves. Those who fled into the mountain area to 
escape the mayhem died by the hundreds of exposure, starvation, and 
disease. Other Bandanese fled overseas and reached Seram, Kei, and Aru. 
Of the population which had been estimated at 15,000 people, no more than 
1,000 seem to have survived in the Archipelago. The most prominent 
leaders of Banda, forty-four orangkaya, were seized, chained, and confined on 
board Coen’s flagship awaiting execution.43 A Dutch naval lieutenant, 
Nicolas van Waert told how Japanese soldiers were ordered to behead the 
orangkaya on 8 May 1621. They all died silently except for one who said, 
’Sirs, have you then no mercy?’44 After the English factories on Lonthor and 
Run had also been seized, all of Banda had been conquered. Coen was 
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reprimanded by the Gentlemen XVII for his brutal behaviour but all the 
same was given a gratuity of 3,000 guilders for his conquest of the islands.45 
‘Indigenous’ Bandanese society now was almost extinct. In 1636 the 
native population numbered no more than 560 persons, as against 539 
Dutch and 834 free aliens. The VOC created perkeniers, concessionaires, who 
were obliged to produce and deliver nutmeg and mace to replace the 
Bandanese planters. These perkeniers were Dutch free burghers from Batavia 
and Ambon. For manual labour, the Dutch imported slaves from Papua, 
Maluku and elsewhere.46 The Banda Archipelago (Lonthor, Neira, and Ai) 
were divided into sixty-eight perken (park or garden) for thirty-four to sixty-
eight perkeniers. In theory every perk employed twenty-five slaves. All in all, 
there were around 1,900 slaves at work on Banda. The problem of 
monopolizing nutmeg and mace had now been solved. Production and 
delivery could be controlled and the price could be fixed with ease. The 
main function of the administration now was to protect the perken from 
foreign threats, and to assure that the whole system of production and 
delivery of nutmeg and mace ran according to plan.47 From that time Banda 





The Ambon Islands consisted of Hitu-Leitimor, Saparua, Haruku, and Nusa 
Laut. These islands are located off the south-west coast of the island of 
Seram. In the sixteenth century, traders who wanted to sail to North Maluku 
made landfall here first.48 On 23 February 1605 the VOC fleet of twelve 
ships under Steven van der Haghen conquered the Portuguese Fortress 
Nossa Senhora da Anunciada on Ambon, Leitimor. This meant in terms of 
contemporary European logic that the Ambonese who had formerly been 
under Portuguese authority simply became the subjects of the VOC. As 
Knaap puts it, ”The VOC gained the sovereignty over this area and thus 
could arrange the administration as it wished.’49 Therefore the VOC 
developed a type of governance geared towards interest in developing and 
maintaining the monopoly system. All the subjects of the VOC were obliged 
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to deliver the cloves to the warehouse of the VOC at a fixed price.50 To 
stake its claim on the cloves, which were produced outside of its ‘authority’, 
the VOC concluded ‘contracts’, actual agreements, with local authorities. In 
these contracts, the producers of the cloves had to deliver all of them to the 
VOC at a fixed price. In return, the VOC promised to protect them from 
any renewed Iberian ‘aggression’. In 1599 when Admiral Van Warwijck 
appeared at Ambon and made a contract with ‘independent’ Hitu, the threat 
of the Portuguese still existed. At that time Ambon could be categorized 
into two entities: the Ternate dominion and the non-Ternate dominion. In 
1605, after the conquest of Portuguese-occupied Ambon, the contract with 
Hitu was renewed. A similar contract was concluded with Hoamoal through 
Ternate in 1607. In the following years the clove price increased because of 
the high demand in Europe. In 1599 the price was still 35 real per bahar (550 
pounds). It rose to 50 real in 1610 and 70 real in 1620. In the VOC 
regulations, the price was fixed at 56 real per bahar and paid in money or 
goods in kind such as textiles, gongs, rice and the like. The rub was that 
from other traders, such producers could expect payment in cash and the 
price 50 per cent higher than the VOC price.51  
When the producers of the cloves demanded higher prices and the VOC 
refused, the former tried to sell to third parties. In order to prevent this, the 
VOC used force. Between 1624 and 1658, a series of wars was waged 
between the VOC and the inhabitants of Hitu and Hoamoal on Ambon and 
Seram. These so-called Ambonse Oorlogen, were not always about the delivery 
of cloves, compulsory or corvee labour was another point of friction. During 
1636-1637, even the local Christian people of Amboina revolted because 
they had to bear the heavy burden of compulsory labour in the hongi 
expeditions and suffered from general bad treatment. Through the personal 
mediation of Governor-General Van Diemen the relationship with the 
Christians was re-established. During the years 1640-1650 the VOC subdued 
the independent Ambonese ‘states’ and those which were vassals of the 
Ternate Sultanate. In fact they had mounted resistance against their own 
Sultan who requested the Company to govern them ‘in his name’. After the 
death of Sultan Hamzah, Sultan Mandarsyah, his successor, was persuaded 
                                               
50 Idem, ‘Kora-kora en kruitdamp: De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in oorlog en 
vrede in Ambon,’ in Knaap and Teitler (eds.), De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, 258; 
Idem, Kruidnagelen en christenen, 21, 23. 
51 Ibid. 24; J. Keuning, ‘Ambonese, Portuguese and Dutchmen: the history of Ambon to 
the end of the seventeenth century,’ in Meilink-Roelofsz, Opstall, and Schutte (eds.), Dutch 
authors on Asian history (Leiden: KITLV, 1988), 377. 
THE VOC IN MALUKU 
 
25
by the Dutch to continue this arrangement because the Dutch feared the 
palpably growing involvement of Makassar traders in the spice trade.52 
The actions against Luhu in 1625 and Lusiela in 1637 provide ample 
material to extrapolate a pattern of the VOC tactics in warfare. A raid used 
to begin with an initial bombardment with ships’ canon. This was followed 
by an assault by storm, in the first case involving about 800 Europeans and 
1,000 Ambonese; and in the second, 1,500 Europeans. The usual operational 
unit employed in the field by the Dutch was a company of sixty to seventy 
men. Using another strategy, the strike force of the VOC on Hoamoal in 
1625 burned down the abandoned settlements on a large scale, destroyed 
hundreds of prahu on the coast, chopped down 10,000 clove trees, and 
destroyed other cash crops of the inhabitants. A similar pattern of tactics 
was also applied on Manipa and Kelang in 1651 and again in 1653, and on 
the coast of Buru in 1652. The casualties in the opposing groups of 
inhabitants ranged from 100 men at Loki to 700 men at Laala. At Laala, 
around 400 women, children, and older people were captured and treated as 
slaves.53  
To suppress the overproduction of cloves, in May 1650 the Governor of 
Ambon, Arnold de Vlaming, submitted a proposal to limit production to 
Hoamoal. This was rejected out of hand because it was believed that the 
demand for cloves was so huge that whatever the amount produced, it could 
still find a market. Under Kimelaha Majira, Hoamoal rebelled against the 
VOC and the Sultan of Ternate, Mandarsyah, in 1651. Fighting continued in 
Hoamoal until 1656 and on Buru until 1658. Despite the support of the 
Makassarese, the rebellion which is known as the Hoamoalse Oorlog was 
eventually suppressed by the superior military and naval might of the VOC. 
Under the terms of the spice extirpation policy, the local inhabitants 
obtained nothing for this assistance because all compensation went to the 
Sultan of Ternate personally. The people of Hoamoal and those thought to 
be ‘rebels’ forfeited their rights. After the war, the ‘cultivation’ of clove was 
limited to Ambon, Haruku, Saparua, and the Nusalaut Islands. The VOC 
decreed that all other trees had to be destroyed. When these prolonged 
armed conflicts finally drew to an end, the monopoly on the export of 
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cloves was at last realized but had to be guaranteed by an armed peace 
(gewapende vrede).54 
In the second half of the century, the military and naval power of the 
VOC was restricted mostly to patrols and inspection. However, expeditions 
were occasionally launched against villages in East Seram. In 1659 two hongi 
expeditions were deployed to these remote areas and in 1660 yet another 
had to be dispatched because the inhabitants were still stubbornly opposing 
the efforts of the Company to limit their trade relations with the outside 
world. The ‘normal pattern’ of tactics was repeated: Villages were burned 
down and the vessels of the local people beached on the coast were 
demolished. Finally, the people of East Seram were also forced into 
submission and made to recognize the VOC as their overlord, which meant 
acceptance of a limitation in their trading relations with Makassar. Despite 
the fact that the VOC punitive expedition aroused great fear among the 
people of East Seram, undaunted some of their leaders and traders 
continued their business with the outside world or foreign traders whenever 
they had opportunity to do so. Should a punitive hongi expedition of the 
Ambon Governor approach their villages, they abandoned these but 
returned as soon as the hongi had gone. Those who did not want to have 
trouble with the Company or pretended to be loyal and submissive came on 




Ternate and Tidore 
 
The North Maluku areas – Ternate, Tidore, Bacan, Makian, and Motir – 
were also centres of clove production in the sixteenth century. At the 
beginning of that century these five islands produced 6,000 bahars of cloves 
per year: Ternate 150; Tidore 1,400; Motir 1,200; Makian 1,500; Bacan 500 
bahars and the remainder from other areas. The cloves from Tidore and 
Motir were brought to Makian which was in a manner of speaking the 
subject of Tidore. In contrast to Ternate and Bacan, Tidore was hampered 
as it had no good ports. All rulers or sultans of these islands were linked by 
ties of kinship. For example, Sultan Bacan, Yusuf (Cuçuf), was a half-
brother of Sultan Ternate, Abu Lais. The ruler of Makian, Ucem, was a first 
cousin of Sultan Tidore, Mansyur (Almançor). During this particular period 
the most powerful sultanates were Ternate and Tidore which were 
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embroiled in interminable rivalry.56 The arrival of the European traders 
hungry for cloves was inevitably bound to bring about significant changes in 
North Maluku.    
Learning from his bad experiences with the Portuguese, sometime 
before 1599 Sultan Said of Ternate sent a letter to Prince Maurice of Orange 
in Holland to offer friendship and promise the ‘fruits of his lands’ 
exclusively to the Dutch. When the first Dutch ships arrived at Ternate in 
1599, Sultan Said immediately opened up the door to sealing an alliance. He 
granted permission to collect spices, precious stones, and pearls and showed 
off his military might to convince the Dutch of his worthiness as an ally.57 In 
1605, after having seized the Portuguese fort in Ambon, the Dutch forces 
joined Ternate in an attack against the Portuguese on Tidore. The 
Portuguese forces were no match for the fleet of nine Dutch ships 
reinforced by their Ternatan allies and had to surrender. Lack of manpower 
caused the VOC to decide to demolish the Portuguese fortress.58   
On 26 March 1606, a Spanish expedition from Manila, composed of a 
total of 3,095 men, supported by Tidore and Bacan, attacked Ternate. The 
Ternatans were overwhelmed and their fortress fell into hands of the 
Spaniards. Sultan Said and the entire Ternate government were sent into 
exile in Manila. The rulers of Ternate, Tidore, Bacan, Siau and others now 
were forced to swear their allegiance to the King of Spain, to whom they 
promised to deliver all their cloves. Despite this acknowledgement of 
vassalage, the Spaniards suspected that the Ternatans were just biding their 
time waiting for the Dutch return and indeed Kaicili Ali was sent to Bantam 
to notify the Dutch of the Spanish conquest and to ask them for help.59 On 
29 March 1607 a Ternatan envoy met Admiral Cornelis Matelieff and was 
given assurances that the Dutch would send a force to expel the Spaniards 
from the island. Only two months later, on 13 May 1607, a fleet of six ships 
and two yachts carrying 530 Dutchmen and fifty Ambonese arrived in 
Ternate. But Sultan Muzaffar, who was expected to provide 2,000 men, only 
managed to raise a couple of hundred. Instead of launching an attack, 
Matelieff decided prudence was the better part of valour and contented 
himself with establishing forts alongside those of the Spaniards. Within a 
few years, Dutch forts were established at Malayu, Toloko, Takome, and 
Kalamata on Ternate. On Motir Fort Nassau was erected, on Bacan Fort 
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Barneveldt, on Moti fortress Tabalola, and another fortress on Tidore and 
Halmahera. Fort Oranje at Malayu, close to the palace of Ternate, became 
the regional headquarters.60  
The rivalry and open contest of force between Tidore and its Spanish 
allies pitted against Ternate and the Dutch turned out to be a protracted 
business. Occasional skirmishes occurred in 1608 in Halmahera and in 1614 
on Tidore. This time ‘Fortuna’ favoured the side of Ternate. The skirmishes 
usually ended with a Dutch-Ternatan victory thanks to their naval 
superiority and led to a subsequent jockeying for advantage in the location 
of forts. Ultimately, in 1662 the Spanish authorities in Manila decided to 
abandon their Maluku garrisons.61 Then the VOC was the only European 
force left in Maluku. 
Dutch intervention in the internal affairs of the Ternate Sultanate started 
long before the departure of the Spaniards. The Company deposed Sultan 
Muzaffar in 1627 suspecting that he was involved in a plot with the 
Spaniards, and put in his place Sultan Hamzah (r. 1627-1648) who had been 
‘educated’ in how to rule by the Spaniards during his exile in the Philippines. 
This new Sultan tended to use force and levy fines rather than resorting to 
the more traditional methods of marriage, gifts, and persuasion in dealing 
with the lords of the land. When Hitu resisted him in 1644, he demanded 
the Dutch assist him and ’to govern all groups in my name.’ Sultan Hamzah 
was the first Sultan of Ternate to involve the Dutch in the government of 
the territories of the Ternate Sultanate. Andaya deems this precedent to have 
been ‘a legacy which came to haunt later rulers.’ Afterwards Dutch 
intervention in the internal power struggle of Ternate Sultanate became a 
common phenomenon.62 
Overproduction of cloves in Maluku depressed the profits in Europe. 
Sultan Mandarsyah of Ternate, whose throne was at stake assailed by the 
opposition of three powerful families, sought safety with the Dutch (1651-
1653), and was ready to sign a treaty with the Company on 31 July 1652 
which inaugurated the spice eradication (extirpatie) policy. In exchange for 
annual payments, he promised to fell and destroy all clove trees on Ternate 
and other areas under his authority. A similar policy was also applied in 
Ternate’s dependencies in the Ambon region. From now onwards 
production was limited to areas under direct Dutch rule. In compensation 
for the loss of revenue an annual recognition (recognitie penningen) of Rds 
12,000 was given to the Sultan, Rds 500 to Kaicili Kalamata, and a total sum 
of Rds 1,500 to be divided among the bobato. The Dutch delivered the 
money to the Sultan who in turn supplied the bobato with their allotted 
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share.63 The grip of the Dutch power over Ternate was strengthened in 1683 
when, after a few years of resistance, Sultan Amsterdam had to sign a 
contract in which Ternate Sultanate became the vassal of the Company.  
Five years before the Spaniards decided to leave Tidore, Sultan Saifudin 
of Tidore had already begun to make overtures of friendship with the Dutch 
Governor of Ternate, Simon Cos. Ten years later, on 29 March 1667, a 
written contract was signed according to which the Sultan had to eradicate 
all cloves and nutmegs growing in his territory. Henceforth all Tidorans had 
to obtain a permit from the Governor to sail outside the Maluku region. No 
more foreign traders or forces were allowed to maintain contact with Tidore. 
Moreover the appointment of a new ruler had to be approved by the 
Company and a Company servant was to join as a member of Tidore’s 
governing council. In return, Sultan Tidore obtained yearly a recognition 
payment of 3,000 real.64 The status of the bond was made clear. The Dutch 
became schut- en beschermheer, protector of Tidore. Sultan Bacan signed a 
similar contract in 1653.65 From that time in regard to controlling clove 
production and the local politics the VOC had a ‘legal’ basis to deal with the 
sultans in the best interests of the Company. On paper, at least the 
production of cloves in all areas under Ternate, Tidore, and Bacan was fully 
regulated. The rest was to control and to enforce those three kingdoms to 
obey the contracts.    
 
The imposition of VOC domination in Maluku followed different paths. 
In Banda the whole traditional power structure and organization of trade 
and politics was obliterated. Neither contracts nor negotiations with local 
leaders were any longer required  Banda resembled a ‘plantation colony’ in 
the American sense of the word. In Ambon the VOC exercised direct rule 
over the indigenous population. The going was tough and bloody in the 
beginning, but after sixty years of struggle the area finally quietened down. 
In Ternate and Tidore the VOC rule was indirect via the sultans through 
whom the Company dictated its directives. The main tactic was to direct the 
ruling sultan and to control his succession. Without doubt, the success of 
the VOC in establishing the monopoly occurred at the cost of the 
independence and welfare of the indigenous communities. Therefore the 
dominant presence of the VOC for almost two centuries was coloured by 
occasional unrest, with the exception of Ambon and Seram which remained 
relatively quiet from about 1660 to the advent of Prince Nuku in the third 
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quarter of the eighteenth century. This does not mean however that the 
relationship between the indigenous subjects and the Company was either 
peaceful or fair. 
In her monograph on the VOC trade in the eighteenth century, Els 
Jacobs insists that the Company operated as a true trader, with the 
plantation on Banda being an exception to the ‘rules’.66 Charles Boxer was 
probably closer to the truth when he characterized the VOC as a Company 
of the ledger and the Sword.67 These two faces of the VOC were already 
presaged in the Charter of 1602 which stated that in the area between the 
Cape of Good Hope and the Cape of Hoorn, the VOC had the freedom to 
trade, conclude treaties, and declare wars. In 1609 when Admiral Verhoeff 
sailed to Banda, he was instructed by the Gentlemen Seventeen: ’We draw 
your special attention to the islands in which grow cloves and nutmeg, and 
we instruct you to strive after winning them for the Company either by 
treaty or by force.’68 Similar instructions were also given to other admirals: 
Steven van der Haghen, Cornelis Matelief, and Paulus van Caerden. In this 
regard, Knaap is right in stating that the VOC in the Maluku behaved as a 
state. The VOC clearly functioned as dominant ruler and established a 





The spice monopoly was the overriding reason for the Dutch presence in 
the Maluku. It was the engine which had driven local dynamics and change 
ever since the sixteenth century. The extermination and forced evacuation of 
Bandanese society, the subjection of Ambon to the direct rule of the Dutch 
VOC, and the long-drawn-out process of imposing the VOC policy on the 
Ternate and Tidore Sultanates evolved in the context of the establishment 
and maintenance of the spice monopoly in Maluku. Backed by its naval and 
military superiority, the VOC emerged as the dominant power in Maluku 
and functioned as state as well as trader. 
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This chapter discusses the structure and expansion of VOC rule in Maluku. 
Its chief focus is the policies and strategies which were designed to deal with 
the local polities. The VOC succeeded in depriving its Malukan subjects of 
contacts with other ‘foreign’ traders and forces, and also expounded the 
doctrine that the spice monopoly subsequently required other forms of 
‘monopoly’, namely the restructuring of the power relations between sultans 
and their ‘peripheries’, the imposition of VOC authority on the local people, 
and even reorganizing the local authority relationship. All these 
interventions in local society provide the background for the curious 
configuration of the VOC relationships with local rulers (sultans and bobato), 
which eventually created opposing groups and led to ‘rebellion’ in Tidore at 
the end of the eighteenth century.  
 
 
Expanding Structure and Rule 
 
Owing to the enormous expansion of its power, the VOC had to address a 
great deal more than just trade. The trade ‘managers’ also had to govern 
subjects in areas under the control of the Company, to maintain relations 
with other Asian states, and if necessary to wage wars in Asia.1 There were 
four Governments in the Eastern East Indies in the seventeenth and the 
eighteenth century: Banda; Ambon; Ternate; and Makassar. Each of these 
Governments was headed by a Governor and council who dealt with 
administrative and political matters, and also managed the spice production 
and local trade. In Ambon, some 200 soldiers manned various military posts 
in 1626, but their number expanded to 300 in 1645. The local administration 
consisted of personnel of all ranks such as opperkoopman (senior merchant), 
fiscaal (attorney), onderkoopman junior merchant), boekhouder (accountant), 
pennist (clerk), predicant (clergyman) and so on. In the second half of the 
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seventeenth century, more than 500 employees served in Ambon.2 In 1753 
between 700 and 800 persons, including members of naval and military 
forces, were employed in each Government. More than half of the 
personnel in one Government were composed of military men.3  
Right from in the beginning, the VOC created a colonial state in Ambon. 
On 23 February 1605, when the fleet of twelve vessels under Steven van der 
Hagen took over the castle Nossa Senhora da Anunciada and other 
Portuguese possessions in the Ambon islands, the VOC assumed the role of 
a state because it inherited thousands of subjects, mostly nominal Christian 
Ambonese, from the Portuguese Government. As elsewhere the VOC was 
involved in trade, politics, and war.4 During the course of seventeenth 
century the VOC built various small strongholds along the coast. These so-
called blokhuizen or ‘redoubts’ were generally built of stone and had two 
storeys. Some were protected by a stone perimeter wall reinforced with 
bulwarks. Others were surrounded by a simple wooden stockade (palissade).5 
At the end of the century, the VOC possessed nineteen smaller strongholds 
manned by garrisons of different sizes, varying from five to forty-five men. 
The garrison was usually in charge of a sergeant. The highest ranking 
military officer of the VOC in this region was a captain stationed at Castle 
Victoria. Therefore the VOC possessed a standing army. Alongside this 
regular fighting force, there was also a burger militia which conducted night 
patrols in the town. The majority of inlandse burgers were Christianized 
Asians from Ambon.6  
In Ambon, the garrisons of the VOC in the strongholds and the men on 
board the patrol vessels were only able to guarantee security in ‘normal 
times’. When a crisis occurred, for example, a war or a rebellion, these police 
forces were only strong enough to defend and to maintain the interests of 
the Company and its personnel, ensuring at least they could not be driven 
out. If a greater offensive action was necessary to defeat the enemy, the 
support more forces was indispensable. Therefore, during the Ambonse 
Oorlogen of the 1640 and 1650s, expeditions of strike forces were regularly 
provided from Batavia. In such a situation, the striking power of the VOC 
multiplied exponentially. The maritime force no longer consisted of a single 
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sloop or yacht; it was reinforced with much bigger vessels. The biggest ships 
were armed with thirty to forty cannon, including many fourteen-pounders.7 
Such large cannon could only be fired ten times per hour and had a firing 
range of one half to two kilometres depending on conditions. In 1636 a 
special expeditionary fleet with the Governor-General Van Diemen on 
board was sent to the Maluku. This fleet consisted of twenty ships, and was 
manned by 2,000 crewmembers with the aim of ‘pacifying’ the Ambonese, 
and securing a contract with Sultan Hamzah of Ternate.8  
In his study of the establishment of the VOC’s spice empire in the 
Maluku, Kruidnagelen en Christenen, Gerrit Knaap has stated that after 1656 the 
authority of the VOC in the region was based on four basic elements: 
military predominance; strict surveillance of the inhabitants; a ‘divide and 
rule’ policy; and on ‘consensus’. The military predominance relied on the 
garrisoning of fortifications and a simultaneous policy which discouraged 
the indigenous inhabitants from possessing weapons. Securing control over 
the inhabitants was achieved by the expedient of resettling those who lived 
on the mountain slopes and in the remote hill regions to the coastal areas. 
Having re-grouped the population into manageable formations, the VOC 
could take immediate action in times of emergency. After the great Ambonse 
Oorlogen in 1658, the core areas of the Ambonese Islands enjoyed a long 
period of armed peace (gewapende vrede) which was only disrupted by a single 
year until the end of the eighteenth century. The recalcitrant spirit of the 
Ambonese rebels had been tamed and continued to slumber for generations. 
In hindsight, this seemingly serene ‘Pax Nederlandica’, rested on fear rather 
than affection for the foreign master.9  
The policy of ‘divide and rule’ was relatively ‘easily’ applied because there 
was hardly any sense of unity among the Ambonese, even during the pre-
European presence period. During the Ambonse Oorlogen, for example, this 
lack of unity among the Ambonese was quite striking. The VOC 
administration came to terms with the fact that the building of consensus as 
cement for a good bond between overheerser (ruler) and overheersten (ruled) was 
only feasible with discrete groups of the inhabitants: the Christians and the 
local elites. The indigenous Christians prided themselves at sharing the same 
religion with the colonial administration. This sense of belonging to one and 
the same religion was expressed in the belief that the VOC and the 
Christians were wapenbroeders (comrade in arms) during the war. Consensus 
building and the sharing of mutual interest with such members of the local 
elites as headmen of settlements, was also feasible option because their 
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loyalty to the Dutch master could be stimulated and reinforced by bestowing 
allowances at the delivery of cloves and by giving them a respectable 
position in the colonial state apparatus. The hierarchy among the indigenous 
heads was generally measured by the relative importance of the contribution 
they made with their kora-kora crews and vessels in the hongi.10  
 
In Ternate the Dutch faced a less complex situation than in Ambon. Instead 
of having to juggle with numerous local heads of different factions, they had 
only to deal with Sultans. The unhappy experience of Ternate with the 
Portuguese during the sixteenth century made a positive precondition for 
the Dutch VOC presence on the island. Familiar with European norms and 
customs, Sultan Ternate received the Dutch with amity, not only hoping to 
rescue the Sultanate from the iron grip of the Portuguese, but also seeing the 
temporary alliance with the Company as a prelude to gaining more people 
and territory in Maluku. The success of the VOC in Ambon in suppressing 
the resistance of the Hoamoals during the 1650s at the request of Sultan 
Hamzah also contributed to the strengthening of the alliance between the 
VOC and Sultan Ternate. Not averse to meddling in local affairs, the Dutch 
co-operated with the contender for the throne (Sultan Mandarsyah) and 
exerted a strong influence on the outcome of the power struggle within the 
Sultanate. When the VOC invited Sultan Mandarsyah to sign a contract for 
the eradication of spice-bearing trees in 1652, this request stirred up no 
significant resistance. However the political grip of the ‘Kompeni’ always 
remained limited to the uppermost level of the Sultan and his closest 
grandees. 
The apparently cemented relationship may have seemed stable on the 
surface but this was misleading as became apparent when a rebellion 
suddenly erupted in 1679. The reprisals were severe. Sultan Sibori 
Amsterdam (r.1675-1690) was temporarily removed from office and 
banished to Batavia and many of his followers were executed. With this 
victory, the Dutch ‘legally’ reinforced their position. The Sultan was 
eventually pressed to sign a contract on 7 July 1683 by which Ternate 
became the vassal of the Company. From that year, Sultan Ternate was 
reduced to the status of a leenman (liegeman) and the Company had won the 
full right to select and appoint not only the new Sultan in the Sultanate but 
was even able to exert extraordinary power on the nomination of the rulers 
of dependencies falling under the aegis of Ternate from Sula to Sangihe.11 
Armed with this treaty, the Company asserted its dominance in local affairs 
                                               
10 Ibid. 37-49. 
11 Hendrik E. Niemeijer, ‘De geveinsde vrede: Eer, protocol en diplomatie in de 
machtsverhouding tussen de VOC en Ternate omstreeks 1750,’ in Knaap and Teitler (eds), 
De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, 311. 
RULING THE LOCAL RULERS 
 
35 
and the erstwhile ‘equal’ relationship was transformed into one of vassalage. 
The biggest blow to the Ternatans was the implementation of the policy of 
eradicating spice-bearing trees in the centre and the periphery of the 
sultanate. This caused great hardship to the common people. The money 
which was paid in recompense to the ruler and his coterie was never 
adequate for the loss of local revenue from the clove trade. When Ternatans 
attempted to supplement their income through trade in other items, they 
were hampered by other Dutch restrictions such as limitations on the size of 
vessels allowed to sail westwards.12 
The introduction of the eradication policy and the annual remittance of 
recognition money to the Sultan indubitably strengthened the political 
position of the Sultan in relation to the bobato class, because it ineluctably 
deprived the latter of their economic resources derived from the spice trade. 
Yet, the amount of recognition money he received from the Company was 
never enough for the Sultan to run his court. Literally a financial hostage of 
the Dutch, the Sultan of Ternate continually depended on the payment of 
his debts by the Company, which Niemeijer has consequently likened to a 
bank van lening (pawnbroker). The more debt the Sultan accumulated, the 
stronger the grip the Company on him. The Sultan was put in a lamentable 
situation in which he could not maintain his authority and power in the 
periphery without Dutch assistance. The traditional pattern of power 
relations between the Sultan and the bobato, as well as between the Sultan 
and the leaders in the peripheries was shattered.13 
The ambition felt by successive sultans of Ternate to expand their 
territory but concentrate manpower on Ternate and its immediate 
surroundings was supported by the Company administration. During the 
reigns of Sultan Hamzah and Sultan Mandarsyah, the Dutch contributed 
significantly to this development by their readiness to lend their resources 
and arms to their ally. They understood the efficiency of dealing with a 
powerful ruler and found it more convenient to work with a single 
individual than with an entire council. A Sultan so empowered could sign 
treaties, make quick decisions, and be manipulated much more easily than a 
government operating on the basis of consensus. Subsequently the power of 
the bobato and the grandees within the Sultanate was fatally undermined. In 
short, the Dutch controlled Ternate and North Maluku indirectly through 
the power of Sultan Ternate who had been made dependent on the goodwill 
of the Dutch.14 
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In dealing with the Ternatan subjects, the Makianese, the Dutch took a 
different tack when a confrontation took place in 1745 after a long period of 
disaffection towards the Sultan of Ternate on the part of the Makianese. 
Angered by the contemptuous treatment of their sangaji by Sultan Saifuddin, 
in March 1742 some 140 Makianese from Foya and Gane voted with their 
feet and went over to Tidore beseeching the local Sultan to accept them as 
his subjects. These Makianese actually contravened the rules of the 
Company which explicitly forbade local headmen to transfer their loyalty 
from one overlord to another. Responding to the conflict, in 1745 the 
Dutch decided that all islanders who remained on Makian would be made 
direct subjects of the Company. Instead of the customary corveé of thirty-
three people who were rotated monthly to perform compulsory labour for 
Sultan Ternate, the inhabitants were now ordered to supply the Company 
with eight kora-kora whenever these were needed and to provide all transport 
services and supplies for Dutch ships putting in at Makian. They were also 
shouldered with the additional task of gathering coral to make lime for the 
Dutch. Interestingly enough, Andaya argues that the Makianese thought this 
direct subjection actually was an improvement in their position because for 
the first time compensation was paid directly to the people of Makian and 
not via the Sultan Ternate. The compulsory labour organized by the Dutch 
was less burdensome than that which they had had to perform for Sultan 
Ternate in the past.15 In June 1752, however, the sangaji and the village heads 
of Makian arrived in Ternate with fourteen to fifteen kora-kora. The leaders 
stated that their direct subordination to the Company had been only 
temporary and that they wanted to swear allegiance to Ternate again. The 
visitors were granted an audience with the Sultan and the grandees in the 
Sultan’s palace (dalem). Some agreement was finally concluded. What the 
nature of their agreement was is not clear. From the archival sources, it is 
quite possible that the Sultan complied with his subjects’ proposal because 
in the third week of July, the Makianese left Ternate in a happy mood and 
sailed back to their island.16 
 
The centre of military activities on Ternate was Fort Oranje which also was 
the residence of the Governor. In 1753 Governor-General Mossel reported 
that the number of the personnel serving in the Government of Maluku 
(Ternate) amounted to 700 men, about 400 of whom resided on Ternate. 
The subordinate posts were manned by some seventy soldiers under three 
sergeants and ten corporals. The others, some forty-three persons in all, 
were assigned to such remote areas as Manado and Gorontalo. At Sula and 
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Besi there were seventeen men stationed, ten of whom were soldiers.17 In 
1782 the number of servants employed by the Government consisted of 759 
personnel. Six hundred and thirty-nine of these men held military positions: 
452 Europeans; thirty-seven Balinese; and 150 Alifurus. About 75 percent of 
the total number of personnel served in the military.18 This slight increase 
after 1780 can perhaps be related to the rebellion of Nuku. The living 
conditions of the soldiers were far from optimal. Niemeijer cites a 
description of Fort Oranje, dating from 1750, when it housed 125 old and 
sick soldiers. Their garrison was expected to patrol and guard the four 
ammunition warehouses located in the fort. During the eighteenth century 
the Dutch Government of Ternate also relied on the indigenous forces of 
the Sultans of Ternate. Without the assistance of kora-kora and the armed 
Alifurus, it would have been impossible for the Government to launch any 
expedition to police and suppress raiding or any trading activities in the 
areas which were considered illegal in the Dutch eyes.19 Only in critical times 
could the VOC Government of Ternate demand the support of vessels and 
soldiers from Ambon, Banda, or Batavia.  
The ‘divide and rule’ policy operated at two levels. First and foremost it 
applied to the Ternatan elite. It manifested itself whenever a Sultan died and 
succession disputes reared their ugly heads. Commencing with the reign of 
Sultan Mandarsyah, the Dutch were quite active in intervening and 
supporting the contender they favoured. The appointment of Sultan 
Mandarsyah is an example of such Dutch intervention. The administration 
of the foreign overlord made sure that Mandarsyah remained in power 
despite the powerful opposition of the influential local families. In 1650, the 
three powerful families of Fala Raha: Tomagola; Tomaitu; and Marsaoli, 
drove the Sultan out of Ternate and Kaicili Manilha seized the reins of 
power. Sultan Mandarsyah promptly sought a safe haven in Fort Oranje 
asking for help. In 1651 the Dutch in Ternate, supported by the fleet of 
Arnold De Vlaming from Ambon, proceeded to take action against the 
rebels. In 1653 the back of the resistance was broken and the leaders either 
killed or executed. When Mandarsyah was finally re-installed as Sultan 
Ternate in 1655, he asked the Dutch to govern Hitu and Hoamoal. Three 
years earlier, in 1652, when he was virtually powerless he had signed the 
treaty with the Company which inaugurated the eradication policy of spice-
bearing trees. In fact, this was nothing but a quid pro quo for Dutch assistance 
and support.20  
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The second level at which the Dutch imposed their policy was to play 
the balance of power between Ternate and Tidore. When Ternate showed 
signs of resisting the Dutch, the latter did not hesitate to take advantage of 
their relationship with the Tidore Sultan to call upon his help. The VOC 
administration also exploited the rivalry within Ternate itself by dealing 
directly with the jogugu, kapiten laut, or hukum of the Sultanate. This juggling 
was utilized during the reigns of Sultan Saifudin of Tidore and Sultan Sibori 
of Ternate. Andaya postulates that the Dutch developed a well-perfected art 
of using indigenous polities to do their fighting for them. When his 
relationship with Sultan Sibori of Ternate worsened, Governor Padtbrugge 
sought assurance from Sultan Saifuddin of Tidore that he would not support 
or give refuge to the Ternatans. Saifuddin was favourably inclined towards 
the Dutch and persuaded his son, Kaicili Seram, to abjure his earlier 
determination to ally himself with Ternate. Seeking advantage in this 
situation, Sultan Tidore renewed his claims to Gammalamo in Ternate 
territory and the half of Makian which had once acknowledged Tidore 
leadership. His kora-kora even flew orange flags in honour of the Dutch 
House of Orange, proclaiming to the Ternatans that the Tidorans had now 
become Dutch allies. The bulk of the fighting was shared by the Tidorans 
and the people from the islands to the north of Sulawesi. Their prowess 
enabled the Dutch to eliminate all resistance from Halmahera, the centre of 
the Ternate war effort. Sahu, the strongest post of Ternate, fell to Dutch 
forces on 8 July and Gamkonora on 17 July 1680. Sultan Sibori and his 
Tobaru warriors finally surrendered to the Dutch on 30 August 1681.21 
Similar manipulative practices were applied in reverse whenever Sultan 
Tidore resisted the Dutch in the eighteenth century.22 These tactics were 
easily employed because of the dualistic pattern of the Tidore-Ternate 
relationship in which both Sultanates were in a constant state of rivalry.23  
 
 
Exploiting Local Forces 
 
The eastern archipelago fostered the tradition of the hongi, organized fleets 
consisting of kora-kora which were already used in warfare among the 
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indigenous groups long before the arrival of the European forces. At the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, the VOC developed an important 
strategy relating to the hongi and its relationship with its own subjects in the 
Ambonese Islands. Around 1630 the VOC had a hongi fleet join its own 
ships to quash the local resistance. Having hit upon such an effective policy, 
the frequency of hongi deployment sharply increased. This led to the uprising 
of Ambonese Christians in 1636, which was suppressed and then set straight 
by Governor-General Antonio Van Diemen in the following year. After the 
end of the Ambonse Oorlogen, the VOC-hongi sailed out one month each year 
preferably in October and/or November. During these months the turn of 
the monsoon presented ideal weather conditions for such a voyage. After 
1658 a more or less complete hongi ritual was instituted. Every two years 
forty-six kora-kora – out of a total of around sixty vessels – were fitted out 
once for police actions. In the interim period a smaller squadron was relied 
on. The enlisted men of the hongi crews were occasionally also employed for 
such corvée labour as digging canals, cutting palings for palisades, breaking up 
coral stones or burning limestone to maintain the fortifications of the VOC. 
By that time the hongi was only seldom used for any violent actions. Under 
the command of the Governor or his representative, its main task was to 
carry out a tour of inspection around Seram or among the islands west of 
Seram. In such a situation, the most important goal was in fact a display of 
force.24  
Ambonese participants considered their presence on board a kind of 
compulsory labour. The Dutch referred to this as hofdienst. Each family in a 
village was expected to deliver one able-bodied man for the kora-kora. In 
return, the family received rights to the use of a certain plot of land from the 
village council. Calculations have shown that in theory 11 or 12 per cent of 
the inhabitants were supposed to do service either as a rower or warrior on 
the kora-kora. In actual fact, it seemed fewer men were actually needed, 
about 4 to 8 per cent in all. For ten to eleven hours at a stretch, they rowed 
and manned the sails.25 Limited space on board and the shortage of food 
sometimes caused acute discomfort, especially towards the end of the 
voyage.26 The hongi as an instrument of power employed by the Dutch 
colonial administration on Ambon was finally abolished in 1861.27 
Whenever an uprising erupted within the communities in the region, the 
VOC authority dispatched a hongi expedition to suppress it and to terminate 
the resistance. If the scale of the uprising was widespread, the Governor 
requested assistance from Batavia. Upon the arrival of the hongi, the rebels 
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usually disappeared inland or took refuge in the mountainous areas carrying 
their valuables with them. They left their houses behind to be looted and 
burned by the warriors of the hongi. Open resistance was rare because of the 
recognized superiority of the VOC troops. For the hongi warriors a punitive 
expedition meant an opportunity for looting and robbery, and killing. The 
hongi in this sense was a well-planned and well-organized visitation of terror 
on the populations of Ambon and Seram. During the Ambonse Oorlogen of 
the 1650s, Arnold de Vlaming van Oudshoorn, the Governor of Ambon, 
was notorious among the Malukans for the ferocity of the hongi expeditions 
he commanded.28  
Under ‘normal circumstances’ the hongi expedition from Ambon 
resembled a colourful carnival fleet consisting of fifty to a hundred vessels as 
it rowed and sailed its way along the coast of Seram. The kora-kora were 
decorated with umbul-umbul and banners, and the noisy beating of the drums 
set the rhythm for the movement of the rowers. This showing of the flag 
(vlag vertoon) was very much a display of force to the island peoples of 
Maluku on the part of the Company. Yet it was also a ritual closely 
connected to the island world which the Dutch Company was controlling. 
Instead of ordering local headmen to gather at the administrative centres as 
often happened elsewhere in colonial society, here the administrator would 
travel from island to island to inspect the Company’s island empire 
personally. On every tournée, in which the Governor himself often took part, 
local heads would show up and pay their respects to demonstrate their 
loyalty to the Company. They either visited the Governor on board or 
attended a gathering of local headmen at appointed places. The visiting fleet 
was sometimes welcomed with music, songs, and local dances. The 
Governor not only ominously gave orders for punishments; he also 
generously bestowed rewards on loyal subjects. The hongi ritual was 
unequivocally a symbol of dominance as long as the spice monopoly lasted 
in Ambon-Lease and on Seram. It was employed to inspect and assure that 
the clove production was being diligently pursued with every care and that 
the order for the eradication of ‘illegal’ spice-bearing trees was being obeyed, 
but it was also a curious tool of colonial state formation with the aim of 
keeping highly divergent populations together.29 
What has just been said refers mostly to Ambon, which leads to the 
question of whether Ternate and Tidore also assembled such a hongi and 
how the Dutch made use of it for their own best interests. Hanna says that 
on Ternate the hongi prevailed for more than 200 years until 1857. Here a 
hongi fleet was a formally organized group of kora-kora under the direct 
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command of the kapiten laut who was appointed by the Sultan or one of his 
lower-ranking subordinates such as mayor ngofa or kapiten ngofa. The able-
bodied men required for the fleet were recruited from among the Sultan’s 
Ternatan subjects and the villages in the periphery. The number of men and 
the strength of a fleet depended on the extent of the influence the Sultan’s 
officials (kapiten laut and jogugu) exercised on the people in villages from 
which they originated. For example, Sultan Muzaffar of Ternate (r. 1610-
1627) appointed Sangaji Gamnokora as jogugu and Sangaji Makian as kapiten 
laut of Ternate, because both areas were rich in resources and had large 
populations. Also in later years the troops for the fleet were mainly recruited 
from Makian and Halmahera.30 The system was different from the usual 
practice on Ambon, because on Ternate and Tidore the Dutch neither dealt 
directly with nor organized the fleet needed for a hongi expedition. Except in 
few areas such as Makian (1745-1752), the Dutch Governor of Ternate did 
not have direct formal contact with the people and therefore hardly ever 
joined or led an expedition. In this area of ‘indirect rule’, it was the task of 
the Sultan to comply with the Company directives to dispatch hongi 
expeditions. 
The hongi was organized in accordance with arrangements agreed at 
district level. The most responsible leader was the sangaji and the 
commander at district level was the kapiten laut. Every vessel or kora-kora was 
manned by able-bodied men from certain settlements under the supervision 
of the kimelaha and kapiten laut of these areas as group commanders. All 
these contingents gathered at the centre of the Sultanate and reported to the 
highest commander, the kapiten laut of the Sultanate. Not every expedition 
was directly commanded by the kapiten laut himself. Sometimes other 
officials of the Sultanate such as mayor ngofa or kapiten ngofa took over the 
command as they were called upon to act as utusan (delegates). The hongi was 
not always intended to be a bellicose or punitive affair in the event of any 
swelling discontent among dissident subjects, it also served to collect tribute 
from the Raja Ampat Islands and Onin by Tidore, or from the Sula and 
Banggai Islands by Ternate. The recruitment of men for a hongi was done in 
rotation. No settlement was permanently assigned to provide men for hongi. 
The war canoes or kora-kora could measure up to thirty metres and had a 
carrying capacity of forty to a hundred men. One-third of the crew consisted 
of rowers. The troops were armed with parang and assegais, occasionally with 
swivel guns. Everyone had to carry his own food provisions sufficient to last 
about a fortnight. If a man did not bring a weapon, he would not be allowed 
to join in a land attack, and as a consequence would be debarred from a 
share in the spoils. In time of war, such Dutch vessels as pancalang, sloops, or 
bigger sailing vessels from Batavia led the hongi. Provisions for the troops 
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were loaded on an arumbai. Joining a hongi could be an enormous burden, 
especially in the case of a war expedition which could last for months. In the 
middle of a war the troops often deserted because they had simply become 
too tired and hungry.31  
Whether it was meant for the destruction of clove trees, the punishment 
of the unruly subjects, or just showing the flag, the fleet of the Sultan was an 
important tool for showing his power. Nevertheless, in a joint forces 
expedition, the command was always in Dutch hands. For example, in 1704 
the Utusan of Sultan Tidore, Hamzah Fahruddin, arrived in Misool on a 
Company ship to punish the local people for their raiding in areas where 
subjects of the Company lived. On this occasion Papuan ring leaders were 
captured and delivered to the Company. This created bad blood between 
Sangaji Patani and Sultan Tidore and mobilized most of the people of Maba 
and Patani. The Sangaji even decided to transfer his allegiance to Sultan 
Ternate, Saifuddin Kaicili Raja Laut. The rebellion of Patani and Maba 
continued under the new Sultan Tidore Hasanuddin (r.1708-1728). Sultan 
Hasanuddin knew that his actions were judged unfair in the eyes of his 
subjects but he was powerless to resist VOC pressure, because he risked 
losing his throne should the Dutch feel dissatisfied with his actions.32  
 
 
The Decline of the VOC 
 
The downfall of the VOC has inspired writers to take up their pens ever 
since the eighteenth century. Various reasons for the decline have been 
given such as poor financial management in the Dutch Republic, corruption 
on the part of the servants in Asia, the growing costs of the overseas 
administration, the intense rivalry of other European powers, and the mortal 
blow to the trade caused by the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. The shifts in the 
trading patterns in Asia and in the European-Asian shipping trade also 
tended to work to the disadvantage of the Company network. The malaria 
epidemic in Batavia not only decimated the population and undermined the 
military capability of the Company, but also caused considerable financial 
losses (f 900,000 in extra expenses, f 300,000 in loss of income). All these 
factors contributed to the steep decline and finally the bankruptcy of the 
Company.33 
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During the course of the eighteenth century, the Dutch gradually lost 
their powerful position as a trading power in Asia. After the first heady 
years, by the end of seventeenth century, the output (rendement) of the 
activities of the VOC in Asia had already begun to decline. Batavia used to 
send millions of guilders to the Republic, but from 1692 the roles were 
reversed and the homeland had to support the operation in Asia. Until 1744, 
the Gentlemen XVII easily bypassed this problem thanks to big profits on 
the sales of Asian products in Europe.34 Trying to explain the declining 
profitability of the Company, historians have adduced a number of causes. 
Changes in the consumption pattern of Asian products in Europe certainly 
played a role. In the eighteenth century Java coffee, Chinese tea, and Indian 
textiles were terribly popular in Europe. The Gentlemen Seventeen tried to 
take advantage of these products by adding them to the VOC package which 
had previously been dominated by spices. The activities of the Company 
grew explosively with the expansion of the assortment of merchandise. The 
total purchase value of Asian products amounted to 600 million guilders in 
the eighteenth century compared to less than 250 million in the seventeenth 
century. The drawback was, however, that the new products for which the 
VOC had to compete with the other Europeans yielded less profit than such 
monopoly products as spices.35 
The Fourth Anglo-Dutch Sea War (1780-1784) froze trade completely 
for two years. Many ships and cargoes fell into the hands of the English 
causing the Company enormous losses and forcing it basically to work with 
money borrowed from the Amsterdam bourse. In 1782, the Gentlemen 
Seventeen decided to hazard extra expenses by chartering ships under a 
neutral flag in order to re-establish the contact with Batavia and obviate 
English confiscation. This policy did not go nearly far enough. The response 
was too late and the number of chartered ships was too small. Despite 
strenuous efforts to obtain new loans, the Company suffered from a 
shortage of funds during the decade 1780-1790.36  
Pragmatically the VOC could not maintain its power beyond the 
Indonesian Archipelago and Ceylon. Especially in India were the losses 
severe; Surat, which had been the main trading emporium for Western Asia 
fell into the hands of English in 1759. The Company had to retreat from and 
lost the trade in the Persian Gulf entirely in 1765. The VOC activities in 
Malabar in South India had almost stopped by 1793 and the English took 
the port of Cochin in 1795.37 To make matters worse, French troops 
invaded the Dutch Republic in 1795. This invasion led to the creation of the 
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Batavian Republic as a satellite of Revolutionary France and automatically 
plunged the Netherlands into a war against Great Britain. In the years which 
followed one by one the English occupied the VOC establishments in Asia 
to prevent these from falling into the hands of the French. With the 
exception of the trading-post in far away Japan, all the former VOC 
establishments ended up in English hands.38 
  
In Maluku the effect of the decline of the VOC was not as significant 
and visible as was as elsewhere in Asia. The three VOC Governments in the 
east: Banda; Ambon; and Ternate; remained competent in their control of 
the Sultanates and in smothering potential unrest. The number of personnel 
in naval and military service remained the same as it had been in the 
previous century, hovering around 700 men. The number of vessels 
available, however, declined and, to make matters worse, many of them were 
over ten years old.  
On 12 August 1771, a report from the Ternate Government informs us 
about the availability of the ships. Besides the barque De Mossel and the 
recently arrived pancalang Ternate, the sloop De Jaccatra was available. 
Furthermore, the fleet consisted of seven pancalang De Snuffelaar, De Sara 
Maria, De Caneelboom, De Goedkeuring, Het Haasje, Het Genoegen on Manado, 
De Vrijheit in Gorontalo, supplemented by some landing craft and two 
inspection launches.39 On 10 September 1793, the Ternate Government 
reported that it had even fewer vessels at its disposal: the two-masted barque 
De Manado built in 1779, the pancalang De Windhond (1777), the pancalang De 
Swaan (1786), the pancalang De Lassum (1786), De Waker (1787), and De 
Padang (1791). It requested support from Batavia, asking it to provide new 
vessels.40 If a large sailing ship had to be repaired, the Company could not 
rely on local carpenters. Such an undertaking required an able Dutch 
shipwright.41 
Large Dutch sailing vessels were also vulnerable to piracy. In 1782 Haji 
Oemar with a well-equipped Mangindanao fleet of twelve prahu managed to 
overpower a relatively large sailing ship belonging to the Dutch Ternate 
Government, the pancalang De Jonge Cornelis, which was manned by fourteen 
Europeans and 180 Gorontalese, in Gorontalo. After having been 
plundered, the vessel was fired. The ‘King’ of Gorontalo and his family had 
to buy the freedom of the captives at the cost of Rds 3,700. Even so, 140 
captives were taken away to Mangindanao. On the island of Obi, the brig Ida 
sailing under the Dutch flag was also seized. Eighty men were captured and 
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the post at Obi was raided. Such experiences led Governor Valckenaer to 
conclude that pancalang were vulnerable prey for local piracy. He suggested 
Batavia provide the Ternate Government with six galleys and two barques.42 
After the loss of the Jonge Cornelis, the Dutch on Ternate still had two two-
masted sloops: De Manado and Lankmoedigheid, and four pancalang: De Kruisser; 
De Caneelboom; De Windhond; and Het Kasteel Orange. Because this force was 
considered inadequate, the Governor requested two more new pancalang.43  
 
 
Handling Rebellious Tidore 
 
Before the 1657 contract was signed between Sultan Saifuddin of Tidore and 
the VOC, Tidore continued to display hostile attitude: it chose to honour its 
earlier loyalty to the Spaniards. In order to thwart too much Tidore 
influence on its subjects, Gamrange and the Papuans of the tiny Raja Ampat 
kingdoms, the Dutch Governor of Ambon, Arnold de Vlaming, concluded 
contracts with the leaders of North Seram and East Seram in 1649 and 1650. 
Wishing to bring the Papuans under his control but realizing that the 
contracts were hardly worth the paper they were written on, De Vlaming 
declared war on Tidore on 20 August 1653. He also dispatched an 
expedition under the command of Senior Merchant Simon Cos to the 
Papuan Islands, which he considered the true source of problems in Hatiwe 
(North Seram), Weda, and Patani. In the same year, on the orders of Sultan 
Tidore, Raja Salawati attacked Ambon. This was a double-edged blow as it 
signified that Salawati had submitted to the power of Tidore. Open hostility 
formally ended, when the contract between Tidore and the Company was 
concluded in 1657.44  
In 1657, after the death of Sultan Saidi of Tidore, Simon Cos, then 
Governor Ternate, succeeded in supporting Kaicili Golafino in his bid to 
become Sultan Saifuddin of Tidore, even though Prince Goranja, his older 
brother, was more favoured for the succession. This was the first Dutch 
intervention in the matter of the royal succession in Tidore. As a gesture of 
gratitude, in the same year Sultan Saifudin made a verbal agreement that 
Tidore would implement the Dutch spice eradication policy. From that 
moment, Tidoran vessels were required to acquire a pass from the Dutch to 
sail beyond Maluku. In addition to this, the Dutch gained the right to let one 
of their men attend the Tidore council meetings, but in return they also 
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provided Sultan Tidore with a yearly recognition payment some 3,000 real.45 
This agreement was reaffirmed ten years later, in a 1667 contract, making 
the Dutch States-General schut- en beschermheer, protector of Tidore.46 This 
contract entailed quite a few mutual obligations, but above all Saifuddin was 
expected to provide a counterweight to Ternate. The decade of 1657 to 1667 
was critical to Tidoran political independence because the Sultan had to cede 
some of his sovereign rights. One of these was the stipulation that the royal 
succession had to be authorized with the stamp of the High Government of 
the VOC in Batavia. Henceforth the Dutch could easily control and monitor 
Tidore political strategies because of their representation in the council of 
Tidore, which allowed them to intervene in the local policies of the 
Sultanate. This ultimately affected the traditional relationship between 
Tidore as the centre and the peripheries, Gamrange and Raja Ampat, 
because the Company had a stake in stopping their raiding activities, which 
victimized Company subjects, endangered the life of local traders, and 
hindered expeditions sent out to extirpate the clove trees.  
On paper Sultan Tidore was obliged to terminate the Papuan custom of 
raiding, but, from his point of view, this also damaged his old relationship 
with his subjects in the periphery, Raja Ampat (Salawati, Misool, Waigama, 
and Batanta) and Gamrange (Maba, Weda, and Patani). The Tidorans had an 
interest in maintaining the raiding activities of the people of Gamrange and 
those of the Papuans because they were involved in many ways themselves. 
The Papuans were not simply attacking and robbing the populations, they 
were simultaneously also trading. This situation was bound to exacerbate 
relations between Tidore and the Company. In 1673, for example, a burger 
of Banda, Gerrit Adriaensz., was driven away as he was about to trade in the 
Raja Ampat Islands by a certain Tidoran who was backed up by Raja 
Salawati. Again in 1673 Misool raiders, with the support of Tidore, were 
preying on the coasts of Sulawesi and Gorom. In 1676, on the orders of 
Sultan Tidore, people from Misool mounted an expedition to attack Onin. 
Their probable objective was to obtain slaves, but far more important is that 
this operation revealed that the Sultan was not honouring his promises. As a 
matter of fact, Tidore paid little more than lip service to the contract. A 
combined fleet of Maba, Weda, Patani, and Misool, led by Kaicili Boelam of 
Tidore, raided the coast of Onin and Kei in 1696, prompting a Dutch 
commission consisting of Pieter Rooselaar and Thomas Laps to appear in 
Tidore in 1697 and pressurize Sultan Tidore to stop his subordinates from 
raiding and robbing.47 
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When Sultan Saifuddin died in 1687, the Dutch supported Kaicili Seram 
to succeed him as Sultan Hamzah Fahruddin on 31 Juli 1689. Until the end 
of the seventeenth century, the Sultan showed no inclination at all to punish 
the wayward Papuans, which is what the Dutch had hoped and expected. 
However, in 1704, succumbing to severe pressure, he decided to show his 
loyalty. With the utusan of Tidore on board one of the Company vessels, a 
punitive expedition headed for Misool to punish the recalcitrant subjects for 
their raiding voyages. This expedition indeed captured and delivered the 
Papuan ring leaders to the Company. This punitive action was considered by 
the subjects in the peripheries, especially the leaders of Patani, Maba, and 
Weda, an act of betrayal and contrary to a well-established tradition of 
collaboration. These vassals considered it unjust because subjects were being 
punished for activities which were normally praised and encouraged by the 
Tidore ruler.48  
The most prominent leader of Gamrange, Sangaji Patani mobilized the 
majority of the people of Maba, Patani, and the Papuans of Raja Ampat to 
rise against their Sultan.49 They refused to deliver their annual tribute and 
even symbolically transferred their vassalage to Sultan Ternate Saifuddin 
Kaicili Raja Laut. The rebellion of Patani, Weda and Maba simmered on 
even during the reign of the next Sultan Tidore, Hasanuddin (r.1708-1728). 
Threatened with being overwhelmed, Sultan Hasanudin eventually requested 
the help of the Dutch. Before the commissioners sent from Batavia, he 
delivered a letter blaming the Dutch Government in Ternate for a lack of 
commitment. He complained that the rebellion had caused so many deaths 
he was forced to request extra cloth from the Company to furnish requisites 
for the numerous burial ceremonies. The rebellion was not immediately 
suppressed because there was a strong current of opposition within the 
Tidore Sultanate to taking harsh action against the rebels. In 1722, when the 
Company administration finally decided to dispatch a punitive expedition, 
the Tidorans were reluctant to take up arms against the rebel and many 
opted out and returned home secretly. For more than a decade, during 1716-
1728, the rebels could generally act with impunity, which also meant that the 
spice eradication hongi had not been carried out for twelve years. Sultan 
Tidore refused to take up arms against the people of the Gamrange and the 
Papuan Islands because of established family links between them. This 
situation also reflected the ongoing struggle between the Sultan and the 
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bobato who were closely connected with the activities pursued by the 
Papuans and Halmaherans. In 1728 the rebellion ended abruptly with the 
sudden death of Sultan Hasanudin.50  
Kaicili Gapi, a direct descendant of Sultan Saifuddin, was installed as 
Sultan Amirulfadli Aziz Muhidin Malikilmannan (r.1728-1756) on 14 June 
1728. He restored the relationship with the people of Gamrange and the 
Papuans. To accomplish this, he granted a general pardon to the rebels, sent 
the hostages back from the rebels’ families and returned Tidoran subjects 
who had moved to Galela to their land of origin. Sangaji Patani who had led 
the rebellion was rehabilitated as head of the Papuan islands and the 
reconciliation was concluded by a treaty agreed upon by both Tidore and 
Patani.51 Peace may seem to have been restored yet the problem of raiding 
was far from over. In order to deal with this problem once and for all, on 23 
June 1733, a contract between Sultan Tidore and the Dutch Governor, Elias 
de Haeze, agreeing upon making an end to Papuan raids was imposed. On 
11 December 1734, a similar contract was concluded between the Governor 
of Ternate, and Tidore, Maba, Weda, and Patani. In reality Sultan Tidore 
cannily sustained the status quo. Instead of punishing the Papuans and 
Halmaherans, he avoided taking any real action against them.  
Since 1733 the losses which had been caused by raiding activities had 
been totted up by the Dutch and had been assumed to be a ‘debt’ owed by 
Sultan Tidore.52 In 1757, when Sultan Jamaludin (r.1756-1779) ascended the 
throne,53 he was expected to pay Rds 50,000. However, he showed no 
intention of disbursing this sum and even claimed that his own subordinates 
were also victims of piracy. His relationship with the new Governor of 
Ternate, Jacob van Schoonderwoert, who was appointed in 1758, was hence 
doomed to deteriorate.54 To make matters even worse, Sultan Jamaludin 
showed little enthusiasm in dealing with his Halmaheran and Papuan 
subjects. It may well have been because Tidore was simply not powerful 
enough to convince his grandees within the Sultanate to mount the punitive 
expeditions. The situation was extremely fraught because the obedience of 
the Halmaherans and the Papuans was pretty conditional. Whenever the 
orders of the centre, which was Tidore, were considered injurious to their 
interests, the Papuans paid such orders scant attention. From the Tidoran 
perspective, whatever the thoughts of the Company about its errant 
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subordinates, Sultan Jamaludin had succeeded in balancing the conflicting 
interests of the Tidore leaders and the Company. 
The Company made costly efforts to deal with the Papuans. A number 
of expeditions were mounted to try to solve the problem of raiding and 
encourage the obedience of the Papuans, to implement the extirpation of 
clove and nutmeg trees, and to check the possibility of any foreign intrusion 
in the vicinity of the Papuan Islands and eastern Halmahera. Some fifteen 
expeditions, beginning with an expedition under Jan van Benthem and Frans 
Ernst in 1702 and ending with that of Jan Jonkers in 1762, were thrown into 
fray.55 Despite these concerted efforts, the problem could not be solved 
completely. The Company suffered even more anxiety about the political 
control in Papuan areas when the English appeared in the adjacent islands. 
Much as they may have desired to do so, the Dutch could not take action by 
themselves. They were dependent on Tidoran assistance in this matter, but 
Sultan Jamaludin displayed very little enthusiasm to aid the Dutch in their 
attempts to get a firm grip on his Halmaheran and Papuan subjects.  
The spice extirpation policy also ruffled the uneasy relationship between 
Sultan Tidore and the Dutch Government in Ternate. It was an arduous task 
for those subjects who were recruited for the expedition and were required 
to penetrate the dangerous dense forest and cut down trees. They were only 
given a tiny compensation (some arak and textiles) for this service. The 
lion’s share of the compensation went to the Sultan and the Sangaji. In the 
implementation of the eradication policy, the colonial administration was 
completely dependent on the co-operation of the Sultan. Here then was an 
inherent conflict of interests. If he honoured the terms of contract, the 
Sultan would ineluctably court unpopularity and sow the seeds of another 
potential uprising in the peripheries. The same would have happened had he 
really addressed the matter of halting the raiding enterprises of the Papuans. 
Consequently, Sultan Jamaludin continued to enjoy the tribute accruing 
from the infamous raiding activities. He had learned from the past 
experiences of previous Sultans who had complied with the Dutch and 
subsequently suffered from political turmoil caused by the rebellion of its 
subjects.  
Jamaludin did indeed differ from Sultan Ternate in terms of 
implementing the eradication policy. On 26 May 1763, the Dutch sloop De 
Roos manned by a crew of twenty-four under the command of a sergeant 
and four corporals carried out a reconnaissance mission in the Messa and 
Doti districts of Halmahera. When they arrived and looked for spice-bearing 
trees in the forest, a great number of nutmeg trees between three to six feet 
high were discovered and extirpated. The deeper they ventured into the 
forest, the more trees they found. Not far from Dodinga, in the same island, 
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some two hundred trees were also discovered. A commission was 
despatched to Tidore requesting Sultan Tidore to extirpate the trees in areas 
under his authority. Jamaludin replied that the extirpation of spice-bearing 
trees had begun fifty years before, during the reign of his predecessor, Sultan 
Hasanudin. Any new extirpation expedition would cost a mint of money and 
unfortunately at the time of his death, Sultan Hasanudin still had debt of 
Rds 2,900. Jamaludin considered him himself too impecunious to implement 
the eradication policy in Halmahera even though he was obliged by the 
contract to do so. It was a delicately phrased refusal, which the Company 
interpreted as a pretext to squeeze more compensation money out of it. The 
intransigence of Tidore contrasted with the willingness of the Sultan of 
Ternate, who gave assurances that he would mount the extirpation 
expedition as soon as possible.56  
In 1764, Sultan Jamaludin again received a complaint about the hostile 
conduct of the East Seramese and Gamrange people who had been less than 
welcoming when the armed pancalang De Garnaal from Banda arrived in 
October 1764. Responding to this complaint, Jamaludin promised to 
prepare kora-kora and to undertake an expedition in order to discipline the 
scoundrels (belhamels) of Maba, Weda, and Patani and afterwards deliver 
them to the Company. The Sultan, however, reneged on his promise. In fact 
he found himself in deep trouble when it was found out that 200 pounds of 
gunpowder lent by the Company for this purpose had not been used. The 
impertinence of Gamrange had not been addressed, and to exacerbate 
matters even further, the Company supplies had been sold. The ‘profits’ 
derived from the raiding, European goods, textiles and other items, were 
transported and sold on Tidore without any check of their provenance. The 
Dutch council on Ternate suggested detaining the Sultan to dampen his 
enthusiasm for scheming and also paying off the heads of Patani, Maba, and 
Weda to recompense them for their loss of income from raiding and illicit 
trading.57  
A Tidoran spy in the pay of the Dutch, who had just escaped from being 
caught in Tidore by the skin of his teeth, suggested that the Company 
should mount a joint campaign with Sultan Ternate and mobilize the 
Alifuru. It was rumoured that the jogugu ‘prime minister’ and the princes of 
Tidore had supplied 4,000 men and fifty burghers with arms in order to 
attack Ternate. The Tidoran envoy hastened to explain that this was false 
information and that the jogugu had only called upon the Alifuru people to 
pay homage. The preparations, according to the Dutch, were taking place in 
Patani where four vessels and two two-masted barques were stationed. 
Sultan Tidore reaffirmed his loyalty to the Dutch and stated his 
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preparedness to lend assistance in the event of an attack from Patani. The 
Government Resolution of 23 May 1764 assumed this to be a frivolous 
remark because in fact two Patanese kora-kora had recently been plundering 
in Minahasa. During these attacks, a number of men had been wounded and 
robbed. Surprisingly Jamaludin took action by seizing the vessels as they 
passed Tidore and handed the leaders over for capital punishment. This was 
the first such action of his reign, but was not very clear whether the people 
handed over were really the important leaders of the raiding groups. 
Meanwhile, a messenger arrived on Ternate reporting that another eight 
kora-kora and more than twenty other smaller vessels were heading for 
Manado to launch hostile actions.58  
Wherever the truth lay, in order to maintain the peaceful relationship 
with the Dutch, Sultan Jamaludin mounted a series of expeditions in the 
Tidore peripheries around Maba, Weda, and Patani. In 1768-1769 from the 
promontory of Dehopodo to Sinopa and Payahe beyond, all in Halmahera, 
an expedition successfully destroyed 23,900 nutmeg trees. This was repeated 
throughout 1770, 1771, and 1772 in the districts Sinopak, Maidi, and 
Samola. No report about an expedition was made in 1773 or 1774. In 1775 
it was mentioned again and in 1776 disciplinary action was taken in the 
districts of Doti and Waisele. During this nine year period no less than 





Comparing the power relation between Ternate and Tidore and the Dutch, 
Ternate was clearly more amenable to the Dutch directives. Sultan Ternate 
was able to improve his power in relation to his subjects and the lords of the 
land, but while achieving this, he was also driven into greater dependency on 
Dutch intervention to retain his authority. Generally speaking Tidore 
succeeded in retaining more of its independence. The grandees and the lords 
of the lands, supported by the strong and rebellious peripheries, managed to 
limit Dutch influence over the Sultan.  
Monopoly, the spice tree extirpation campaign, and political intervention 
in the affairs of Ternate and Tidore none the less changed the pattern of the 
relationship between the Sultans and the lords of the land, depriving the 
latter of the revenues from the clove trade and marginalizing them in their 
relationship with the Sultan.  
South-east Halmahera and the Papuan Islands were the most rebellious 
subjects of both the indigenous Sultans and the VOC. The relative distance, 
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the adverse geographical conditions, and the hostile spirit prevalent among 
these communities were all major hindrances to the success of any punitive 
expedition from outside. The area with its abundant resources in manpower, 
boats, and goods was a potential hotbed for fostering and sustaining a 
rebellion. The settlements of coastal New Guinea and East Seram therefore 
provided a secure support base which could operate independently of 
Tidore and the Dutch. People from these areas were to emerge as the 








The discussion in the preceding chapter has shown that the political 
relations between Tidore and the VOC ran far from smoothly. From time to 
time, ever since the seventeenth century, Tidore had shown a tendency to 
resist the policies of the VOC, which invariably intervened in successions 
and liked to flex its muscles to emphasize its dominance. Now the time has 
come to deal with internal Tidoran affairs. The first logical step is to 
describe the people, leadership, and the structure of the Sultanate of Tidore. 
With the stage set, the next step is to probe the logic of the situation that 
created the conflicts between Tidore and the Dutch which emerged prior to 
Prince Nuku’s rebellion. Having done so, we can map the course of the 
rebellion and analyse it in chronological order, from the Toloa attack in 1780 
up to the moment when Nuku occupied Tidore in 1797.  
 
 
Organization and Leadership of the Sultanate 
 
Unfortunately, no detailed contemporary description of the structure of the 
Tidore Sultanate exists. Nevertheless, some information gleaned from 
scattered sources leads us to assume that it was quite similar to that of its 
near neighbour Ternate. At this juncture it is essential to comprehend the 
concept of leadership in North Maluku, expressed in the term bobato. Bobato 
is a general term used to distinguish leaders or heads in North Maluku from 
the Sultan as the highest ruler.1 Distancing himself from the view taken by 
Leirissa, Andaya2 writes, ‘The bobatos were heads of socio-political units or 
soa aggregated into residential sections within the sultan’s or the sangajis’ 
domain. Politically, at the very highest rung was the sultan as religious and 
political leader of the kingdom, followed by the sangaji and other kolano who 
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governed their own traditional domains, then the bobato as heads of soa 
within these lands.’ I am inclined to use Leirissa’s definition of bobato as a 
general term which embraced sangaji, kolano, jogugu and others. Bobato were 
not only important in the organization of political, economic and everyday 
life (secular bobato) but also in religious life (religious bobato).3 Religious bobato 
could be found at all levels of society under the authority of the Sultan, but 
only among the Muslim population. Although no bobato were known among 
the Alifuru, the indigenous inland people, they nevertheless controlled the 
political and economic relations of the Alifuru with the outside world, 
particularly in the Sultanates of Tidore and Ternate. Willer claims that the 
Alifuru of Halmahera were more integrated into the North Maluku political 
system than were those of Seram (Central Maluku). The best yardstick by 
which to measure this degree of integration was the involvement of the 
Alifuru in the hongi or extirpation expeditions organized by Tidore and 
Ternate.4  
In the Ternate state structure, there were two kinds of bobato or ‘state 
dignitaries’. Serving the Sultan, a bobato was certainly an official of the state 
but his function was also to represent the interests of his bala or ‘common 
people.’ These were the bobato dunia or secular bobato who composed the 
group of the four main chiefs (dopolo ngaruha) at whose head was the gogugu 
or jogugu. Next to him in rank were the kapiten laut, the hukum soasio, and 
hukum sangaji.5 The jogugu and kapiten laut were the two most powerful 
positions after that of the Sultan. The former performed the function of 
chief minister or chief executive, while the latter performed the duties of sea 
lord, who had command over the fleet and other maritime matters. It stands 
to reason that in a kingdom extending over a vast area of sea territory, the 
kapiten laut was a very important authority.6 These four chiefs were chosen 
by the Sultan. Chris van Fraassen argues that in appointing these officials, 
the Sultan could not always promote his own interests and impose his 
preference. They were usually chosen from the ordinary people but Royal 
family members could also be appointed jogugu or kapiten laut.7 These 
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appointees also observed their own social norms and interests in various 
contexts when they dealt with the Portuguese or later with the Dutch.8 
The Sultan himself also employed an utusan (an ambassador), whose 
main function was to supervise the collection of tribute as a spokesperson in 
the various outer districts. Other functionaries were: the jurutulis (scribe); the 
miantu (head of the dano, that is the princes); the ngosa (messenger); soseba 
(bearers of the royal sword, sirih-set and other regalia); and the marinyo and 
kabo (guards) at whose head was the marinyo kie. To distinguish him from the 
other jurutulis, the Sultan’s personal scribe was called the sekretaris.9 The 
Sultan’s troops (baru-baru) were led by the following royal military officers (in 
descending order): Mayor; Kapiten; Letnan; Alferis; Ajudan; Sarjeti; and Korporal. 
The Sultan’s sons were also granted military ranks, kapiten-ngofa and letnan-
ngofa. These princely officers also participated in such important state 
deliberations as the signing of treaties, forming a commission in conjunction 
with the four major functionaries (kapiten laut, jogugu, hukum, and sekretaris) 
under the aegis of the Sultan himself.10  
In Tidore, the leadership of the state was fairly similar to that of Ternate. 
The distinction lay in the terms for titles in the Tidoran language. To give 
some examples, the Ternatan jogugu was called jojau in Tidore; ngofamanjira in 
Ternate became famanyira in Tidore; kimelaha became gimalaha.11 The state 
council in Tidore was composed of thirty-one members, including the four 
principal officers (jojau, kapiten-laut, hukum sangaji, hukum soa-sio) and twenty-
seven (three times nine) bobato. The composition may have differed slightly 
from that of Ternate, but the number followed the indigenous principle of 
four and nine which lay at the foundation of the pattern of government 
structure. Among the foreigners, groups were formed under leaders with 
such titles as kapiten Makasar or kapiten or letnan Cina. The Kapiten Makasar 
also exercised control over non-Makassarese migrant groups.12 As in 
Ternate, the category of bobato was divided into two groups (secular and 
religious) on the basis of the kalima malofo or in Arabic Kalimat’ush-shahadat. 
The authority of the religious bobato was based on the Confession of Faith 
ashadu alailaha illallah (There is no God but Allah) and that of the secular 
counterpart on the ashadu anna Muhammad ar-Rasulallah (Muhammad is 
Allah’s prophet). The powerful elites in Tidore were chiefs categorized into 
two groups. The first was composed of members of the royal and noble 
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families. The second was that consisting of the chiefs of negeri and 
compounds. This division was based on kinship and genealogical lines. 
People in the royal category used the title kaicili for males and boki for 
females.13 Their most salient privilege was that only their male members 
were eligible to become Sultan. There was no clearly delineated rule of 
succession. Usually the eldest son of a former Sultan had the greatest chance 
to assume his father’s position, but a particular person’s capabilities and 
influence over the other nobles also played a role in the selection process. 
Since the era of Sultan Saifudin (r.1657-1689) the intervention of the Dutch 
in this matter was prominent. Given these circumstances, it was inevitable 
that disputes and political crises over the throne would occur from time to 
time when the position of Sultan fell vacant.  
Government in the outer areas was the responsibility of local rulers. In 
both north and east Halmahera, those who acted as representatives of the 
Sultan were called sangaji. These sangaji, who usually lived in the main negeri 
(soasio), were responsible for the district-level government. They had special 
costumes to denote their status as representatives of the power of the 
Sultan. This outfit was known as destar ngongare and consisted of a long black 
flowing robe and a turban. The Sultan wore a white variation of this. Sangaji 
were not formally paid a salary by the Sultan. For their daily needs, they had 
slaves to work in their gardens and to take care of other chores. The slaves 
were sometimes purchased in the market, but the majority were people who 
had found themselves in debt. Many slaves were captives who had been 
taken during raiding or punitive expeditions. Below the sangaji were the local 
leaders known as kimelaha on Tidore or ngofamanjira on Ternate. They owed 
their position to the Sultan. They were the scions of powerful local families 
and their appointment was sanctioned by the Sultan. As leader of a negeri, 
such a man had a dual function, as community leader and as representative 
of the Sultan’s apparatus. As community leader, his duty was to guard the 
interests of the people. As an official of the Sultan, he was obliged to help 
the sangaji in collecting tribute and mobilizing able-bodied men for the hongi 
and expeditions. Occasionally he saw himself forced to renege on the 
Sultan’s interest when he judged demands from above could not be borne 
by his people. Small villages were governed by kalaudi or mahimo (elders). 14 
The sangaji in north Halmahera, which was under Ternate rule, were 
selected among prominent families in each district to supervise the 
ngofamanjira. Certain sangaji came from noble families on Ternate15 but the 
sangaji in east Halmahera, which was under Tidore rule, were not from noble 
families. Leirissa has concluded that all sangaji outside the main islands of 
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Tidore or Ternate were accorded a lower status than those on the main 
islands and hence were not eligible for membership of the council of the 
Sultanate in the rank of bobato madopolo. In this case, I do not altogether agree 
with Leirissa because it is well known that Sultan Mandarsyah of Ternate 
appointed a sangaji of Makian as kapiten laut and a sangaji of Gamkonora as 
jogugu.16 A sangaji of Makian was also appointed as jogugu by Sultan 
Kamaludin in 1785 and later he was even raised to the status of Raja Jailolo 
by Nuku. The appointment of such men to be important officials in the 
Sultanate was most probably a device to strengthen the power of the Sultan, 
allowing him greater access to the provision of the manpower and natural 
resources in which both Sultanates were lacking. 
A sangaji was supported by assistants whose titles were similar to those of 
office-bearers in the Sultanate: jogugu; kapiten-laut; hukum; and juru tulis. The 
districts of Galela and Gamkonora in north Halmahera had a full 
administrative staff. In other districts, a sangaji had to fend for himself and 
could expect very little back-up. Sometimes he was assisted only by a jogugu 
and a kapiten-laut, or just only one kapiten-laut. The role of juru tulis was often 
filled by the khatib. In east Halmahera, a sangaji was assisted by a kapiten-laut 
and a hukum. A jogugu was sometimes replaced by a junior sangaji, who was 
usually a son of the sangaji. In the nineteenth century, in order to nip 
disputes in the bud and to promote justice, the Raad van Sangaji en Kimelaha 
was established. This council took decisions concerning the violation of 
customs and determined the amount of the fines imposed. This punishment 
was meted out equally to both the common people and bobato families. The 
defendant was obliged to pay a fine or to submit to such physical 
punishment as a caning. Such more serious and more complicated cases as 
murder or incitement to rebellion were transferred to the centre and 
submitted to the verdict of the Sultan.17  
Tribute, which was collected once a year as a rule, was paid in kind with 
agricultural products. In Maba, east Halmahera, tribute was paid in rice 
because Maba produced this crop. But Patani was supposed to deliver slaves 
in tribute.18 When manpower or corveé had to be supplied to the Sultan, this 
was done in rotation. In north Halmahera, in Sahu to be exact, at the 
beginning of nineteenth century, certain negeri were expected to provide 100 
men each for Sultan Ternate. Thirty of them were lent to Dutch officials for 
gardening at a stipend of f 6 or f 10 a month. A number of them were 
employed in harbours as kuli on a stipend of 20 cents a day. Those who 
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wished to avoid compulsory labour were obliged to pay 12 real instead.19 In 
certain negeri, there were families who had turun temurun (for generations) 
served the needs of the Sultan. In north Halmahera the Dutch Company 
officials designated them kroonslaven (crown slaves). In east Halmahera, this 
group was called rumah dapur (domestics) by Cambier. They were to be 
found not only in Maba and Weda, but also in Payahe, Kayasa, and Maidi. 
The people of Patani were absolved from this duty because they had to 
provide slaves for the Sultan, either captured or purchased from the Raja 
Ampat and Onin.20 Indubitably, slaves were also captured during raids on 
other places. During the seventeenth and the eighteenth century, Patani 
leaders were the most prominent aggressors in raiding the Malukan area and 
the adjacent islands. 
Most negeri had a mosque or a special place set aside for Muslim worship. 
Every mosque had a religious bobato or religious leader, called modin, imam, 
hatibi (or khatib). The difference implied by each term is not clear, but 
broadly speaking their function was similar. Cambier reported that these 
religious leaders were active in instructing pengajian (Koran recitation) and 
leading prayers at the mosque, besides taking care of other rituals such as 
circumcision and marriage. The bobato also regularly observed the practice of 
fasting during Ramadhan and kept a very close eye on the implementation of 
the prohibition on consuming pork. In the palaces of Tidore and Ternate, 
they also taught Malay and its Jawi script. Letters from districts and negeri 
were usually written by him. The kalim or kadi held the highest rank among 
religious leaders under the Sultan. Kalim was a special title and position 
reserved for one of the members of those noble families who were close 
relatives of reigning Sultan. He was usually addressed as Kalim Mangofa. For 
example, Nuku’s stepbrother, Prince Mohammad Thaher — who was 
appointed Sultan Tidore (r.1810-1821) — had previously been a kalim 
mangofa. Likewise, the younger brother of Sultan Ternate was appointed 
kalim in 1820.21  
 
In their exercise of traditional power relations the Sultans Tidore and 
Ternate worked closely with their ‘ministers’, namely the jogugu, kapiten laut, 
hukum and other grandees in the palace. The power of the Sultan depended 
on the support of the bobato who functioned as a link between the Sultan 
and his subjects in the peripheries. Political decisions were made on the 
basis of consensus and achieved after consultation with the Sultan. 
Symbolically, power relations were established through marriage, gift 
distribution, tribute submission, and other socially acceptable methods 
                                               
19 Leirissa, Halmahera Timur and Raja Jailolo, 98-9. 
20 Ibid. 100-1. 
21 Ibid. 89-90. 
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sanctified by tradition. The most important role of the bobato in maintaining 
the power of the Sultan was to provide manpower for defence purposes and 
to man the Sultan’s fleet for expeditions to the peripheries. Before the 
Dutch concluded treaties, with Ternate in 1652 and with Tidore in 1667, 
bobato were able to use the proceeds from the sale of cloves harvested from 
their own trees and those in their villages for their own needs. The ruler 
enjoyed an income from his own personal clove trees. Over and above this, 
he also benefited from customs duties collected in the royal ports.22 
The arrival of the Europeans, especially the Dutch, disrupted the existing 
social patterns. The Dutch interest in securing the monopoly on spices was 
translated into the political subordination of the three Sultanates including 
Bacan. Undeniably the introduction of the policy of the eradication of the 
spice-bearing trees deprived the traditional leaders especially the bobato, lords 
of the land, of their income from the trade in spices. The compensation or 
recognition money paid by the VOC every year went to the Sultan, not to 
the bobato. This unquestionably affected the power relations between the 
Sultan and the bobato because the latter now found themselves dependent on 
the Sultan’s largesse.23 Even though the treaty had specified a precise 
allocation of the compensation between the Sultan and the bobato, in practice 
it was more honoured in the breach than the observance. The Sultan had the 
authority to choose whom he favoured by bestowing monetary 
remuneration. He believed he was no longer obliged to accommodate the 
interests of the lords of the lands. In times of conflict with the bobato or with 
the people in the periphery, the Sultan could request the Dutch to come to 
his aid and support his cause. Taking advantage of his seemingly unassailable 
position under the new Company overlordship, the Sultan imposed greater 
demands on the people. He need not worry. Should there be a rebellion or 
uprising in the heart of the Sultanate or in the peripheries, the Sultan knew 
he could seek for military help from the Dutch. The Company would 
comply with such requests, as long as the Sultan kept his side of the 
agreements made.24 The Sultan of Tidore quite often encountered difficult 
problems in governing his subjects in such peripheries, as Gamrange and the 
Papuan Islands. Nor was the atmosphere closer to home was always 
tranquil. The grandees in Tidore tended to subvert the policy of the Sultan 
and the Dutch when they considered that this might clash with their 
interests in the periphery.  
 
 
                                               
22 Andaya, The world of Maluku, 168. 
23 Van Fraassen, Ternate, de Molukken, I, 160-4. 
24 Andaya, The world of Maluku, 167-8, 206. 
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The Seram Dispute: the Beginning of Turmoil 
 
The latent political instability in the northern Moluccas became palpable in 
1768 when two Tidoran princes, Badiuzaman Garomahongi25 and Nuku, 
alias Bakanuku or Syaifudin, expressed their dissatisfaction with a treaty 
concluded between Sultan Tidore, Jamaludin, and the VOC Government on 
Ternate, by which the former had to cede his rights to Seram (including East 
Seram).26 The bone of the contention was the ‘debt,’ which the Company 
called in unilaterally, under the terms of the contract of 23 June 1733.27 The 
Company insisted that this ‘debt’ had been incurred from the losses that the 
Company and its subjects had suffered from the raiding activities of Tidoran 
vassals. In effect Sultan Tidore was being held accountable for the behaviour 
of his subjects. Jamaludin refused to concede because he explained that his 
subjects were also victims of raiding. Therefore, besides the fact he had no 
money to pay the debt, he was far from predisposed to comply with the 
Company demands.  
The Governor of Ternate, Hermanus Munnik (1767-1771), completely 
overrode the objections of Sultan Jamaludin. He unilaterally resolved the 
‘problem’ on 12 June 1768 by imposing a contract in which Sultan 
Jamaludin, in lieu of paying the debt, had to cede the rights to East Seram 
which had been attributed to the Sultan of Tidore28 in the contract of 5 May 
1700. In his letter of 4 August 1768, the Sultan tried to negotiate the issue by 
limiting East Seram’s cession the Company to twenty years only. Prince 
Nuku, supported by Garomahongi, was opposed to the cession and insisted 
that it should not have been a ‘cession’ but only a ‘lease’ for fourteen years. 
Governor Munnik obdurately refused to budge in the face of these 
arguments and insisted that the cession be applied in perpetuity (voor altoos). 
In return for this cession, the Sultan would receive a present of Rds 400—
added to his yearly compensation money. It was not called a ‘payment’ but 
was euphemistically referred to as ‘a friendly memento of the Company 
towards a more stable maintenance of mutual harmony and alliance.’29 
                                               
25 The complete name of the Crown Prince, Garomahongi, is mentioned by Katoppo, 
Nuku, 43. 
26 W.G. Miller, ‘The Moluccas under the British’ (M.A. Thesis: University of Hull, 1974), 
17. 
27 Corpus Diplomaticum, V, 153-7. 
28 The ‘district’ of Sultan Tidore began on the north side of Seram, stretched to Waru 
eastwards as far as the eastern side of Keffing and then proceeded south-westwards as far 
as Tobo. See MvO Governors of Ambon, Pieter Gabrij (1721-1725) and Willem Fockens 
(1764-1767), in G.J. Knaap (ed.), Memories van Overgave Ambon, RGP 62 (1987), 311, 397. 
29 ‘Een vriendelijk gedenkteken van wegen de Compagnie tot vaster onderhouden der 
wederzijde harmonie and bondgenootschap,’ as quoted in Haga, Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea 
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It transpired that the increase of Rds 400 in compensation money and 
the euphemistic terminology adopted by the Dutch were not enough to 
sustain the mutual harmony and alliance. Instead of being appeased, the 
unrest among the Tidorans swelled considerably in 1779. It spilled over 
when the Dutch Governor of Ternate, Jacob Roland Thomaszen (1778-
1780), arrested Sultan Jamaludin, Prince Garomahongi, Prince Zainal 
Abidin, and Sultan Bacan.30 They were sent to Batavia and brought to 
‘justice’. Garomahongi and Zainal Abidin were later exiled to Ceylon. The 
Sultan and the princes were formally charged with the perpetration of a 
number of misdeeds. The first charge brought against them was that they 
did not fulfil their obligation to eradicate spice-bearing trees. Over and, to 
make matters worse, the Sultanate did nothing to prevent or punish the 
raiding of its subjects - Maba, Weda, Patani, and Gebe. Furthermore, there 
were suspicions afoot that the Sultan and the grandees of Tidore had 
conspired with the Sultan of Bacan to plot with the Sultan of Mindanao to 
fight the Ternatans and to expel the Company from Maluku.31 The Dutch 
Governor of Ternate had also been informed that Sultan Jamaludin and 
Sultan Bacan had made contact, exchanged gifts, and dispatched their men 
to help Thomas Forrest in his expedition to the Raja Ampat and Dorei - the 
north coast of New Guinea.32  
Governor Thomaszen named the elderly Prince Gaijira as successor to 
Jamaludin. It did neither of them any good as both passed away soon 
afterwards. After the death of Prince Gaijira in April 1780,33 those Tidoran 
                                                                                                                             
en de Papoesche Eilanden: Historische Bijdrage, 1500-1883, (Batavia: W. Bruining & Co.,1884), 
262. 
30 According to Katoppo, the raja muda (crown prince) was Garomahongi. Here he differs 
from Andaya who says that Kamaludin was the raja muda. It was a mistake to include 
Kamaludin among the princes who were banished to Batavia with Sultan Jamaludin. In 
fact, Kamaludin was banished to Batavia later, as a result of the Toloa attack a year later in 
1780. See Andaya, The world of Maluku, 219.  
31 Corpus Diplomaticum, VI, 435-6. See also Katoppo, Nuku, 42-3. 
32 NA VOC 3602, Secret letter from Ambon to Batavia, (?) 1781, 8-9. In December 1774, 
the Crown Prince of Bacan reported to Governor Valkenaer of Ternate about the meeting 
between Sultan Bacan and the English adventurer Thomas Forrest (La Tartare), which had 
also been attended by Hadji Umar, a man with a redoubtable reputation for his 
revolutionary enterprise. Sultan Bacan gave presents and provided men and interpreters. 
Sultan Jamaludin contented himself with sending his envoy to meet Forrest on Waigeo. 
See also Thomas Forrest, A Voyage to the New Guinea and the Maluku, 1774-1776 (London: 
G. Scott, 1779), 48, 113, and 132. 
33 The versions of Haga, Heeres and Stapel fix the date of the death of Prince Gaijira in 
April 1780. But Andaya prefers another date one year later, June 1781. Considering the 
sequence of political events on Tidore, the inauguration of Patra Alam in 1780 and the 
assault on Toloa in 1780, the date of the death must have been before the inauguration of 
Patra Alam, which was in 1780. Compare Haga, Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea, 297 and Corpus 
Diplomaticum, III, 433 to Andaya, The World of Maluku, 221.  
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princes who were considered to have the capacity to be sultan were Prince 
Nuku, Malikudin, and Kamaludin. Taking no heed of such regal qualities, 
Thomaszen’s successor, Alexander Cornabé (1780-1793) - who was acting-
governor at the moment - preferred a son of the late Gaijira, Prince Patra 
Alam, as Prince Regent of Tidore.34 Governor J. Ekenholm has stated that 
(in 1793) the candidate most preferred was Kamaludin. Patra Alam, who was 
not considered to be made of ‘the right stuff’ and was politically weak, 
bought the support of Acting-Governor Cornabé by bribing him with 
presents.35 In retrospect, it would be not unfair to say that Cornabé’s 
political policy aggravated the political situation. 
Two of the sons of the former Sultan, Prince Kamaludin and Prince 
Nuku who were thoroughly dissatisfied with the appointment of Prince 
Patra Alam, decided to oppose his nomination. They swore not to recognize 
Patra Alam as their ruler and threatened to make trouble and imperil the 
Sultanate. By openly defying the new regent they showed unquestionable 
disobedience. Cornabé believed that his opponents had perpetrated all sorts 
of brutality on the inhabitants on Tidore. When the rebel leaders and their 
supporters were known to be holding a meeting in Negeri Toloa, Patra Alam 
and Cornabé decided to attack them. Governor Cornabé sent two vessels to 
Tidore under the command of Commissioner De Chalmot. Upon their 
arrival, the Onderkoopman Hemmekam was delegated to issue Prince Nuku’s 
group with a ‘friendly’ warning. He might just as well have held his breath 
because the rebel did not even bother to listen to him. While a translator 
was sent to warn them one last time, Hemmekam mobilized his troops for 
the assault.36  
On 14 July 1780, Negeri Toloa was finally attacked. In his bid to oust the 
rebels, the Governor of Ternate had enlisted the assistance of four kora-kora 
on which there were a hundred European and indigenous Alifuru militia. 
Heavy fighting ensued between the Tidoran dissidents and the Ternatan 
Alifuru. About thirty Tidorans were killed and the survivors fled inland. 
Only one European and few Alifuru were wounded. Negeri Toloa was put 
to the torch. Most of the princes, Sultanate officials, hukum, and few sangaji 
and kimelaha from Toloa, who headed the opposition, were captured. The 
Governor’s troops returned to Ternate that same evening, carrying along the 
defenceless Tidoran opposition leaders and their supporters who had no 
choice but humbly to request a ‘pardon.’ The Governor eventually 
proclaimed an ‘act of amnesty’. The suspected ring leaders of the opposition, 
Prince Kamaludin, Prince Mossel and Prince Van der Parra remained in 
                                               
34 NA OIC No. 90, Secret Advice Ternate to Batavia, 18 September 1793, § (Margin) 23. 
See also Katoppo, Nuku, 48. Miller, ‘The Moluccas,’ 21. Andaya, The World of Maluku, 219. 
35 NA OIC No. 90, Secret Advice Ternate to Batavia, 18 September 1793, § 23. 
36 NA VOC 3602, Letter from Ternate to Ambon, 11 September 1780, 75-8. 
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detention.37 In order to restore peace, Governor Cornabé had to inaugurate 
a new Sultan as soon as possible. He decided formally to appoint Prince 
Regent Patra Alam as Sultan Badarudin, on 17 July 1780. Prince Kamaludin 
and the other princes were shipped to Batavia ten days later.38 Prince Nuku 
and Prince Malikudin who, as Miller puts it, were also men ‘of great 
significance’, escaped arrest. In Nuku’s letter to Governor Van Pleuren in 
1781, he explains that he took refuge in the Papuan Islands accompanied by 
bobato, jogugu, hukum, ngofamanjira, two kimelaha, and 400 Tidorans.39 They 
managed to flee to Payahe, and then from there escaped to Maba, Weda, 
and Patani, where the Dutch sighted them on 22 July. The areas the rebels 
chose as their refuges were situated in central and eastern Maluku, where 
Dutch control was relatively weak and where Papuans and East Seramese 
had a long tradition of subverting the power of the VOC. East Seram 
became Prince Nuku’s chief haunt.40  
Since the beginning of the dispute over the cession of East Seram 
required by the 1768 contract, Prince Nuku had been one of the prominent 
princes who had resolutely opposed the cession. His opposition to the 
Company stiffened when Governor Thomaszen banished his father and 
brothers. Subsequently, Prince Nuku openly repudiated the appointment of 
Patra Alam as Sultan in 1780.41 Initially his strategies were still somewhat 
inchoate, but he soon succeeded in augmenting the number of his 
supporters and maintained some communication with the Tidoran leaders at 
home. At that stage, he and the other Tidoran leaders expected that Sultan 
Jamaludin would come back from Batavia. But, once he found out that his 
father would never return, he had no other choice but to mount a rebellion. 
In this lull in the proceedings, Prince Nuku had a chance to prove his 
leadership to the members of the Tidoran elite who were hiding as refugees. 
Determinedly he set about creating an alternative structure of power in exile. 
He was proclaimed ‘Sultan Seram and Papua’ by his East Seramese and 
Papuan followers.42 In a short time, his star was well and truly in the 
ascendant in the Tidoran peripheries. 
                                               
37 Prince Mossel and Prince van der Parra were sons of the exiled Sultan Jamaludin (r. 
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42 NA VOC 3603, from Ternate to Batavia, 22 May 1781, 17-26; ANRI Ternate No.138, 





The Treaty of 1780: Loss of Independence 
 
On Tidore, a new treaty between Patra Alam and Governor Cornabé was 
signed in Fort Oranje on 17 July 1780. On this occasion, the VOC formally 
changed the whole status of its relationship with the Tidore Sultanate. 
Previous treaties were annulled. Let us briefly recapitulate what the contents 
of the original treaty were: Sultan Saifudin (r. 1657-1689) had decided to 
repudiate the Spaniards and instead sought an alliance with the Dutch43 in 
1667. A treaty was concluded between the VOC and the Tidore Sultanate, in 
which the VOC was accorded the status of ‘protector’ (schuts- en beschermheer). 
Now, one hundred years later, the Company claimed that, in view of the 
malefactions and disloyalty of Sultan Jamaludin and his coterie, it was forced 
to end the formal status of the ‘mutual relationship’ between Tidore and the 
Company, which it claimed to have honoured in accordance with the terms 
of the contract of 1667.44 In the 1780 treaty, the Sultanate of Tidore was no 
longer described as a bondgenoot or ‘ally’ of the VOC, but as a ‘vassal.’45 This 
imposed status reduced Tidore to the same situation as that of the Ternate 
Sultanate which had been demoted to vassalage as early as in 1683.46 
The 1780 treaty can be seen as the end of Tidore as an ‘independent’ 
state. As leenmannen (liegemen) the Sultans now had to deliver an annual 
tribute consisting of four slaves, ten cockatoos, and ten loeris to the 
Governor-General in Batavia. The Sultanate was even formally obliged to 
hand over an inventory of all the jewellery, gold, and silverware it possessed. 
Most of its political authority was mercilessly expropriated. The Sultan was 
no longer allowed to communicate with more distant foreign or 
neighbouring countries without the prior permission of the Company. No 
fortress or other construction was to be built without the consent of the 
Company. The Sultan was deprived of the right to exercise his power in 
settling any dispute or crime within the royal family or among the 
grandees.47 A draft of the treaty had actually been proposed to Sultan 
Jamaludin and then to Raja Muda Garomahongi before they were banished 
but, as Nuku said in a letter written many years later: ‘both my father and 
brother scornfully rejected this, and preferred to submit to the sentence of 
                                               
43 Andaya, The World of Maluku, 170-1. 
44 Corpus Diplomaticum, II, 350-1. See also Haga, Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea, 92-3. 
45 It is written in the treaty of 1780 that ’het rijk van Tidor nu niet meer in 
bondgenootschap, maar in onderdanigheid met betrekking tot de Nederlandsche 
Compagnie staat…’ See Corpus Diplomaticum, VI, 441. 
46 Miller, ‘The Moluccas,’ 23-24. 
47 Corpus Diplomaticum, VI, 442-7. 
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banishment and imprisonment for life passed on them’. This refusal was the 
main reason why Jamaludin was removed from his throne.48 Basing himself 
on the Dutch sources, Andaya contradicts this statement by saying it was 
Sultan Jamaludin himself who had proposed relinquishing his power and the 
concomitant change of status, but that his offer had been declined by the 
Dutch.49  
Prince Nuku’s letter to the Governor of Ambon, Bernardus van Pleuren, 
on 11 November 1781, suggests that the smouldering resistance had been 
ignited into action by the detainment of Sultan Jamaludin and Crown Prince 
Garomahongi. Already suspicious, Nuku insinuated that the Company had 
lied to the Tidorans, trying to allay their apprehension by saying that the 
Sultan had been sent to Batavia for a short time and would return home 
almost immediately, in three months to be exact. Instead of sending the 
Sultan back, the Company appointed Patra Alam in his place, ignoring the 
manifest objections voiced by the Tidore Sultanate. These objections had 
been made known to the Government of Ternate in no uncertain terms 
when Prince Gaijira had been replaced. Inevitably the appointment of Patra 
Alam heaped insult upon injury. Nuku argued that, according to the custom 
of Tidore, the proper choice would have been either Prince Kamaludin or 
himself. The prince blamed the solecism committed by the Governor of 
Ternate who had blatantly ignored the customs pertaining to the succession 
on Tidore. Since the Governor and Patra Alam had also attacked his people, 
their homes and possessions on Toloa, matters conspired to make the 
people of Tidore eager to join Nuku and seek refuge in East Seram and the 
Raja Ampat.50 Actually, from his father’s letter, Nuku had known since 1780 
that his father and brothers had been exiled for life. He believed that Patra 
Alam had meekly accepted the terms of the Treaty of 1780 because he was 
fearful that the same fate which had befallen his predecessor would be his 
lot.51 
 
Initial Contest (1780-1783) 
 
The records show that Prince Nuku did not need much time to drum up 
forces in the Tidoran ‘peripheries.’ The Papuan Raja Ampat, the Gamrange 
                                               
48 IOR/L/PS/19/14, ‘Letter of 1795’ Alexander Dalrymple, ‘Memoir Concerning 
Keecheel Nookoo Sultan of Teedore,” 11 February 1801, 5.  
49 Andaya, The World of Maluku, 219. 
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of south-eastern Halmahera (Maba, Weda, and Patani), Gebe, and the East 
Seramese were more than ready to support his cause, linked as they were to 
Tidore by more than a century of common experience of trading and 
raiding. Sometime around November or December 1780, Nuku was 
proclaimed ‘Sultan Papua and Seram.’52 In his letter in 1781 to the Governor 
of Ambon, Van Pleuren, he called himself Sultan Muhammad Saifudin Sah, 
the King of Papua.53 From the time of the Toloa attack, the relationship 
between Tidore and the three Governments, mainly Ternate, revolved 
around Prince Nuku’s rebellion. Nuku repeatedly attacked Dutch subjects 
and, in return, the Dutch raided those areas in which the people were 
considered to be Nuku’s adherents. It would seem that most of the Tidore 
peripheries lost no time in transferring their support and loyalty to the 
Prince Nuku forces. The newly Dutch-appointed Patra Alam was rendered 
powerless, almost totally overshadowed by Nuku’s authority over the 
Tidoran peripheries. 
In the early months of 1780 Nuku’s forces raided Nusatelu (Drie 
Gebroeders) Islands, Amblau, Haia, and Luhu and captured and enslaved 134 
inhabitants. Two European soldiers and eight indigenous soldiers were 
wounded in an encounter near Kramat on Buru.54 Many people from 
Hatileng were either massacred or fled.55 The coastal inhabitants of Sulawesi 
were also raided at Selayar, Buton, and Bawulang.56 A Papuan fleet of 197 
vessels devastated one village on Sula and captured 300 men and ten prahus 
from the fleet of the local Raja.57 Around October 1780, a committee for 
spice extirpation was twice attacked on both Obi and Bacan. A European 
and other twenty-nine crewmembers also were captured. On Talaud, North 
Sulawesi, a burgher's vessel was seized and burnt at the command of Sangaji 
Moluko.58  
The Ternate and Ambon Governments had little choice but to respond 
the challenge posed by Nuku. In October and December 1780, two large 
hongi fleets were launched. The first fleet attacked Gamrange and the second 
East Seram. The hongi expedition of the Ternate Government, supported by 
Sultan Patra Alam and Tidoran and Ternatan kora-kora, was strengthened by 
fifty-seven Balinese and twenty-two Makasarese vessels under the command 
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of Captain Heinrich and the translator Coenraad van Dijk. Sixty vessels, 
large and small, manned by about three thousand Alifuru of Tobelo and 
Gorahe under the command of Lieutenant Maffa Mira were also thrown 
into the fray. On 20 November, the negeri Wosso and Maba were attacked 
and defeated the day after. The attack on Patani launched on 17 December 
did not succeed. In total, around eighty supporters of Nuku were killed and 
145 were detained. Prince Nuku and his remaining supporters fled to Papua. 
One hundred and eighty-two captives (Burunese, Amblauwers, Ternatan, 
Gorontalese, Sangirese, and Butonese) were liberated and sent home.59 New 
sangaji, kimelaha, and kapiten were appointed and stationed under a new 
contract concluded on 8 November 1781.60 The second expedition under 
the command of Officer Heuser of the Ambon Government targeted the 
north and east coasts of Seram. On Negeri Kelibat in Rarakit, Heuser 
attacked vessels from Keffing and won the battle, losing one European and 
one local soldier. No important rebel leader was captured.61  
It took Nuku less than a year to win the South and West Seramese, who 
had been under close control of the Dutch over to his cause. Instead of 
remaining loyal to the Company, the villages of Amahai, Makariki, Soahuku, 
Elpaputi, Paulohi, Hualoi, Latu, and Iha paid homage to the rebel. In 
December 1781, with a combined fleet of 160 vessels, they assaulted and 
looted Amahai, one of villages under Saparua.62 Although one of Prince 
Nuku's captains was beheaded, the rebels succeeded in killing Sergeant 
Cornelis Stephanus and one European soldier who doggedly pursued them 
at Itawaka.63 The raiders went on looting other negeri on Saparua and 
attacked Hatuana in the northern part of this island. At the beginning of 
February 1782, the raiders again attacked the hinterland of Saparua and 
invaded the island of Nusalaut, burning negeri Ameth to cinders, and killing 
one Dutch officer, Dirk Quant. In May 1782, during the night, the raiders 
again surprised the islanders of Haruku and reduced the negeri Hulaliu, Kriu, 
and Pelau to ashes. A number of the Dutch subjects were either captured or 
executed. They then proceeded to the Negeri Liang under Hila and destroyed 
its settlements including a VOC post at Loki and its sago bakery.64  
On 7 May 1782, the Government of Ambon dispatched a stronger task 
force under Merchant William Beth to try to overcome the rebels. It 
consisted of pancalang and sloops, including the Bataviase Welvaren, the two-
masted arumbai of the Governor, and was bolstered by support from the 
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military posts of Saparua, Haruku, Hila, and Larike. The expedition force 
included a Dutch lieutenant, and another officer, four sergeants, eight 
corporals, and sixty-four foot soldiers. Nevertheless, before the fleet could 
unite, sixty-four vessels belonging to the rebels surprised them on Babi 
Island. One vessel of Raja Nusa Laut and three other vessels and their entire 
arsenal were seized. Gnatahoedij Mardika, Raja of Soya, and twenty-nine of 
his men were drowned, killed, or captured by the raiders. Yet the expedition 
force also succeeded in capturing some raiders and the villages loyal to the 
rebels were plundered and burnt, including a great number of sago and 
coconut palms which provided the rebels with victuals.65 
In 1782, the Dutch stepped up their military campaign to curb the rebels. 
In this year, the Ambon Government launched at least three expeditions to 
various places in Seram. In February, under the command of Officer Johan 
Sigbrand Borgguits, a number of vessels were sent to cruise around the 
waters of South Seram but when the fleet arrived there the rebels had 
already vanished. Many of the villages which had supported the rebels were 
reduced. Fearful of what the consequences might be if they did not do so, 
others surrendered and submitted to the Government.66 The second 
expedition which was launched in May proved a failure. In the course of the 
third one, active between October 1782 and January 1783, the hongi visited 
most of the important settlements in Seram. The Governor of Ambon, Van 
Pleuren, pledged his subjects his support and granted pardon to those who 
chose to submit. But those orangkaya and the raja that were known dissidents 
were detained and replaced by loyalists. Again a number of villages were 
burnt down to set an example.67 In East Seram, the hongi of the Ambon 
Government fought a rebel fleet, composed of 150 East Seramese vessels68 
and reduced a number of villages after having looted all copper utensils, 
textiles, and sago. Nuku had already disappeared but his brother Abdul 
Mutalib surrendered and begged for mercy. He informed the Governor that 
Prince Nuku had run out of weapons.69 
The Governor of Ambon was none the less quite aware that Prince 
Nuku’s power had grown dramatically in a short time. The rebellion was 
supported not only by the traditionally obdurate traders and raiders from the 
East Seramese, Halmaheran, and the Papuan Islands; its cause had also won 
over a significant part of the south and west Seramese. Within two years, 
despite a number of military expeditions dispatched by the Ambon and 
Ternate Government, Prince Nuku had won widespread support among the 
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Malukans. Governor Van Pleuren would have been happy to intensify the 
Company campaign against the rebel, but he was also aware that most of the 
Company’s weaponry was already more than twenty years old. As it had 
been used repeatedly on earlier hongi expeditions, its reliability was open to 
question. The existing manpower was neither enough to safeguard the peace 
nor to manage the present disturbed situation. Even so, he had no choice 
but to continue the campaign and encourage his local allies to fight against 
Prince Nuku's troops. Van Pleuren promised a reward of 500 to 1000 
Rijksdaalders for any person who was able to capture Prince Nuku and 
another Rds 500 for taking such of his main supporters as Raja Lukman of 
Keliluhu and Orang Kaya Imam Sarassa. These leaders were the most 
prominent Seramese traders on Pulau Gesser, and were now kapiten-laut in 
Nuku's fleet.70 At this stage fortune had taken the side of Nuku. 
 
 
The ‘Tidoran Revolution’71 
 
In 1782, the Governor of Ternate made a number of efforts to bring the 
Papuans to heel and make them obedient to the Sultan of Tidore but with 
only meagre success. In many respects Sultan Patra Alam and Governor 
Cornabé failed to operate on the same wave-length. In September 1782, only 
one head of the Papuans, Sangaji Muka, came to pay homage to Sultan Patra 
Alam. In 1783, after having heard that the fleet of Ambon had defeated 
Nuku’s forces in 1782, Cornabé was anxious to send a fleet carrying many 
European soldiers to force the Papuan people to pay homage to the Sultan 
of Tidore. Here he met a stumbling-block, the Sultan refused to acquiesce in 
his plan. His relationship with his ‘Father’, Cornabé was fast deteriorating. It 
was an impossible task for the Sultan to send an expedition to Papua: not 
only did Prince Nuku command great support in that area, the Sultan was 
also painfully aware that he could not rely on the loyalty of his own chiefs 
and subjects. Even on Tidore, the grandees and princes were inclined to 
support Nuku. The Sultan was powerless and actually afraid of Prince Nuku, 
rather than having any intention of collaborating with him.72  
Following the steps taken by his colleague, the Governor of Ambon, the 
Governor of Ternate now promised to grant rewards to those who could 
capture Prince Nuku or Raja Lukman and planned the severest punishment 
for the rebels if they should be taken. A reward of a hundred ducatons out of 
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the Governor’s own private fund and a rattan cane with golden knob for 
senior-ranking leaders and canes with a silver knob for leaders of lower rank 
would be granted to those who proved themselves valiant in battle.73 
Pragmatically, the Company administration also realized that most of the 
East Seramese remained steadfast in their loyalty to Nuku, despite the very 
protracted and violent assaults launched by the Dutch with the support of 
two East Seramese leaders, namely Kapiten Baukan of Keffing and 
Orangkaya Kana-Kana of Kuwaus.74  
Translator Coenraad van Van Dijk was assigned to dispatch an 
expedition to Gamrange and the Papuan Raja Ampat. Boarding the Tempel, 
he departed on 25 May 1783. On 25 September, the Governor was informed 
that the Papuans had welcomed the Tidoran fleet under Van Dijk’s 
command. This immediately fostered hope that this apparent amenability 
would lead to more submissions among the Papuans, who would eventually 
abandon Nuku.75 Later, on 3 October 1783, the Governor of Ternate 
received news of ‘treachery’ within the expedition fleet itself. At the end of 
September 1783, Van Dijk and a number of European soldiers and some 
native burgers were massacred by the rebels on the island of Batanta. The 
Papuans, who had formally submitted and were supposed to be supporting 
the Company fleet, proved turncoats. One hundred and twenty vessels from 
Maba, Patani, and Papua appeared at Gane and Saketa and the VOC-
appointed Kapiten Hairun and other sangaji on board had gone over to the 
rebel side. Two hundred Ternatan subjects were captured. It was a total 
disaster for Sultan Ternate and the Dutch Ternate Government. Van Dijk 
was taken to Salawati where he was executed. Adding insult to injury, all the 
artillery on board of the vessel was distributed among Nuku’s followers.76  
Around the same time, 6 September 1783, twelve sangaji and kimelaha of 
Seram, who were hiding in the village Misa, wrote a secret letter to Sultan 
Patra Alam. They beseeched the Sultan to abandon the Company and to 
take the side of Prince Nuku’s forces, threatening that if he failed to do so, 
the Sultanate of Tidore would be destroyed. The letter was phrased to 
convince the Sultan that Prince Nuku’s forces were very powerful because 
the latter had gained and consolidated the support of many parts of Maluku. 
Apart form the Gamranges, the Papuans, and the East Seramese, now 
people from Ternatan Halmahera, Aru, Tanimbar, and Timor had also 
joined the rebellion. Every sign pointed to the fact that Nuku could expect 
the back-up from such other people as the Mindanao, Bugis and 
Makassarese and others farther afield. It was claimed that Nuku was 
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supported by the kings of ‘the north, the south, and the entire east’. This 
letter probably helped to win the Sultan of Tidore over to Nuku’s cause;77 a 
move bolstered by Prince Nuku’s promise that within the not too distant 
future fourteen English ships would come to the aid of him and his 
people.78 
Upon hearing the news of this treachery, Sultan Ternate, Aharal, sent a 
relief fleet of composed of fourteen kora-kora under the command of 
Kimelaha Marsaoli, but this force was routed in the Patinti Strait. Two kora-
kora attached to this fleet fell to the Nuku's party. While panic gripped 
Ternate, the rebels triumphantly attacked and burned the poorly defended 
village of Ngofakiaha on Makian. All the women and children were 
captured.79 The rebels were now within shouting distance of the heart of 
Tidore. On 16 October, Commander Agaatz heard the sound of cannon 
shots. Because his suspicions had been aroused by the attitude of Sultan 
Tidore and his grandees, he had artillery pieces and ammunition brought 
over from the post Tobo-tobo. Shortly afterwards, when Nuku appeared 
with 150 vessels carrying troops, the Sultan and his chief supporters did 
indeed declare war on the Dutch. Led by Hukum Doi, they attacked the 
Dutch strongholds and murdered all the Europeans, including Agaatz and 
the twelve bodyguards assigned to Sultan Patra Alam.80  
On 26 October, the rebels with a fleet of seventy kora-kora made landfall 
on the south-western coast of Tidore, where they ran across the Ternatan 
forces. In the affray in which the Dutch allies fired heavy cannon salvoes the 
rebels lost twenty vessels but escaped to Marieko. The Governor of Ternate 
precipitately declared war, determined to revenge the massacre of the 
Company's employees. Two hundred European soldiers and a large 
combined force of 1500 Ternatan and Alifuru were dispatched under the 
command of Hemmekam and Secretary to the Council, Durr, on board two 
two-masted sloops and a pancalang. The Patanese rebel fleet of only forty 
vessels was no match for them and Soasio was easily overpowered as it lay 
abandoned. After Tahula and Gomaffu had been razed to the ground, the 
combined Ternatan-Dutch force marched on to the strongly defended 
village of Tomalau. After a long and persistent siege, this village and those 
surrounding it were overpowered and laid waste. The Sultan and those 
grandees who were in Marieko were now trapped with nowhere to flee and 
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began to surrender. More than a hundred persons, including the family of 
the Sultan, were arrested and carried off to Ternate. Hukum Doi was killed, 
but the main instigator of the murder of Van Dijk and the other Europeans, 
Prince Major Bajo, was captured alive. In all one thousand Tidorans were 
killed in the battle and the Ternatan side also sustained severe losses. Only 
four Dutchmen were killed and twelve were wounded. The success of this 
expedition proved that the Company was still capable of quelling a political 
rebellion.81 
On 17 December 1783, the heads of Tidore had no option but to sign a 
new ‘treaty’. They had to confess to all the felonies that the Governor of 
Ternate with which chose to reproach them: the murders committed on the 
Company servants and the defection of their adherents to join Nuku’s 
uprising. They had to promise to extradite all those who had participated in 
the rebellion. Henceforth all Tidorans were forbidden to make any contact 
with either the rebel groups or foreign forces. Articles Seven and Nine of 
the treaty were a reaffirmation of the expropriation of political authority 
which had already been stated in 1780.82 Sultan Patra Alam was accused of 
collaborating with Nuku and was shipped to Batavia to await trial.83 Used as 
a zondebok (scapegoat) for Cornabé’s failure, he was eventually exiled to 
Ceylon.84  
Among the Tidoran grandees under the rule of Sultan Patra Alam, Prince 
Nuku had also attracted heartening support. The treason committed by 
Kapiten Hairun of Tidore and other Tidoran leaders on board the Tempel, 
and the sudden attack at Gane and Saketa by Gamrange and Papuan 
groups85 are two pieces of palpable evidence of the success of Nuku’s 
strategies in mobilizing the support of Tidorans on the island and in exile. 
The success boosted the morale of the rebels and cast Sultan Patra Alam, 
who still remained on the Dutch side, into a slough of despondency. The 
secret letter to Sultan Patra Alam signed by twelve sangaji and kimelaha of 
Tidore on 6 September 1783,86 which recognized and perhaps exaggerated 
the military might of Prince Nuku, was certainly instrumental in pushing the 
Sultan to decide to join Nuku’s forces. In what was known as the 
‘Tidoreesche Revolutie,’ of 1783, all Tidorans united to support Nuku’s 
cause and slaughtered the Company soldiers posted on Tidore. Even though 
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the uprising was immediately suppressed by the Dutch,87 it was yet another 
example of the success achieved by Nuku in unifying the Tidoran forces 
both at home and in exile. 
 
 
Sultan Tidore versus Sultan Papua and Seram88 
 
After having deposed and punished their formerly ‘loyal’ Sultan Patra Alam, 
the Dutch now appointed Prince Kamaludin, whom they had arrested and 
exiled to Ceylon89 after the Toloa attack in 1780, to the position. The act of 
the investiture of Prince Kamaludin as Sultan of Tidore was signed in 
Batavia on 18 October 1784. Under the terms of the act, the absolute power 
and ownership of the VOC over the realm of Tidore was explicitly 
restated.90 Sultan Kamaludin arrived on Ternate on 18 April 1785 and was 
inaugurated the same day. Mohammad Arif Bila, former Sangaji of Tahane, 
who had been captured by Nuku’s troop on Makian in 1783, was appointed 
jogugu, Batta was installed as kapiten-laut, and Abdul Gane as sekretaris.91 
Sultan Kamaludin was obliged to remain on Ternate for a while, because in 
the combined Ternatan-Dutch attack on the Tidoran capital of Soa Sio in 
1783 had destroyed the palace.92 At the inauguration, a general amnesty was 
granted to princes, grandees, and other subjects of Tidore, especially on 
Maba, Weda, Patani, and the Papuans. They were obliged to pay homage 
and submit to Sultan Tidore and the Dutch Government within ten months. 
A number of people from Weda and Maba took advantage of the amnesty 
and surrendered. Those from Weda were allowed to reside in Gita.93 The 
appointment of Prince Kamaludin as Sultan Tidore was a shrewd strategy to 
gain the loyalty of the Seramese, the Papuans, and especially the Tidorans 
who had supported Prince Nuku.94 A significant number of Weda people 
supported the new Sultan and presented themselves to the Company.95  
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Kapiten Sadaha Gula Manis, who had once been a supporter of Prince 
Nuku and had been captured by a Ternatan expedition in 1781,96 was now 
appointed envoy of Sultan Kamaludin. On 3 December 1785, Gula Manis 
and Adjutant-Lieutenant Ali went to Salawati and conferred with two envoys 
of Prince Nuku, Hukum Tajudin and Kimelaha Kamtohe. They had been 
assigned by Nuku to prepare a Papuan fleet and at that time 325 vessels had 
already been assembled on Salawati. From Salawati, Gula Manis rowed 
onwards to Negeri Daraki (?) on Seram. When he went to land, he took fright 
at the multitude of the prahu and ‘countless’ armed people on the coast. 
They had all been mobilized by Prince Nuku.97 He finally met Prince Nuku 
and handed over the Sultan’s letter which offered a free pardon and an 
opportunity for Nuku and his followers to surrender to Sultan Kamaludin, 
and to the Company. This offer was repudiated out of hand.98  
In the face of this refusal, Sultan Kamaludin decided to send four kora-
kora to Papua and requested ammunition from the Dutch for this purpose. 
The plan failed to arouse much enthusiasm from Governor Cornabé, with 
whom his relationship was not much different than that he had maintained 
with Patra Alam. Cornabé who had no real faith in the Sultan and his 
grandees, suspected that, if he were to be supplied with the Company’s 
ammunition, he might well attack Ternatan subjects instead of fighting 
against Nuku.99 In June and again in November 1786, Kamaludin proposed 
calling on Prince Nuku at his headquarters on Waru, Seram, to Cornabé. 
Cornabé utterly refused to countenance this suggestion. Not only did the 
Dutch administration distrust Sultan Kamaludin, its skepticism extended to 
all Tidoran leaders whoever they may have been. A Patanese messenger, 
Serangnoli, who had brought letters from Nuku, was bribed Rds 500 by the 
Dutch officials, Heinrich and Durr so that they might read its content.100 By 
this means, it was discovered that Jogugu Mohammad Arif Bila and other 
Tidoran leaders maintained correspondence with the rebel Prince. Nuku 
would later admit that he had always kept up a correspondence with 
Tidorese grandees during his flight.101 
On 5 April 1787, a squadron under the command of Commander Van 
Halm, consisting of three frigates—Scipio, Ceres, Lynx- and a brig the Pijl, 
arrived at Ternate. The Ceres and Lynx did not tarry long but departed to 
Makassar. Instead of employing the warships to fight Nuku, Governor 
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Cornabé openly accused Kamaludin of collaborating with Nuku. Cornabé 
refused to believe Kamaludin’s explanation that he had proposed an 
expedition three times but had always been refused. Suspicious of the Sultan 
and the other Tidoran leaders, Cornabé was convinced that there was always 
a possibility Tidoran soldiers would commit treason. When the Government 
obtained news from Ambon that Nuku’s followers had abandoned him 
between Hote and Waru in the north-east Seram, the Scipio and the Pijl went 
back to Ambon.102 In contrast to Cornabé, the Governor of Ambon Van 
Pleuren was willing to negotiate with Prince Nuku rather than to fight 
him.103 In fact, in his letter to Van Pleuren, Prince Nuku, using the title ‘the 
powerful Sultan of Seram’, threatened that his subjects would go to any 
lengths to obstruct any vessels of the Company entering Seram waters. 
Nevertheless, these letters did not provoke Van Pleuren to send another 
expedition. Nuku also wrote letters to the Governor of Banda who 
forwarded them to Ambon without replying to them. Haga claims that 
Nuku simply wrote all these letters in order to buy time.104  
In 1787 a free burgher named Harmansz, who had been in Maserai a 
negeri close to Salawati, affirmed that Nuku’s authority was still well 
entrenched there. The passes which Nuku handed out were still valid on 
Seram and in Papua. A Bandanese vessel which did not have one was seized 
and plundered and its crew were taken into captivity.105 Under these 
circumstances, Governor Cornabé once again dispatched an extirpation 
expedition to Maba, Weda, and Patani. But a slave, arriving from Weda via 
Payahe, told the people in Gita that Prince Nuku had prepared a fleet of one 
hundred vessels from Seram, Misool and other Papuans to attack the 
extirpation fleet. This news struck fear and panic among the crew. But 
Cornabé persisted in claiming that it was only a rumour, deliberately 
fabricated in order to dishearten the expedition.106 Meanwhile, in December 
1787, Gula Manis and certain Tidoran heads were sent on an expedition to 
Salawati. Twenty kora-kora from Maba, Weda, and Patani which now 
supported Sultan Kamaludin joined them. On 31 January 1788, on Samate, 
before Gula Manis and his men reached Salawati, Nuku prevented them 
from landing. The Raja and Kapiten Laut of Salawati who remained loyal to 
Nuku attacked and captured one of the vessels. One of the captives reported 
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to the Dutch that Nuku had really planned to attack Maba, Weda, Patani, 
and then Tidore.107 
 
 
Temporary Decline and Epidemic (1785-1790) 
 
At this stage Sultan Kamaludin was willing to appoint Nuku ‘Governor’ of 
Seram, but in 1789, further attempts to negotiate with Nuku were 
abandoned because it was clear that they were entirely fruitless. Despite the 
distrust between Cornabé and Kamaludin, on 26 February 1789, both agreed 
to launch a joint Tidore fleet, supported by people from Maba, Weda, and 
Patani, against Salawati where it was supposed Nuku was residing. During 
this expedition eleven Salawati supporters of Nuku were captured and a 
number of negeri on Salawati were attacked and burned down. Even the 
cannon, which had been plundered from Van Dijk’s vessel in 1783, were 
retrieved. By this achieving success, Kamaludin gained a measure of respect 
and trust from Cornabé. He proposed another expedition to East Seram to 
fight Nuku in a direct confrontation but there was no follow-up. In the 
middle of 1789, the Governor of Ambon also sent a fleet to attack Nuku in 
East Seram but Nuku’s small fleet of thirty-five vessels managed to escape. 
The Company officers wondered where Nuku might have been: On Salawati 
or with his brother, Manoffa, in the Aru Islands? Neither supposition was 
correct as after some time, news was received that he was in Misool waiting 
for a letter from the English.108  
The people of Salawati who had abandoned Nuku now wanted to have a 
new raja. Sultan Kamaludin supported Prince Arowe of Salawati to fill this 
position. A fleet of fifteen Tidoran kora-kora plus three from Maba, Weda, 
and Patani, carrying 900 men in total, was sent to Salawati under the 
command of Kapiten Abdul Jalal to perform the investiture of Prince 
Arowe as Raja Salawati. Haga asserts the people of Salawati welcomed their 
new raja with ‘jubilation.’ This was not without repercussions on the people 
of Misool, who had fled to the forest upon the arrival of the fleet. When 
they returned, they expressed their intention of also submitting themselves. 
In the days which followed, Raja Misool, Bagus, and Raja Waigama, 
Kamassan, both submitted themselves to Sultan Ternate and the Dutch. As 
a result of this change of heart, Nuku had lost the support of significant part 
of the population of Raja Ampat. Meanwhile, the pro-Kamaludin Tidoran 
fleet was suffering from an outbreak of disease which killed some sixty of 
his men. Because of this, the expedition could not sail on to Gorom - as 
originally planned – but was forced to turn back to Tidore. When warships 
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from Batavia arrived, reinforced by two pancalang and 100 soldiers, the 
Governor of Ternate hoped that the rebel could finally be forced to 
surrender. The Governor of Ambon suggested the two other Governments 
use any means at their disposal to destroy Nuku’s force and, if possible, 
arrest him.109  
In 1790, the Raja Ampat Islands were no longer safe for Nuku. His 
power was on the wane and he was said to be hiding somewhere in East 
Seram. Because the Gamrange and the Raja Ampat now were deemed 
pacified, the extirpation expeditions were commenced again. In that year, 
the pancalang the Windhond, under the command of Lieutenant Linke, and a 
military detachment under the command of Officer Hartsmann left Ternate 
and headed for Maba, one of the nutmeg-rich areas. As they were drunk 
most of the time, Linke and Hartsmann fought each other over which 
course to take and consequently lost direction. After Hartsmann had won 
and Linke had been clapped in irons, he called at Warsai on Waigeo, instead 
of Salawati, because his men suffered from a shortage of water. When 
twenty-three soldiers went ashore, the Papuans surprised them and took 
them prisoner. The pancalang was taken and many of the crew were also 
captured. One of the soldiers, Kamanga, tried to negotiate the release of the 
captives. It was agreed that some of the Company’s goods would be handed 
over to the sangaji. While the exchange was being negotiated, a Maforese 
kora-kora suddenly appeared on the scene, and after a cannon shot, one of 
the soldiers cut the anchor cable and the pancalang sailed away leaving Swerus 
Sijbrands with eleven soldiers behind in the hands of the Papuans. After 
having abducted a woman in the Laluga Islands, the escaped vessel arrived at 
Maba. When the case was investigated, the Governor decided the first step 
should be to liberate the captured soldiers. Sultan Kamaludin dispatched an 
envoy on a small vessel to negotiate the release amicably and with the co-
operation of Raja Salawati and Sangaji Warsai, the captives were released in 
exchange for a ‘gift’ of f 100.110 This event shows that the Papuans of the 
Raja Ampat did not really submit to either the Sultan or the Dutch, but 
retained their independent attitude and followed their own interests.  
At the end of the year 1790, the Governor-General in Batavia decided to 
close the areas of Seram and its immediate vicinity to the people of Gorom 
who were subordinate to the Government of Ambon. The burghers of 
Banda were granted vrije vaart (free navigation) and trade in these areas. This 
was a pious hope as there was no question of free navigation because the 
Goromese and the inhabitants of the south-east part of the islands strongly 
resisted this move. Several clashes followed: The hongi fleet of Ambon 
destroyed and burned a few of Prince Nuku’s vessels, and shortly 
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afterwards, a fleet of thirty-five vessels belonging to Prince Nuku appeared 
in the region of South Seram but was repulsed.111 During the attack on 
Gorom, Prince Malikudin, one of Nuku’s followers, surrendered to the 
Company, forfeiting any respect he may have had among the Tidorans. The 
Governor therefore preferred that he remain in Ambon for fear that Nuku’s 
sympathizers might ridicule him.112  
To eradicate Nuku’s influence in the area, a strong fleet manned by 
European soldiers and the Alifuru warriors was prepared.113 In 1791 the 
frigate the Bellona and the brig the Mercuur, under the command of Captain 
Werner Gobius, anchored in Banda. After the cutter the Patriot and the 
pancalang the Willem had joined them, the expedition fleet set sail. The first 
act of the task force was to punish the inhabitants of Aru, Watubela, and it 
then headed for Gorom. The hongi landed at several places on Gorom, and 
destroyed fortified settlements forcing the local population to surrender. 
Because Prince Nuku was not found and the commander, Captain Gobius 
was severely injured (he died soon afterwards), the operation was 
suspended.114 How the captain was wounded is not clear but his death was a 
great blow to the Dutch. The fight was in fact by no means over. 115 
The Governor of Ambon, Adam Schilling, referring to information 
supplied by a burgher from Banda, Joseph Jacobsz., wrote to his colleague 
on Ternate that Nuku’s brother, in charge of two fleets of raiders, was 
poised to attack the northern and the southern parts of Seram. Meanwhile 
Prince Nuku himself with a group of eighty vessels was sailing from Tobelo, 
Galela, Maba, Weda, Patani and Gebe to Hote on the north-east coast of 
Seram to await a fleet of allies from Gorom and other East Seram areas 
before waging an attack on Saway, and then Manipa. Seven of his vessels 
were sighted between Manipa and Buru on 28 August 1791. The same 
information was received from various sources116 among them Raja Pohon 
Pati, a spy who had often been despatched to Gorom by former Governor 
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Van Pleuren because of his excellent knowledge of the negeri, islands, and 
anchorages.117  
The campaign to terminate Prince Nuku’s rebellion did not run 
according to plan. When it came to local allies, especially Tidore, the Dutch 
did not quite know who could and who could not be trusted. As the 
Company was really dependent on the local support, this lack of trust and 
confidence posed a real problem. The bitter experiences of the Van Dijk 
expedition in 1783 and the subsequent Tidore rebellion were fresh in 
people’s memories. Reports about raid and assaults, on a greater or smaller 
scale, were received almost every day even though the leaders of Maba, 
Weda, Patani, Salawati, Misool, and Waigama had formally submitted to the 
Dutch. An outbreak of smallpox also hindered the Ambon expedition which 
had been planned for February 1792. A force of thirty Tidoran kora-kora 
with 2,000 men on board, which had already been assembled, was 
disbanded. Nevertheless, by September 1792, another expedition was being 
considered because small vessels belonging to Nuku were still making 
unexpected attacks on Ternatan vessels, but this plan was also cancelled 
because of the smallpox.118  
Meeting in council on 26 October 1792, Governor Cornabé explained 
how strong an expedition would be required to defeat Prince Nuku’s forces. 
On the basis of the information collected by Governor Schilling of Ambon 
and the ‘loyal’ orangkaya and raja, Cornabé could size up Nuku’s strength. He 
said he required four pancalang, 150 European soldiers, under a capable and 
vigilant commander, backed up by forty kora-kora manned by stalwart locals, 
amounting to about 2600 men, under an alert chief. The enemy had to be 
attacked at three places simultaneously employing two pancalang and half of 
the kora-kora in the main attacking force. The other half of the fleet should 
land on the other side piloted in by three arumbai.119 Nothing came of this 
proposal because smallpox was still rampant and another sickness had also 
reached epidemic proportions.120  
The years of 1790-1791 were a very critical and difficult time for Nuku 
and his forces. The army of Tidore under Sultan Kamaludin, reinforced by 
the Governments of Ternate, Ambon, and Banda, were launching systematic 
attacks on Nuku’s bases in East Seram, the Raja Ampat, and Gamrange. 
During the period, his main supporters as well as leading groups on Raja 
Ampat, Raja Salawati, Misool, Waigeo, and Waigama, either surrendered to 
Sultan Kamaludin, or were captured or killed in battle. All local rulers were 
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replaced by those who were considered loyal to Sultan Kamaludin and to the 
Dutch. His supporters in East Seram and Gorom were dispersed after the 
attack by Gobius’ fleet in 1791. Most disheartening of all, Nuku also lost the 
support of his two brothers, Prince Malikudin and Prince Manoffa—killed 
in a battle on Aru. Even some of his own bobato, Katoppo claims,121 had 
turned their allegiance to Sultan Kamaludin. Prince Nuku’s forces had 
dwindled to a small core of loyalists. To some extent the smallpox epidemic 
and the death of Gobius conspired to save him. By playing hide and seek the 
prince managed to survive.   
Sultan Kamaludin was more decisive than his predecessor Patra Alam in 
dealing with Nuku. He had won his antagonist’s most important adherents, 
among them the leaders of Maba, Weda and Patani during 1786-1787 and 
the Raja Ampat during 1789-1790, over to his camp.122 In his first five years 
on the throne, he successfully consolidated the Tidore realms under his 
authority.123 Kamaludin who had formerly been Nuku’s partner in opposing 
the Dutch contract which attempted to regulate the cession of Seram in 
1768 now successfully confronted him. In his dealings with Kamaludin, 
Nuku was well aware of this but at all times he skilfully avoided creating an 
impression of enmity towards Kamaludin. He strove none the less very hard 
to hinder Kamaludin’s strategies of influencing Raja Salawati and Misool.  
 
 
Resurgence of Forces (1791-1796) 
 
In 1781, Nuku’s bases on East Seram and Gamrange were attacked by the 
Dutch and Ternatan forces, strengthened by a detachment of North 
Halmaherans, namely the Alifuru from Galela, Tobelo, and Tobaru. Ten 
years later, many of these same people turned their allegiance to Nuku. After 
1791, Nuku somehow quickly recovered his military and naval strength. The 
support of 400 North Halmaherans in this period was quite decisive. By this 
time the east coast of Halmahera, the Gamrange and all the Papuan Raja 
Ampat, except Salawati, were gradually returning to Nuku’s fold.124 Why and 
how this happened is not completely clear. Nuku had again requested 
assistance from Mindanao125 but there is not any evidence to show any real 
support from those parts. A Makianese who had been captured by Nuku’s 
forces reported that Prince Nuku promised his people that English ships 
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would soon come to help them against the Dutch. Nuku may have already 
established contact with British vessels but this had not yet materialized in 
any material assistance to Nuku’s forces.126  
On 1 March 1793, Governor Schilling became very anxious when he 
heard that the strength of Nuku’s forces at Gorom had swelled to about 
20,000 to 30,000 men.127 He did his utmost to strengthen the ties with 
Kapiten of Keffing, Baukan, and the Orangkaya of Kuwaus, Kana-Kana, but 
the influence of these two East Seramese leaders was not potent enough: 
Most of their people Nuku’s side. To strengthen the power of Kapiten 
Baukan, Schilling recommended the Banda administration not to allow 
Goromese, people of Seram Laut, or Gesserese, to trade with Banda without 
a pass from Kapiten Baukan. But Schilling’s plan was unworkable, as the 
inhabitants of Banda could not survive without the provisions supplied by 
the traders from these places.128  
Sometime around July-August 1793, Sultan Kamaludin was showing 
signs of being eager to conduct another expedition against Nuku’s base. The 
Sultan was afraid that the longer the rebellion had to develop, the stronger 
his opponent would grow and the more people (subjects of Bacan, Tidore, 
and Ternate as well) he would attract to his cause. But the enthusiasm of the 
Ternate Government, having learned its lesson from the storms and diseases 
which had afflicted earlier expedition, was somewhat tempered.129 
Nevertheless, despite its misgivings, a Ternate Government fleet was 
dispatched under the command of Sergeant Heydelman. The fleet visited 
Gane, Bacan, Obi, Sula, and Besi, all places where the rebels had been 
operating the previous year. Some fighting did take place but tended to be 
desultory.130 An extirpation expedition was also carried out on Obi even 
though in the end many participants were afflicted by sickness.131 Mindful of 
the decline of Dutch power and the surge of Nuku’s power, Sultan Tidore 
suggested that Nuku should be accommodated.132 By the end of 1793 quite 
patently Prince Nuku was enjoying the support of the English. On Tidore, 
the Sultan realized that many of his subjects were now defecting to Nuku’s 
side.133  
The mounting of a hongi expedition was not an easy operation. First 
sufficient vessels and men had to be assembled, and then adequate 
provisions had to be accumulated. But even if all these preparations could 
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be made, success was not assured. This became all too clear to the Governor 
of Ambon, J. Schilling, when he conducted the next hongi to the south coast 
of Seram. On 1 November, the kora-kora of Bonoa, from which the 
Governor commanded the fleet, ran into a heavy storm and went down as it 
was crossing to Asahudi on the island of Manipa. The Governor had to 
abandon ship and transfer to the the kora-kora Alang. The original plan was 
that the fleet would continue along the coast of Seram as far as Kilimuri, but 
when he was told that smallpox was raging on Keffing, the Governor did 
not want to expose his crews and soldiers to the contagion. He had learned 
an awful lesson in 1787 when a significant number of the hongi crew had 
died of illness. Schilling decided to turn back, and visited the island of 
Nusalaut instead. There he distributed clothes as gifts to the indigenous 
leaders. Once again, an attempt to catch Nuku on Seram misfired.134 At the 
end of 1793, Governor Cornabé of Ternate succeeded Schilling and was 
appointed Governor of Ambon. Johannes Ekenholm replaced him as 
Acting-Governor of Ternate.135 
In 1794 Nuku’s younger brother, Prince Zainal Abidin, who had been 
exiled to Ceylon with late Sultan Jamaludin in 1779, arrived in Maluku on 
board an English ship and decided to throw in his weight in with Nuku’s 
forces. How he managed to leave Ceylon which at the time was still under 
the Dutch control remains shrouded in mystery. The prince made a curious 
statement alleging that the Company had granted him the title of Raja 
Salawati and that Prince Nuku had abdicated his authority over all the 
Papuan Islands to him. He had command of ninety kora-kora.136 In Gebe, in 
September 1794, Prince Nuku, accompanied by two English ships the 
Resource and the Duke of Clarence, had command of one hundred vessels not 
counting new followers from Galela, Ratu, and Use, who were on their way 
to Waigama with fifty-three vessels.137 The Rebel Prince had sworn before 
the people of Maba and Weda that, with the support of the English, his fleet 
would go to Tidore. Kapiten Saisai from Tidore passed on the information 
that the English ships were transporting forty kimelahas from Maba, Weda, 
and Patani, as well as a number of Muslim clerics to Waru.138 The influential 
Ternatan prince, Ibrahim Al-Mukaram, was also accompanying him. Upon 
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hearing these ominous tidings, Sultan Kamaludin grew increasingly worried 
and made overtures to the Ternate Government. The Governor had already 
sent a Ternatan envoy, Kapiten Gula Manis, to Gamkonora and Maidi in 
Halmahera to obtain information about Nuku’s movements. He came back 
on 10 September reporting that he had seen thirty great kora-kora as well as 
other smaller ones in the vicinity of the island of Gebe. In the meanwhile, 
more and more people flocked from Tidore to support Prince Nuku. In 
view of these developments, the Government of Ternate realized that power 
was slipping out of its hands. Only one ship was on standby at Ternate, 
assisted by a couple of pancalang verging on the unseaworthy.139  
On 6 December 1794, the Acting-Governor of Ternate, Ekenholm, 
wrote about the precarious political situation between his Ternate and 
Tidore subordinates, saying: ’From time to time, disagreements and discord 
have occurred between Tidore and Ternate which have led to hatred, 
quarrels and enmity.’140 To make matters worse, the Tidoran elite was 
polarized between the Sultan Kamaludin and Prince Nuku. Actually, by this 
time, the power of Sultan Tidore had ebbed away drastically, while Prince 
Nuku’s followers grew more aggressive and expanded their operations even 
into Ternatan territory. On 28 November 1794, powerless to combat the 
increase in Papuan raiding activities in the area, the extirpation programme 
of the VOC collapsed. The hongi returned from the coast of Ilat with no 
result.141 At the end of December, all the Papuans had withdrawn their 
support from Kamaludin and had preferred to join Prince Nuku. Governor 
Johann Godfried Budach, who had replaced Ekenholm on 18 October 
1794, reported that Maba and Patani people now also supported Prince 
Nuku because they were afraid of him. He recommended patience; they 
would leave him sooner or later and return to their homeland. Budach was 
quite anxious about the situation on Tidore. Nuku had made an alliance with 
the English and assembled all the dissatisfied princes and grandees of Tidore 
under his banner. The Company could do very little as the number of its 
soldiers and weapons had dwindled significantly.142 
In view of Nuku’s rising power in the periphery and his collaboration 
with the English, the Governor chose to strengthen the defences of Ternate. 
A small new stronghold was built at Kayu Merah and garrisoned with one 
sergeant, two corporals, and twenty soldiers. He also strove to inspire and 
encourage Sultan Kamaludin, who showed little interest in the fate of his 
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Sultanate. The Governor sensibly concluded that lacking sufficient power he 
could not force Nuku to submit. Repeated efforts to apprehend Nuku or 
offers to grant him amnesty had failed to raise even the glimmer of a 
response. The situation also worried the Governor-General in Batavia. He 
shared the fear that, with his combined forces, Nuku might attack and 
overmaster both Ternate and Tidore.143  
Batavia also issued cautious instructions urging that any expedition in 
which ‘expensive armaments’ would be involved should be avoided. On 10 
February 1795, the Governor-General and Council sent a conciliatory letter, 
ordering Prince Nuku be granted an amnesty. All his hostile conduct, 
displayed for almost fifteen years, would be forgiven. He was also to be 
given choices about his future. The Prince could choose either to be ruler of 
Papua under the authority of Sultan Tidore and the Company, or to be ruler 
of the north coast of Seram which is what the Governor-General would 
prefer him to do.144 On 29 August 1795, Prince Nuku, who had grown even 
more confident of his military force and now bore the title, ‘Paduka Sri 
Sultan Saidul Djohas Muhammad Mabus Amirudin Syah Kaicil Parang, the 
Sultan of All Negeri and Countries which Obey Me’, wrote a letter to Sultan 
Kamaludin in which he stated that he had finally allied his forces with those 
of the English, achieving what he had striven to achieve for such a long 
time. He guaranteed that he would do no harm to the Tidore Sultanate, the 
Sultan, and the grandees,145 and offered an alliance146 governing Tidore 
together in peace.147 Governor Budach forbade Kamaludin to answer the 
letter,148 but he himself wrote a letter granting Nuku amnesty as Batavia had 
done. Apparently, Nuku was disinclined to avail himself of the offer.149 
Many worrying rumours kept filtering into Ternate from outside about 
the mushrooming force of Prince Nuku and his ambition to conquer 
Ternate. Governor Budach observed that most of the news or rumours were 
untrue and had been dreamed up to terrify the inhabitants. He none the less 
remained vigilant and alert. In an attempt to clarify matters, Budach and 
Kamaludin decided to send Gula Manis to Patani to find out what was 
happening. In Gebe, Gula Manis was discovered and hounded by Nuku's 
followers but managed to escape.150 Returning from his alarming trip to 
Gebe, Gula Manis reported that the Ternatan Halmaherans were also 
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supporting Prince Nuku, and believed that Kamaludin no longer had 
authority over his subjects. Raiding activities were also increasing in Manado 
and Gorontalo.151 On 18 December 1795, the Tidoran Prince Hassan who 
was loyal to the Dutch told them that on Maba he had seen a thousand 
Tobelo people, excluding women and children, who supported Prince 
Nuku.152  
On 19 September 1795, Governor Cornabé and the Council in Ambon 
resolved that no hongi voyage would be undertaken that year.153 Two months 
later on 5 November 1795, when the Tidoran grandees again requested 
support from Budach to send an expedition against Prince Nuku, the 
Governor refused their request because he was sure that Prince Nuku would 
prove too strong.154 Instead of sending hongi, on 9 March 1796 Governor 
Budach dispatched Prince Major Hassan to Gebe to negotiate Prince Nuku’s 
return home and offered him North Seram to rule. When it transpired the 
mission was a failure, it was finally concluded that Nuku was weerbarstig, 
‘recalcitrant’, and bloeddorstig, ‘bloodthirsty’, and unwilling to live ’in 
friendship and in peace’ with the Company.155 The High Government in 
Batavia ordered the three Governors in Maluku to break off all negotiations 
and declared Prince Nuku an onverzoenlijke vijand, ‘irreconcilable enemy’.156 
Neither negotiations nor military expeditions were to be undertaken at this 
time.157  
By the end of June 1796, the garrison of Ternate consisted of nine 
officers and 323 non-commissioned officers and soldiers. About half of 
them were Manadonese. They were dispersed over several defence posts: in 
the castle; at Forts Kayu Merah; Telukko; and in the palaces of Sultans 
Ternate and Tidore. The sea forces consisted of three lightly armed pancalang 
(Padang, Windhond, and Lassum) manned by two lieutenants, seven petty 
officers, and twenty-four seamen, a number of kora-kora to make patrols off 
Hiri. The armaments on the vessels were all light calibre.Exerting his 
authority, the Governor also ordered a number of kora-kora from Ternate 
and Tidore to undertake patrols off Hiri, Makian, Saketa, and Gane.158  
During his term of office, Budach had been forced to confront the ever-
growing power of Nuku and the arrival of British Navy. The British fleet 
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consisted of nine ships carrying 712 European officers and soldiers, plus 996 
native officers and soldiers on board.159 On 29 March 1796, Lieutenant 
Nicolaas Pilander arrived at Ternate with a small arumbai and reported to 
Governor Budach that Ambon had been taken under English ‘protection’. A 
similar report from Prince Abdul Halim of Tidore described the seizure of 
Banda. Adding to the pressure, three vessels of English country traders were 
allied with Prince Nuku. This was very bad news for the Dutch Governor; 
now that Ambon and Banda had been occupied by the English, the supply 
of provisions from Batavia also ran into trouble.160  
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The Conquest of Tidore 
 
In May 1796, Prince Nuku was busy consolidating his forces which required 
moving constantly between Gebe and Patani. His campaign to overwhelm 
Maluku was launched in the second half of the year. When Nuku’s Alifuru 
troops from Gita landed on Makian, Sultan Kamaludin asked Governor 
Budach for some six-and-half-pounders and six-pounders with the requisite 
ammunition to be able to defend himself.1 Sultan Ternate also reported that 
a party of Nuku‘s men had landed on Makian. The crews of these thirty 
vessels plundered, and burned the villages killing those inhabitants who had 
no stomach to join the rebellion. Determined to counter this, Hukum 
Mohibu of Tidore mobilized ten kora-kora, equipped with eight four-
pounder and twenty-two two-pounder cannons, ten small barrels of 
ammunition, and twenty guns.2  
Prince Nuku now felt the time had come for psychological warfare. He 
sent a letter, signed by himself and three English country trading captains, to 
Sultan Kamaludin who passed it on unopened to the Governor. Nuku 
intimated that he had allied himself with the English who were providing his 
fleet with plenty of munitions. The English flag was now raised at Maba. He 
made Kamaludin an offer to join his forces, but the Governor did not deign 
to reply to this ‘outrageous’ letter, and instructed his subjects to remain 
vigilant, awaiting the imminent attack. The beach batteries were prepared. 
Reinforcements were sent to Forts Kayu Merah and Telukko.3  
Meanwhile Sultan Aharal of Ternate (r. 1780-1796) exacerbated the 
situation. After having refused to attend a meeting with the Dutch Governor 
of Ternate to explain his wayward behaviour, he was arrested. He was 
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1796 § 39-40; See also P.A. Leupe, ‘De verdediging van Ternate onder den Gouverneur 
Johan Godfried Budach 1796-1799,’ in BKI 12 (1865), 280, 283. 
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suspected of having hatched a scheme to attack the Dutch and cross over to 
Nuku and the English. Fortunately, the Dutch still had loyal collaborators 
within the Sultanate, who were themselves aspirants to the throne. The 
Ternatan Princes (Schoonderwoert, Jasim, and Beynun) betrayed their own 
Sultan who had written a letter, via Gula Manis, to Prince Nuku inviting him 
to Ternate. When it was discovered that he had prepared around 120 
Alfurus armed with klewang (a kind of machete) for this purpose, Sultan 
Aharal was eventually banished.4 Although the Government of Ternate 
believed that: de trouwelooze bedrijven van den koning zoo helder als het daglicht 
waren,5 instead of one of the three ‘loyal’ princes, he appointed, Prince 
Sarkan Sultan of Ternate formally inaugurating him with the title ‘Paduka Sri 
Maha Tuan Sultan Nur Arifin Wahuwa Sayidina Muhidin Sah Kaicil Sarkan’, 
on 22 August 1796.6 Not long afterwards, Sultan Sarkan sent three kora-kora 
armed with Dutch munitions and with a European Corporal on board to 
Wosi. Unfortunately they were promptly attacked by Nuku’s raiders. By now 
everybody on the Dutch and Ternatan side agreed dat men met alle middelen van 
geweld niets kan winnen.7 Communications became extremely difficult for the 
Dutch Government on Ternate. It took a pancalang from Batavia no less than 
a year to reach Ternate. Budach tried to send a letter reporting his parlous 
situation with a Makassarese, but Prince Nuku happened waylay his pancalang 
in the Strait of Bacan and intercepted this message.8 
On 13 March 1797, with the help of English country traders,9 Prince 
Nuku, with fifty vessels big and small, laid siege to Bacan.10 The process of 
occupation took more than a week. Reportedly, on 16 March, Nuku’s allies, 
the English country traders, demanded the post-holder Van Diest surrender 
his redoubt but he refused to do so. Four days later, on 21 March, the 
redoubt manned by a corporal, cannon, and five soldiers submitted. 
Governor Budach wrote to Batavia that the post-holder at Bacan had 
initially refused to surrender but because of the treachery of the Bacanese, 
                                               
4 NA OIC No. 91, Ternate to Batavia, 29 April 1796, §64, 68. 
5 ’The treacherous behaviour of the Sultan was as clear as day.’ 
6 NA OIC No. 64, Ambon, General Letters, 21v-22v; OIC 89, Ternate to Batavia, 13 
September 1796, 76. See also Leupe, “De verdediging van Ternate,” 268-9, 271. 
7 ’…that with all means of violence we cannot achieve anything’. NA OIC 64, Ambon, 
General Letters, 21v-22v; OIC 89, Ternate to Batavia, 13 September 1796, 76. On 8 
November 1796, Governor Budach instructed Sultan Kamaludin to send an expedition to 
Gita to fight Nuku’s forces, but it seems that Sultan Kamaludin did notfollow his orders. 
See also ANRI, Ternate 127, Letter of Governor Budach to Sultan Tidore, 8 November 
1796. 
8 Leupe, “De verdediging van Ternate,” 286-8. 
9 NA OIC No. 65 General Letters, 11; ANRI, Ternate 127, From Governor Budach to 
Prince Regent of Bacan, 18 March 1797; See also Andaya, The World of Maluku, 236. 
10 ANRI 89.1, Secret Letter from Johan Godfried Budach to G.G. Willem Arnold Alting 
(Batavia), 71-5. 
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he had been obliged to do so. Prince Nuku’s fleet also attacked and burnt 
Christian villages. When they requested the English to help them kill all the 
Christian inhabitants, they met with a stern refusal.11 Two days later, when 
Prince Nuku, the Prince Regent, and the English were examining the 
fortress, a sergeant of Labuha reported that Nuku’s people had detained two 
Christian women. The English demanded Nuku release the detainees and 
hand over the people who had been responsible for the outrage. As a 
punishment the English tied the perpetrators to a flag pole.12  
Nuku, assisted by these country traders, proceeded to lead a fleet of 
seventy kora-kora to Tidore, where they made their appearance on 12 April 
1797.13 Instead of joining Nuku’s force, as Patra Alam had done during the 
‘Tidoreesche Revolutie’ in 1783, Sultan Kamaludin and the Dutch garrison 
abandoned Tidore and fled to Ternate on five kora-kora. Nuku’s followers 
plundered what remained, especially gunpowder, and eventually destroyed 
the Dutch military post.14 The Ternate Government allowed the Sultan and 
the refugees to remain on Ternate under their protection, but on the same 
day, in the middle of the night, three of the five kora-kora left Ternate again, 
and joined Nuku’s forces. Commenting on the escape of the three vessels to 
Tidore, the Governor Budach said: ‘No Tidoran can be trusted.’ 
Consequently the presence of the remaining two kora-kora was no longer 
tolerated.15 Kamaludin, the Tidoran princes, royal relatives, and children 
were put under protection of the Dutch, and provided with half a last of rice, 
three cans of coconut oil, two pounds of candles, cotton, and Rds 2 per 
day.16 Eleven days later, on 23 April, Sultan Kamaludin admitted to the 
Dutch Governor that the Tidoran grandees no longer wanted him and 
desired Prince Nuku to be their Sultan. De facto Prince Nuku now became 
Sultan of Tidore. At this time, Budach believed that the surrounding area 
had been encircled and that he could be attacked at any time.17  
During Kamaludin’s reign (1784-1797), Nuku had one supporter with an 
important position in the Tidore Sultanate: Mohammad Arif Bila, the Jogugu, 
the ‘prime minister.’ In the Dutch sources he is simply referred to as Jogugu 
Tahane.18 Since 1786, he had been suspected of having led a faction within 
the Sultanate in support of Nuku’s rebellion. In 1796, Sultan Kamaludin had 
                                               
11 ANRI 89.1, Interrogation Soldier Hilbert Keegel of Ternate, 24 April 1797, 113-7. 
12 ANRI 89.1, Interrogation Soldier Hilbert Keegel of Ternate, 24 April 1797, 118-9. 
13 Katoppo, Nuku, 115-6. 
14 NA OIC No. 65 General Letters, 11v, 11r. See also W.G. Miller, ‘The Moluccas under 
the British’ (M.A. Thesis: University of Hull, 1974), 85. 
15 ANRI 89.1, Secret letter from Budach to Alting, 76-7, Extract of daily report, 145. 
16 ANRI 89.1, Secret letter from Budach to Alting, 80-1. 
17 ANRI 89.1, Letter from Sultan Kamaludin to Governor Budach, 125-7. 
18 Tahane was a name of a settlement in Makian, the place from which Mohammad Arif 
Bila came. See ANRI Ternate 8, Council Meeting, 15 September 1794.  
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him arrested after some letters which betrayed the prime minister’s 
clandestine correspondence with Nuku were intercepted. His was a brief 
detention as he was soon released on the orders of the Company in order to 
sustain the flow of information from Nuku’s side. Arif Bila left Tidore a few 
months before Nuku’s triumphant return to Tidore in 1797 and joined the 
rebel’s forces which were in East Halmahera at that time.19 In the past he 
may have acted as a mole leaking information to Nuku from Tidore about 
the plans for the various expeditions sent by Sultan Tidore and the Dutch, 
which were never able to capture Nuku, even at a time when Nuku’s force 
was really dwindling.  
In 1789, Kamaludin’s victory over Nuku was actually only a hair’s 
breadth away. During 1791-92 the Sultan managed to persuade the people of 
Galela, Tobaru, and Tobelo to join his side in the rivalry. But when Nuku 
regained his power with the support of North Halmaherans, the Gamrange 
and Raja Ampat regained confidence in the rebel Prince.20 It was a real blow 
to Sultan Kamaludin in 1794 when Prince Zainal Abidin, who had returned 
from Ceylon on board an English ship, was entrusted with the command of 
the Gamrange and Papuan forces by Nuku. In 1795, Nuku sent Kamaludin 
an intimidating letter urging him to terminate his relationship with the 
Dutch, now that most of the North Malukans and the English were on his 
side.21 The effect of the letter was truly demoralizing. Subsequently Sultan 
Kamaludin offered to welcome Nuku and confer his title of Sultan on him.22 
Nuku had won the game. 
 
 
The Conquest of Ternate (1798-1801) 
 
The idea of conquering Ternate had been clearly on the cards since the 
beginning of English occupation in 1796. Ambon and Banda had already 
fallen into the hands of this lurking enemy, but the Dutch on Ternate were 
still determined to resist. Two months after the occupation of Ambon by 
English naval forces, Nuku dispatched a fleet of seventy vessels under the 
command of his ally, Prince Ibrahim of Ternate. In his meeting with the 
commander of the Royal Navy operations in the East Indies, Rear-Admiral 
Peter Rainier, Prince Ibrahim requested the assistance of the English in 
overmastering the Dutch on Ternate and in the territory of the Tidore 
                                               
19 R. Z. Leirissa, Halmahera Timur dan Raja Jailolo: Pergolakan Sekitar Laut Seram Awal Abad 
19 (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1996), 145. 
20 Miller, ‘The Moluccas,’ 36. 
21 NA OIC No. 91, Ternate, Separate Letter from Ternate to Batavia, 16 September 1795, 
§ 42-58. 
22 NA OIC No. 91, Ternate to Batavia, 29 April 1796, §16. 
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Sultanate. However, the English commander declined the proposal.23 The 
following year Nuku tried again. He sent Prince Ibrahim and Raja Muda 
Zainal Abidin to meet Farquhar, the British Deputy-Resident on Banda to 
test the plan afresh. Cautiously, Farquhar did no more than to advise them 
to see his superior in Ambon, Resident William Jones.24 After taking over 
Tidore from Sultan Kamaludin, Nuku had been persistent in contacting 
Resident Jones in Ambon about the reduction of Ternate. Receiving no 
decisive answer from him, the Prince directed himself straight to the higher 
echelon of the East India Company in Madras. By letter, Nuku reminded the 
English Company that he was desperately waiting for an answer.25 As 
Farquhar would later recall, the English administration in Maluku had never 
had one moment’s respite from Nuku’s pressing solicitations to assist him 
against the Dutch.26  
While he was courting the English administration, Nuku, with the 
support of the English country traders and his subjects in Halmahera, did all 
he could to cut off Ternate’s supply lines with Batavia and other places.27 
During a visit to Gebe, Lieutenant Frost of HMS Bombay was informed 
about the impact of Nuku’s blockade of Ternate. In January 1798, Nuku’s 
forces also tried to strike up a closer relationship with another English naval 
officer, Captain Ballard of HMS Hobart. Frost and Ballard lent a willing ear 
to Nuku and also proposed an attack on Ternate to Resident Jones. When 
the Hobart and the Bombay were anchored at Tidore, friendly encounters 
took place between the naval officers and the local people and their 
leaders.28 In other words in the English leadership there was considerable 
disagreement between Captains Pakenham and Ballard of the Royal Navy on 
the one hand and the Commercial Resident on Ambon, William Jones, and 
Lieutenant-Colonel McNeile of the army on the other.29 
                                               
23 Walter Caulfield Lennon, “Journal of an expedition the Molucca Islands,” 305-309; See 
also, Miller, ‘The Moluccas,’ 69; Andaya, The World of Maluku, 235; Dalrymple, “Memoir 
Concerning Keecheel Nookoo Sultan of Teedore,” IOR/L/PS/19/14 date 11 February 
1801, 22. 
24 IOR/P/241/74 M Pub C, 11 Agustus 1797, Jones to Farquhar, 17 February 1797, 2633. 
25 IOR/P/242/11, M.M.Pol.C., February 1799, From Deputy Commercial Resident R. T. 
Farquhar, Banda, to Madras, 2 December 1798, 508-9. See also Translated letter from 
Prince Zainal Abidin to Governor General at Bengal, no date, attached to the former 
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26 IOR/P/255/18, MMC, 18-02-1803, “An Account of Tidoreeze Revolutions from the 
year 1779 … until the expulsion of the Dutch from the Moluccas in 1801.” From 
Farquhar to Colonel Oliver, 1 June 1802, 1015. 
27 Leupe, “De verdediging van Ternate,” 266, 275-6, 280. 
28 See Miller, ‘The Moluccas,’ 90-1. 
29 IOR/P/254/01 MMC, 8 August 1797, Colonel McNeile to Lord Hobart, Madras, 20 
May 1797, 4840. 
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The break-through came in 1799, when Farquhar replaced Jones as 
Resident Ambon. This changed the complexion of the political situation 
completely. Unquestionably Nuku’s ambitions to bring down Ternate 
coincided with Farquhar’s, but for different reasons as each had his own 
agenda. Farquhar was actually eager to prevent the expansion of Nuku’s 
power and consequently would have preferred to reduce Ternate without 
Nuku’s assistance. At the back of his mind, he was also afraid that, if the 
English did not conquer Ternate, Tidore and Nuku might ally themselves 
with the Dutch to expel the English from the Maluku.30 In the first attack on 
Ternate on 22 January 1801, the English forces under the command of 
Colonel Burr, on the orders of Farquhar, declined Nuku’s offer of 
assistance, even though a large fleet of prahu and kora-kora had appeared in 
the roads under the command of the Prince Major. The Prince remained 
within hailing distance during the attack which was a failure.31 In the second 
siege stronger forces were thrown into the fray, after Farquhar had 
concluded that he had no option but to accept the assistance of the Tidoran 
prince. A country trader by the name of Captain Lynch was ordered to 
organize the Tidore forces, instructing so as they would be capable of firing 
cannons of a larger calibre, chiefly nine-pounders.32 The siege lasted more 
than two months before Ternate Government finally surrendered on 21 
June, despite Governor Cranssen’s refusal to concede defeat.33 The English 
appreciated the very substantial service the Tidorans had rendered during 
the siege. Without their aid, said Burr, it would have been utterly impossible 
for the English troops to have moved beyond the beach. They had 
furnished the English troops abundantly with every item of provisions their 
                                               
30 IOR/P/242/14 M Pub C, 31 May 1799, Resident Farquhar, Amboyna, to Madras, 5 
April 1799, 2184-5. IOR/P/242/15 M Pub C, August 1799, Resident Farquhar to 
Commander of the forces at the Moluccas, Lieut. Col. McNeile, 22 June 1799, 2998. See 
also IOR/F/4/74/1617 Memoir concerning the capture of Ternate, Alexander Dalrymple, 
31 March-11 April 1801; IOR/P/242/15 M Pub C, August 1799, Resident Farquhar to 
Commander of the forces at the Moluccas, Lieut. Col. McNeile, 22 June 1799, 3007. Add. 
Mss. 13869, Farquhar Defence on his conduct in the Moluccas, 28 February 1802, 
Deposition of Abdul Djalil Al-Mukadar a principal Ternatean chief, 15 October 1801, 117. 
31 IOR/P/254/74 MMC, 2 June 1801, Burr to Madras, 28 February 1801, 4057-8 and 
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32 IOR/P/255/11 MMC 7 September 1802, Resident Farquhar to Francis Lynch, 13 
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English captains J Brougham and J Walker, 21 June 1801, 4838-50. See also Report of the 
conquest of Ternate, P/254/79 MMC, 3 November 1801, Col Burr to Madras, 30 June 
1801, 7233-46. 
FROM REBEL TO SULTAN 
 
93
region produced.34 Raja Jailolo, Mohammad Arif Bila, who had originally 
joined the expedition itself, was detached to cover the northern side to cut 
off the Dutch supplies of men and provisions from Halmahera (Jailolo), on 
which the Ternate garrison had long been dependent and from where it had 
recruited its bravest soldiers.35 Consequently, Resident Farquhar showed his 
gratitude to Sultan Nuku for the loyal attachment he had shown to the 
English.36  
Sultan Nuku and Resident Farquhar concluded a treaty on 12 November 
1801 and Sultan Nuku was finally inaugurated by the English.37 Although he 
had ruled the Sultanate of Tidore for almost four years, to be acknowledged 
and confirmed by a European power was a sign of important recognition.38 
He was no longer a ‘prince rebel’ but a ‘Sultan’ in the eyes of the English, 
who referred to Tidore as an ally, not as a vassal. In the first article of the 
treaty, it was stated that Sultan Nuku of Tidore was in ‘uninterrupted and 
unshaken fidelity, amity and alliance to his Imperial Majesty George the 
Third’. Having obtained a superior position to that of the Sultan of Ternate, 
Nuku would annually receive recognition money from the British 
Government amounting to 6,000 Spanish dollars. Earlier treaties concluded 
by the Tidoran Sultanate were annulled, and no new treaties would be 
allowed with other nations. Therefore, under the terms of the treaty, Tidore 
regained its position as an independent state. Unfortunately the treaties and 
reports of Farquhar’s arrangements on Ternate did not reach Madras until 
June 1802.39 
The political events in Europe, however, changed the fate of Tidore. In 
the eyes of the Madras and Bengal Governments ‘the impetuous action’ of 
Farquhar and Burr was out of step with ‘the system of their policy’. The 
Governor of Madras decided to relieve Farquhar as Resident of Ambon and 
Banda and Colonel Burr as military commander in Moluccas. In their place 
Colonel Oliver was appointed to take charge of the entire civil and military 
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administration in these islands.40 Only two months after the replacement of 
Farquhar by Colonel Oliver, in Ambon on 16 January 1802, the treaty of 
peace between the French Republic, the King of Spain, and the Batavian 
Republic on one side and His Majesty the King of the United Kingdoms of 
Great Britain and Ireland on the other side, was concluded on 25 March 
1802 in Amiens. This treaty stipulated that the evacuation by the English 
and the restitution to the Dutch of the settlements in the East Indies should 
be made six months after the ratification of the treaty.41 The treaties 
between Resident Ambon, Farquhar, and Ternate, Tidore, and Bacan were 
abrogated. Henceforth, the legality of Sultan Nuku as an independent ruler 
under the Law of Nations could not be recognized.42 Nuku had to accept 
that he had to commence his struggle against the Dutch for Tidore 
independence all over again. 
During the course of conquering Ternate, Nuku also had to defuse a 
risky affair involving a prince by the name of Hassan, who sought to topple 
Nuku as Sultan and himself become Sultan of Tidore. Hassan, a half-brother 
of Nuku and a full brother of Zainal Abidin, had the reputation of being a 
meddler of sorts among both the Dutch and Nuku’s party. He never joined 
Nuku in exile but rendered the Dutch service by supplying them with 
information. In 1792 he had revealed the rise of pro-Nuku Tidoran and 
Gamrange leaders who persuaded the people of Galela and Tobaru to join 
Nuku to the Dutch.43 At the end of 1795, on the orders of the Governor 
Ternate he made a trip to observe Nuku’s force on Maba and to gain 
intelligence about the presence of the English country traders.44 In the year 
which followed, he led a commission to Gebe to negotiate with Prince 
Nuku.45 Governor Budach had ordered him to travel to Tidore in secret and 
entice his brother Zainal Abidin away from Nuku. In 1797, he went to 
Tidore ostensibly to fetch his wife but his real task was to sap Nuku’s 
support.46 When Governor Cranssen arrived in 1799, Prince Hassan was still 
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on Ternate and he was again ordered to exploit the rumbling disunity in 
Tidore and to lure the Buginese troops away from Nuku.47  
In his letter to Batavia, 10 September 1797, Governor Budach boasted 
that Prince Hassan had many supporters on Tidore. He had persuaded his 
younger brother, Zainal Abidin, to renounce all hostile behaviour towards 
the Company. He had proposed schemes to vitiate Nuku’s authority plus a 
host of other achievements.48 In a letter to Cranssen from Batavia in 1800, 
Hassan was described as a shrewd (schrander) and cunning man and the ‘most 
faithful and brave ally of the Company’ as well.49 On 11 September 1800, 
Governor Cranssen, Hassan, and other six Tidoran grandees attended the 
meeting of the Council of Ternate. Cranssen explained that Nuku had 
transferred his authority to Hassan, as Raja Muda, and Zainal Abidin, the 
former Raja Muda, had been banished to Madras by the English. He 
presented a letter, which was signed by Hassan and other Tidoran grandees, 
endorsing the transfer of authority and requesting a pardon for Nuku. There 
were real doubts about whether Nuku, who had been fighting Dutch power 
since 1780 and had gained the power over Tidore in 1797, would relinquish 
all he had won so easily. Be that as it may, the Council on Ternate accepted 
the validity of the letter and of the delegation. On 14 September, Hassan 
was installed as Raja Muda and Nuku was granted the title ‘old Sultan’. It 
was a festive day for Ternate. The town was decorated and a ball was held 
that night.50  
On 30 September, in a letter to Governor-General Van Overstraaten 
Cranssen confidently wrote that were he able to capture Nuku dead or alive, 
the moderate Tidoran leaders, and finally the majority of Nuku’s supporters 
would certainly submit and be loyal to the Company.51 This was nothing but 
a self-fulfilling prophecy as became clear a few days later. On 3 October, 
Hassan reported that there was some trouble on Tidore because Nuku still 
refused to concede on several issues. On 5 October, Cranssen agreed to 
Hassan’s proposal to send a military force to Tidore to eliminate what was 
termed the rival group on Tidore. He also planned to join Hassan on the 
island of Mare (close to Tidore). According to this scenario, Cranssen would 
blockade the island of Tidore and stop all provisions reaching the island. But 
on Mare he was visited by Nuku’s envoy, who asked him why he was 
preparing a military expedition against an ally. In return, Cranssen delivered 
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an ultimatum demanding the extradition of Major Ceylon, Raja Jailolo, and 
Lieutenant Jalaludin, who were assumed to be opposed to Hassan. The 
ultimatum was ignored and Hassan did not deign to make an appearance on 
Mare. On 13 October, Cranssen was informed that Hassan had been 
murdered and thereby his plans collapsed like a house of cards.52 
Many questions and interpretations might be raised about the motives 
for the murder and who was behind all this, but it is impossible to retrieve 
the details from the archival sources. However, the curious course of events 
and the dramatic ending reveal that the Dutch were ensnared in their own 
trap. Hassan may well have compiled fake reports about the transfer of 
authority. Cranssen may have been overwhelmed by his obsession to resolve 
the ‘Nuku problem’. Nevertheless, Tidore society, re-invigorated under 
Sultan Nuku, overcame its common weaknesses by dealing with the 
treachery of its own compatriots. If this interpretation is accepted, whoever 
killed Hassan must have been supported by Nuku or at the very least Nuku 
must have felt triumphant when the political intrigues of Hassan and 
Cranssen were brought to a sudden end.  
Nuku’s long struggle since 1780 had shown his unwavering endeavour to 
unify North Maluku under his power. In this strategy the island of Bacan 
played a crucial role. On the way to Tidore in 1797, Nuku’s fleet in the 
company of English was not in any hurry to sail directly to Tidore but first 
took the time to conquer Bacan. Admittedly this was a small kingdom and 
could raise an insignificant force compared to Ternate and Tidore but it was 
an important cornerstone in the Malukan worldview. It was one of four 
kingdoms which shaped the world of Maluku. As far as Nuku was 
concerned, conquering Bacan was an integral part of unifying Maluku. The 
cost of such a conquest would not require any great expenditure as Bacan 
was located on the way from Halmahera to Tidore and Ternate.  
The political stance of Bacan during the Nuku rebellion was 
indeterminate. In the sources there is no evidence of communications 
between Nuku and Sultan Bacan or vice-versa. During the reign of Nuku’s 
father, Sultan Jamaludin, Sultan Bacan had worked hand in glove with the 
former, with the result that both of them were exiled to Batavia. Afterwards, 
it seemed that the next Sultan Bacan, Patra Iskandar Alam, took advantage 
of Nuku’s rebellion to move the people from North Seram over to Bacan. 
For instance, in 1787, Sultan Bacan transported 246 persons from Hatileng 
to his island. In his letter to the Dutch Governor, he wrote that he had been 
forced to land in North Seram owing to stormy weather. When he departed, 
he had taken along those people who had been suffering from Prince 
Nuku’s exigencies to Bacan. The Dutch who did not believe Sultan Bacan’s 
story dispatched the frigate the Lijns en Pijl and the barque the Verwagting to 
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Bacan to pick up the North Seramese and escort them back to their villages 
via Ternate.53 In 1797, after the conquest of Bacan by Nuku, the Prince 
Regent of Bacan was accused of treason, but Cranssen defended him 
arguing that he found himself in a similarly difficult situation to that of 
Kamaludin in 1797.54 This Sultanate suffered from a chronic lack of 
manpower and hence was militarily weak. Therefore it had fallen victim to 
the competition for power between Tidore, Ternate, and the Dutch.  
There is evidence to support the hypothesis that Nuku’s aspirations 
seemed to spread wider than the realm of Tidore itself. He was dreaming of 
an independent ‘Greater Maluku’. When his power was resurgent in 1795 
and Kamaludin offered him the throne of Tidore, Nuku simply ignored this 
gesture. Likewise he repudiated the Dutch Governor-General’s offer to 
allow him rule North Seram as a ‘Sultan’. Gamrange (Maba, Weda, and 
Patani), Gebe, and the Raja Ampat had already returned to his authority. He 
was quite sure that even those Tidorans, including the palace elite, who 
resided on the island of Tidore supported him. This was proved true in 1797 
when his fleet entered Tidore waters. No significant resistance was reported 
and Sultan Kamaludin and his family simply left the island to seek protection 
with his ‘father’, the Dutch Governor in Ternate.  
Ternate was traditionally the most powerful Sultanate in North Maluku. 
In Nuku’s eyes, Ternate with its impregnable Dutch fort formed the most 
difficult target in his strategy. At the beginning of 1790s, despite his 
dwindling support from Gamrange and Papua, Nuku took a decisive step by 
winning over some erstwhile allies of Ternate, namely Galela, Tobaru, and 
Tobelo. This achievement not only strengthened his fleet, it also boosted the 
moral of his old adherents such as Gamrange and the Raja Ampat. Under 
the Sultan of Ternate the three North Halmaheran groups enjoyed the 
reputation of being brave and reliable warriors. When they turned their 
political loyalty to Nuku, this was a sign to Sultan Ternate that he was losing 
his satellites. Since 1796, Nuku had also won the support and assistance of 
Prince Ibrahim of Ternate, whom he assigned to negotiate with Rear-
Admiral Rainier of the Royal Navy, in Ambon in 1796. Nuku’s struggle to 
debilitate the position of Ternate booked further progress when Sultan 
Aharal of Ternate was arrested in 1796, on account of his secret 
communications with Nuku through the intermediation of Gula Manis.  
The restoration of the ‘Jailolo Sultanate’ was another central idea in the 
context of Nuku’s dream to restore the four kingdoms in the Maluku.55 In 
                                               
53 ANRI Ternate 85, Secret letter from Ternate to Batavia, 15 July 1787. 
54 ANRI Ternate 89.1, J.W. Cranssen to Mr. P.G. van Overstraaten, 27 February 1800. 
55 Concerning this matter, Farquhar explained, ’Before these Islands became subject to 
Europeans and even under the dominion of Portuguese the territories of Gilolo formed a 
sultanship of themselves but when the Spaniards obtained possession of Spice Islands and 
CHAPTER FIVE 98
his negotiations with Farquhar, Nuku tried to win recognition for Raja 
Jailolo’s claims to the throne of Jailolo. Farquhar fully understood that this 
move was a part of Nuku’s scheme to weaken Ternatan power in Halmahera 
(Jailolo) and, consequently, that of the Dutch as well. By restoring the 
Sultanate of Jailolo, the whole of Halmahera which was a portion of Ternate 
territory would fall under Nuku’s influence. Farquhar therefore foresaw that 
the restoration of the Jailolo Sultanate would make Nuku even more 
powerful and chose to proceed cautiously because it was important to keep 
the balance of power between Ternate and Tidore. He did not reject Nuku’s 
main request out of hand, but prudently compromised by recognizing Raja 
Jailolo during the siege of Ternate, granting him a ‘certain sum for his 
service during the siege’.56 Ironically the Treaty of Amiens of 1802 put a 
spoke in the wheels. Nuku’s dream of re-inventing the unity of a ‘Greater 
Maluku’ under the aegis of Tidore remained a mirage.  
  
 
Negotiations for an Independent Tidore (1803-1805) 
 
After the evacuation of the British from the Maluku, under the terms of the 
Amiens Treaty, Nuku had to deal once more with his old enemy, Governor 
Cranssen. On 19 January 1803, Cranssen arrived in Ambon and it did not 
take him long to negotiate an agreement on the manner of the transfer 
between British Resident, Colonel Oliver, and the Dutch Commissioners 
which was to take place on 1 March.57 The Dutch were better prepared than 
the British. News of Farquhar’s appointment as a British commissioner 
arrived only on 2 June 1803. Not until 4 March 1803, did Oliver receive 
directions on the manner of the transfer of the Moluccas to the Dutch, by 
then it was too late in the day.58 These stated that Willem Jacob Cranssen 
was thereby appointed Governor of Ambon, of which the Governments of 
Ternate and Banda were subordinates. Right from the beginning, the 
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Gezaghebber of Ternate, Peter Adrianus Goldbach (1803-1804) had the 
impression that impetuous Cranssen was not the right person to deal with 
indigenous affairs, especially in Tidore (Nuku) and Ternate. Cranssen had an 
inclination to rely over-heavily on Zainal Abidin who had a conflicting 
relationship with Nuku. on assuming office, he had immediately sent his 
envoy to East Seram, Halmahera, and Papua to meet Zainal Abidin. 
Knowing this, Nuku sent Raja Jailolo to meet Zainal Abidin before 
Cranssen’s envoy could reach him. Haga asserts that Cranssen began 
fomenting unrest before he even set foot on Ternate.59  
In early May 1803, the formal discussions between the Dutch 
commissioners and British commander on Ternate, Webber, were 
concerned with matters of a logistics, rather than those of a political nature: 
the date of the disembarkation of the Dutch troops; the withdrawal of the 
British troops from Fort Orange; the condition of the defences and so on. 
The relationship between the British and the Sultans seemed to be 
mentioned only in passing. Nuku’s attitude during the first visit of the Dutch 
commissioners to Ternate remained cool and non-committal, but could not 
be described as uncommunicative or hostile.60 On 23 May 1803, the British 
left Ternate for Ambon.61 One month later, Oliver and the whole of the 
remaining British force finally withdrew from Ambon on the Queen Charlotte. 
As far as Oliver was concerned, British political ties with the Maluku appear 
to have been too insignificant to need any further discussion. Nevertheless, 
the British flag continued to be flown at the capital of Tidore, Soasio. When 
the Dutch protested about this, Oliver wrote a letter clarifying the ‘flag 
affair’ at Soasio, explaining that Nuku had not received any authority from 
him to make use of the flag.62  
Nuku clearly made no positive attempt to present a friendly face to the 
returning Dutch; one sign of which was his persistence in continuing to 
hoist the British flag at Soasio.63 As soon as Cranssen arrived from Ambon 
on Ternate on 5 August 1803, the Ternate Sultanate and its council held a 
meeting. Sometime later, Nuku sent a letter asking whether Cranssen 
planned to visit him or expected him to send his envoy. Cranssen replied 
that he expected Zainal Abidin to act as intermediary. When Zainal Abidin 
appeared on Tidore, Nuku smiled in the face of adversity. He received 
Zainal Abidin hospitably and with honour. He offered him the title of Raja 
                                               
59 Haga, Nederlandsch Nieuw Guinea, 414-5. 
60 Miller, ‘The Moluccas,’ 176, 178. 
61 Andaya, The World of Maluku, 238. 
62 Miller, ‘The Moluccas,’ 177-8. 
63 Ibid. 179. 
CHAPTER FIVE 100
Muda which the latter refused saying that he preferred to remain 
rijksbestierder, ‘prime minister’.64  
At some time between 12-16 August 1803, Zainal Abidin proposed that 
the Nuku‘s political status and position should be discussed. But Cranssen 
was determined that nothing would be forthcoming before Nuku had 
demanded a formal pardon.65 A few days later, Nuku did indeed send a letter 
to Cranssen in which he confessed his guilt at having acted against the 
‘Company’, and requested the forgiveness. This act of repentance was made 
conditional on the meeting of several terms. His first demand was the 
restoration of the Jailolo Sultanate. He requested a subsidy of Rds 8,000 for 
Tidore – considerably more than Sultan Ternate was receiving. He was 
adamant in demanding a higher status for Tidore than Ternate. Finally he 
insisted that the Makian people and the thousands of Ternatan subjects who 
had rallied under his aegis the right to choose for themselves under whom 
they would live. Nuku was prepared to renew the treaty which Tidore had 
made with Simon Cos on the basis of equality between the two signatories: 
that is as an ‘ally’.66  
On 20 August 1803, Nuku’s terms were discussed and largely agreed to.67 
One sticking point was that Cranssen did not accept to Nuku’s proposal for 
the right to choose being granted the Makian people. He discussed the 
Jailolo issue with Zainal Abidin and the possibility of granting Kayasa, the 
southern side of Dodinga to Raja Jailolo, plus Rds 600 for recognition. 
Nothing was immediately forthcoming and Cranssen affirmed that he was 
awaiting the consent of High Government in Batavia for the final decision, 
which would be made within six months. In the matter of Kayasa, Raja 
Jailolo demurred as he found the area was too small. On 31 August, before 
his departure, Cranssen granted Nuku and the Tidoran grandees a general 
amnesty and pardon. After the departure of Cranssen, Goldbach who was 
keen on improving the relationship with Nuku showed a conciliatory 
attitude by returning the Tidoran throne, which had been kept by 
Kamaludin’s children. A meeting was arranged at Kayu Merah and on the 
agreed day, Nuku approached Kayu Merah where Goldbach was already 
awaiting him on board a large vessel. Then a storm suddenly arose making it 
impossible for the vessel to land safely. This was taken as such a bad omen 
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the meeting was cancelled. After this incident, both fell sick although Nuku 
still tried to visit Goldbach at Ternate. On 6 December, the news of the 
renewal of hostilities in Europe brought deterioration in the comparatively 
peaceful state of affairs in the Maluku.68 The Dutch were again at war with 
the English.69 
During 1803-1804, the settling of the new treaty between Tidore and 
Batavia reached an impasse. Cranssen who continously intervened in the 
affairs on Ternate hindered Goldbach’s attempts to improve the Dutch 
relationship with Sultan Nuku. First, the promise of the High Government 
in Batavia to ratify the concept of agreement failed to eventuate within the 
six months agreed upon. This foot-dragging embarrassed Nuku a great deal. 
Moreover, before the term of six months had even elapsed, Raja Jailolo had 
resumed his practice of raiding Ternatan subjects. Certainly, the news of the 
new outbreak of hostilities in Europe of course did not spur Nuku on to 
seek reconciliation with the Dutch either.70 On 13 January 1804, the 
administration of the provinces of Ternate and Banda was made subordinate 
to that of Ambon. Cranssen was appointed the Governor of Eastern 
provinces. On 27 January 1804, Governor-General Siberg in Batavia wrote 
to Nuku in a conciliatory tone, as friend and ally, but totally avoided 
acceding to any of the latter’s demands.71  
In April 1804, Prince Ibrahim moved to Tidore and conspired with 
Zainal Abidin to design a plan to attack Ternate with the help of the 
Patanese. Prince Mossel did his best to foil this plan but failed to do so. Raja 
Jailolo also contributed to the turbulence by raiding Dodinga, but Nuku and 
Zainal Abidin exculpated him by blaming the attack on the Ternatan 
Alifuru. Caught in the throes of this ticklish situation, Cranssen relied on 
Zainal Abidin in dealing with Nuku.72 Throughout the whole month 
Tidorans attacked Ternatan kora-kora. Zainal Abidin defended Ibrahim and 
Jailolo who had a hand in this and blamed the outbreak of hostilities on the 
Sultan of Ternate. On 8 June 1804, a Dutch envoy went to Tidore to settle a 
treaty with Nuku. Twenty days later, a provisional treaty was drawn up by 
the Dutch and sent back to Tidore for Nuku’s endorsement.73 In June 1804, 
Carel Lodewijk Wieling (1804-1809) replaced Goldbach as Resident of 
Ternate. On 27 June 1804, the Dutch sent an expedition to punish Raja 
Jailolo for his raids, but the latter excused himself by complaining that 
recognition as Raja and the payment of the subsidy within six months, as 
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Cranssen had intimated, had not been fulfilled. When the expedition against 
the Raja who commanded no fewer than ninety kora-kora misfired, the 
Dutch complained bitterly to Nuku.74 During July and August 1804, the 
number squabbles between Ternatan and Tidoran princes seemed endless.75  
On 11 September 1804, Nuku’s comments on the provisional treaty 
were received on Ternate. Nuku disagreed with seven of the twenty-six 
Articles. His most important objection regarded the cession of Seram and 
the intervention by the Dutch Governor of Ternate in the prosecution and 
punishment of the rulers and princes of Tidore. Nuku refused to demolish 
forts and defensive works on Tidore, rejected the demand to deliver twenty 
Papuan slaves, repudiated the appointment of chiefs by the Dutch instead of 
according to traditional procedures, and finally declined to be responsible 
for the return of the Ternatan princes (such as Ibrahim), the Makianese, and 
the Alifuru who had established themselves on Tidore, even though he 
would have been glad to be rid of them. Nuku was clearly doing his best to 
maintain the independence of Tidore. Referring to the intervention of the 
Dutch in internal Tidoran political affairs, he insisted on saying, ’zulks 
geschiedt enkel volgens usantie, dat die qualiteiten aan degeen die ze toekomen gegeven 
worden, anders niet.’76 Patently the Sultan was not prepared to tolerate any 
interference in internal affairs. On a more conciliatory note, in October 
1804, he sent Imam Abdul Gaffar, the secretary of Tidore, to Ternate to 
discuss again the issues concerning East Seram in the provisional treaty.77  
Raja Jailolo’s attacks against Ternate continued unabated and his claims 
to areas of Halmahera became even more grandiose. He took over Galela 
and Kau. Nuku believed that the conduct of Raja Jailolo was not meant to 
demonstrate hostility to the Dutch, but was directed towards Ternate. After 
all, the Raja deserved a territory for his people whom Ternate had 
conquered in the past. The Dutch should not intervene in this. Adopting 
this argument, Nuku was referring to events as long ago as 1551 when a 
combined force of Ternatans and the Portuguese destroyed the Jailolo 
Sultanate under Sultan Katarabumi. In the wake of the campaigns waged by 
Raja Jailolo, Ternate was suffering from a lack of sago, because the supply of 
this foodstuff from Halmahera had been obstructed. At the same time, the 
Papuans were making continuous raids on a number of areas in the Malukan 
waters. On 19 December 1804, Cranssen launched a fifty-three arumbai 
strong expedition to restore order in the area of Seram (Kelang and Manipa) 
and to punish the Patanese. Three commanders led the expedition: The Raja 
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of Negeri Suli was responsible for the indigenous soldiers; Captain-
Lieutenant Schroijenstein for the fleet; and Sub-Lieutenant Tarowsky for the 
military. Suffering from illness and a lack of provisions the crew of the fleet 
did not even encounter any of their enemies. Unsurprisingly, in this hostile 
atmosphere, the correspondence between Tidore and the Dutch stopped 
entirely after 15 October 1805. Then on 22 November 1805, Nuku passed 
away and was succeeded by Zainal Abidin.78 His new title was Sri Sultan 
Halifatur Rifai Amiril Mu’minil Mohammad Zainal Abidin.79 
 
Nuku had remained confident of his power even during his last days, 
retaining his independent attitude towards the Dutch until his final breath. 
He never deigned to visit Cranssen on Ternate and continued to fly the 
English flag. He realized henceforth he had to face the Dutch without 
English support, but he still remained in control of all Tidore and a part of 
Ternatan territory. He realistically complied with the conditions proposed by 
Cranssen but he also continued to set his own terms. His proposal that all 
the treaties between Tidore and the Dutch be disregarded and that the old 
one with Simon Cos in 1657 and 1667 be renewed showed his efforts to 
build an equal relationship with the Dutch, even though in the above-
mentioned treaty Tidore had actually ceded a part of its independence. 
Seemingly undeterred by this, he raised strategic issues concerning the 
independence of Tidore as a sovereign entity. He openly refused 
intervention in internal policy making in Tidore, especially in matters 
concerning exercising justice over chiefs and princes and the building of 
defence works on Tidore. He believed that such matters should be left to 
Tidoran leaders to deal with according to their own customs. After all he 
had struggled and achieved, no new treaty was concluded. The High 
Government in Batavia and the Provincial Government in Ternate were 
both quite aware that Nuku did not have long to live. The Dutch estimated 
he was between seventy and eighty years old.80 Once Nuku died, they 




Post-Nuku Struggle: the Decline of Tidore(1805-1810) 
 
Sultan Zainal Abidin (r. 1805-1810) had assumed an important role during 
the Nuku era. Records about of this prince are hazy before 1794. His name 
suddenly occurs in the sources when he arrived in Maluku on an English 
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ship from Ceylon in 1794. He was one of the princes that had been banished 
with the former Sultan, Jamaludin, in 1779. The puzzle is that his name 
cannot be traced in the sources of that period. It seems that Nuku and his 
adherents were unquestionably already well acquainted with him; otherwise 
he could never have joined Nuku and taken command of one of his fleets 
immediately. He even claimed Nuku’s authority over the whole Papua 
region (Raja Ampat). Perhaps this was true because later he was referred to 
as raja muda.81 For three years (1796-1798) Zainal Abidin was entrusted by 
Nuku with the delicate diplomatic task of negotiating with the English 
Governments in Ambon and Banda.82 In 1799, Zainal Abidin and Prince 
Ibrahim of Ternate seemed to be for more interested in trading spices with 
the English country traders in East Seram than in fighting for Nuku’s cause. 
They were even accused of disloyalty by Nuku, who complained about 
usurpations of authority, the creating of disturbances, and then their refusal 
to support him against Ternate. The English Resident, Farquhar, asserted 
that their activities in East Seram were illicit and harmful to the English 
interests. Therefore on 21 October 1799 Nuku and Farquhar agreed to 
arrest Zainal Abidin and Prince Ibrahim.83 They were eventually banished to 
Madras.84  
When Zainal Abidin returned from his exile at the beginning of 1802, 
Nuku – even though he sent a letter expressing his disappointment to the 
English Government in Madras that it had let the men go – approached him 
again.85 This was because Nuku knew that Cranssen might otherwise strive 
to employ him in dealing with Tidore affairs. What is interesting is that 
Nuku avoided any open conflict with strong figures such as Zainal Abidin 
and Prince Ibrahim but he was not averse to having them punished 
vicariously by the English. When Zainal Abidin returned to Tidore, he 
actually welcomed him. This attitude was consistent with Nuku’s efforts to 
preserve the unity in Tidore, and rightly so because in the long run Zainal 
Abidin turned out to be more loyal to Nuku than to Cranssen. From 1804, 
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both Zainal Abidin and Prince Ibrahim of Ternate were back on the Nuku’s 
side. Zainal was also becoming close ally of Raja Jailolo, Muhammad Arif 
Bila. Most of actions undertaken by Zainal after his return from Madras 
were in Nuku’s interests. Directly after Sultan Nuku’s death, Raja Muda 
Zainal Abidin succeeded him as Sultan without any challenge from the other 
princes.86  
With time the relationship between Tidore and the Dutch achieved a 
hostile status quo because the negotiations between Nuku and the Dutch had 
never been concluded. At the end of 1805, armed clashes – in which Prince 
Major Ceylon was wounded – aggravated the situation. Cranssen lost no 
time in writing to Sultan Zainal Abidin in order to to come to terms with 
him.87 But as the Gezaghebber of Ternate, Wieling, complained, Zainal Abidin 
did not show the slightest inclination to make peace and Raja Jailolo also 
continued harassing the Company vessels.88 On 6 July 1806, Zainal Abidin’s 
position was strengthened even more by the arrival of a British Navy 
squadron. The Dutch were thrown on the defensive and feared a joint 
Anglo-Tidore attack.89 On that day, the British ship HMS Greyhound, 
escorted by the brig the Harrier, captured a small Dutch brig the Belgica, 
armed with twelve guns and with a compliment of thirty-two men.90 After 
the British had left, on 13 November 1806, the Dutch and Ternate forces 
launched an attack on Tidore and re-occupied the island which had been 
taken over by Nuku on 12 April 1797. Ten days later, a number of Tidore 
chiefs signed an amnesty. Haji Umar, who had been one of the greatest and 
most important supporters of Sultan Nuku, was handed over to the Dutch 
and sentenced to death. Two days before the attack, a Ternatan prince had 
spied on the local situation and the military strength in Tidore. Fortunately 
for the Tidore party, Prince Abdul Halim of Tidore informed Zainal Abidin 
and Raja Jailolo and Tidorese grandees about the attack, enabling them to 
escape to Weda.91 
On Weda, Zainal Abidin explained that he was prepared to lead a war 
against the Dutch just as Sultan Nuku had done. He ordered the chiefs of 
Weda to support him, but to his surprise they refused to join. At that time, 
most of the pro-Tidoran supporters resided on Bicoli (Maba). Five days 
later, Zainal Abidin moved to Patani, where he ordered the heads to mount 
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an expedition to attack Kau, Galela, Makian, and Tidore. Again he met with 
a stubborn refusal. While he was engaged in these fruitless negotiations, 
Wieling’s fleet chased him around Maba, Weda, and Patani which were 
subsequently conquered in February 1807.92 In December 1806 he lost one 
of his most able commanders when Raja Jailolo died as he and his family 
(including his son) accompanied by Sangaji Weda and his slave Njenga 
Magoro sought refuge in the forests on Mount Kia in Halmahera.93 Around 
April 1807, an English private vessel, under Captain Elkelek (?), called at 
Gebe and Patani. Zainal came on board himself and requested assistance to 
defeat the Ternatan force. This time he even failed to win support from the 
English. Everybody was turning their back on him.94 
In May 1807 Zainal Abidin ordered Raja Misool, Salawati, Waigeo, and 
Waigama to kill Sangaji Patani, Mancay, and Kapiten Laut Weda, Lukman, 
who had refused to carry out his orders. Because the Dutch had granted the 
four raja of the Raja Ampat a general pardon and their honour was at stake, 
they had no option but to refuse to obey Abidin’s commands. Afterwards 
Zainal Abidin found out that most of the heads of Weda and Patani were 
also no longer obedient to him. Three months later, Governor Wieling of 
Ternate issued a general pardon to the heads and people of Weda and 
Patani.95 On Patani, the Sultan continued to live with only a small entourage: 
Prince Alting, Kapiten Sehe, Secretary Achmad, and Major Ibrahim. Prince 
Mossel and Prince Baba, who had joined the flight, were in Maba. All of 
them finally assembled at Misool. To make matter worse, the Tobelo people 
murdered Prince Hassim and his wife and the people of Loloda murdered 
Prince Syukur and Prince Santosa. Their bodies were thrown into the sea. 
Consequently there were now only two pro-Tidoran leaders left who were 
still loyal: Kapiten Laut Rachmat and Kimelaha Gotowassi, Galilba.96 Most 
certainly, Zainal Abidin was now in great trouble. 
Smarting from his failure to mobilize the Papuan Rajas and heads of 
Weda and Patani, in October 1807 Zainal Abidin dispatched an envoy from 
Misool to Ambon to deliver a letter to Governor Cranssen who welcomed 
the envoy and sent the Sultan a diamond ring. Eager to make the most of 
the moment, Cranssen dispatched four arumbai and one brig to Kilmuri, 
where they were supposed to meet Zainal Abidin. But the latter changed his 
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mind again because of the sudden arrival of the English country traders’ ship 
the Lord Minto.97 Princes Mossel, Ibrahim, Achmadi, and Hadi, who were 
supporting Zainal Abidin, were puzzled his behaviour at a juncture which he 
seemed to be trying to make peace with Governor Cranssen, but 
simultaneously in a blatantly hostile move mobilized Tidoran subjects to 
fight against the Dutch. When Abidin, adding insult to injury, also affronted 
Prince Sehe by seizing his wife, he found himself faced by open conflict 
from these princes, especially Prince Mossel.98 By the second half of the 
year, Dutch control had already reached as far as the east coast of 
Halmahera. When Zainal Abidin fled farther east to Misool, Sangaji and 
Kimelaha Gebe refused to join him.99  
On 14 November 1807, the English country trader Captain William 
Grieg anchored at Tidore and sought out Zainal Abidin and his family.100 
The Tidoran leaders received him hospitably, even waving the English flag. 
Apprised of this action, some of them, including Kimelaha Bukati, were later 
interrogated by the irate Dutch Government on Ternate. The Dutch were 
furious because not having reported the English presence was construed as a 
major act of insubordination.101 The Ternate Government immediately sent 
a group of fifty Madurese soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Swarts 
to attack the English, but for some reason the planned assault did not 
materialize.102 On 3 January 1808, another expedition of some twenty-five 
soldiers (Madurese, under the command of Raden Kudani Larsa) and a fleet 
of ten Ternatan kora-kora under the command of Lieutenant Herder were 
sent to Maba.103 Karel Wieling, the Gezaghebber of Ternate, who had learned 
from events of ‘Tempel treachery’ perpetrated by Tidorans in 1783, did not 
involve Tidorans in these expeditions. He recruited only non-Tidorans, 
namely Ternatans, Madurese, Buginese and sundry others.104 When 
Lieutenant Herder was on the point of arriving at Negeri Gotowasi, he had 
to beat a retreat because the Ternatan auxiliary-fleet had lost thirty men to 
disease and another eighty men were terribly ill and not able to fight. At this 
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juncture Zainal Abidin had eleven kora-kora, which had been well equipped 
by the English, at his disposal.105  
On 14 August 1808, Captain Grieg sailed away leaving behind two guns 
and as much ammunition as he could spare. In return for this gesture, he 
was able to load about 100 pikul of nutmeg. Zainal’s secretary, Muslim, went 
on board the Lord Minto bearing a letter to the English Governor-General in 
Calcutta demanding 200 barrels of gunpowder, 300 muskets, ten six-
pounders, and twelve swivel guns.106 Muslim was accompanied by Hatibi 
Patani, Malefu, and a man of Sumbawa by the name of Achmadi.107 Zainal 
was already in debt to the English but he hoped to make up for it in 
spices.108 On its way, the English fleet encountered a Dutch pancalang and a 
brig the Zwerver on 19 August in Patinti Strait. An engagement which lasted a 
few hours occurred. On the side of the Dutch, four men were killed and 
three were wounded. The Captain of the Dutch brig, C.J. Gebhardt, was 
captured and carried on board the Lord Minto.109 Eventually, the brig the 
Zwerver and her captain, Gebhardt, were released after Gebhardt had 
promised not to serve the Dutch against the English.110  
On 11 January 1809, the Governor-General in Calcutta expressed his 
extreme concern at the unhappy plight to which Sultan Zainal Abidin had 
been reduced. He consequently supplied all the weaponry the latter had 
requested, and also sent a company flag, a gold seal, and unsolicited gifts.111 
English ships now appeared everywhere in Maluku. In February 1809, 
Wieling was informed that two English country traders had called at Wosso, 
collected nutmeg and mace in exchange for clothes.112 On 29 March, the 
arrival of an English brig escorted by thirteen kora-kora manned by Woso 
people was reported. Kapiten Laut Maba, Sapor, reportedly dealt intensively 
with the English country traders; therefore he was detained and taken to 
Ternate by the pro-Dutch heads of Weda and Patani. Avoiding an encounter 
with the English fleet, the Patanese and Wedanese moved to Pajahe. When 
the people of Woso and the English landed at Weda, they failed to win 
support from the local inhabitants and subsequently burned the houses after 
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seizing anything that was transportable.113 In March 1809, two heads of 
Weda and Patani arrived from Weda reporting the situation in Gamrange. 
One Patanese leader suggested to Wieling that certain Patanese leaders, who 
were suspected of being pro-Zainal and had made contact with him through 
a slave, should be arrested and banished to Manado. At long last, the 
Ternate Government was prepared to launch an expedition against Zainal 
Abidin. Indigenous troops from Ternate and Makian, who had been 
involved in the expedition sent by the Governor of Ambon to Wosso the 
February before, were on stand by.114  
Knowing that any approaches to Zainal Abidin would prove fruitless, 
Governor Cranssen decided to abandon his policy of reconciliation.115 In a 
bid to restore ‘law and order’ in Tidore and Ternate, the Gezaghebber of 
Ternate, Wieling, proposed that Prince Mossel (54 years old), son of the late 
Sultan Jamaludin, be appointed the new Sultan in Tidore.116 Cranssen shared 
his view and offered the Sultanate of Tidore to Mossel, who would not 
accept the honour unless a strong expedition first be mounted against Zainal 
Abidin.117 In April 1809, after having succeeded Cranssen as Governor of 
Ambon, Wieling118 sent an envoy to Seram. He invited Prince Mossel to 
come to Ambon. A month later, Mossel sent his son Achmad to Ambon to 
discuss the succession and his concerns about the force of Raja Jailolo II 
(the son of Mohammad Arif Bila). Governor Wieling promised military 
assistance. Seemingly not reassured Mossel remained indecisive and refused 
to leave until Zainal Abidin had been finally removed.119 Zainal Abidin was 
informed about the Dutch plans and tried to win Prince Mossel over by 
offering him reconciliation.120 Mossel was inclined to accept the Dutch 
offer, but he was still afraid that his newly gained power could easily be 
subverted if Raja Jailolo II and Zainal Abidin still roamed at large with 
impunity. 
At the end of the 1809 Wieling died and was succeeded by Colonel Filz. 
He continued to try to win the co-operation of Prince Mossel, who was still 
procrastinating because of the debts he owed the local chiefs. Hearing that 
Mossel also suffered from a shortage of supplies, Colonel Filz sent him the 
requisite victuals and promised that he would reimburse all the chiefs were 
they to accompany him to Ambon. In November 1809, Mossel’s son, 
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Achmad, who had been in Ambon all the while, was sent back to East 
Seram to fetch his father. On 5 February 1810, the Englishman Captain 
Tucker, commanding HMS Dover, arrived off Amboina to impose a 
blockade, and after capturing a number of Dutch vessels, occupied the town 
on 19 February. After Ambon had fallen to the English, Prince Mossel 
finally made up his mind. He accepted the throne of Tidore.121 In March 
1810 he was appointed new Sultan under the protection of the English.122 
Colonel Filz and other Dutch officers in Ambon may have influenced the 
English on this matter. The late Governor Wieling had given Mossel a good 
recommendation, because he found him a pleasant person, attached to his 
people, and above all someone who would not make any trouble for the 
Europeans.123  
In April-May 1810, in Maba Zainal Abidin was still at war against the 
fleet of Ternate sent by the Dutch, and was able to repulse them. One kora-
kora from Ternate and one from Makian even fell into his hands. Twenty-
eight Ternatans were killed and another ten men were captured. Just as 
Zainal Abidin’s men before them, the Dutch-Ternatan soldiers were 
weakened by the ‘Papuan disease’ (beriberi).124 In the following months 
Zainal Abidin’s kora-kora continued to wreak havoc, but then suddenly in 
the middle of July the British on Ambon were informed that Sultan Zainal 
Abidin had died. As his successor, the people of Maba, who had remained 
loyal to him, appointed his son Jamaludin to be Sultan.125  
Zainal Abidin was not a charismatic ‘Tuan Barkah’ which is what Nuku 
was called by the Malukans. Compared to Nuku, both his personality and 
leadership were weak. When dealing with the Dutch his stance was never 
bold and clear cut. Embroiled in a conflict with Nuku, he gave Cranssen the 
impression that he was willing to co-operate, but when Nuku welcomed him 
and offered him the important position of jogugu in Tidore, he had absolutely 
no compunction about shifting his allegiance. After Nuku died, he was 
supposed to be the man who could lead the struggle and he showed himself 
inimical to the Dutch. In fact he could never make up his mind. The princes 
and his followers in Maba, Weda, and Patani were equally at a loss what to 
make of him. As a consequence, he forfeited the help of his supporters from 
the Raja Ampat and could not retain the loyalty of his main followers from 
Maba, Weda, Patani and Gebe.  
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As Sultan, he was incapable of acting as an exemplary figure who could 
gain the respect of other leaders. The reverse was true. He acted with the 
utmost selfishness. He sent Prince Sehe, one of his loyal adherents, to fight 
far away in order to seize his wife. This was a moral blunder. Both in the 
Tidoran scheme of things and by Muslim moral standards; the action of 
seizing another person’s wife was an insupportable and humiliating act.  
Despite Zainal Abidin’s moral cowardice, English support for Tidore 
was unwavering until his death in 1810. Every time English ships arrived in 
Maluku, weapons and ammunition were delivered in exchange for spices. 
Significantly, the English Governor-General avoided making any real 
political commitment to Tidore, but Zainal Abidin’s demands for weapons 
and ammunition were faithfully fulfilled, even though he was never able to 
maximize the help of the English.  
Zainal Abidin’s big mistake was that he did not follow the developments 
in the political relationship between the English and the Dutch. When the 
English fleet entered Malukan waters and conquered Ambon in 1810, he 
was still entangled in a fight in East Halmahera. He did not anticipate events 
as Nuku had done in 1796 by sending Prince Ibrahim to Rear-Admiral 
Rainier. He should have sent an envoy as soon as the English conquered 
Ambon in 1810, in order to have his position as Sultan of Tidore 
recognized. The English commander at that time, it seemed, did not realize 
what had happened on Tidore and what Zainal Abidin’s true position was. 
As a result, Prince Mossel or Mohammad Thaher, whom the Dutch had 
greatly favoured, was inaugurated as Sultan, instead of Zainal Abidin or his 
son Jamaludin, who had been elected as an alternate ‘Sultan’ by the people 









The theme of this chapter is a discussion of the roles of the different groups 
of people who were generally unceremoniously thrown together under the 
pejorative label Papuase Zeerovers ‘Papuan Pirates’ by the Dutch. The term 
Papuan, as Gerrit Knaap has observed, refers not only to the Papuans of 
Raja Ampat but was also applied to Tidoran subjects in the south-eastern 
part of Halmahera – the Gamrange, and Bird’s Head Peninsula on the New 
Guinea mainland.1 In a number of cases of raiding, the sources also refer to 
Papuans living in islands around Geelvink Bay2 and to the Papuans of Onin 
residing around the west coast of New Guinea.3 During the rebellion of 
Prince Nuku, the Papuan role in strengthening the rebel forces was decisive 
in a number of skirmishes. From 1791, the involvement of the Gamkonora 
group from North Halmahera, namely Galela, Tobelo, and Tobaru who had 
formerly been subjects of the Ternate Sultanate, was also quite significant. 
This chapter explains the relations between the Tidoran leaders, Prince 
Nuku’s coterie, and these peoples. These relations were basically articulated 
on the practice of raiding and robbery.   
Information about these Papuans is scanty, scattered throughout the 
VOC sources. Frequently mentioned are the raiding enterprises of the 
Gamrange Halmaherans from Maba, Weda, Patani, and Gebe, and of 
Papuans from Salawati and Misool in the Raja Ampat. The other two 
groups, the Waigama and Waigeo, appear less often. In the sources the 
Gamkonora raiding groups are mentioned after 1791, following their 
involvement in Nuku’s rebellion. The raiding enterprises of the Onin people 
were sporadically reported in the seventeenth century and attracted less 
attention in the eighteenth century because the Dutch focused more on the 
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Raja Ampat and Gamrange. The Papuans inhabiting the areas between Onin 
and Kobiai used to ally themselves with the East Seramese who traded 
regularly in the region between New Guinea and East Seram. These Papuans 
of Onin were well known for the swiftness of their vessels and their sudden 
attacks with such traditional weapons as arrows, their traditional spears 
which the Dutch referred to as assegais, and swords.4 The involvement of 
the Papuans of the Geelvink Bay area in the raiding was embedded in their 
alliance with the Raja Ampat groups, particularly Misool.5 Because the 
situation of the region during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries 
was not much written about, it is virtually impossible to piece together a 
complete account about these people. 
The Dutch descriptions of the Papuans in the seventeenth century and 
even in the nineteenth century tend to be denigrating, especially when they 
deal with the physical appearance and character of these people. Leupe 
described them as follows. ’Men and women are completely naked, with the 
exception of their schamelheid ‘genitalia’, which they deck with roots. Their 
necks and arms are decorated with all sorts of corals, broken bits of pipes 
and the like. They are very stupid and ignorant, but nevertheless cruel, 
rapacious, and murderous. Their weapons are bow and arrow, shield and 
‘sword’, and javelin as well.’6 The description of the coastal people was 
slightly different. They were portrayed as good sailors who employed long, 
narrow, but very swift canoes. The majority of the heads of the coastal 
people originated from Tidore and Seram and sported long hair and clothes 
according to the fashion of the rest of the Malukans. As Leupe says, they 
went through the motions of being Muslim, but in daily life they still 
practised the local religions. They hid their local religious practices as they 
were more afraid of Tidoran law than of that of Mohammed.7    
 
 
Papuans of the Raja Ampat 
 
The oldest report mentioning the name ‘Papua’ appears in the travel account 
of Pigafetta in 1521. He talks about a Raja-Papua who had resided in Jailolo 
(Halmahera). The name ‘Papuan Islands’ which probably refers to ‘Raja 
Ampat,’ was mentioned for the first time in the journal of the Spaniard 
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Martin de Uriarte in 1527.8 Two myths of the origin Malukan kingdoms, 
recorded by Galvao in 1544 and Coolhaas in 1923, suggest that Bacan had 
relationship with the Raja Ampat (Misool and Waigeo) earlier than Tidore. 
The letter of Adriaen van der Dussen in 1610 also confirms this suggestion. 
In the myths, Ternate, Tidore, and Jailolo were not even mentioned. It 
probably means that the relationship between Raja Ampat and Tidore 
occurred in later period.9   
The Raja Ampat kingdoms were ruled by four raja: Salawati, Waigeo, 
Misool, and Waigama. The Raja Ampat Islands is a mountainous archipelago 
lying between Northern Maluku and the West New Guinea mainland. Of its 
main islands, only Salawati and Batanta were situated in any proximity to the 
mainland. Longer distances from the mainland separated these from Waigeo 
to the north and Misool to the south. The description of the area is 
elaborated by a Dutch expedition in 1705 which had visited Salawati and 
Waigeo. The ‘kingdom’ of Salawati was located on the south-eastern and 
south-western part of the island, surrounded by numerous tiny islands and 
reefs. Raja Salawati and his jogugu lived in a separate settlement located on 
the opposite side of a large river, located in the south-eastern part of the 
island. The houses stood on high piles and were perched over the river. The 
people in the interior and the mountains lived a nomadic existence in small 
temporary hamlets. Those who lived near the coast especially the chiefs to 
whom the interior people paid allegiance were Muslim. They earned their 
living mainly from slaves (the majority from New Guinea), sago, 
tortoiseshell, ambergris, and spices which they sold to traders from Tidore 
or Keffing in East Seram.10 
With a length of fifty-five kilometres Waigeo is the largest of the Papuan 
islands and it is indented with many bays. Raja Waigeo lived on the south-
eastern side of the island in the settlement Kabilolo. Warjo lay on the 
Eastern Cape and Umpain, consisting of four villages, was located on the 
western side of the island. The kapiten laut lived in Waigamerok, close to 
Lake Waigeo. As on Salawati, the settlements were built along the large 
rivers but the settlement of Raja Waigeo was situated near a lake which 
measures some eleven kilometres in circumference. Surrounded by rugged 
cliffs, it has a piece of flat land jutting out into the water. Excluding those 
people who had gone to Misool, fifty-six able-bodied men lived there. The 
main sources of food were freshwater fish, sago, fruit, and tubers.11  
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Misool consists mainly of islands and reefs. It is roughly sixty-four 
kilometres (40 miles) in circumference. The island was divided between the 
petty kingdoms of Misool and Waigama. The kingdom of Misool was on the 
east side, at the farthest point inland of a bay. Right next to the Raja’s 
settlement was that of Kapiten Laut. Both these chiefs were supreme in their 
own settlements which could muster a total of 3,000 fighting men. Most of 
the people retained their local beliefs and lived in the inland or in the 
mountains. The undisputed leadership of the Muslims who lived in houses 
on stilts on the coast was acknowledged. The settlement of Raja Waigama 
was located in the north-west part of the island, not far from its 
westernmost point. Later it was moved to the southern part. The inhabitants 
of Waigama, just as those of Misool, were divided into the subjects of the 
Raja and those of the Kapiten Laut. Together they could mount a fighting 
force of 500 to 600 men. Misool produced only a few fruit trees, and the 
people’s main staple was sago. This land could supply excellent water and 
possessed a reasonable anchorage. The most important trade item was 
slaves, whom they obtained either by raiding or from the market on 
Salawati. The people of Misool also sold birds of paradise to traders from 
East Seram.  
The Raja Ampat Papuans maintained close connections with the Biak-
Numfor people. In 1705, Raja Salawati was reported to have sailed to 
Numfor to purchase tobacco.12 The Raja Ampat areas were a haven for 
traders and raiders from Biak-Numfor, who had settled several areas in this 
archipelago. The Schouten Islands, namely Biak, Numfor, Supiori and some 
smaller islands which also served as bases are situated in the northern part of 
the Geelvink Bay on the West New Guinea mainland.13  
From an early eighteenth-century report, it is known that the Raja Ampat 
kingdoms recognized the power and authority of Sultan Tidore. In 1705, the 
Raja, Jogugu, and Kapiten Laut on Salawati and Waigeo received an envoy of 
Tidore with great respect. When the envoy finished reading the letter from 
Sultan Tidore, all those who were present uttered an ‘Amin’, the response 
normally made at the end of a Muslim prayer. Andaya has suggested that 
since their incorporation into the periphery of Tidore, the Papuans 
associated Tidore with Islam. Consequently they accorded Sultan Tidore’s 
words and the physical presence of his letter with the same devotion 
reserved for the name of Allah in the Holy Koran.14  
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In 1787, Governor Cornabé complained that the waters around the Raja 
Ampat, south-east Halmahera, and East Seram abounded with reefs and 
innumerable small islands, which made them dangerous and impossible to 
navigate (onbevaarbaar) for strangers. The climate, particularly in the Raja 
Ampat, was deadly to Europeans.15 Leupe describes the air in the Raja 
Ampat as being unhealthy and ‘contagious’ (besmettelijk).16 In 1737, a fleet of 
four vessels of the Ternate Government, sailing to Salawati under the 
command of Lieutenant Jan Oordwyn Sandbergen, ran into bad weather and 
consequently suffered from a lack of provisions and water. To make matters 
worse, the people of Salawati declined to provide them with victuals. Sixteen 
men died and the rest fell sick. In 1744, in the same area a squadron of three 
ships under the command of Matheus Feretz du Rietx was hit by a storm 
and shipwrecked. Most of the crew drowned and the survivors were 
attacked by the Papuans on reaching the coast.17 In 1762, a big punitive 
expedition was sent to the Onin area, the Raja Ampat, and East Seram. It 
consisted of eight vessels from Batavia carrying a hundred Europeans, and 
was accompanied by more than ten supporting vessels from the 
Governments of Ternate, Banda, Ambon, and Makassar, plus twenty-five 
Ternatan and Tidoran kora-kora. This fleet suffered the same fate near 
Salawati.18 It was a double-edged disaster, adversely affecting both the 
Europeans and the Tidorans. In 1789, during the rebellion led by Nuku, the 
pro-Kamaludin Tidoran fleet suffered an outbreak of disease which left sixty 
of its men dead. This was a disaster for the Europeans who could not sail 
these waters in safety without Tidoran pilots. Deprived of such help they 
risked losing their way and falling victim to surprise attacks.19  
 
 
Raja Ampat and Geelvink Bay 
 
Some folk stories imply that the Raja Ampat people inhabiting the coastal 
areas originated from the Schouten and Padaido Islands (present-day Biak) 
lying slightly to the north of the entrance to Geelvink Bay (present-day 
Cenderawasih Bay). Around the fifteenth century a Biak man - one version 
of the legends claims – became the clan leader of the Raja Ampat. This may 
indicate the beginning of the migration of people from Biak to the Raja 
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Ampat. The exogamic keret (clans) sailed away as groups in which individuals 
could operate in specific social functions. They designated the new, foreign 
place of arrival in their own language, using a name similar to that of their 
place of origin, such as Mamoribo (inhabitants of a gravel shoal) and Warjo 
(inhabitants of the river). Often they also used the names of big clans such 
as Osba, Omkai, Kafdarun (the first lived on Ayau and the second on 
Batanta). The Omkai had a fierce reputation for their raiding enterprises to 
Seram and Ambon, from where they took away women as captives. Their 
culture hero, known as Korwar, was worshipped in a form of memorial 
statue (zielenbeeld) after his death. They sang ‘Snonsja nggo mun, binsja nggo mun’, 
which means ‘We killed the men and took away the women’.20 
For a long time, these first occupants of the Raja Ampat, especially those 
from Omkai and Besew, were embroiled in fights with the Sawaiers 
(probably from Sawai on the north coast of Seram) who also strove to 
occupy the same archipelago. A number of names of places are related to 
Sawai, for example, Yensawai (the coast of Sawai) in the northern and 
southern part of Batanta Island or Nyandesawai (landing path of Sawai) in 
south Waigeo. Eventually, according to the legends, the Biak settlers under 
the leadership of their culture hero Sekfamneri (or Gurabesi) drove the 
Sawai settlers away to the farthest point of the Jailolo passage (Halmahera). 
Their victory was commemorated in a place-name Bukorsawai, which meant 
the ‘skull of Sawai’. The end of the story was that the Biak immigrants 
became the masters of the Raja Ampat Archipelago. The Omkai and Besew 
people were also known on (North) Seram. Under the leadership of 
Sekfamneri, they also landed on Patani. There the Sawaiers defended 
themselves from a great fort. But, by exerting his extraordinarily great force, 
Sekfamneri conquered the areas.21  
 
 
The Myth of the Raiding Leaders and Tidore 
 
According to oral tradition, the oldest rajas of the Raja Ampat lived on the 
north-east coast of the island of Waigeo. They belonged to the clan Kawe 
which was related to the Wawiai who lived in the inner bay (Kabu), where in 
earlier times they had formed a strong entity. The centre of their power was 
located on the Kabu Bay, which the oldest story refers to as the birthplace 
of their tribe and their religion. There the small Wai-Kew River, from which 
the name Waigeo is derived, can be found. One of the small, rocky islets in 
Kabu Bay was the site of the pantheon of Wawiai. It had a deep cave which 
                                                
20 F. C. Kamma, ‘De verhouding tussen Tidore and de Papoesche eilanden in legende en 
historie, I,’ Indonesië, 1-6 (1948), 365-7. 
21 Ibid. 368-70. 
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had once been a treasury chamber of the culture hero, Sekfamneri. At the 
headwaters of the bay was located a small ‘temple’ in which the family 
accoutrements were worshipped. In Kabu Bay itself a similar group of ‘gods’ 
was also erected at the same early date on the small island Efdulu. On the 
top of the cliff carved steps led to the place where the sculptures of the 
heads of the gods and their consorts had been erected. The cave sheltered 
such treasures as brocade sarong (cloth), Chinese vases and blue-and-white 
porcelain plates, and large earthenware storage jars (martavanen). The 
treasures were said to be of a supernatural origin. These Papuans may have 
sailed as far as the east coast of Halmahera, around Gamrange, before the 
era of the well-known Raja Ampat or kolano fat. This title was associated with 
Tidore and the raja who governed on behalf of Tidore.22 
With pride it was told how Sekfamneri and his Papuan countrymen had 
travelled to distant foreign lands where they seized specific objects and local 
products and harassed the inhabitants. In their overseas enterprises they 
were hampered by a relative shortage of able-bodied men, so this had to be 
compensated for by taking captives who could be used as rowers. It seemed 
to be a practical method, but sometimes they encountered unexpected local 
resistance and suffered loses. Their rowers were mostly do mamun or ‘dead 
persons’, meaning people seized from such various islands as Seram, Buru, 
Amblau, Selayar, Makassar, Java, and Malaka. Sekfamneri, so the legend 
recounts, continued his voyage to the west in a great vessel manned by thirty 
rowers. Driven by the west monsoon, they arrived in the neighbourhood of 
Seram. Whenever they suffered from a lack of fresh water at sea, Sekfamneri 
could summon the rain by using his supernatural power. When they were in 
need of food, he called big fish to approach them. Thus reassured his people 
maintained their zeal for raiding foreign lands.  
In the course of his extensive raiding voyages, Sekfamneri heard of four 
Malukan kingdoms Kororo (Tidore), Karnaki (Ternate), Jailolo, and Batsjani 
(Bacan). Hence he and his crew sailed along the east coast of Halmahera in 
southerly direction, rounded Cape Libobo, and headed due north through 
Patinti Strait. Even though this strait was notorious for its fierce storms, 
they managed to keep going. The south wind brought them to Tidore, which 
at that time happened to be at war with Jailolo. At the time the Sultan of 
Tidore was in need of seaworthy vessels and brave able-bodied men to repel 
the Jailolo fleet which had already been sighted in a distance. A great attack 
was expected as the horizon was full of the white patches – the sails of the 
prahu of the enemy. Sekfamneri and his men landed just in time. The Sultan 
promised to give him his daughter as his wife if he could defeat Jailolo fleet. 
Within a short time Sekfamneri and his Papuan fellows overmastered the 
                                                




enemy and hauled in the Jailolo prahu. He was then awarded ‘the hand of 
the beautiful daughter of the Sultan’: Princess Boki Tabai.23 Before he left, 
Sultan Tidore told Sekfamneri that he was now the king of his country and 
that the Sultan would help him establish his kingship. As vassals, he and his 
people would have to pay tribute every east monsoon. Finally with the 
princess on board, Sekfamneri sailed back to his homeland and established 
his kingdom on Wai-Kew in the centre of Waigeo.24  
Afterwards Sekfamneri expanded his power by consolidating the 
strength of his Papuan kingdom. He controlled strategic points along the 
coastal areas and the entry ports to the inland areas,25 and hence made 
contact with the inland natives.26 The Biak men taught the inland inhabitants 
how to forge iron, but they also learned their language and through the 
centuries became the intermediaries between the coast and the inland areas 
acting as interpreters in the trade and intercourse with foreigners. The Biaks 
of Numfor, who resided at Amberbaken, prided themselves on having had 
influence over the natives for many years. These middlemen, later bearing 
the title sangaji, married local women, and converted to Islam as their great 
master in Tidore had done, although the strength of their devotion was 
questionable.27 
Regarding the origins of the Raja Ampat kingdoms, there are various 
creation myths. The findings of De Clercq claim that Sekfamneri had four 
sons.28 However, Kamma tells a different version with a similar content. 
One day Sekfamneri and his wife went rowing on a small river and found six 
eggs hidden beneath the grass on the bank.29 Sekfamneri wanted to consume 
them but his wife was curious about what the eggs would produce and took 
them to the ‘palace’. Indeed something extraordinary happened. After a few 
days the eggs hatched and four boys emerged. The fifth egg was a girl. 30  
                                                
23 Sekfamneri has another name, Gurabesi. According to another version, he was not 
married to the eldest daughter of Sultan Tidore, but to her younger sister, Boki Taiba 
(Tabai). See Johsz R. Mansoben, ‘Sistem Pemerintahan Tradisional di Salawati Selatan, 
Raja Ampat,’ in Masinambow (ed.), Halmahera dan Raja Ampat, 165-6.  
24 Kamma, ‘De verhouding,’ 537-40. 
25 F.S.A De Clercq, ‘Noord- en Westkust van Nederlansch Nieuw-Guinea,’ in Tijdschrift van 
het Koninklijk Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap 10 (1893), 166. 
26 Idem, Bijdragen tot de kennis der residentie Ternate (Leiden: Brill, 1890), 324.  
27 Kamma, ‘De verhouding,’ 540. 
28 De Clerq, ‘Noord- en Westkust,’ 164-5. 
29 This version is slightly different from Van der Leeden’s (1980) finding. He notes that 
the number of eggs is only four. See Van der Leeden, ‘The Raja Ampat Islands,’ 21. 
30 Another version of the myth, written by an indigenous Papuan from Salawati, differs 
slightly from the piece in Kamma. The finder of the eggs is not Gurabesi from Biak, but 
Raja Gaman and his wife. Gurabesi, according to this version, had been transformed 
sexually from being a woman called Pintako who had also been hatched from the eggs. See 
Arfan 1981: 2-4. This difference, I suggest, can be attributed to the origin of the 
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Within short time they grew bigger and the people recognized them as 
princes. These four boys and one girl used to go to the forest and the beach 
together, but one day something embarrassing was discovered. The girl had 
become pregnant. As a consequence she was taken to the beach and locked 
in a big shell and floated out to sea on the outgoing tide. Carried away by the 
current she arrived on Numfor Island. This explained how the people of 
Waigeo were related to the Papuans of Numfor.  
Meanwhile, the harmony between the four princes did not last long. 
They quarrelled over a turtle. When this animal escaped, the oldest prince 
speared it, which led to an outburst of rage. The three younger princes 
decided to go away. Each went a little farther: the second prince moved to 
Salawati; the third sailed on to Misool; and the fourth took up residence on 
Waigama after having sailed to Seram.31 The eldest prince remained in their 
place of origin and later moved from Mumus (the mouth of the bay) to the 
outer north corner of the bay, Kabilolo. The reason for this move was the 
growth of the trade with foreigners in the area.32  The sixth egg fossilized. 
For this egg, the people built a ‘temple’ on a tributary of the Wai-Kew. For 
centuries this egg was the object of worship. At critical moments, in times of 
sickness or death, they had to bathe it and the water which was believed to 
then be imbued with magical power, was sprinkled on the faces of the 
participants. Women were strictly prohibited to see or even to talk about the 
stone egg on pain of never bearing children. The taboo (pamali) on talking 
about this stone was extended to all people and those who infringed it 
would be sentenced to death.33 There was a regular contact between the Raja 
Ampat people and their relatives in the Schouten Archipelago. Affinal 
relationships were common. After their marriages, the men of the Raja 
Ampat were sometimes obliged to remain on Biak in order to build a house 
or to make a garden for their father-in-law as bride price.34 
The Papuans of the Raja Ampat, according to Kamma, believed that 
their society consisted of three categories. The first was composed of the 
common people. Every individual among the common people always had a 
genealogy from which their family of origin or koek sarita could be identified. 
The other two groups at each end of the social scale, namely slaves and raja 
or kolano did not have a genealogy. The slaves were denied one because they 
formed the bottom layer of the society and were totally subject to it, thereby 
forfeiting their freedom. The raja likewise lacked a genealogy because he was 
                                                                                                                               
informants from whom Kamma had collected it on Biak. The latter was recorded in the 
Raja Ampat. 
31 Kamma, ‘De verhouding,’ 540-1. 
32 Ibid. 543. 
33 Ibid. 542. 




considered elevated above the community. The raja was perceived to pertain 
to the higher order of the universe. When attempting to depict the higher 
authority, people would talk about the legends and myths about the kings. 
Throughout the whole area of the Raja Ampat Archipelago, people told 
stories about kings who were hatched from eggs of dragons, crocodiles or 
were otherwise of ‘indefinable origin’. In Biak itself, there are stories of 
Manseren Manggundi,35 a figure born of an unknown father who possessed 
power transferred from sampari or the ‘morning star.’36 
These myths offer a clue to the perspective of the Papuans on raiding 
enterprises. It implies that the focus of their culture was travelling to foreign 
lands, to raid the people and to rob them of their goods, and not forgetting 
to bring home foreign brides. Raiding a foreign land was an integral part of 
the whole religious and social life of the Papuans. The figure of the culture 
hero Sekfamneri was a model for great raiding leaders. The booty was stored 
in sacred places as treasure. Going raiding was a sacred and legitimate 
activity. Consequently violence was a method embedded in this enterprise 
and seen as a manifestation of power or martial prowess. Importantly the 
raiding was not limited to foreign lands. In 1705, when Jacob Weyland led 
an expedition to Geelvink Bay, he found that the people to the north of 
Biak or on the north-east corner of Yapen lived in enmity with each other. 
The people fled away immediately the Dutch expedition approached the 
shore.37 This was obviously how slaves were obtained. An oral tradition 
collected and interpreted by Kamma recounts there was a rivalry between 
villages among the Papuans of Biak. The violence of raiders from Biak 
therefore not only terrified the Malukan traders, it generated great terror and 
distress among their own neighbours because they were afraid of being 
kidnapped. As late as 1886, a fleet of eighty Biak canoes assailed Kurudu, a 
village of Biak emigrants from the Samber clan.38  
Chris Ballard argues that this kind of Melanesian creation story derives 
from myths embracing significant clues to the ‘sacred geography’ of a 
cultural area. They explain the structure of the universe and the nature of the 
relationship between people, their geographic position in relation to the 
neighbouring areas, the prevailing strategic interests within a region, and the 
                                                
35 F. J. F. van Hasselt, ‘De legende van Mansren Mangoendi,’ BKI 69 (1914), 90-100.    
36 Kamma, ‘De verhouding,’ 363-4.  
37 Haga, Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea, 166-7; See also G. J. Held, The Papuas of Waropen (The 
Hague: Nijhoff, 1957), 16-7. On the south-western coast of Papua, Onin, rivalries and 
competition among the people themselves also made the area dangerous for inhabitants 
and foreigners alike. In 1858 the people of Kairufa were still at war with Patimuni, a 
settlement east of Karas Island. See T. Goodman, ‘The Sosolot Exchange Network of 
Eastern Indonesia during the XVII and XVIII Centuries,” in Perspectives on the Bird’s Head of 
Irian Jaya, Indonesia (Leiden: IIAS, ISIR, LIPI, 1997) 438-9. 
38 Kamma, Koreri, 216. 
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distribution of minor and major trade resources. The travelling creator 
myths serve as ‘charters’ for regional trade and political relationships.39 
Andaya suggests that the travelling creator stories, such as that of 
Sekfamneri, also serve as socio-political blueprints.40 Moreover, their stories 
also assign pre-eminence to justify power in the sense that they serve the 
interests of the dominant groups. Raiding as a violent practice is legitimized. 
They conceal the power interest of the dominant from the subordinate 
groups to ensure that the raiding is beneficial. They mask the ‘economic’ 
calculation, the political goals, and the power struggle for domination 
between the powerful groups.    
The stories about the relationship between the Raja Ampat and Tidore 
recognize the special relationship between the Papuans of Raja Ampat (as 
well as of Biak) and Tidore and explain the dominance of the latter. Raiding 
other villages, abducting women, plundering foreign goods and the other 
violence which inevitably ensued was explicitly conceived as ideal and model 
behaviour, represented by the conduct of the powerful Sekfamneri alias 
Gurabesi. As the outcome of his power and success, he was granted a 
woman who became his wife by the foreign ‘superior’ King of Tidore. From 
this point of view, the relationship between Tidore and the apparently 
subordinate Papuans may have been conceived as the basis of their existence 
and a recognition of their identity and, moreover, of reciprocal benefit. 
Tidore was supposed to protect and support the raiding ‘tradition’ and in 
return, as a gesture of reciprocity, the Papuans paid homage and tribute. The 
Papuans saw this as a ‘rule’. When Tidore ‘broke’ this rule, for example, by 
punishing the Papuans or their allies for the raiding they had perpetrated, the 
Papuans were ready to subvert this Dutch-inspired policy of Tidore. Above 
all the myth stressed that the ideal pattern of relationship was Tidore-
Papuan, not Ternate-Papuan. Therefore when the situation was understood 
to be returned to ‘order’ the Papuans tended to pay homage to Tidore.  
The social organization of the Biak villages (menu) was in accordance 
with their character as a combat group. One of the leader categories which 
enjoyed special prestige was called mambri. The position of its members was 
emphasized at the ceremony of initiation known as k’bor ‘young adult man.’ 
A mambri might distinguish himself in distant raids from which he brought 
home slaves and valuable goods, or by successfully resisting attackers. Biak 
people who had made a long voyage to faraway foreign lands and returned 
home won great honour. They carried from afar such rare goods as sarong, 
Chinese vases, blue-and-white ceramic plates, beads, bronze gongs, and large 
banners. These foreign goods were displayed to other groups with whom 
they were in competition in order to augment their fame and to put the 
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other party at a disadvantage. The upshot was that others would be 
challenged to conduct an even more spectacular raiding voyage and obtain 
even more goods.41   
The raiders accumulated the foreign wares they had acquired in their 
homes. These precious goods were presented or displayed during the bride 
wealth payments, gift exchange, payments of fines and other ceremonies. 
The gifts delivered at life-cycle feasts were seen to protect their recipients 
and endow them with exceptional powers. The goods were conceived of as 
being imbued with foreign powers. By the act of laying their hands on them, 
the Papuans believed that they had absorbed this power. In Rutherford’s 
terms, this also shows an aspect of the fetishization of the foreign, namely, 
the corporeality42 of foreign value. In its visible forms, value appeared as a 
‘proof’ of an encounter with the outsiders. Yet value also appeared as the 
generic potency conveyed in the gifts of food and ceramics, which enabled 
Biak people to brave the perils of voyages to distant lands.43 Kamma saw the 
circulation of goods and foodstuffs as the lifeblood of the society because 
this was what determined its socio-economic aspects. Those possessing such 
rare goods accumulated only through trading, marriage, or raiding, were 
recognized as reputable members of the society.44   
Papuan raiders or envoys also paid tribute to the Sultan’s vassal on the 
islands of Halmahera and Gebe45 and never failed to travel to Tidore to pay 
homage at the Sultan’s court. Entering the palace and prostrating themselves 
before the throne, the Papuans claimed they were absorbing the barak 
‘blessing’ emanating from the Sultan. Along with the goods obtained and 
Tidoran titles which the Papuans would be granted, the raiders carried this 
barak back to their communities. Upon disembarking in their homeland, the 
travellers shook hands with their relatives, who then rubbed their own eyes, 
a gesture transferring the barak they had received. Tidore appeared to the 
Papuans as the source of the valuables which served as evidence of a 
voyager’s prowess, and of a potency which imbued others with the ability to 
travel.46 
 
                                                
41 Kamma, ‘De verhouding,’ 537. 
42 Adj. corporeal, ‘of or relating to person’s body, especially as opposed to their spirit.’ 
Oxford Dictionary. 
43 D. Rutherford, Raiding the Land of Foreigners, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP, 
2003), 17, 149; Kamma, Koreri, 12-4, 270; Idem, Dit wonderlijke werk, I, (Oegstgeest: Raad 
voor de Zending der Ned. Hervormde Kerk, 1977), 235. 
44 Idem, Koreri, 66-7. 
45 Ibid. 8. 
46 Rutherford, Raiding the Land of Foreigners, 17. 
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The Papuans of the Onin and Kobiai areas 
 
Accounts of the Papuans of the Onin and Kobiai areas in the eighteenth 
century are very few and far between. The following description relies 
mostly on an account from the seventeenth century. The Papuans of Onin 
were mentioned in the sources - probably for the first time – by Miguel 
Roxo de Brito in 1582. Onin was located on the west coast of the New 
Guinea mainland. The Onin area consisted of a number of villages: on the 
southern side Emalat and Gornanang, and on the northern side, Rumbati, 
from all three of which most men went out raiding.47 Up across the McCluer 
Gulf (present day Berau Gulf) at a distance of about twelve miles, resided 
the people of Rumakai. Down to the south-east, lived the Kobiai people. 
Across the sea on the south-west side lies a small island called Wessels 
Island (Pulau Adi), where about a hundred Papuans lived.48 All the people of 
Onin worked very hard to obtain gold, which could be obtained in an area 
called Offin, located between Onin and Ogar.49 Raja Waigeo told De Brito 
that the area was inhabited by 40,000 people. The people of Ogar also went 
into into the interior to collect gold. Besides a desire to procure the gold, 
traders from Serdanha (Seram Laut) came to this place to buy massoi (Cortex 
Oninius) which they bartered for ironware, especially swords called talisas. 
Most of the inhabitants on the shore were merchants. The coastal 
inhabitants were black (that is non-Austronesian) but some of them were of 
mixed blood, quite probably because there had been intermarriage with East 
Seramese. Their staple food was roasted sago. They also kept chickens, pigs, 
fish, goats, and buffaloes.50 In 1610, Adriaan van der Dussen informed the 
Gentlemen Seventeen in Holland that the people of Onin maintained 
trading contacts with the Papuans from Misool.51  
In the seventeenth century, all of these places had a reputation as 
providers of slaves and suppliers of massoi. From 1623, the Dutch in Banda 
had been aware that all these people, but especially the Onin, were in very 
close contact with traders from East Seram, the Seram Laut group, Gorom, 
                                                
47 NA VOC 3676, Secret letter from Banda to Batavia, 1784 (?), 22; Haga, Nederlandsch-
Nieuw Guinea, 26-7. 
48 Leupe, ‘De Reizen der Nederlanders,’ 10-37. 
49 A Spaniard Andres de Urdaneta who had lived in Maluku from 1525 to 1536 reported 
the existence of some gold of high quality on Bacan. According to a Malay he had met, the 
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was an area of Onin on the mainland of New Guinea. See Haga, Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea, 
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1582 to the Raja Ampat, the MacCluer Gulf, and Seram,’ BKI 150 (1994), 135. 
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and Geser. It was known that the inland Kobiai, who reportedly lived in 
caves in the hinterland, would approach the coast when an East Seramese 
vessel hove in sight. In 1636, during the month of August, many East 
Seramese returned home carrying massoi from the coast.52 In 1653 a VOC 
vessel visited Gorom where she encountered a vessel from Onin. The VOC 
employees obtained the information that in Onin there were about ninety 
slaves waiting to be exchanged for cloths and axes either on Gorom or on 
Banda.53 Onin was the centre of the slave market where slaves were 
collected from its neighbours such as Rumakai by the orangkaya of Onin, and 
then sold to East Seramese traders who handed over cloths and such 
ironware as axes, Tombuku machetes, and swords. Through the 
intermediation of Goromese interpreters, the first friendly contact between 
the Dutchmen Joshua Braconnier and Frederick Gommersdorp and the raja 
and orangkaya of Onin was established in 1654. It was even agreed that the 
raja would provide 200 to 300 slaves and a great quantity of massoi per year, 
but this agreement failed to eventuate.54  
Travel accounts of the seventeenth century referring to the climate, 
winds, and weather reveal a situation similar to that in the Raja Ampat. On 9 
December 1655, Jacob Borné, on board the yacht the Coutchin, accompanied 
by the sloops the Batavia and the Japara, sailed to Gorom and then to Onin. 
The Dutch ran into severe storms and unremitting tropical rain and were 
separated from each other, which put the crews in a precarious position as 
the inhabitants were aggressive.55  The records reveal that at least thirteen 
expeditions were launched to the areas around the south-west coast of New 
Guinea in the seventeenth century by the Banda Government. Out of these 
thirteen expeditions, eight fell victim to surprise attacks by the Papuans 
inhabitants of these areas. Many of the crew were killed and wounded. For 
example, in 1657 the Japara which had stranded on the coast near the village 
of Karas was destroyed by the local inhabitants. All of the crew were killed, 
with the exception of Anthonie Adriaansz Multum who was captured and 
resided in the area for three years before being bought free by a trader from 
East Seram.56 The Dutch, who once nurtured a scheme to seize the trade in 
slaves and massoi from the hands of the East Seramese and explore the area 
more thoroughly, found it to distinguish between friendly and hostile 
Papuans. The investigations and the subsequent contract which had been 
concluded with the East Seramese for the monopoly of the slave and massoi 
                                                
52 Leupe, ‘De Reizen der Nederlanders,’ 10-37. 
53 Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, II, 679. 
54 Leupe, ‘De Reizen der Nederlanders,’ 46-9. 
55 Ibid. 49-55. 
56 Ibid. 49-55, 57-8. 
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trades were never put into effect.57 As mentioned above, in 1654 Braconnier 
and Gommersdorp managed to establish friendly contact with the Raja of 
Onin, but Burgert Pietersz. who visited the same place in 1664 was fiercely 
attacked. Later, he learned that the Raja was not in Onin at the time of the 
attack. The Dutch found this situation highly perplexing and frustrating.58 
The people in this area were described as being locked in constant 
warfare with each other. These tribal wars were profitable for them as they 
captured the defeated people and enslaved them. In 1680, an orangkaya of 
Karas called Moffon killed the kapiten of Rumbati, called Masola and raped 
the wife of Raja Jeef of Onin. This led to a pitched fight between the two 
groups. The captives were sold as slaves.59 As an irrevocable part of their 
warlike tradition, the Papuans of these areas organized raiding parties. In 
1684, not far from Tior Island seven Papuan kora-kora from either Fatagar 
or Rumbati robbed a trader from Banda named Waru. The majority of his 
men were killed. Three were sold as slaves and another three of the crew 
made it home alive. Orangkaya Jum’at retaliated by raiding Ogar and Fatagar. 
Thirteen persons were captured. The East Seramese of Keffing became 
embroiled in these chronic, violent encounters. In 1678, traders from 
Keffing, allied with the Papuans from Kobiai, attacked Chinese traders from 
Makassar who were looking for business in the area. In all these cases, the 
well-spring of the violence was competition over the slave and massoi 
trades.60  
The most important contemporary investigation of the Onin people by 
the Dutch was conducted by Johannes Keijts in 1678. He identified the 
network ‘system’ or sosolot, in which the trading relationship between the 
East Seramese and Papuans of Onin, was embedded. As Nicolaes Vinck had 
stated in 1663, in terms of trade the orangkaya of Onin controlled almost 
everything. He was working hand-in-glove with East Seramese traders and 
listening to and conducting almost all his business on the advice of these 
schelmen ‘thugs’.61 The Dutch in Banda were not able to wrest the market out 
of the hands of the East Seramese and to establish a trading relationship 
with Onin because of the obstacles posed by other East Seramese traders 
and the surprise attacks by Papuans which continued until at least the end of 
the seventeenth century.62 
As might have been expected, this relationship between the Papuans in 
these areas and the East Seramese traders was not always co-operative and 
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fruitful. Trading relations and inter-group intimacy varied from one person 
to the other. Certain the various orangkaya of East Seram had a good 
relationship only with certain groups in the area. If one orangkaya had 
amicable contact with Rumbati people, there was a good chance that he was 
perceived as an ‘enemy’ by people inimical to the Rumbati, such as the 
Karas. In the light of this complicated situation, sosolot was not a single 
network between one single entity on the west coast of New Guinea and 
one single group of traders in East Seram, but a series of multiple and 
intermingled networks. In the case of the Keijts’ contract with Orangkaya 
Laku and Uwan, we can infer that other orangkaya from East Seram with 
their own networks in the Onin area would have striven to hinder this co-
operation in monopolizing the purchase of slaves and massoi, in order not 
to jeopardize their own networks. In 1683, the Governor of Ambon, 
Padtbrugge, sent a commission to check the rumour that Keffing traders 
had threatened a trader from Banda, Burger Melis Caes, boasting that they 
would attack the Company’s vessels, kill the crew, and loot the cargoes.63    
During the Tidore alliance with the Spaniards prior to 1657, the latter 
laid claim to the New Guinea mainland, on the grounds that Inigo Ortiz de 
Retes had taken possession of it in the name of the Spanish Crown in 1545. 
They acknowledged however that Tidore was master of Onin.64 In 1673, on 
Kobiai a juru bahasa from Tidore, on board a big vessel with many able-
bodied men, interrogated Schipper Gerrit Adriaensz. who had arrived there 
from Banda in order to check whether he was in possession of a pass issued 
by Sultan Tidore. He claimed that no one was allowed to trade in this area 
without the consent of and a pass from Tidore. He even warned the local 
raja not to trade with foreigners. During the night Adriaensz. was advised to 
leave the area because the Tidorans were planning to kill him.65  In 1697, 
when the Governor of Ternate, Pieter Rooselaar, complained about attacks 
and the prevalence of ‘robbery’ in Onin, perpetrated by a force from Misool 
under the command of Kaicil Bulam of Tidore, Sultan Tidore unequivocally 
argued that his forces had been forced to punish the Onin people because 
they had raided villages in the Kei Islands. The punitive expedition of Tidore 
                                                
63 Ibid. 95. 
64 ’Het was hier, dat de Kapiten bezit nam van het eiland voor de Spaansche kroon, en het 
den naam gaf van Nieuw Guinea’ However Haga argues that … de naam ‘Nieuw Guinea’ van 
Ortiz afkomstig is, maar niet, dat dit land voor de Spaansche kroon in bezit werd genomen. He 
suggests that the term ‘island’ most likely does not refer to the mainland of New Guinea. 
As evidence Haga??? refers to the Great-Ducal map of 1558 on which he found New 
Guinea mainland as yet unnamed. See Haga, Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea, 11; Leupe, ‘De 
Reizen der Nederlanders,’ 81. 
65 Ibid. 72. 
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was carried out in response to the plea to Raja Misool from the heads of 
Kei.66  
These scattered pieces of evidence suggest that Tidore assumed that 
Onin was also its vassal. However, on the basis of information collected 
during his expedition in 1678-1679, Johannes Keijts concluded that there 
was no indication of any influence or authority whatsoever of either Misool 
or Tidore in Onin. Governor Paddtbrugge also concurred this conclusion. 
He was convinced that Tidore had no real influence in Onin. The Tidorans 
had mounted an expedition to this place only to raid the settlements and 
collect slaves. When writing his letter on the state of affairs in the area to his 
successor in 1710, Governor Jacob Claasz. of Ternate acknowledged the 
authority of Tidore only on the north coast of New Guinea. Onin on the 
west coast was excluded. In 1714, the Spanish claim to the New Guinea 
mainland was ended under the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht. During the 
reign of the Charles II, King of Spain 1665-1700, the claim to New Guinea 





Gamrange is a regional name used to refer to a group of three areas, namely 
Maba, Weda, and Patani. Gebe was not formally a part of it, but its 
inhabitants always participated in the raiding enterprises launched from 
there, areas in south-east Halmahera. The description of these people by 
Governor of Ternate, Pieter Rooselaar (1705), has been extensively quoted 
by Leonard Andaya in his study. The Resident of Manado, Joan Pieter 
Cornelis Cambier, also wrote an interesting report on Gamrange while he 
was pursuing his duties as a Commissioner of Tidoran Halmahera at Bicoli 
in 1825. Cambier describes the men of Gamrange as follows: 
 
De inlander is niet misdeeld van verstandelijke vermogens, integendeel hij is zeer vlug van begrip. 
De langdurige onderdrukking, waaronder hij leeft, heeft zijnen moed en trots nog niet geheel 
kunnen uitdooven; in den oorlog is hij dapper, daarbij echter niet van wreedheid vrij te pleiten. 
Hij jaagt in den strijd of op andere tochten zijn doel met eenen ijver na, die zonderling afsteekt 
bij zijne, …gewone luije levenswijs...68 
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The people of Gamrange were generally regarded as the most important 
in the Tidore periphery. The two principal settlements of Maba were 
situated in a place of the same name on the south-eastern Halmahera 
mainland and at Bicoli where the best anchorage was located. In 1825 Maba 
consisted of two districts, Bicoli (three negeri) and Maba (nine negeri). Each 
district (and the head negeri) was headed by a sangaji, while the other negeri 
were under the leadership of kimelaha. At the beginning of eighteenth 
century Maba had a total of 2,000 to 2,400 able-bodied men. It abounded in 
freshwater springs, rivers, timber,69 and produced bumper crops of spices, 
sago, and fruit.70 The people traded spices, mainly nutmeg. In 1825, Cambier 
estimated that the population of Bicoli, Gotowasi, Buli, Panga, and Wasile 
amounted to 2,500 souls. Another 2,500 souls were living on the west coast, 
far fewer than in 1706.71 The area of Maba extended as far as the north-west 
as the overland route at Bobane, and some 800 to 1000 fighting men could 
be assembled from its settlements. The dominant people on Weda, just as 
those in the Raja Ampat, were Muslims even though most of the population 
still adhered to the local religion. In some cases, the Weda people were able 
to make use of Islamic teachings as a pretext to avoid the Dutch request to 
comply with their extirpation programme.72  
Patani was described as stony and hilly with very little flat land. Off the 
coast of Patani lies a small island called Mor blessed with fertile soil which 
was where the people cultivated their gardens. There are numerous cliffs at 
the cape of Patani and no good anchorage. Officially no one could visit 
Patani without the permission of Sultan Tidore, and to arrive without a letter 
from the ruler was to ask for trouble. Whenever a boat appeared in the 
harbour, hundreds of Patanese would rush to the beach armed with bows 
and arrows. They were labelled ‘the greatest pirates and rogues known in the 
eastern quarters’ by the Dutch. In 1706 a sangaji and seven kimelaha governed 
a population of which only half was Muslim. In the whole of Patani there 
were some 1200 men capable of bearing arms.73 In 1825 the population 
from Lelewi, Patani, and Liloba was estimated at 5,800 souls, many more 
than in 1706. The number of women exceeded that of the men by a 
quarter.74  
                                                
69 NA VOC 8074, Extract of a daily report of an expedition to Salawati and Waigeo, 11-13 
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The World of Maluku, 100.  
70 J. P. C. Cambier, ‘Rapport over Tidoreesch-Halmahera,’ in Robidé van der Aa, ‘Een 
tweetal bijdragen tot de kennis van Halmahera,’ BKI 19 (1872), 245. 
71 Ibid. 250. 
72 Andaya, The World of Maluku, 100. 
73 Ibid. 99-100. 
74 Cambier, ‘Rapport over Tidoreesch-Halmahera,’ 250. 
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Gebe was not a part of the area called Gamrange but it had close links 
with it. This island was considered the ‘treasure house’ of Tidore because of 
the abundant ambergris which could be collected there. In 1703, Sangaji 
Gebe, the collector of tribute for Sultan Tidore in the Papuan Islands, 
indicated that Gebe was still a place of significance to Tidore. Its seamen 
attracted traders to Gebe’s ports and made that island an entrepôt for local 
goods. There were three settlements on the northern side of the island, 
where half of the population was Muslim and the other half followers of 
local belief. In total there were some 400 to 500 able-bodied men on Gebe.75 
In general the population in Maba, Weda, and Patani may have been 
decreasing as the result of fighting, raiding and, most importantly, the Nuku 
rebellion and the war between Sultan Zainal Abidin and the Dutch. Many 
people moved to Seram and the Raja Ampat. Cambier even claimed that 
since the period of Nuku (1780-1805), Zainal Abidin’s war (1806-1810), and 
the more recent endeavour of Raja Jailolo, more than 2,000 fighting men 




Long History of Raiding 
 
The emergence of the raiding enterprise and any links this may have had 
with the presence of the Dutch or other European foreigners in Malukan 
waters is not yet clear. Boxer and Manguin indicate that the raiding 
enterprise emerged in ‘Serdanha’ on the east side of Seram early in the 
sixteenth century.77 Pigafetta, a comrade of Magellan, mentioned the 
existence of the Raja Ampat as early as 1521. Its importance in Malukan 
political dynamics was reported in the year 1534 when the Ternate, Tidore, 
and Bacan Sultanates tried to involve these petty kingdoms in their efforts to 
expel the Portuguese from Maluku.78 This shows that the regional 
importance of the military force of the Raja Ampat was already recognized 
at that time. A letter from Van der Dussen of 24 December 1610 reports 
that the Papuans from the Raja Ampat had captured coastal Seramese and 
taken their gold. At this time, raiding and robbery were repeatedly 
perpetrated to collect slaves and booty.79  
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In 1650 and 1653 the Governor of Ambon, Arnold De Vlaming, 
dispatched expeditions in an attempt to eradicate this bane once for all. 
Misool was attacked by sixteen kora-kora and many captives were taken. 
Hatuwe, Weda, and Patani were also punished. But instead of submitting, 
Raja Salawati, with the support of some Tidorans, retaliated against the 
Ambonese Quarter.80 Calm was only restored again to these waters at the 
end of 1650s. It was of fleeting duration. During the years 1660, 1662, 1665, 
and 1666 the raiders were once again posing a threat to the Ambon Islands 
and North Seram. The inhabitants of Amblau were regular victims. In 1666 
the Company launched another expedition of sixteen kora-kora reinforced by 
smaller vessels for the defence of North Seram. They captured only one 
Papuan kora-kora but did drive the raiders out of the area.81 After this exploit 
the raiding ceased for a while, but after a couple of years it revived again. In 
1673 Limau, Raja Misool’s brother Mangenane, and his Kapiten Laut were 
detained by a cruising sloop the Vlissingen of the Ambon Government. This 
success did not contribute favourably to an amicable climate of negotiations 
with the Raja Misool. On the contrary, in November 1677 many bigger and 
smaller vessels manned by 400 to 500 Papuans appeared in the Banda 
Archipelago where seven inhabitants were captured.82 The raiding groups 
then moved on to Ambonese waters, where they captured another thirteen 
to sixteen Amblau people and caught sixteen fishers on the Hitu coast and 
in south Seram.83 
In 1678, with three kora-kora and two smaller vessels at their disposal, 
one of the heads of Patani and the Kapiten Laut of Tidore launched another 
spectacular attack against the Ambonese Islands. About fifty to sixty 
Ambonese traders and fishers were captured and exchanged in East Seram 
for Rds 38-40 per person. This resurgence was indubitably linked to the war 
between Sultan Sibori of Ternate with whom the Crown Prince of Tidore 
had taken sides. This evidence shows that the raiding enterprise involved 
members of the Tidoran elite and was closely related to the inner circle 
politics in the palace. Knaap argues that after 1680 the raiding enterprises 
could at least be repulsed, even though they were not completely 
eradicated.84 Nevertheless, in Ambon waters in 1684 the Onin Papuans still 
managed to capture about sixty-five people and transported them to East 
Seram.85 The majority of the raiders and robbers originated from south-east 
Halmahera (Weda and Patani) and the Raja Ampat (Misool and Salawati) 
                                                
80 Ibid. 65-8. 
81 Knaap, Kruidnagelen en Christenen, 74. 
82 Coolhaas, Generale Missiven, IV, 242-3. 
83 Lapian, ‘Orang Laut-Bajak Laut-Raja Laut,’ 238. 
84 Knaap, Kruidnagelen en Christenen, 76. 
85 Lapian, ‘Orang Laut-Bajak Laut-Raja Laut,’ 238. 
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and occasionally from Onin. The raiders of Onin, sometimes operating 
under the command of Raja Misool, prowled around the Kei and Aru 
Islands. They also ventured farther afield and raided Seram, especially 
Keffing and Gorom, the Tanimbar Islands, and the area under the Banda 
group. In 1689 and 1694, the raiders of Onin, aboard twenty kora-kora, 
harassed the islands of Kei and Banda and captured a number of people.86 
It was not clear how all of these raiders were linked or organized among 
themselves. The victims were chosen indiscriminately whenever they were 
not prepared for defence. The raiders plundered booty and captured men, 
women, and children. The North Seramese played a dual role, not only were 
they victims, they also collaborated with the raiders. For example, in 1660 a 
leader of Lisabata welcomed the raiders and collaborated with them in their 
attack on his neighbours and the inland people. The alliance was not 
restricted to raiding enterprises but extended to trade in sago and captives.87 
In short, raiding was endemic even though the VOC organized many 
‘punitive’ expeditions, which resulted in the detainment of some of the 
perpetrators and destruction of their villages. One of the factors raiding and 
robbery continued unabated was that the leaders and groups of raiders or 
robbers sailed in joint fleets. If one or two leaders were captured and 
punished, there were always other groups who were ready to seize the 
opportunity to start raiding the areas which had been relieved of the 





Raiding enterprises existed long before the arrival of the European power in 
Maluku in the sixteenth century. From the myths described above, and the 
rivalry among villages within the communities in Raja Ampat Islands and 
west coast of New Guinea, it is clear that the raiding had its root in the 
habitus of the Papuan communities. In the wider context of Seram Sea 
social geography, raiding enterprises could also be seen as a part of 
alternative trading systems. In the sixteenth century, De Brito indicated that 
raiding, especially by the people Waigeo and Misool, was meant to capture 
people and to obtain redemption money from their sale. If the captives were 
not redeemed, they would be killed. This pattern changed in the seventeenth 
century and continued thereafter. Not all captives were redeemed or offered 
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for sale. Male captives were also employed as slave labour at home, while the 
female captives were taken home as wives.  
For Papuan and Halmaheran raiders, the raiding enterprises were a 
socially accepted activity as was reflected and internalized in their myths. 
The Papuans of Raja Ampat, for example, conceived of such an undertaking 
as a voyage for gathering foreign power. The raiders as well as the imported 
goods acquired were treated as objects imbued with the magical power of 
the foreign world. The people tended to make a fetish of the objects and 
beings with a foreign origin. Most of the foreign goods were used as 
precious objects in their rituals. Tidore at that time was conceived of as 
representing the source of foreign power. The leaders of raiding expeditions 
had a prestigious position in the ranks of the leadership of the local 
community. So the people themselves perceived that raiding opened the 
road to higher status and more power within the community. From this 
perspective I would say that the Papuans manipulated their relationship with 
Tidore for their power interests within their own communities. This is 
different from what Kamma, using the perspective of the ruler, suggests in 
1940s that the Papuans were subordinate to Tidore.  
The arrival of the European power, the need for slaves, and the 
increased flow of foreign goods certainly did stimulate the raiding activities. 
The Banda nutmeg plantations, which were always in need of slaves, are a 
good example. The increase in raiding activities, indicated by the wider areas 
of raiding and the more groups involved, was also related to the 
implementation of the Dutch Spice Monopoly. Those who were deprived by 
the Dutch-controlled trade or those who saw more potential in raiding 






















There are indications that at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of 
the eighteenth century the Papuan raiding enterprises extended their areas of 
operation. As Andaya puts it, raiding was no longer limited to Ambon, Buru, 
and Seram but extended southwards to the Aru-Kei Islands, Tanimbar, 
Seram Laut, and westwards to the Sula, Banggai, and northern Sulawesi. This 
development challenged the rust en orde ‘peace and order’ which the 
Company needed to foster its policies. Consequently the Company forced 
Sultan Hamzah Fahrudin of Tidore (r.1689-1707), who had become Sultan 
by grace of Company intervention, to condemn this practice. In 1704, in an 
act especially shocking to the Papuans, he sent an envoy to Misool on a 
Dutch vessel, which also carried Dutch representatives. Eager to show his 
gratitude, he then delivered the leaders of one particular raid to the 
Company. This unpopular gesture of political correctness led to a crisis in 
the political relationship between the Tidore Sultanate and the Papuan-
Halmaheran raiders.1  
Before the era of Sultan Hamzah Fahrudin, the co-operation between 
the Papuans, East Seramese, and Sultan Tidore had been deeply rooted. It 
had even been rumoured that Sultan Tidore provided the Misoolese raiders 
with gunpowder and that envoys of Sultan Tidore had been spotted in 
person in the Papuan raiding fleet. Unquestionably the raiding enterprises 
involved a mutual power contest between the parties but they were 
nevertheless prepared to work hand-in-glove to maintain the raiding and 
trading networks beyond the control of the VOC. For example, the Papuan 
Misoolese harvested sago in North Seram and sold it to the traders in the 
Bay of Seleman. To ready themselves for the raids, these people obtained 
some of their gunpowder from Sultan Tidore through the intermediation of 
middlemen from Hatiwe and Rarakit. In return, the Misoolese paid tribute 
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to the Sultan.2 By complying with the Dutch demand, Sultan Hamzah 
Fahrudin undermined the existing mutual co-operation between Tidore and 
the raiding parties.  
The disappointment of Gamrange persisted during the reign of Sultan 
Hasanuddin (r. 1708-1728). As a consequence of this smouldering 
discontent, the first open act of defiance was perpetrated in 1716 by the 
people of Maba, Weda, and Patani. They blatantly refused to deliver an 
annual tribute any longer to Tidore. The Patanese complained bitterly that 
their submission to Sultan Tidore had been rewarded by seizure and 
punishment, instead of the expected support and protection. The conflict 
was aggravated when in 1725 Sangaji Patani led a fleet of seventeen kora-kora 
and six other smaller vessels, and 700 men of the Papuan Islands, Maba and 
Patani to Sultan Saifudin of Ternate to express their loyalty and to foreswear 
their previous subordination to Tidore.3 The Sultan formally welcomed 
Sangaji Patani and the other Papuan and Gamrange leaders, and exchanged 
gifts in recognition of their new bonds. Participation by Tidore subjects in 
this symbolic act deeply offended Sultan Tidore and eventually led to a crisis 
between Tidore and Ternate.  
As has been described in the previous chapter, Sultan Malikilmanan 
(r.1728-1756) restored the broken relationship with Gamrange and the 
Papuans. He granted a general pardon to the rebels and rehabilitated the 
Sangaji Patani who had led the rebellion. The reconciliation was sealed by a 
treaty agreed upon by both Tidore and Patani.4 It was a step in the right 
direction but it did not completely assuage the relationship between Tidore 
and the Papuans. In 1729 a combined fleet of Tidoran and Dutch vessels, 
which sailed to Gamrange and the Raja Ampat in order to collect tribute and 
to check on the continuing presence of any spice trees, met with resistance 
from the Papuans. The people of Waigeo refused to submit tribute and 
consequently the Tidorans and the Dutch attacked their villages. A number 
of skirmishes also occurred in Waigama and Misool. In Salawati a fight 
almost broke out but could be appeased in time when the parties talked to 
each other and found out that the resistance had been incited by one local 
head. In 1730 it was again reported that Kapiten Laut Madjela of Waigama 
and Raja Soemaple of Misool had led a raiding fleet to the coast of Seram, 
where villages were destroyed and burned.5 
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In 1732 another punitive expedition was launched to locate the leaders 
who were involved in the 1730 Seram raiding expedition and their Papuan 
followers – a virtually fruitless exercise as the perpetrators had prudently fled 
to other islands. On 6 April the Tidoran envoy and the Dutch were 
informed by people of Gebe who had just returned from the Raja Ampat 
that the plan hatched by Sultan Tidore and the Dutch to punish the raiders 
had been betrayed to them. It was discovered that the secretary of Sultan 
Tidore, Abdul Kadir, and a Tidoran called Swodja had journeyed to the Raja 
Ampat. Kadir and Swodja had warned Raja Waigeo, his Kapiten Laut, Kapiten 
Laut Waigama, Raja Misool and other heads who had been involved in the 
previous raiding, advising them to escape to the Island of Monfoor, because 
Sangaji Patani, who was seeking for ways to reconcile himself with Sultan 
Tidore and the Dutch, was poised to descend on their areas to arrest them. 
The same news was also passed to Raja Salawati and Waigama. To make 
matters worse, in these areas, six Bajau and Makassarese vessels were found 
trading with the Papuans, and damningly the Dutch found a quantity of 
nutmeg in a house in Waigama.6 This shows that Tidoran leaders were 
secretly maintaining their co-operation with the Papuans despite its 
inconsistency with the policy pursued by their Sultan with the Dutch. In the 
following years, a number of expeditions, for instance in 1737 and again in 
1744, were launched to punish the Raja Ampat leaders, especially Raja 
Salawati, but all these misfired because of bad weather and sickness. 
In 1756, on Tidore a new Sultan, Muhammad Mas’ud Jamaluddin Syah 
(r. 1756-1779), was inaugurated, but the raiding continued unabated. It was 
the same old song: in front of the Dutch, the Sultan stated his intention to 
bridle the raiding of his subjects, but in practice he was reluctant to mobilize 
his forces to punish any perpetrators. In December 1761, Raja Salawati 
aided and abetted by Patani recruited about 500 men for a raid on Sula and 
Besi, while his son led a major expedition against Buru. Villages in both 
areas were plundered and destroyed. As a result of this raiding, 200 men 
were captured and carried away to Patani and Weda. Reacting to this 
challenge, in 1762 the High Government in Batavia, with the support of the 
four Governments in the East and the Ternate Sultanate, launched a big 
expedition under the command of Jan Jonkers. This fleet consisted of more 
than forty vessels big and small and more than 500 warriors, including about 
100 Europeans. The Tidore envoys and their men did not appear and 
cancelled their participation at the last minute for reasons which remained 
obscure. The chief destination was Salawati where the plan was to capture 
the Raja, his Kapiten-Laut, as well as the Kapiten-Laut of Misool. The only 
information to be derived from the report was that the fleet arrived in 
                                                




Salawati in November 1762 and returned to Ternate on 2 January 1763 with 
empty hands. Most of the crew were felled by diseases and many died.7  
Raja Salawati, who had arrived home from a raiding expedition, had 
obtained prior knowledge of the expedition. He immediately sailed to Patani 
for safety and to sell the captives they had taken from Buru and Sula Besi to 
the East Seramese and Makassarese.8 Sultan Jamaludin reported that his 
jogugu who had been sent to Salawati to arrest Raja Salawati, had sailed 
instead to Patani where he had some ‘connection’ with the daughter of the 
suspected Sangaji Maunere of Patani.9 A Dutch soldier who had been 
captured on Sula was later returned to Ternate thanks to the intervention of 
this same Jogugu of Tidore. Sifting through these facts, the Dutch suspected 
that the Tidore palace had been secretly involved in the raiding enterprise. 
The Jogugu, his brother, the Sekretaris of the Sultan and the Kapiten Laut were 
not of Tidoran origin.10 Andaya suggests that they were from an influential 
Javanese family on Tidore.11 
In 1765, Sangaji Patani with fifty kora-kora and smaller vessels had called 
at Galela and demanded the Jogugu Gamkonora to supply rice on pain of 
having his village destroyed.12 Similar events occurred in 1769 when 250 
kora-kora and smaller vessels from Maba, Weda, Patani, and of the Papuans 
called at Morotai and threatened the area. The post-holder requested guns 
and two canons from the Government. At the same time a Tidoran prince, 
Mayor Malikudin, was said to have gone to Dodinga taking the land route. 
From there he had supposedly sailed to Morotai to conspire with raiding 
groups from Gamrange and the Raja Ampat.13 In 1771, in a conversation 
with the Dutch Governor at Ternate, Sultan Jamaludin of Tidore stated that 
he could no longer tolerate the behaviour of his subordinates of Gamrange 
and Gebe. He believed that all four raja of the Papuans had meddled with 
the former groups. He planned to send four armed kora-kora under the 
command of the Raja Muda to punish them. To facilitate this plan, he 
requested the Dutch Government to augment the expedition with a well-
equipped sloop.14 It is not clear whether the plan was realized and even 
whether the request was approved. As matters transpired, it seems the Sultan 
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was only paying lip to the Dutch in order to appease the Governor and to 
maintain good relations. 
Andaya stipulates that the raid led by Sangaji Patani and Raja Salawati in 
1761 was not simply an act of robbery and violence but was actually more of 
a political rebellion against their former overlords, Sultan Tidore, the 
Company, and Sultan Ternate. When Sultan Tidore decided to send an 
expedition to punish the rebels, he faced opposition from the various bobato 
in the Tidore Sultanate. This internal opposition was not simply the fruit of 
traditional political ties; it was also inextricably linked to the existing kinship 
relations between the bobato of Tidore and the elites of the Raja Ampat.15 In 
my opinion, this particular raid was just as the previous raids in which the 
important ministers and leaders of Tidore were constantly involved. The 
involvement of Tidore grandees or officials in such enterprises was 
ineluctably linked to the monopoly of the spice trade and the policy of spice 
eradication.  
Before the monopoly was imposed, Sultan Tidore, his grandees, and the 
bobato had enjoyed a regular income from the spice trade. It is not too far 
fetched to speculate that since seventeenth century, and especially after the 
arrival of the Dutch in Maluku, these grandees had found themselves 
deprived of a substantial part of their income. They were perfectly aware 
that opposition to the raiding enterprises of the Papuans and the Gamrange 
people could harm their long-fostered relationships with Papuan leaders 
which had been enshrined in what Andaya labels ‘blood ties’ and kinship 
relations.16 Raiding may have provided them with quite a bit of pocket 
money. Booty and captives were distributed among those who had joined 
the fleets of the raiders. In terms of manpower for a fleet, in general Tidore 
was also dependent on the delivery of slaves from Gamrange and the 
Papuans. This was one cogent reason the officials of Tidore did not want to 
lose their support. Comparing the events of 1761 and the ‘subversion’ by 
Tidoran subjects between 1716 and 1728, we may conclude that the latter 
was more an expression of disappointment on the part of Gamrange and 
Papuan leaders than a real rebellion. After sometime, Sultan Malikilmanan 
managed to placate his subjects.  
 
 
Prince Nuku and the Papuan-Gamrange Warriors 
 
The ‘alliance’ between the Tidore elite and the Papuan raiders improved 
considerably during the reign of Prince Nuku’s father, Sultan Jamaludin. On 
23 December 1779, the Ternate Governor passed on the information that 
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Rajawali, a Bacan-born sailor who had been regularly sent to Misool by 
Sultan Jamaludin, was invariably conspiring with the Papuan raiders.17 As 
has been explained in Chapter Four, the political turmoil on Tidore 
generated by the conflict between the VOC Government and the Tidore 
Sultanate in 1779, eventually strengthened and reconsolidated the alliance 
between the anti-Dutch Tidoran leaders, North and East Seramese, and 
Papuan and Gamrange raiders. At the end of 1779, soon after the 
detainment of Sultan Jamaludin, the raiders were back in action terrorizing 
Dutch subjects. This time their raids formed a virtually united front. Among 
the leaders were Raja Lukman of Kililuhu, Sangaji Patani, Raja Rumasoal 
(Misool), Sangaji Salawati, an unnamed Papuan Onin leader, as well as the 
Kapiten Laut of Gah and Orangkaya Agnisa of Rarakit.18 Behind this action, I 
suggest, lurked the involvement of the Tidore elite. 
The raiding enterprises under the flag of Prince Nuku’s uprising in 1780 
reveal a new dimension. Nuku’s leadership succeeded in uniting most of the 
long-experienced rebellious local leaders whether they were kapiten laut, 
orangkaya, gimelaha, sangaji, or even mambri who were experienced in sea-
raiding and battles around the Raja Ampat Islands, Gamrange and North 
and East Seram; it also embraced the Tidoran people and grandees, and even 
south-eastern Malukans, namely people from Aru and Kei. Looking even 
farther afield, he investigated the possibility of allying himself with 
Mindanao raiders, and Thomas Forrest’s visit in 1775 gave him the idea of 
attracting the British to his cause. In the context of Malukan politics and 
power struggles, he was able effectively to gain the support of the prominent 
raiding leaders and to transform these into his loyal following to put himself 
into a position to be able to challenge Dutch-dominated Maluku.  
Right from 1780, the time when Nuku launched his rebellion, the heads 
of Gamrange and the Raja Ampat supported him unreservedly as was 
testified to by his inauguration as Prince Nuku, Sultan of Papua and Seram, 
in the last months of 1780.19 Taking into account that Nuku and his Tidoran 
supporters left Tidore after the Toloa attack in July 1780,20 it must have 
taken just five short months to build up the formidable alliance with the 
Papuans, Gamrange, and the East Seramese. He is said to have succeeded in 
mobilizing more than 150 vessels. If one vessel carried an average crew of 
fifty men, Nuku may have mobilized as many as 7,500 able-bodied men. 
                                                
17 NA VOC 3586, Apart From Ambon to Batavia, 23 December 1779, 83.  
18 NA VOC 3595, Part 3, Appendix of Ambon Resolution, 14 September 1781, 36, 40-41, 
180. 
19 NA VOC 3603, from Ternate to Batavia, 22 May 1781, 17-26. 
20 NA VOC 3602, from Ternate to Ambon, 11 September 1780, 75-8; See also E. 
Katoppo, Nuku: Perjuangan Kemerdekaan di Maluku Utara (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1984), 50; 
W.G. Miller, ‘The Moluccas under the British’ (M.A. Thesis: University of Hull, 1974), 23; 
Andaya, The World of Maluku, 220. 
THE RAIDERS, TIDORE, AND NUKU 
 
141
Caution prompts us to suspect that the number of vessels reported was 
exaggerated by the Dutch reports. However, considering the vast distances 
which had to be covered and the many captives seized, the numbers do 
make sense. Within five months in 1780 the rebel forces raided Amblau, 
Haia, Hatiling, and then Sula and Besi, their depredations reaching all the 
way to Obi and Bacan. Even Selayar, Buton, and Bawulang in southern 
Sulawesi and Talaud at the northern tip of Sulawesi were attacked.21 During 
these raids more than 300 persons were seized.22 These vast, far-flung areas 
and hundreds of captured people could never have been handled if only a 
small number of vessels and crews had been involved.  
The support of the Papuans and Gamrange was challenged when Dutch 
expeditions attacked and destroyed Maba, Patani, and Waigama in the 
closing months of 1780 and the beginning of 1781.23 After the victory, the 
Dutch, as usual, imposed a contract in which they appointed new heads who 
also had to sign it. In the contract, the new heads of Maba, Weda, and Patani 
expressed their regret and repentance for their past misdeeds against the 
Company and Sultan Tidore. They swore that raiding activities would come 
to an end and formally recognized the authority of Sultan Tidore and the 
Company. They promised to fight against Prince Nuku’s adherents and 
either to extradite them to the Company or root them out. They also 
promised to help the Company to eradicate spice trees and report any 
important events occurring in their districts to the Company. The contract 
was concluded on 8 November 1781, and on the same occasion, new heads 
for the three districts of Gamrange—three sangaji, three kapiten laut, and 
seven kimelaha—were inaugurated.24  
The contract had a little effect. Nuku’s fleet was back raiding Hatuano 
(Saparua), Amet (Nusa Laut), Hulaliu, Kriu, and Pelau (Haruku) only a 
month after peace had been concluded in December 1781.25 It is impossible 
to judge how many men of Gamrange and the Raja Ampat altered their 
allegiance after the punitive expeditions and the contract. Nor do we know 
how effective the Gamrange heads who had been newly appointed by the 
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Dutch were at exercising their authority. Judging from the unabated 
persistence of attacks, the number of Papuans and Halmaherans who had 
transferred their loyalty was not significant. One tiny clue can be derived 
from the fact that a sangaji of Weda by the name of Muka, who paid homage 
to Sultan Tidore Patra Alam in 1783,26 was not one of new heads who had 
been inaugurated by the Dutch in November 1781. Muka had been 
supporting Nuku and he knew that after the signing of the contract he was 
no longer recognized by the Dutch. In an attempt to cling to power, he may 
have tried to obtain support and recognition from Sultan Patra Alam. 
Another possibility is that he changed his loyalty to Patra Alam and the 
Dutch with some hidden agenda in mind. 
The ‘Tempel Treachery’27 in 1783 may have been related to the plan that 
the Papuans, the Gamrange, and Nuku had forged. The incident took place 
on Batanta, Raja Ampat, where translator Coenraad Van Dijk and his 
soldiers and crew were massacred by Papuans who had pretended to offer 
their submission. The fleet of 120 vessels of Maba and Patani which had 
accompanied Van Dijk’s fleet suddenly turned hostile. The plot was 
perfectly executed. Van Dijk and his European and Ternatan soldiers were 
caught unprepared and overwhelmed by Nuku’s supporters.28 This 
temporary success led to another attempt to occupy Tidore, an incident 
which was known as the ‘Tidoreesch Revolutie.’29 However, the Dutch-
Ternatan joint force proved to be superior to Nuku’s party even though the 
latter had mobilized the greatest force he could gather together. The first 
boost to Nuku’s struggle which culminated in 1783 reveals the significant 
role of Gamrange and the Papuans in the rebellion. After the defeat of 
Nuku’s forces on Tidore in 1783, the rebel force was depleted. Its later 
attacks were not as powerful as the earlier ones.30 
In fact Prince Nuku eschewed creating new alliances. Capitalizing on his 
great influence among the Gamrange people and the Papuans of the Raja 
Ampat, he improved the co-operation between the existing raiding groups. 
By doing so he may have produced new leaders and recruited more people 
in the Tidore periphery to improve his naval and military forces. He 
transformed the unruly rabble of raiders and robbers into a political force 
and attacked the Dutch subjects selectively. In most of their attacks Nuku’s 
adherents did not seek an open engagement with the Dutch forces. Hence, 
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areas where the defence was weak and the Dutch presence was limited were 
chosen as favourite targets. Whenever the VOC launched a bigger 
expedition, Prince Nuku chose to avoid confrontation because the Dutch 
armaments and the organization of their fleet were superior to his own. In 
1783 when Prince Nuku tried to occupy Tidore, he openly fought the Dutch 
and their allies who, despite the limited number of their vessels and soldiers, 
still managed to keep Nuku’s forces at bay.    
During an increasing number of punitive campaigns mounted by the 
VOC against the areas of Seram, the Raja Ampat, and Gamrange, Prince 
Nuku lost many of his important leaders and supporters from these areas. 
Many of them were not killed but chose to surrender. This decreased the 
number of raids during 1786 and 1790. The only record of an attack was in 
1787 when a Bandanese barque was captured and plundered by Raja 
Salawati.31 Apparently undeterred, Nuku remained constantly on the move 
from one place to another to avoid being captured. As part of their ‘guerilla 
warfare at sea’, the Gamrange and Papuan leaders gave him shelter 
whenever an expedition approached his base. 
The decrease in the support of Gamrange only gradually became 
significant after the installation of Nuku’s rival, Sultan Kamaludin, in Tidore 
1784. It remained on the wane for five years. Under Kamaludin’s command, 
a joint fleet of Tidore, Maba, Weda, and Patani, successfully defeated Nuku’s 
forces on Salawati on 26 February 1789. Raja Bagus of Misool, Raja Massan 
of Waigama, and some leaders of Salawati surrendered to Kamaludin. In 
1790 most of the Gamrange and the Raja Ampat groups no longer 
supported Nuku.32 This turning-point in Gamrange and Papuan support was 
related to the success of Kamaludin and the Dutch in suppressing and then 
persuading them of the futility of Nuku’s cause. Nuku had to find an 
alternative way to rebuild his forces. 
 
 
Gamkonora33 and Renewed Loyalty from Tidore’s Periphery 
 
In 1791, after having been in a difficult predicament for more than five 
years, Prince Nuku managed to recover some of his forces. It was reported 
that a brother of his, whose name is unknown, assaulted the northern and 
the southern parts of Seram with two fleets of raiders. Meanwhile, the 
Prince himself sailed to Hote in north-eastern Seram with a fleet of eighty 
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vessels from Tobelo, Galela, Maba, Weda, Patani and Gebe to await the 
fleets from Gorom and others from the East Seram area to launch a planned 
attack on Sawai and Manipa. Seven more vessels were joined between 
Manipa and Buru on 28 August 1791.34 Newcomers to Nuku’s fleet were 
people from Galela, Tobelo, and Tobaru. The support from these Ternatan 
subjects in North Halmahera – who were collectively called Gamkonora – 
was quite decisive because the south-eastern coast of Halmahera, Gamrange 
and all Papuan Raja Ampat, except Salawati, now chose to rally behind 
Nuku again.35  
The Tobaru people belonged to the Gamkonora in North Halmahera, 
one of the most important areas in the periphery of Ternate. The settlement 
of Gamkonora could raise an estimated 400 men in 1662, but by 1686 the 
number had declined to about only 100 of whom sixty were Muslim and the 
rest were Tobaru and other interior tribesmen. About a three hour row to 
the north of Gamkonora was Tolofuo, a settlement located on the banks of 
a river. The Muslim inhabitants had once been the personal subjects of 
Sultan Amsterdam (r. 1675-1690), but after the 1679-1681 war, they were led 
by a sangaji. Upriver lived about 300 Tobarus who were in the habit of 
coming to the river mouth to fish. As Andaya puts it, it was the presence of 
these Tobarus which made Tolofuo of importance to Ternate. The Tobarus 
of the interior had such a fearsome reputation they were supposed to be able 
to assume a cloak of invisibility. ’Their fierce loyalty to the person of Sultan 
Ternate made them a major factor in the ruler’s ability to withstand 
challenges to his authority. In the war between Ternate and the VOC, only 
the Tobarus remained faithful to Sultan Amsterdam up to the very point of 
his capture.’36 
Galela also officially fell under Sangaji Gamkonora. In 1662, when 
Loloda could summon some 200 men, half of these were Galelas who lived 
about two and half kilometres south of the river estuary, in two 
neighbouring villages on the shores of an inland lake. Sago, coconuts and 
other palm trees supplied their basic food and the materials they needed for 
daily life, but they also grew rice, obtained fish from the lake, and hunted 
wild pigs in the forests. With this substantial food surplus, they were able to 
supply Ternate’s needs, alongside carrying on a profitable trade. The Galelas 
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who had a close relationship with the Patanese were led by a hukum and was 
accountable to Sangaji Gamkonora who in turn represented the interests and 
authority of Sultan Ternate. In the late seventeenth century, there were an 
estimated 300 able-bodied men in Galela. After the Dutch attack on the 
Patani settlement in 1722, the Patanese and Mabas moved to Galela in 
Ternatan Halmahera and even joined their Galela hosts with thirty boats in a 
raid on Salawati in 1724.37 
South of Galela on the north-eastern coast of Halmahera was the 
seawards settlement of Tobelo (Tobelo-tai) in which Muslims and the 
Alifuru lived together. The Sangaji and the lesser officials resided on a 
hilltop, while the rest of the population lived on the lower slopes to the 
north and west. The staple diet of the people was sago bread supplied by the 
abundance of sago forests. Every three or four months they would venture 
to the seashore to fish and gather oysters which they smoked and took back 
upriver with them. Eight villages of the Tobelo (Tobelotia) were located 
inland on the shores of a freshwater lake. They had a reputation for being 
‘evil and murderous’, and only those from Gamkonora dared to visit them. 
They were known to possess large amounts of silver and gold – some would 
wear three, four, and even five silver and gold bracelets at a time. The Dutch 
claimed that Sultan Sibori Amsterdam of Ternate enticed 600 Tobelo 
warriors with silver and gold with silver and gold to fight in the 1679-1681 
war against the VOC.38 
The Gamrange, East Seramese, and Tidoran leaders helped build 
alliances with the people of Gamkonora. In 1792 it was reported a new 
alliance had been forged between Gamrange and Tobelo. Alferis Hassan of 
Tidore passed on the information that a paduakang had called at Morotai 
with five East Seramese, plus a number of people from Maba and Patani and 
they had engaged in a symbolic exchange with eight inhabitants of Kau and 
Tobelo-tai. The East Seramese and Gamrange leaders presented a gift of 
two doves, a sword, and an assegai to the daughter of Kapiten Laut Tobelo, 
Afir. At this event a Tidoran named Sarjeti Haruna and a man of Marieko, 
Madiru, were also present on board two smallish crafts with ten crew 
members. After the exchange, forty kora-kora were prepared for a raiding 
expedition to Manado.39 The sequence of events reveals how a new alliance 
was established. Gift exchange and marriage were two instruments 
employed to serve as a ‘charter’ between the groups involved. The presence 
of a Tidoran officer may also have legitimized the new alliance, which 
indicates new support for Nuku’s struggle among the people of North 
Halmahera.  
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Not all efforts to cajole the people of North Halmahera to join Nuku’s 
forces elicited a positive response. Some of the leaders and inhabitants chose 
to remain loyal to Sultan Ternate. In 1792 two ordinary men of Tobelo 
informed Alferis Hassan that a brother of Sangaji Maba on board kora-kora 
manned by a number of his compatriots and Kau people had failed to 
convince the inhabitants in the Tobelo area to go to Morotai to ‘make sago’ 
– another expression for going raiding.40 Again in the same year, several men 
of East Seram joined by leaders from Galela and Tobaru returned to Wossi 
on a kora-kora. The Kapiten Laut of Weda had sent two of his men and 
proposed that the people of Galela use the kora-kora to conduct joint raids, 
but Hatibi Baharun of Galela refused because he had received no orders 
from Sultan Ternate.41 On a different occasion, five vessels from Maba had 
landed on the shore of Gane. The raiders offered friendship and co-
operation in fighting against their common ‘enemies.’ But the Sangaji 
repudiated the offer because that he had had no orders from Sultan 
Ternate.42 
Generally speaking, Nuku’s campaign to win the support of the people 
of Gamkonora was effective: more and more people from Tobelo, Tobaru, 
and Galela were involved in raiding enterprises. In October 1792, a man 
from Sula, Hamisi, reported that ten kora-kora from Tobelo under the 
command of Kapiten Laut Kitabi and Colu had destroyed his village, 
including his house, on Taliabu Island. Some were killed and others were 
carried off. Eight of the Tobelo kora-kora fleet then sailed to the coast of 
Sula while the other two remained in the vicinity of Taliabu.43 In October 
1792, a fleet of Sultan Tidore, under the command Lieutenants Abdul Habu 
and Soseba Abdullah, sailed to Weda to fetch Prince Major Hassan of 
Tidore. On Maba the envoys were told that a kora-kora belonging to the 
people Galela and Tobaru had called at Wossi and Gane looking for 
provisions in the form of raw sago and water. The inhabitants had been 
forced to provide them with twenty barrels of sago. After they had seized a 
small prahu and killed two people from Gane, they left for Great Gane.44  
A Makassarese named Rasit, who had been at Negeri Jerongo on Gane in 
October 1792, had also seen a fleet of ten kora-kora manned by the Alifuru 
of Tobelo, nine by Papuans and one by people from Hatiwe. Rasit and his 
companions had been surprised by these raiders as they had been cutting 
cane on the shore. One paduakang belonging to his companion was seized. 
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The anakoda and slaves had run away to the forest. Afterwards the negeri on 
Gane was burned down. Sixty-eight of its inhabitants were either killed or 
captured. Among the captives were two children, the mother, and the 
brothers of Sangaji Gane.45 After their attack on Gane, the Tobelos and 
other raiders went cruising to the Widi River, while the Papuans sailed to 
Buton.46  
In between July-August 1793, a Chinese trader Kwee Tenie had 
purchased a Butonese captive called Kapita from an Alifuru of Tobelo area 
called Wali. It later turned out that Kapita was a son of the raja at Matam in 
the Strait of Buton. Raiders from Maba, Weda, and Patani on board of a 
fleet of seven kora-kora had attacked and captured them when Kwee Tenie 
and other six men were fishing on Siampo Island. After he had been 
transported to East Seram, Kwee Tenie and his friends fled to Obi but 
unfortunately they again fell into the hands of Tobelo raiders. He did not 
know where his friends were. It later transpired two were being looked after 
by Sultan Ternate. Three other Butonese were handed over to Cornabé and 
sent to Makassar.47 In October, the same fleet of raiders seems to have 
continued their raid southwards to the area around the islands of Kelang and 
Manipa where twenty-five vessels of a Papuan and North Halmaheran 
raiding fleet burned down four villages.48  
In 1794, two men of Sula called Dego and Bay, who had been captured 
and remained in the hands of the raiders for eleven months, reported that 
after having raided Buton, the Galelas and Tobelos on board of twenty-six 
kora-kora arrived on Sula and Besi where they captured many people. The 
raiders then continued to pursue their raiding as far as Amblau where they 
captured a dozen men. After this, they headed back to Waru where Prince 
Nuku resided. The victims who reported the incidents managed to escape 
after finding a prahu, on which they sailed to Ambon.49 Makian people were 
targets in Prince Nuku’s campaign. A man from Makian reported to the 
Dutch that as he and his fellows were working in the gardens on Gunaga 
Island, a huge group of Papuans, Seramese, Galelas, Tobelos, Mabas, Wedas, 
and Patanese surrounded his people. Seventy were captured and taken to 
Prince Nuku on Waru. There the captives were sold to the East Seramese, 
for seven to ten pieces of white-and-blue cloth a head. Later they were sold 
to Banda as slaves. This Makianese had made a daring escape the raiders and 
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taken refuge on one of the Papuan islands, where he was saved by Raja 
Bobo and sent to Obi. On his way he was chased by Alifuru, but after 
fleeing into the forest he eventually arrived on Obi.50  
A Ternatan Alifuru called Suwui, who had been captured and remained 
on Salawati, reported that the rebel force numbered up to a hundred vessels. 
He asserted that new recruits from Galela, Ratu, and Use were joining the 
raiders of the pro-Nuku Papuan fleet of fifty-three vessels which had 
assembled at Waigama (Misool). Corporal Jacobus Laiso and Burger Lucas 
Johannes who were sent to locate the English Fort Coronation – a palisade 
fortress which had been built by the English Captain Hayes on Dorei, on the 
north coast of New Guinea mainland in 1793 – were attacked on Gebe by 
three kora-kora of Nuku (See Chapter Eight).51 The return of Prince Zainal 
Abidin from Ceylon in 1794 contributed to the greater fighting capability of 
Nuku’s forces. When Tidoran envoys met him on Salawati in May, he was 
commanding twenty-five kora-kora belonging to Papuans, East Seramese, 
and Makassarese.52 The Gamkonora may have already joined Zainal’s fleet. 
In that year it was reported that the Papuans and Gamrange people 
(including those from Gebe) attacked and plundered a village on Ternate.53  
In 1795, some Maba and Weda people who had earlier abandoned Prince 
Nuku changed their minds as soon as they found out that the English ships 
were helping the Prince. They then joined him wholeheartedly again. When 
the English ships the Resource and the Duke of Clarence were seen to be 
accompanying Prince Nuku’s fleet, all the doubts of the Tidore subjects in 
the peripheries were dispelled. They were especially impressed when the 
envoy of Prince Nuku sailed on board an English ship to Bengal to ask the 
Governor-General in Calcutta to send more ships to support the rebellion. 
In August 1795, Nuku and his English allies moved from Waru to Gebe, 
where they remained about a month.54 By now Nuku’s allies openly 
announced that they were no longer afraid of the Company.55  
Considering the weight of the evidence, it seems raiding was the perfect 
medium for the alliance. The first party offered its co-operation in fighting 
the second party’s enemy and raiding foreign lands or islands. The above 
facts show that the Gamrange often forced the other groups to join their 
raiding enterprises. We may speculate that the bonds between the allies, even 
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though only one story has been found, were established and confirmed 
through exchanging gifts and even marriage between men and women 
across the groups involved. The Gamkonora groups, especially the Galelas, 
Tobarus, and Tobelos, had once been known as brave reliable warriors of 
Sultan Ternate. Enjoying a blood-thirsty notoriety they were perceived as an 
asset to Nuku’s cause and the Gamrange leaders, supported by the East 
Seramese, endeavoured to win their support. The alliance between Prince 
Nuku, the Tidoran prince, and the people of Tobelo, Tobaru, and Galelo 
was unheard of. Indubitably, this was perceived by the people of North 
Maluku as a sign of the prowess of Prince Nuku. They joined the rebellion 




Raiding (and Trading) Networks 
 
The raiders covered quite long distances. The voyage from Patani to Amblau 
(a small island near Buru), to Sula (on the eastern side of Sulawesi) or to 
Selayar (on the southern side of Sulawesi) took weeks. Therefore they 
needed transit places where they could obtain victuals and fresh water. As 
they did not come from one single place of origin, they also needed to agree 
on a rendez-vous. Most of the raiding groups had such places where they could 
meet each other, reside temporarily, and obtain fresh water and sago. 
Valentijn tells us that the Papuans of Onin used the islets of Gussa and 
Serowaki in the vicinity of Seram Laut as meeting points and hiding places. 
On Gussa the Keffingese also pursued their trade in the slaves from Onin. 
Some Papuans also lived on Serowaki and married East Seramese. The 
settlement of Iha was a place where Patanese raiders used to hide. The 
raiders of Weda and Salawati preferred occupying Hatileng and Permata in 
North Seram. Close to Hatileng, Tulusei provided an abundance of sago. 
They also used these sites to hide themselves from the authorities and trade 
with the Misoolese. Besides dealing in slaves, they sold birds of paradise.56 
The Misoolese raiders had a permanent border post at Hote in North Seram, 
where they could rely on an abundance of sago palms and fresh water and 
also raided the neighbouring villages. In the Saifudin era (r. 1657-1689), the 
Ambonese had often complained to the Sultan and the Ambon Government 
about these depredations. The meeting points of these raiding groups were 
quite close to each other and located between north-east Seram, eastern 
Seram, south-east Seram, and Seram Laut.  
                                                




Remembering a raiding incident in January 1780, a Dutch soldier by the 
name of Hardingsveld indicated that the raiders consisted of a motley crowd 
of Tidoran, Halmaheran, East Seramese, and Papuans. The flag ship flew the 
standards of Prince Nuku and the English.57 The raiding parties before and 
during the rebellion of Prince Nuku consisted of multi-ethnic groups, which 
spoke different languages.58 These different groups formed a sort of 
confederation of raiders in which each leader commanded a sub-group 
according to place of origin. For example, the Raja Ampat raiders were 
organized under the command of a kapatla (or kapiten laut), who was usually 
subject to a certain raja.59 Among the people of Maba, Weda, Patani, and 
Gebe, the kapiten laut also occupied a prominent position alongside the 
sangaji. In this case the sangaji was perhaps the highest decision maker among 
the Gamrange. Sangaji Patani was often mentioned in the sources as leading 
a fleet of raiders. Among the Raja Ampat raiders, Raja Salawati must have 
been the most active as he was constantly mentioned in reports. For a big 
expedition raja and sangaji often joined the fleet.60 Besides these few scant 
facts, little is known of the lines of command and the hierarchy on board. 
In 1781 four Dutch and Ternatan vessels attacked the raiders’ lair at a 
gam ‘settlement’ on Waigama and captured eighteen local leaders who had 
gathered there.61 Among the captured leaders were one kapiten laut, four 
kimelaha, and four sangaji. From an examination of a similar sort of event, a 
hongi expedition, I have abstracted the fact that there was one category of 
leaders, who were not expected to participate in raiding parties, the imam and 
hatibi. These leaders were, none the less, captured during punitive 
expeditions because they were suspected of being privy to the organizing of 
raiding activities. On the basis of information obtained from detainees, it 
appears that a raiding enterprise was an activity which involved all levels of 
leadership. The differentiation between leaders among the communities was 
not strictly defined and everybody could be a warrior, because raiding was 
considered the most central activity of the male population in the area. 
Therefore it can be postulated that in a fleet of raiders the leadership 
followed the structure and hierarchy of governance on land. It was central, 
perhaps, because raiding was one of the main means by which to obtain 
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foreign goods. From the booty and captives, the participants were awarded a 
portion depending on their status in the community.  
After a raid was over, it was essential to have markets at which the 
captives could be exchanged. At this stage, the role of middlemen who were 
ready to redeem or pay off the captives was important. The raiders seem to 
have relied on East Seramese traders who were experts in this trade. This 
may have been the reason these men did not participate in the raiding 
themselves. They were orangkaya and raja, similar to those in the Ambon 
Islands, who probably controlled the non-VOC trading in the Seram Sea 
region. Of the various meeting points on Seram, East Seram was likely to 
have been the most important market for the trade in human captives. 
Sometimes the purchasers of captives also visited Patani and Salawati when 
the crews arrived back home carrying a number of captives. Sometimes 
woman captives were taken as a wife or wives by the raiders.  
Despite all these details, important elements in the raiding enterprise 
remain obscure. It is not known, for example, who took the initiative for a 
raid; how exactly the raiding fleet was organized; how it was decided who 
would be in command among those kapiten. During Prince Nuku’s rebellion, 
I would suggest that it was the Prince himself who controlled these 
enterprises. Nevertheless, how the project was managed and how Nuku 
distributed orders and passed on strategies remains unclear. 
Some of the captives were sold as human commodities. The price was 
relatively high, but depended on gender, age, place of origin, and the wealth 
of the captives. In the 1780s a certain Kobiai, orangkaya of Gesser, redeemed 
eleven Selayarese captives from Tanete (men, women, and children) from 
the Papuan kora-kora for Rds 160. The price was relatively low perhaps 
because among the captives there were several children.62 The new owners 
who bought from the raiders sometimes doubled the ransom demanded 
from their families.63 A Chinese trader who had been captured around Onin 
and was handed over to the post-holder on Sawai had to pay redemption in 
kind equal to the value of Rds 100.64 The captives who had no families or 
masters and were not able to pay the redemption were sold as slaves. In 
1667 the price of a Makassarese or Buginese female slave in the hands of a 
trader was about Rds 30-35, while a male slave was about 40 rds.65 Valentijn 
records that Balinese and Makassarese slaves could be sold for about Rds 
80-100 because these were considered the best slaves. The other ethnic 
groups were cheaper at about Rds 40-60.66 
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In a series of raiding voyages, the number of captives would range from 
dozens to hundreds. In 1780 a raiding party managed to capture 113 people. 
The number of captives increased in 1783 when an alliance between Papuan 
raiders and Tidoran rebels captured 200 Ternatan subjects. Even if a captive 
were exchanged for only Rds 25, the raiders could still earn a huge income. 
Slaves may have been one of main commodities in the alternative trading 
network, but according to Kamma, not all captives were sold because the 
raiders also carried some of them home.67 For instance, in January 1775, 
when Thomas Forrest treated Moodo, a Papuan leader to tea and sugar 
candy at breakfast time, this guest was accompanied by two of his wives 
who had been taken at Amblau during a raid. It was reported that both had 





The raiding enterprise was thus more than mere zeeroverij ‘sea-borne robbery’ 
or ‘piracy’, it was also an element in power struggles within the local 
communities and an element in the resistance of the Papuan-Malukan ruling 
elite, against the VOC-imposed political and economic policies, which 
systematically dispossessed the local rulers, especially the bobato, of their 
main natural resources (spices) and deprived them of their authority to 
control their own subjects. Both social worlds, in which alternative and 
Dutch-controlled trading existed, provided arenas in which the struggle for 
and against domination exerted violence on rivals.69  
The raiding enterprise revealed a new dimension during the rebellion of 
Prince Nuku. The targets of the attacks seemed to be selected deliberately. 
The raiders attacked areas and people who were perceived to be Dutch 
subjects and allies or those who declined to support the rebellion. At this 
stage, Papuan and Halmaheran raiders had contributed significantly to the 
strengthening of Prince Nuku’s rebel group. In the context of the rebellion, 
the trading and raiding fleets were transformed into a naval and military 
power by Prince Nuku. Not only did he encourage and improve the 
predatory escapades of Gamrange and Papuan, he also employed them to 
gain new support from North Halmaherans who had traditionally been the 
most important suppliers of manpower for Sultan Ternate. 
Was the raiding enterprise a lucrative business? The raiders may have 
gained plenty of money or a great amount of goods from trading captives, 
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but these profits had still to be distributed among many members at home 
whose number might reach one hundred or even more. The costs of 
investment in a great number of vessels, the provisions of food for crews for 
about two-three months, weapons and gunpowder must also be taken into 
account. Raiding was a highly risky business. During a mission a number of 
lives were usually lost and many were wounded. In particular, when the 
VOC Government sent out a punitive expedition, many villages and vessels 
were destroyed. All things considered, it is likely that many of the raiding 
enterprises were not really profitable at all. They were mounted because 
there must have been other reasons and interests in addition to purely 
economic considerations which motivated the Papuans and the 
Halmaherans. After all, although the foreign goods did have an economic 
value, they were equally imbued with enormous political and cultural kudos 
as well. In particular, Chinese porcelain and copperware brought back from 
their voyages and raids by the islanders gradually acquired an important 
function in the ceremonial exchange of presents. In the course of time, the 
number and variety of these valuables of foreign origin multiplied. Gongs 
and copperware, Chinese porcelain, beads, lengths of red-and-blue cotton 
cloth, hatchets, and iron bars were the most important.70 The raiders could 
use their booty for the payment of fines, for bride wealth and other forms of 
ceremonial exchange. In return they would accrue recognition, fame, and 
influence in their families and kin groups. Those who possessed these 
foreign goods enjoyed prestige, authority, and power. The mambri, ‘hero’, 
who triumphantly returned from a raid with foreign goods, won such 
intangible distinction. Foreign goods made him a ‘big man’ or promoted him 
to the ranks of any kind of local category of important person or leader or 
man of fame.  
                                                










Cerammers eene natie waarmeede men van de eerste tijden tot hier toe zo min door 
zagte als harde middele veld heeft kunnen winnen, en te regt door veele beroemden 
mannen onder onze voorgangere beschreeven voor het snoodste en trouwlooste volk dat 
onder de zon te vinden is…1  
 
The relationship between Prince Nuku and the East Seramese was 
extraordinary. During his fifteen years in exile from Tidore, Waru – on the 
east part of Seram – was one of the safe hiding-places of the prince while he 
pursued his struggle. The role of the East Seramese in the whole gamut of 
the struggle throughout the course of Prince Nuku’s rebellion was 
significant. The bulk of this chapter revolves around the East Seramese 
traders and their relationship with the protracted rebellion. It begins with a 
description of the historical background to the East Seramese experience in 
dealing with the VOC in the seventeenth century. It goes on to focus on and 
underline the persistent endeavours of the Seramese to maintain their 
‘traditional’ trading networks in the Seram Sea and beyond, despite the 
hindrance and intervention of the VOC and the British East India Company 
(EIC), both eager to secure the spice monopoly. This sheds light on the 
dogged resistance of the East Seramese to the Dutch and, to some extent, 
the English. Indubitably this explains the prominent roles of the East 
Seramese, including the Goromese and the Seram Laut people, in Prince 
Nuku’s rebellion. The discussion concentrates heavily on the East Seram 
areas, including Seram Laut, Geser, Gorom and the surrounding areas, but 
South Seramese and North Seramese also enter the picture whenever they 
figured prominently in Nuku’s rebellion. 
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The main supporters of Prince Nuku during the time he spent in Seram 
were the East Seramese. The majority of them were commercially oriented 
people from prominent negeri with a reputation as centres of trade. Rarakit 
was one of the big negeri and was considered a centre of trading and raiding 
networks, because Papuan raiders used to carry their captives and goods 
there for sale. Among the indigenous inhabitants were also many Bandanese 
who had fled and settled there after 1621. Big houses and a mosque could be 
found in Rarakit in the eighteen century. Even one hundred year earlier, in 
1619, there had been plenty of wealthy traders over there.2 In the first years 
of the Nuku rebellion, in 1780 the inhabitants of Rarakit armed themselves 
with fine Makassarese guns. Some houses were guarded by four small, heavy 
swivel guns (rantaka), a little longer than the draaijbas used by the Company. 
The colonial administration had no idea how these weapons had been 
obtained. At the arrival of the hongi fleet, the people of Rarakit quickly 
buried or hid their goods and pieces of artillery and were not prepared to 
show open resistance because the Dutch hongi fleet carried superior 
weaponry and was supported by an indigenous fleet. Instead, they chose to 
disappear temporarily in the forest for safety.3  
Between Hote and Rarakit was located Waru where a great amount of 
sago was sold. The old Waru settlement had nine compounds. Valentijn 
stigmatized the inhabitants as ‘wild’ because they invariably refused to join 
the hongi of the Ambon Government. When a hongi approached the area, all 
of the inhabitants simply fled into the forest.4 Located in between two rivers 
and protected by reefs, Waru was one of the favourite hiding-places of 
Prince Nuku. Not far from Rarakit to the south, in Keffing, traders and 
raiders also met each other at the Pasar Besar ‘big market’ which was open 
seven days in a week. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the people 
of Salawati were reported to be selling their slaves, sago, tortoiseshell, 
ambergris, and spices to Keffing traders.5 Keffing had four settlements: 
Kesongat; Kelibon; Kuwaus; and Ernanang. In 1633, it could muster 4,000 
fighting men. Even so, in 1659 through the collaboration of one orangkaya of 
Keffing, the inhabitants were subjected to VOC oppression. One year later 
the settlement was harassed and destroyed. Just as other East Seramese, the 
people denigrated as the ‘unruly and perfidious rabble’ of Keffing were also 
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lauded as astute traders. The Makassarese and Bandanese frequently came 
there to trade and settle. As their part of commercial network, the Keffing 
people fostered special trading connections with Onin and Pulau Adi to the 
east of Onin.6  
Seram Laut lies to the east of the peninsula on which Keffing is located. 
Governor Anthonio van den Heuvel of Ambon (1634-1635) estimated that 
in 1633 it boasted of having about 3,000 able-bodied men.7 Around it cluster 
five small islands, of which Pulau Geser is one. From east to west Seram 
Laut measures only 3.7 km across and it is 1.5 km long north-south. Because 
there was no fresh water on this island, it had to be transported from its 
neighbours. In 1633 Artus Gijsels attacked Seram Laut and arrested most of 
the orangkaya. Their houses were burned and the spice trees destroyed. The 
inhabitants were removed to Keffing where they built eleven settlements: 
Kilwaru; Kiltai; Rumatameri; Keliluhu; Ena; Kelibia; Kilberau; Kelimala; 
Rumaesi; Rumamaru; and Rumalolas. A hardy breed of intrepid traders the 
Seram Laut people worked assiduously to maintain their trading networks. 
In the 1670s Orangkaya Uwas (Rumatameri) and Uwan (Kilwaru) controlled 
the massoi and slave trade with Onin, especially with Rumbati and Karas, 
but were deeply involved with Kobiai as well. On the eastern side of Seram 
Laut lies one other small but important island: Suruwaki (Panjang), which 
belongs to the Gorom group of islands. On this island, slaves, the property 
of the Goromese, used to be kept temporarily before being sold. Papuan 
raiders also used to hide on these thirteen small islands to the south-eastern 
of Seram Laut.8 Within the Gorom group, there are two other islands: 
Manawoka and an eponymous island. Gorom and Seram Laut represented 
two prominent groups in East Seram. As were their counterparts on Seram 
Laut, the Goromese were very active traders.9 In 1633 Gorom could muster 
around 10,000 able-bodied men.10 
To the west of Geser, on the main island of Seram, there were 
substantial settlements whose inhabitants were known to be bold and skilful 
in their commercial dealings. These included the Guli-Guli, Kelibon, 
Kumilang, Kilmuri, and Werinama as well as the Elpaputi on the western 
side. In 1633 Gulu-Guli had 2,000 able-bodied men. In 1648 Kelibon and 
Kilmuri had 300 brave, strong, armed men. They were mobile traders and 
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spoke good Malay.11 In 1765, these people, supported by raiding groups 
from Maba, attacked an Ambon Government pancalang, the Garnaal, which 
was cruising around Pulau Geser and murdered its crew.12 Refusing to be 
browbeaten by the Company, they were often subjected to punitive 
expeditions from Ambon. When such an expedition loomed, they usually 
also carried their property away and disappeared into the forest.13  
 
 
East Seram Trading Networks 
 
At the end of sixteenth century, 1581-1582, Miguel Roxo de Brito described 
Serdanha (very probably Seram Laut) as being inhabited by 5,000 men, most 
of whom were wealthy merchants. These Serdanha heads employed Papuan 
slaves and produced sago bread which they traded in Banda for nutmeg and 
mace. The people of Serdanha built seaworthy vessels on which they sailed 
as far as sandalwood-producing Timor. Voyaging west, they also traded to 
Bali where they acquired substantial amounts of gold and cloth, to Bima 
where again much gold, ambergris and wax were to be found, and to a 
number of Javanese ports. They also traded with merchants of Marcho 
(probably Makassar) and Butung, where they bought quantities of gold, 
textiles, and cotton yarn. During this period, Tombuku was already a 
supplier of quantities of iron (ware) which the traders of Serdanha sold on 
the New Guinea mainland, particularly, as De Brito mentioned, at Magusia 
on the southern shore of the MacCluer Gulf, where they exchanged it for 
Massoi which they sold to the Javanese who valued it as a medicine.14  
Leupe collected various reports of VOC voyages to Raja Ampat and 
even to the north coast of New Guinea during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. He shows that there were intensive trading connections 
between East Seram and Papua.15 Despite the Dutch-administered trade, 
which had been concentrated on what was known as the Pasar Kompeni, 
‘Company Markets’, in Ternate, Ambon, and Banda since the seventeenth 
century, the Seramese trading networks which were centred partly on Seram 
Laut and Gorom were not obliterated and even continued to show a 
development during the period 1750 to 1850 in response to the Chinese 
demand for exotic produce.16 The traders of East Seram, especially those 
from Gorom and Seram Laut, played an important role in linking Maluku 
with the trade networks - called sosolot - in the Raja Ampat Islands to the 
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north and with the western coastal areas of the Papuan mainland, Onin and 
Kobiai. The coast between the various south-eastern Seram polities was 
divided into sosolot, bays or anchorages in which one individual, descent 
group, or polity maintained a recognized monopoly in trade.17  
 The sosolot as a socio-economic unit was discovered by Opperkoopman 
Johannes Keijts who was posted in Banda. On 9 July 1678 with the help of 
East Seramese traders he mounted an expedition to Onin from Banda. This 
expedition resulted in a fund of knowledge about the network of the west 
coast Papuan trade with Seram. Keijts was the first European to realize that 
there was a network and that the Seramese and the Onin people participated 
in it. This traditional network gave the East Seramese merchants the 
privilege of purchasing slaves, massoi, and reef pearls provided by the 
Papuans. Before heading to Onin, Keijts visited Orangkaya Laku in Keffing 
in East Seram. While he was there he was witness to how an Onin ‘prince’ 
called Jeef visited Laku to ask him for help in family matters.18 It turned out 
that carefully constructed commercial ties were strengthened by marriages 
between Seramese men and Papuan women. There was also a ‘charter of 
mythology’ as the relationship between the Onin people and the Seramese, 
for example, was enshrined in the myths found in East Seram (Suruwaki 
Island). These facts indicate that the relationship between Onin and the 
Seramese was socially and religiously rooted.19 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, A. J. Bik specified that the 
trading relationship between Gorom and Onin was concentrated exclusively 
in the hands of the leaders of Kataloka. Only traders from this respected 
negeri were allowed to trade with various trading points in the Onin area, 
namely Rumbati, Petisi, and Ati-Ati. Other negeri on Gorom, which was 
eager to procure Onin products such as tripang, turtles, and massoi, were 
obliged to purchase these from Kataloka traders. In return, Kataloka 
supplied the people of Onin with machetes and other items. Trading 
relations with the people of Teluk Berau (McCluer Gulf) was also limited to 
the East Seramese traders. Consequently, traders from South Sulawesi had 
to co-operate with the East Seramese when they wanted to collect products 
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from the area.20 The sosolot network also spanned the Banda and Aru 
Archipelagos. Many outside traders, mainly Buginese and Makassarese, 
joined this network in Seram Laut and Gorom. They functioned as trading 
agents, exchanging textiles and ironware for local products. Around 1660, 
the East Seramese traders borrowed about twenty to forty vessels from the 
Makassarese and Buginese to collect a great quantity of massoi bark and 
other items from New Guinea.21  
The most sought after items were massoi bark, nutmeg, bird of paradise 
feathers, and slaves. Slaves had been a major export of New Guinea from 
the earliest period and were originally been taken by the East Seramese to 
supply their own labour needs. Only later were they traded on to Banda and 
farther afield. The development of seventeenth-century colonial society in 
such manpower-poor areas as South-East Asia created a new need for slaves 
in Banda, Ambon and elsewhere. The 1689 decree of the VOC forbidding 
the purchase of slaves in large tracts of the western archipelago also 
increased the demand for this human commodity in the East, where free 
burghers and Mardykers (freed slaves of Christian Asian origin) were 
licensed to supply the VOC which relied on their extensive knowledge of 
local trade networks. Although local traders were initially excluded from 
dealing in slaves by the VOC, they were soon able to evade the controls 
imposed and to restore the profitability of their involvement.22 The slave 
trade intensified again in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth 
century.23  
It was reported that Rarakit, Gah, Kelibat, and Seram Laut were meeting 
points where captives from raids were exchanged. In the trade in this human 
commodity, the role of the East Seramese traders was prominent and it 
should be recalled that in 1780 the rebellion of Prince Nuku began with the 
raiding of Dutch subjects. These raids had resulted in the taking of more 
than fifty captives who were sold to a number of orangkaya of Gorom and 
Ondor in exchange for guns, bullets, assegais, and gunpowder. The readiness 
of the East Seramese traders to purchase this lucrative source of manpower 
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encouraged the Papuan raiders to hunt more captives. Once they were in 
their hands, these East Seramese transported them to Saparua in order to try 
to make a profit on them, partly by demanding a ransom either from their 
relatives or partly from the Dutch Governor in Ambon. The ransoms could 
sometimes be paid in cash and in commodities like clothes, machetes, and 
Chinese ceramics.24  
 
The westward trading connections of the East Seramese traders with 
markets in Sumba, Sumbawa, Lombok, and Bali are also traceable 
throughout both the seventeen and eighteen centuries. Leirissa notes that 
there were two possible passages. The first went in a northerly direction 
along the north coasts of Seram, Buru, Buton and then south-westwards 
across to the Java Sea via Bonerate to Timor or Sumbawa, finally ending up 
at Bali. The second was the southern passage via the Kei-Aru Islands, the 
Banda Archipelago, the Tanimbar Islands, then onwards to Wetar and 
Timor, eventually reaching Bali sailing west along the Lesser Sunda Islands.25 
Some operated with Dutch passes, but most without. The Goromese traded 
directly with Bali. Traders from Negeri Amar in particular had close links 
with a Balinese princedom, as is reflected in their modern oral history.26 
There are traditions of a Goromese presence in Bali among people from 
Kilmuri.27 In the month of August, the other East Seramese left from Banda 
and Nusa Laut to sail to the Burning Islands and from there through the 
Bali Strait, Lombok, to Pasir and Bancahulu, possibly returning via Nusa 
Barong, Parigi, and Balambangan.28 It seems there were even more than two 
passages to Bali. Governor Van Pleuren recorded that the period between 
October and February was the best time for the East Seramese to sail for 
Bali and Buton. This voyage was also undertaken by the Mandarese and 
Buginese.29 
East Seramese vessels, sailing to Bali, were laden mainly with Papuan 
nutmeg, massoi, some tripang, and bird of paradise plumes. Bearing south of 
Rosengain, the vessels would put in at Nila, where they picked up sulphur 
which could be sold in Bali for two Spanish mats a pikul. Bik also points out 
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that in the earlier period30 there had been direct trade with Java, attested to 
by the fact that many people in the area had visited Surabaya.31 Those from 
Kilwaru, Geser, Kelibia, Kuwai, Urong, and Guli-Guli travelled to Buton, 
Timor, Bali on their own vessels and indeed ventured even farther to the 
west to exchange commodities. The trading groups’ vessels were loaded with 
massoi bark, tripang, totombo, Papuan slaves, loeri, and kakatua. In 1784 it was 
reported they also carried long nutmegs (local, warong) from Halmahera and 
the Papuan Islands. The reward reaped as the result of this long voyage was 
that the traders exchanged their commodities at a healthy profit for paddy, 
clothes, copperwork, swivel guns, and coarse earthenware, not to mention 
stocking up on ammunition and bullets.32 Traders from Keffing sometimes 
sailed to Tombuku and Buton. They carried baked and unbaked sago; in 
return they procured Javanese and Buton cloths, various kinds of yarn, 
paddy, and swivel guns, but no opium.33 In 1785, in his memorial to his 
successor Van Pleuren noted that the islands of Keffing, Geser, Seram Laut, 
and Gorom were important points to watch because these islands were a 
hub of alternative trading. Besides the Seramese, Mandarese, Buginese, and 
English country traders were also involved.34  
In French archives from Mauritius, it has been discovered that the non-
Dutch trade in spices was not quelled by the VOC and that its tentacles also 
reached as far as the southern parts of the Philippines. For instance, it was 
reported that in May 1754 sailing on board La Colombe, the well-known 
French mariner Pierre Poivre departed on his second voyage to Manila and 
then to Zamboanga in Mindanao in the southern part of the Philippines, a 
port to which Malukan vessels carried their spices. Upon his arrival, 
Governor Oscotte of Zamboanga told him that he had missed a great 
opportunity, because a few months earlier in January 1754 two Malukan 
vessels had called with a cargo of mature cloves and fresh nutmegs.35 What 
Oscotte meant by ‘Malukan vessels’ could have meant ‘East Seramese 
traders’ or ‘Makassarese and Buginese’. In the Dutch sources, it is reported 
that in 1761 many Makassarese and Buginese without bothering about a 
Dutch pass bought up nutmeg in Misool, Waigeo, and Onin, called at 
Gorom, and then transported their cargoes to Manila and Bali.36 The 
Malukan vessels in this case most possibly referred to the Buginese or 
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Makassarese who had collected the spices from these respective areas. Wild 
long nutmeg (Myristica argentea) was traded from New Guinea throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Some of it was taken to free ports in 
Borneo by East Seramese traders, while cloves were leaked out from such 
domains as Kilmuri.37 
On the basis of the knowledge he acquired during his eight years’ tour of 
duty in Makassar, Alexander Cornabé, the Governor of Ternate, stated that 
the westward trade was neither harmful to the Company nor undermining 
the spice monopoly because he believed that no spices were traded there. 
However, he was informed that East Seramese traders – co-operating with 
Makassarese traders - also secretly sent a fleet of six pancalang, ten arumbai, 
and ten paduakang38 to sail the waters between Nusa Laut and the Schildpad 
Islands, in the Bali Strait during the months of August, September, October, 
and November. This period was a good time to keep watch, which would 
give the Dutch an opportunity to waylay this ‘illicit’ trade. Despite such 
optimistic predictions, no successful seizure could ever be achieved. The 
East Seramese, who always had to juggle with limited quantities of water, 
used hide-aways on small rivers and creeks in which to conceal themselves 
from any patrols.39  
The purchase of spices was not restricted to collection points outside the 
production areas. In 1760s East Seramese vessels laden with goods and 
various kinds of cloth from Sulawesi paid annual visits to clove-producing 
areas. Under cover of darkness, they approached such parts of Hitu as Hatu, 
Alang, and Liliboi by stealth and met local inhabitants to exchange their 
goods for cloves. Sometimes the vessels which were supposed to deliver 
cloves to Saparua called at the southernmost point of Nusalaut where they 
had a rendez-vous with traders from East Seram. The East Seramese 
sometimes hid in places between Honimoa and Oma. At home, Company 
subjects in the clove-producing areas concealed cloves in holes in the 
ground, caves, or buried them packed in bamboo boxes. Whenever East 
Seramese, Chinese, or even free burghers happened to pass by, they were 
then ready to hand over the cloves. The Governor of Ambon, Willem 
Fockens, strove to solve the problem by sending a messenger to investigate 
this ‘smuggling’ and ordered the post-holders to keep a check on the 
number of vessels, the names of anakoda, and the quantity of bags of cloves 
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carried carefully.40 In 1763 in Haia, Central Seram, a small expedition from 
Ambon under Lieutenant Albertus Michiel found 11,838 pounds of cloves 
as well as rantaka belonging to a ‘Buginese’ trader hidden in a cave. They 
also burned vessels belonging to Buginese and East Seramese in which 370 
pounds of clove had been discovered.41 
During the harvest season of 1764-1765, Fockens dispatched one sloop, 
four pancalang, and twenty-two arumbai of his subjects to cruise around 
outside their own areas but within Ambon-Lease Islands. During the patrol, 
the vessel of Patih from Suli encountered four East Seramese vessels with 
which they had a small engagement. In 1766 he also ordered the post at 
Alang to send one soldier to remain in Hatu and another in Liliboi.42 Muslim 
Ambonese, mainly from Hitu and Haruku, were also involved in the 
contraband trade. These Ambonese provided cloves which were exported to 
Sulawesi and elsewhere by Buginese and Makassarese. Raja Kuwaus of East 
Seram, for example, had a kinsman in Batu Merah near the town of Ambon, 
and through his influence, his son became a raja in Batu Merah. Leaders of 
East Seram settlements such as Seilor, Urong, and Guli-Guli also had 
kinship ties with Muslim negeri in Hitu, namely in Larike, Uring, Asilulu, Tial, 
and Tulehu.43 Certain Ambonese, Buginese, and Makassarese had married 
villagers and settled there.44 In 1772 a Malukan named Matiahi explained 
that every year these East Seramese traders who had relatives in Ambon sent 
their vessels to collect cloves clandestinely. The voyage was sometimes led 
by the owner of the vessels himself but, sometimes vessels were sent under 
the command of an anakoda. After they had collected the spices, they carried 
these along with tripang, tortoise-shell, massoi,45 Papuan slaves, birds of 
bright plumage, ambergris, pearls and other products from Seram and the 
islands to east of it, to Bali, Pasir and other trading centres to the west, 
including eastern Java, where they exchanged them for rice, fire-arms, and 
such oriental manufactured goods as piece goods, pottery, copper utensils, 
and silks. Buginese and other seafarers from the west came to Seram to 
trade and also met the East Seramese in Bali and elsewhere. The ‘smuggled’ 
spices ultimately found their way to the markets of China and India. 
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Nanyang Chinese46 vessels frequented Bali, and the Buginese had contacts 
with Chinese, Indian, Arab, and European traders in many ports.47  
Roy F. Ellen explains that VOC policing of the spice monopoly, backed 
up by an efficient body of regulations, a strict system of accounting, and a 
commercial bureaucracy, in conjunction with the damaging punitive 
expeditions to extirpate clove and nutmeg trees, caused sufficient disruption 
for the indigenous population of the ‘Banda zone’ to seek economic 
alternatives to spices, at least after 1669.48 The system which the VOC 
imposed was certainly designed with preserving the monopoly in mind, but 
controlling the complex indigenous trading networks was also part of the 
exercise and therefore it threatened and jeopardized the basic livelihood of 
the East Seramese. The contracts and punitive expeditions proved an 
inadequate deterrent to dislodge this traditional trade largely because East 
Seram was a relatively remote area from the perspective of the Ambon and 
Ternate Governments. At such a distance, surveillance and punitive 
expeditions were expensive to mount. The tyranny of distance could not be 
overcome by the Dutch. In the long run the VOC faded into something of a 
paper tiger for the East Seramese, even more so because their trade 
networks did not really harm the spice monopoly. Spices were only 
smuggled out on a small scale and not in quantities significant enough to 
undermine the monopoly. Undaunted whenever the opportunity presented 
itself, the East Seramese would continue their economic pursuits and 
maintain the trade networks.  
 
 
East Seram-Dutch Relationship in the Seventeenth Century 
 
In hindsight indigenous trading networks may not have posed a huge threat, 
but the VOC in Ambon had a stake in limiting the trading networks of East 
Seram-based traders. The southward route led mainly to Banda, Kei, and 
Aru. Banda, the centre of nutmeg production, was dependent on such 
indigenous networks for its daily needs, especially food provisions.49 In view 
of this dependency, the trading relationship between Banda and East Seram 
was of necessity intensive. This explains why, after the conquest of Banda in 
1621, many Bandanese traders fled to East Seram.50 The mounting hostile 
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relationship between the East Seramese and the Dutch was allegedly 
instigated by the newly settled Bandanese. Because he foresaw that the 
Bandanese refugees would encourage the East Seramese to subvert the VOC 
policy on the spice monopoly, on 23 December 1624 Herman van Speult, 
Governor of Ambon (1618-1625), concluded a contract with orangkaya from 
Seram Laut, Keffing, Gorom, Guli-Guli, Urong and Kuwaku (south-east 
corner of Elpaputi Bay) with the aim of circumventing any injurious 
influence infiltrated by traders of Banda origin.51 
Under the terms of the contract, the orangkaya were prevented from 
allying themselves with enemies the Company. In their westward trade, they 
were obliged to obtain a pass from the Government of Ambon. This 
passport was more than simply a laisser passer, it also obliged them to report 
any complaints and misbehaviour which may have occurred in every west 
monsoon. To maintain ‘law and order’ they were also obliged to cease 
hostile actions against each other. Whenever possible, any captive taken in a 
raid, especially subjects of the Company should be redeemed. The Company 
would subsequently pay Rds (Rix dollars) 20 for an indigenous captive and 
Rds 40 for a ‘Hollander’ captive upon presentation of a receipt.52 These 
captives were perhaps redeemed because of humanitarian motives, but once 
they returned home they were subjected to debriefing sessions to find out 
more about the movements of the raiders who had ransomed them.  
In practice, the East Seramese traders paid scant attention to these 
prescriptions and continued their westward trade without soliciting a Dutch 
pass. For this reason, in 1633, Governor Artus Gijssels of Ambon launched 
a punitive expedition on Seram Laut and imposed a contract, stipulating that 
the heads of Seram Laut were obliged to pay a fine of 50 taël of gold and 200 
slaves for any infringement. This fine impoverished many of the East 
Seramese traders,53 as under the terms of this contract the Dutch could 
obtain slaves without having to organize a costly expedition. Another 
contract with the Papuan Raja of Rumbati or Rumakay had been attempted, 
but this agreement proved a disappointment because besides the 
inconsistent attitude of the Papuans, the Dutch faced continual obstruction 
from East Seramese traders in their attempts to obtain slaves.54  
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In 1649, Governor Arnold de Vlaming launched another violent reprisal 
in East Seram and succeeded in forcing Rarakit to surrender.55 As an 
outcome of this stern measure, a similar contract was again imposed. There 
was an additional article stating that the heads of Rarakit had to join the hongi 
fleet of Ambon every year, should they fail to do so a penalty of 200 real 
would have to be paid. To pre-empt any attempts at resistance, the heads 
were not allowed to build new fortresses.56 Two separate contracts were 
imposed on the orangkaya and raja from Gorom on 30 November 1650 and 
their counterparts from Seram Laut, Keffing, Kilmuri, Rarakit, and Gorom 
on 18 November 1656.57 In December 1657, a small force from Ambon 
under Herman van Outhoorn attempted to establish a post at Guli-Guli and 
subsequently tried to detain the three heads. This triggered more resistance. 
Four Company soldiers and one crew member were killed.58 The war which 
broke out as a result, known as the Sixth Ambonese War, lasted three years. 
In 1661, succumbing to a shortage of provisions, the East Seramese and 
Papuans allies surrendered. A contract with basically the same contents was 
imposed on 10 February 1661. To the relief of the East Seramese, under its 
stipulations, the Dutch post at Guli-Guli was to be abandoned.59 
One of the reasons for the persistence of the East Seramese in 
maintaining their westward trade was the trade in massoi bark from New 
Guinea, which was regularly exported to Java where it was used for 
medicinal purposes. In order to solve the problem, the Ambon Government 
decided to buy small amounts of this commodity even though it was not 
lucrative. In 1666, following the Makassarese-Dutch War, seven Makassarese 
vessels made port in an East Seram harbour and collected massoi. Then nine 
to ten Seramese vessels sailed to Gresik in Java to sell massoi. In reaction to 
this disturbing development, the Dutch decided that the remedy was to 
impose another similar contract in 1670.60 Undeterred, the East Seramese 
continued sending vessels to Java and Bali, especially when the price of 
massoi was sliding down to around Rds 6 to 8 in Ambon. Resorting to tried 
and tested methods, the Government of Ambon remained vigilant, regularly 
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patrolled the waters, and confiscated vessels without a pass whenever they 
were encountered.61 
In 1674 orangkaya from Kilwaru and Keliluhu requested a pass to send 
vessels westwards. Instead of granting the request, the Governor of Ambon 
proposed buying up the massoi at Rds 8 per pikul. This eliminated the profit 
for the traders as the price was the same as that in Banda or East Seram. 
Not unsurprisingly the traders preferred to carry the massoi farther 
westwards where they knew it would fetch a good price. In 1675, the 
Batavian High Government issued a pass for the East Seramese to sail 
westwards, but Fort Victoria in Ambon cancelled the licence as it claimed 
the East Seramese were untrustworthy and continued to welcome foreign 
traders. In 1679, when the massoi price fell as low as Rds 4 per pikul, one 
orangkaya from Kilwaru sailed to Batavia to request permission directly from 
the High Government. Because of the infestation of piracy around Banten, 
he only ventured as far as Cirebon. The pass for the westward trip was not 
granted. Again, in 1683, the tension mounted when the East Seramese 
reportedly obtained a letter from Sultan Banten promising help them to fight 
against the VOC. Immediately, an expedition to East Seram was launched to 
prevent the situation worsening.62 Another way of obstructing the East 
Seramese trade was the brainchild of Governor Dirk de Haas of Ambon. In 
1689 he established a new rule which obliged the East Seramese traders to 
obtain a pass on Honimoa before pursuing trade in massoi, slaves and other 
commodities in the ‘East’, which meant in the Raja Ampat, on Halmahera, 
and on the New Guinea mainland.63  
At almost any cost, the Dutch endeavoured to obstruct the possibility of 
smuggling spices outside Maluku. The contracts functioned more as signs of 
conquest and tokens of the superiority of VOC power rather than the 
outcome of negotiations. By and large these contracts accommodated the 
interests of the Dutch and tended to undermine the interests of the other 
parties. With its greater power, the Company kept imposing its directives to 
protect the spice monopoly by rigorous regulation. Administering the trade 
by issuing passes was one way of controlling the movement of vessels. For 
their part the East Seramese proved a foe worthy of their steel and never 
relinquished either their westward or their eastward trade. They had to run 
the risk of punishment by the Company when they sailed without a pass but 
when they did at least try to request a pass from the VOC for westward 
trade, it was not granted. The relationship between the East Seramese and 
the Dutch in the seventeenth century therefore never reached a point of 
agreement which satisfied both parties. 
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East Seram under Tidore (1700-1769) 
 
From their history of running the Dutch gauntlet, the East Seramese traders 
built up long and varied experiences in resisting and subverting Dutch rule. 
Despite the limitations on and the control of trade, they doughtily y strove 
to find a safer route to avoid Dutch surveillance and to transport their 
commodities. Therefore the East Seramese traders had to be in a state of 
continual vigilance while engaged in trade. As a consequence, in the eyes of 
the VOC Governments in the East, the indigenous trade in East Seram was 
regarded as a threat to the interests of the spice monopoly which it was the 
duty of the three Dutch Governments in Maluku to promote and uphold. 
The English historian H. R. C. Wright has even exaggeratedly described the 
islanders as the ‘chief threat’ to the Dutch spice monopoly.64  
In the eighteenth century, especially the period prior to the outbreak of 
Nuku’s rebellion, the main Dutch problems concerning East Seram were 
how to control the movement of the East Seramese vessels, the leakage of 
spices out of Maluku, and the increasing raiding activities being facilitated by 
the East Seramese traders. Under the terms of 1700 contract, East Seram 
was under the authority of Tidore. Therefore Sultan Tidore was expected to 
participate in East Seram affairs, but Tidoran authority and presence in this 
troublesome area was more honoured in the breach than in the observance. 
In 1743 the questionable nature of Tidore authority in East Seram was 
addressed by the High Government. There were two choices for Sultan 
Tidore: comply with the Dutch directives in East Seram or relinquish this 
authority and the concomitant enjoyment of the compensation. It seems 
Sultan Tidore preferred to retain his authority in East Seram, probably 
because the Sultan received a sizeable annual tribute from the leaders of this 
part of his Sultanate.65 Freed from all but the most nominal authority, the 
East Seramese were going about their own affairs and dealt with the Dutch 
in their own way. In 1740, traders from Seram Laut and Keffing sailed to 
Bali and Banjarmasin, carrying nutmeg, massoi, and Papuan birds of 
paradise. The nutmegs had supposedly been collected from Negeri Sikara, 
somewhere in the Raja Ampat Islands, and transported to Urong. In 
Banjarmasin, the traders encountered and traded with the English.66 In July 
1747 a Muslim cleric (khatib) reported to the Dutch Government in Banda 
that two Buginese vessels had arrived at Gorom and Keffing to purchase 
nutmegs. The nutmegs had been collected from the forest of Hatumeten 
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which was known to be a muskaatbos ‘nutmeg forest’ and from Gorom, but 
the nutmegs traded were unripe. Alerted by this report, Batavia ordered the 
Ambon Government to take steps to prevent any further trade of this spice 
in this area.67  
During the first half of eighteenth century, I have found only one violent 
incident between the Dutch and the East Seramese in the records. In 1746, 
the Ambon hongi under the command of Governor Nathaniël Steinmetz 
(1743-1748) was attacked by the people of Waru, supported by Papuans 
armed with their bows en arrows. Four indigenous soldiers and one 
European soldier from the hongi were wounded. In retaliation, the Dutch 
troops attacked villagers and killed forty reducing the village to ashes.68 East 
Seramese society itself was not at peace either. In 1726 a collective fight 
broke out between groups from Gorom and Manawoka causing those 
people who did not want to be embroiled in the fighting to flee to deep into 
the inland or at least into the forest.69 These two minor examples show that 
the situation in the first half of the eighteenth century did not differ much 
from that in the previous century as far as the relations either between the 
East Seramese and the Dutch, or indeed among various groups within East 
Seramese communities. 
In the second half of the eighteenth century it seemed the Day of 
Reckoning was about to dawn. On 12 March 1764 a punitive expedition 
consisting of two sloops, two pancalang, and twelve arumbai was launched 
bound for south and north Seram. This time it targeted not only the East 
Seramese but other nominal Company subjects too. During the hongi, Haia, 
Taluti, Tobo, Seilor, and Batulomi were punished, but in the neighbourhood 
of Keffing, Geser, and Seram Laut, the Dutch fleet was hemmed in by thirty 
to forty East Seramese vessels (Seram Laut, Keffing, Keliluhu, and Kilbia) 
under the leadership Orangkaya Geser and Raja Kilmuri. In the affray two of 
the hongi arumbai were captured. Four of their crews were killed, six 
wounded, and sixty-two were reported missing. Retaliation followed a year 
later. On 14 March 1765, a stronger fleet under Hendrik van den Brink and 
the Patih of Suli, Pieter d’Costa, was dispatched. This fleet had one extra 
barque and the number of arumbai was doubled from twelve to twenty-six. 
Enna-Enna, Batulomi, Kwamor, Kilmuri, and Urong came under fire. In 
Awang, Dawang, Kelibon, and Kisalaut, fifteen vessels were burnt, including 
two big Makassarese vessels. Keffing and Kisalaut, which were left empty by 
their inhabitants, went up in flames too. The hongi lost two men and eight 
wounded. Even so, none of the East Seramese leaders was captured.70  
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In April 1767 Governor Fockens of Ambon launched an even more 
powerful fleet under the command of Captain Van den Brink. This fleet 
consisted of two sloops, two pancalang with 226 soldiers and forty crew 
members plus thirty arumbai carrying native warriors. A secret letter from the 
High Government dated 23 December 1766 stated that no pardon should 
be granted to the East Seramese. When the fleet unexpectedly attacked 
Keffing, Seram Laut, and Geser, these places were overwhelmed with dread 
and no resistance was met. Sixteen vessels, including a ship seventy-five feet 
in length, were burnt. To make matters worse, the native warriors plundered 
the remaining wealth of the Geser, Keffing, and Seram Laut inhabitants and 
seized two bags of cloves, four metal draaijbassen, nine guns (snaphanen), and 
about sixty small cannon. Ninety-three people of Geser and Seram Laut and 
thirty slaves were captured. Other such nearby settlements as Urong, 
Dawang, Batulomi, Enna-Enna, and Guli-Guli suffered similar attacks. The 
latter had allegedly previously been involved in the murder of Patih Wasu in 
Ambon area. Two draaijbassen, one bag of nutmeg, one cannon, four 
snaphanen, one bag of gunpowder, and some clothes were looted. Spared by 
the south-eastern winds which relentlessly drove the fleet westwards, the 
Gorom area was left untouched.71  
Two years before the contract of cession was imposed on East Seram by 
the VOC (1769), Governor Fockens forced four heads of East Seram, 
namely Raja Werinama, Orangkaya Seilor, Raja Kilmuri, and Orangkaya 
Kelibon to sign a contract in which they had to recognize the contracts 
concluded between the VOC and Tidore of 29 March 1667 and on 5 May 
1700. In this contract of 1766, the East Seramese were obliged to cease their 
commerce with foreign traders (European and Indian), and such indigenous 
merchants as Makassarese, Mandarese, Butonese, Buginese, Selayarese, 
Javanese, and their traditional trading Papuan partners. They also were 
expected to apprehend these and hand them over to the VOC were they to 
call at their shores. To conduct trade outside Seram, the Seramese had to 
obtain passes from the VOC Government. The contract obliged the East 
Seramese to assist the VOC during its regular hongi expeditions to which 
they, nota bene, themselves had been subject. To serve the main interest of 
the VOC, the preservation of its spice monopoly, the East Seramese were 
still expected to help the VOC eradicate spice trees whenever they found 
them in their area.72 
The cession of East Seram from the authority of Tidore to the Dutch 
was one Dutch manoeuvre by which they hoped to gain a better grip on 
East Seramese traders who had been incorrigibly involved in ‘smuggling’ 
cloves and stubbornly continued their westward trade despite a number of 
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contracts forbidding these activities. Despairing of any real input from 
Tidore, the Dutch Government on Ternate pushed Sultan Jamaludin of 
Tidore to cede East Seram to Dutch authority in 1769. In the previous 
contract of 1700, when Tidore was ruled by Sultan Hamzah Fahrudin, the 
Dutch had recognized the authority of Tidore in East Seram from the 
promontory of Hote, on the northern side of Seram, to the southern side of 
Hatumeten and to Gorom, including other small islets around Seram Laut. 
Knaap argues that the recognition of the authority of Tidore over the islands 
off the coast of East Seram was a reward for the Sultan who had been 
complying with the Dutch policy over Papuan raiding.73 They the cession in 
1768 may have allayed some Dutch fears but it also stirred up unrest among 
the Tidoran grandees and aggravated the relationship between the Tidore 
Sultanate and the VOC.  
 
 
East Seram and Nuku 
 
As was recounted in Chapter Four, Nuku and his adherents left Tidore and 
took refuge in, among other places, Waru, in East Seram. The East Seramese 
leaders among whom traders predominated were more than ready to 
welcome Nuku’s decision to use Waru as one of his headquarters. So far no 
explanation has been found in the sources which elucidates why the majority 
of East Seramese traders tended to support Nuku. The most straightforward 
answer to this question would seem to be an age-old reason, they shared a 
common enemy. The East Seramese had regularly been victims of the Dutch 
punitive hongi expeditions which had resulted in their impoverishment. The 
hongi fleet not only destroyed their villages and sometimes killed their people, 
it also deprived them of the wealth they had been used to accumulating for a 
long time. In such a situation the arrival of Nuku in East Seram in 1780s 
must have been quite welcome. Moreover, the presence of Nuku who was 
imbued with royal legitimacy as this Tidoran prince strengthened the 
political position of the already dominant East Seramese traders in the areas. 
In a hongi expedition during the November and December of 1780, 
Governor Bernardus van Pleuren of Ambon visited many villages along the 
coasts of north and south-east Seram. He openly warned the village leaders, 
orangkaya, kapiten, and elders he had met, not to help Prince Nuku and his 
raiding parties, let alone join them. He also remorselessly threatened that 
those who were involved in raiding or in illicit trading would be treated as an 
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‘enemy’.74 But the inhabitants and local heads who had resolved to support 
Prince Nuku clearly refused to be intimidated, because raiders and rebels 
continued assaulting and harassing the inhabitants of Seram and its 
surroundings. These raiders attacked villages whose inhabitants were loyal to 
the Dutch or refused to support the raiders and the rebels. From the various 
steps it took, it seems that the Ambon Government realized the weight of 
the role played by the leaders of the East Seramese.  
At the end of 1782, the Ambon Government in Fort Victoria launched a 
hongi expedition consisting of sixty-one native vessels, five Ternatan 
korakora, one sloop, and three pancalang.75 The first major engagement in 
East Seram occurred at Kilmuri, where the hongi fleet of Governor Van 
Pleuren skirmished with Prince Nuku’s fleet, composed of 150 vessel, under 
the command of Raja Lukman from Keliluhu. After five hours of 
exchanging hostilities, Kilmuri was set on fire, but many of the rebels 
managed to escape. One hundred and twenty four prahu and kora-kora were 
seized: eighty were burnt and forty-four rendered unseaworthy. The Dutch 
captured many flags, cannon, and other weaponry. The Victoria fleet then 
proceeded to Kotarua, Kelibon, Dawang, Awang, Pomilang in East Seram, 
and Ondor and Camar in Gorom. Raja Kilmuri, Kapiten Kelibon, and 
Orangkaya Batumoli as well as Imam Sarassa of Geser, one of the most 
prominent pro-Nuku supporters, were forced to surrender. The East 
Seramese residing in Urong, Enna-Enna, and Guli-Guli were chased away 
and their houses and vessels were destroyed.76  
In this particular expedition the role of two East Seramese leaders on the 
Dutch side was important. Kapiten Keffing, Baukan, was the one who had 
suggested the Governor destroy villages on Keffing. Orangkaya Kuwaus, 
Kana-Kana, even advised the hongi commander to attack and destroy his 
own village. Attacks such as these were actually no more than side-shows; 
the most important target in the operation was the illusive Prince Nuku. 
Because Van Pleuren believed the Prince was in Rarakit with a full force, 
two villages near Rarakit, Kelinga and Kelibat, were attacked. Although the 
people this time defended them resolutely, the two negeri were destroyed. 
Prince Nuku's brother, Abdul Mutalib, surrendered and asked to be 
pardoned. He informed the Governor that Prince Nuku had run out of 
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weapons, and had already disappeared to one of the Papuan Islands, perhaps 
Salawati. The Governor indeed discovered one of Prince Nuku’s residences 
but not the Prince himself. He also chanced upon a huge vessel thirteen and 
half feet in the beam and fifty-three feet long, which had been designed for 
Nuku and his wife. The Dutch-commanded troops also looted any portable 
wealth: copper-work; textiles; and sago. The inhabitants were hunted down 
and slaughtered even in the fastness of the forest.77 
After the punishment of East Seram in 1782, the arena of struggle was 
moved out elsewhere, but the resistance was not spent. In 1785, Adrian de 
Bock claimed that he had overwhelmed Rarakit but, because information of 
his arrival preceded him, it was not a total success.78 Nuku was not in East 
Seram at that time. In 1788 people from negeri Amar and Salakat on Gorom 
were allegedly involved in a raid on the garrison on Aru.79 In 1790 the area 
close to the Nuku’s headquarters was attacked again.80 Another fleet under 
Captain Warner Gobius was also sent the following year.81 Generally 
speaking, the operation was successful but Captain Gobius himself was 
killed.82 On 1 March 1793, the Governor of Ambon who had heard rumours 
that the strength of Nuku’s forces on Gorom totalled about 20,000 – 30,000 
men grew very anxious. The number was perhaps exaggerated but it 
reflected the magnitude of the support Nuku could rally.83 At this time 
Nuku was busy concentrating his forces drawn from many parts of Maluku 
in East Seram. 
On 10 September 1795, Prince Nuku demonstrated to the East Seramese 
that the alliance with the English was both real and significant. That day an 
English ship appeared carrying on board forty kimelaha of Tidoran 
tributaries – most of them from villages on Maba, Weda, Patani, and the 
Tidoran cleric Tipsale. The East Seramese also witnessed the moment when 
Prince Nuku had sent envoys on board an English ship to solicit more 
support from the British Governor-General in Bengal. The English ship 
presented Prince Nuku with snaphanen and cannon to strengthen his forces. 
After this display of strength, the rebel messenger Sai Sai and many ordinary 
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people from Gorom and the north coast of Seram openly rallied to Nuku, 
the ‘Sultan Papua and Seram’.84  
                                               










Is hij een Radja, ik ben het ook. Heb ik vaartuigen, slaven, lila’s, kruid, en lood, en 
geld om strijders te bezoldigen, dan beorloog ik den eersten vorst die mij beleedigt, hoe 






At the end of sixteenth century East Seramese people, especially those from 
Seram Laut (Serdanha), were described by De Brito as wealthy merchants. 
Besides an abundance of gold, cloths, and other forms of wealth, at that 
time they also possessed about 600 small fire-arms. De Brito said that they 
kept these for reasons of prestige, but were ignorant of how to use them. 
Their wealth was derived from their wide-ranging eastward and westward 
trading networks. Their obvious riches had attracted the Papuans from 
Misool to raid this area regularly and carry off such booty as gold, gongs, 
and cloths. Conscious of the dual necessity of pursuing their trading 
activities on the one hand and defending their country on the other, the East 
Seramese decided upon a change in their commercial activities. They 
organized a shift in trade. Two of the heads set off on their vessels each year 
to trade, while the rest remained behind to guard and if need be to defend 
their country. On the return of those who had gone away, those who had 
not ventured forth immediately set out. In Serdanha they had ‘treasurers’ 
whose function was to take care of the deposits of gold and cash which they 
could use for the common needs and well-being of the entire village. Each 
time the vessels returned from a trading voyage, they contributed to the 
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fund. In times of emergency or when embroiled in war with other regions, 
for example with the Bandanese, they handed over a certain reward to the 
people with whom they made up a fleet to defend themselves, and 
sometimes they were even prepared to pay to launch attacks. This fund was 
also used when the raiders from Misool took hostage a respected individual 
of Serdanha who was unable to redeem himself.2 
The situation in the seventeenth century changed significantly after the 
VOC established its spice monopoly and strove to control the trading 
activities of Malukans, including the East Seramese traders. The East 
Seramese were in dire straits as they could no longer regularly obtain 
nutmegs and mace from Banda or elsewhere. The westward trade was also 
officially forbidden. And, by the end of seventeenth century, the traditional 
eastward trading route to the Papuan Islands, the mainland of New Guinea 
and elsewhere also required a pass. These new Dutch regulations placed the 
East Seramese traders in very difficult situation because trade had lain at the 
very heart of their livelihood. When Valentijn strove to understand the 
reasons for persistence shown by the people of Urong in continuing their 
‘illicit’ trade at the beginning of the eighteenth century, he ended up 
concluding that, ‘Zy van de zeevaert moeten leven’ (they had to live from 
seafaring.).3 From the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century descriptions, it 
appears axiomatic to state that the East Seramese could not live without 
trade.  
In 1829 after an interview with someone in Seram Laut, Kolff quoted 
the opening remarks at the beginning of this chapter. The statement casts 
light on how the contest for power was undertaken. Wealth was an 
important factor in acquiring power. Surplus wealth could be converted into 
more followers which was the real wealth in sparsely populated regions. 
Therefore the communities on East Seram were dominated by traders who 
could employ a great number of followers and sail large vessels. Trade was 
located at the very centre of the society. Slaves were also an important item 
in trade, because the possession of many slaves, either directly in New 
Guinea or from raiding groups, was profitable. Slaves undertook the labour 
needed to support daily life and provided the manpower to row the vessels. 
In the sixteenth century, De Brito reported that the heads of Serdanha 
employed 1,000 slaves both to work in their gardens and to produce sago 
bread which could be exported to Banda.4 In Banda, before the virtual 
extermination of its society by Coen in 1621, most wealthy, powerful 
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orangkaya employed slaves to take care of and harvest the nutmegs.5 In 1780 
a slave from Mandar belonging to Raja Tobo was a thirty years old Muslim 
married with a wife and children, who had worked at Tobo tending gardens 
for a few years.6  
A vessel was the vital means of transport in a maritime community. 
Communication and social interaction among the people depended on 
maritime transport. Most of the community leaders therefore owned 
vessel(s). These had to be armed with guns and provided with ammunition 
for defence. In East Seram communities where enmity and concomitant 
hostility among villages were rampant, able-bodied men and guns were 
indispensable to any success. Possessing vessels made trade more secure and 
augmented the capacity of the community to attack rival or opposing parties. 
Raja Tobo had a vessel equipped with twenty-three crewmembers, weapons, 
and ammunition. He did not lead trading voyages himself but hired an 
anakoda. His vessel carried Selayarese cloths and Makassarese textiles which 
were exchanged for massoi and tripang.7 One important Nuku supporter, 
Raja Keliluhu, Lukman, owned several vessels, plenty of slaves, and so much 
ammunition that even without the Dutch pass, he could carry on regular, 
safe trade from Papua to East Seram, namely on Gah, Rarakit, and Waru.8 
A man who pursued trade and consequently possessed slaves, vessels, 
money, and other foreign prestige goods enjoyed influence and power. Such 
persons were usually called orangkaya or raja. Both raja and orangkaya are 
terms borrowed from Malay. As Ellen has stated, their widespread use was 
partly because Malay was the main language used in trade. The proof that 
Malukans used Malay in their dealings with the outside world as early as 
1514 is found in two Malay letters from Ternate translated into Portuguese. 
Probably spoken Malay had already been the trade language for some 
centuries before the arrival of the Europeans.9 The term orangkaya was 
employed variously to refer to indigenous ascribed leaders (chiefs), 
traditional leaders of the ‘big man’ category who had attained authority by 
the manipulation of resources in indigenously approved ways, local persons 
who acquired influence by virtue of being middlemen in the commodity 
trade, and foreign merchants.10 However the term remains confusing when 
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it has to be differentiated from the term raja. Riedel tried to distinguish 
between the two by stating that an orangkaya was chosen and that a raja was 
hereditary.11 However this was not always the case. The quotation from 
Kolff implies that the term raja was also based on achievement. 
Furthermore, the arrival of European powers in Maluku strengthened the 
use of the terms. The Europeans bestowed titles on persons they perceived 
to be local dignitaries, first as a sign of respect following the protocol of 
European diplomacy, and later as an instrument of political control. Up to 
nineteenth century the rank of orangkaya was subordinate to that of the raja. 
For example, the orangkaya of Ainike and Besilan on Pulau Suruwaki were 
under the authority of Raja Amar.12  
 
 
Type of Leaders 
 
In the following paragraphs a number of leaders, both orangkaya and raja are 
described in relation with their trading and political activities during the 
Nuku rebellion. The first type is the orangkaya who benefited from the 
raiding enterprises by trading human captives as their commodity. In 1780 
the Papuan raiders had taken captive fifty-five men, women and children of 
Haia. They were carried to and offered for sale in East Seram, at Rarakit, 
Gah, Kelibat, Kiltai and on Seram Laut. Orangkaya Haia and his people only 
had the means to redeem thirty-five captives from Kapiten Keffing, at Rds 80 
per captive. Consequently twenty persons still remained captive. For these 
the ‘owners’ demanded such an excessive ransom that those who wished to 
redeem them were unable to do so.13 With the prospects of such profits, the 
Papuan raiders were encouraged to continue raiding to an even greater 
degree because the Goromese and other East Seramese were always ready to 
purchase the people captured by providing the Papuans with all kinds of 
necessities, especially textiles, local copper products, ceramics, machetes, and 
axes.14  
On 17 September 1779, Kobiai alias Maba - an orangkaya of Geser origin 
- sailed to Rarakit on a vessel with eighteen people. He traded with Papuan 
raiders originally from Salawati. He purchased eleven Selayarese captives 
from Tanete, South Sulawesi, whom the Papuan had captured on Bawulang 
Island for the sum of Rds 660. Afterwards he sailed back to Geser and then 
to the Dutch post on Saparua to obtain a pass to sail to Selayar. On Selayar, 
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he made a profit of Rds 10 per head from the captive business, which 
allowed him to enjoy a profit of more than 15 per cent. Eager to earn more 
profit, in a village of Tanete he captured five children of a karaeng, local 
noble, by force. He planned to exchange his captives with other traders. The 
redemption which could have been earned from the karaeng family would 
have been fairly lucrative.15 During the punitive hongi expedition in 1782, this 
Kobiai was one of the targets singled out by the Governor of Ambon. 
Nevertheless his Dutch partner in his shady business– Free-burgher Fedder 
from Banda - had warned him about the arrival of the hongi from Ambon. 
Kobiai disappeared immediately to a hiding place on Gorom.16 Besides 
trading goods, Kobiai also raided undefended villages. In this business, he 
functioned both as a broker in captives and a raider himself. This implies 
that his vessels and men must have been equipped with plenty of guns and 
ammunition.  
Imam Sarassa was also of Geser origin. This brother of Kobiai had 
earned a reputation as a kapiten laut in Nuku’s fleet and was one of the 
greatest East Seramese traders.17 The Dutch had had him labelled a 
dangerous smuggler since 1780. His two vessels invariably sailed to Papua to 
collect Papuan forest and sea products. The Ambon Government was 
informed that under the leadership of Imam Sarassa (and in co-operation 
with Free-burgher Fedder) the people of Urong, Gumilang, Awang, 
Dawang, Kelibon, Kilmuri and Seilor sent a number of vessels to trade in 
Buton and Bali. Van Pleuren, was not very agitated as he claimed there were 
no spices transported, with the exception of some young nutmegs and mace. 
Despite this seemingly being shrugged off a fairly minor trespass, Imam 
Sarassa was a wanted man as he was one of the most prominent East 
Seramese leaders in Prince Nuku’s forces. The Governor of Ternate strove 
to arrest him because he was convinced that this would scare off others who 
were also involved in illicit trade or supported Prince Nuku. In 1782, in the 
wake of the VOC punitive expedition, Imam Sarassa surrendered. But it 
seems that this did not dissuade him in his support of Prince Nuku,18 as in 
1784 he was arrested again. Before the Dutch could commence their 
investigation, he died on the way to prison on board the pancalang the 
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Victoria.19 In his fortified residence the Dutch discovered: fifteen and a half 
pounds of ripe cloves, a number of cannon and guns, plus a significant 
supply of ammunition.20  
Orangkaya of Gah, Agnisa, was also known as one of Prince Nuku’s 
adherents even though his role was not as important as that of Imam 
Sarassa. The Governor of Ambon put a reward of Rds 50 on his head. This 
orangkaya had not paid homage to Ambon for four years, and allegedly 
provided the rebels, Raja Keliluhu, Lukman, and his brother, Kapiten Mama, 
with a place to hide. He had transported them to Salawati where Mama later 
died. Two years earlier, about 1779, he had murdered two Bacanese 
headmen. The Dutch received this information from an inhabitant of Gah 
who had come back from Salawati. Begging for pardon, Agnisa denied all of 
the accusations made against him by the Governor. Concerning his 
relationship with Prince Nuku and the Papuans, he explained that he entered 
into it as he was driven by fear and powerlessness. Unmoved, the Governor 
concluded that his ‘disloyalty’ had been too blatant and he had him detained 
when his hongi visited the South and East Seram areas at the end 1780.21 In 
the company of Orangkaya Balukelang, he was banished to Batavia.22  
Raja Keliluhu Lukman, alias Witna, and his brother, Mama, had 
conducted regular trade from Papua to East Seram, to wit on Gah, Rarakit, 
and Waru. Blackening their reputation even more in Dutch eyes, these two 
traders had also worked for Nuku’s father, Sultan Jamaludin, and then for 
Prince Nuku. When Sultan Jamaludin was still in power, they co-operated 
with Jamaludin’s envoy and led a great fleet of a hundred vessels of Papuan 
raiders in 1779.23 On 11 April 1781 a secret envoy of the Governor reported 
that Raja Lukman, leading a pro-Nuku fleet of twenty kora-kora from Patani 
and Salawati, had forced the inhabitants in North and East Seram to join his 
force. He threatened to punish those who declined to support the rebel. At 
this time Prince Nuku’s force were based in Salawati.24 From 26 January 
1780, Governor Van Pleuren of Ambon had ordered Jacob Knop the 
Resident of Manipa to apprehend these ‘vagabonds’ and promised a reward 
of Rds 300 per head for those who captured them alive. Accordingly, the 
Resident informed the Alifuru and pro-Dutch groups about the reward. He 
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was sure that it would motivate them at least to provide some information.25 
In 1782 Van Pleuren increased the value of the reward to Rds 1,000 for 
those who were able to capture Prince Nuku, and another Rds 500 for 
capturing the main Nuku supporters, namely Raja Keliluhu, Lukman, and 
Orangkaya Geser, Imam Sarassa. These leaders were considered the most 
prominent Seramese traders on Geser and were then kapiten laut of Nuku's 
fleet.26 In February 1797, Lukman was one of the members Nuku’s embassy 
in which Raja Kiliwaru, Raja Muda Zainal Abidin and Prince Ibrahim Al-
Mukaram were included, when this party paid a visit to the British Vice-
Resident Farquhar on Banda.27 
For two years Orangkaya of Keffing, Balukelang, had been assisting 
traders from Urong and Enna-Enna and he had also allegedly been involved 
in the forbidden clove trade. When he appeared on board the Dutch hongi, 
he admitted he had gone to Bali but denied carrying cloves saying he knew 
nothing about the clove trade. He claimed complete ignorance of all those 
people from Seilor, Kelibon, Kotarua, Urong, Enna-Enna, Guli-Guli and 
elsewhere, who had been involved in the contraband trade. Accused of 
having harmed the envoy of the Governor and an orangkaya of Seilor and of 
having challenged the pro-Dutch Kapiten of Keffing, Baukan, to enter the 
fray, he was finally arrested by Orangkaya Boano in 1780.28 At the beginning 
of 1781 Balukelang was banished to Batavia.29  
A different type of leader is represented by the Orangkaya of Ondor, 
Baliang. He neither joined Prince Nuku’s rebellion nor allied himself with 
the Dutch, but was involved in the ransom business in league with 
Goromese and Papuan raiders. On 30 October 1780 Baliang with eleven 
men of Gorom came on board to pay a visit to Governor of Ambon, 
Bernardus Van Pleuren. He was also accompanied by the Governor’s envoy, 
a Raja of Iha, Sinene. Baliang admitted he and other Goromese had traded 
in men, women, and children who had been captured by the Papuans. Later 
he exchanged three slave women and some totombo, buying allegedly for ‘self-
defence’ three guns, two assegais, two hundred bullets and two flasks of 
gunpowder.30 He provided Van Pleuren with detailed information about the 
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number of captives (from Amblau, Buru, Manipa) who were still languishing 
in the hands of the raiders. He thereby managed to convince Governor Van 
Pleuren to give him various cloths, ceramics, and armaments in exchange for 
his assistance in freeing more Dutch subjects who had been captured.31 
When Van Pleuren queried why he welcomed the Tidorans, Bacanese and 
other groups who were collaborating with the Papuan raiders to his shores, 
Baliang was always able to offer plausible excuses and convince the 
Governor that it was impossible for him to take on the powerful Papuan 
fleet and win. Governor Van Pleuren gave Orangkaya Baliang money from 
his private fund to bring home more of the ransomed victims, and supplied 
him with five pieces of Javanese cloth, five sarong, and ten lengths of fine 
cloth, thereby purchasing Orangkaya Baliang’s loyalty and obedience to the 
Company.32  
Besides the leaders supporting or taking advantage of Nuku’s rebellion, 
East Seram also had two important leaders who had been unswerving in 
their loyalty to the Dutch. They were Kapiten Baukan of Keffing and 
Orangkaya Kana-Kana of Kuwaus. In 1782, on a hongi expedition to East 
Seram, these two leaders guided the fleet in choosing its targets. Kapiten 
Baukan even suggested the Governor destroy a village on Keffing, of which 
he was a native. On Kuwaus, some negeri were likewise burned at the 
instigation of of Orangkaya Kana-Kana of Kuwaus.33 No wonder the Dutch 
counted Kapiten Baukan and Orangkaya Kana-Kana as their most two loyal 
local heads in East Seram.34 They may personally have been paragons of 
loyalty but most of their people took Nuku’s side. To strengthen Baukan’s 
power, the Governor of Ambon recommended the Banda Ministry not 
allow traders from Gorom, Seram Laut, and Geser to trade on Banda 
without a signed letter of permission from Kapiten Baukan. This was a 
serious miscalculation because the inhabitants of Banda could not live 
without the provisions brought over from Gorom, Seram Laut, and Geser.35  
 
 
West and South Seramese 
 
Compared to the East Seramese, the indigenous people of West and South 
Seram, showed less enthusiasm for supporting Prince Nuku. Their 
involvement in Nuku’s rebellion lasted only two years, from 1781 to 1782. 
These people had been co-operative to the VOC Government in Ambon 
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since at least the second half of seventeenth century. When Prince Nuku 
recruited them in December 1781, the people he managed to convince to 
join him originated mainly from the area stretching from Tanunu in north-
west Seram to Batuasa in south-east Seram. In West Seram the uprising was 
supported by people from areas stretching from Kaibobo to Hualoi. In 
South Seram, the supporters came from villages beginning in Amahai and 
then going eastwards as far as Batuasa. Some refused to join the rebellion 
and consequently were harassed by the rebels. In a series of campaigns at the 
beginning of 1781, Prince Nuku was able to mobilize 160 vessels, including 
the new support from the West and South Seramese. Details of precisely 
how this alliance between the rebels and the South and West Seramese have 
been blurred by the passing of time, but the alliance certainly did pose a 
problem to the VOC as it threatened one of the most important centres of 
the clove production in the Ambon-Lease group.36  
Some inhabitants of Amahai and other areas who refused to join the 
rebels were attacked and looted by their fellow Amahai and other Seramese 
who had switched their allegiance to Nuku. One native soldier and a 
Company messenger were beheaded. When the joint rebel forces moved to 
Hatuana, the northern part of Saparua, the Dutch mobilized the sloop the 
Batavier and the pancalang the Beschermer to strengthen their hold on Saparua 
and Haruku and challenged the rebels at sea.37 These were joined by the ship 
the Bataviase Welvaren and the pancalang the Manipees, which were better armed 
and carried a number of free burghers and indigenous soldiers, dispatched 
by the Government of Ambon. In the encounter which followed the rebels 
lost many vessels and men, and were forced to make for the shore. One of 
Prince Nuku's most important captains was beheaded, and his head was 
borne away as a trophy. Four more Papuan and Seramese fighters were 
hacked down. The rebels were again attacked at Itawaka and chased as far as 
Noloth. The Dutch also suffered losses: Sergeant Cornelis Stephanus and 
another European soldier who had continued to pursue the fleeing rebels 
too eagerly were shot dead by them.38  
Without wasting any time, Governor Van Pleuren of Ambon dispatched 
more vessels under the command of Johan Borgguits with orders to crush 
the rebels, who had disappeared, probably fleeing to Amahai on the Kuwaku 
promontory where the main supporters of Nuku resided. The villages 
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Amahai, Makariki, Soahuku, Elpaputi, Paulohi, Latu, Iha, Hualoi, Sulor, 
Rumakai, and Tihulale on West and South Seram which were not willing to 
submit to the Company were plundered and set alight. Two kapiten of 
Kamarian were detained and later gaoled in Ambon where one of them died 
soon afterwards. While Negeri Kaibobo in West Seram looked quiet and 
peaceful, some of the inhabitants of Hatusua, a settlement south-east of it, 
had actually fled away with their leader. Those who had remained submitted 
themselves to the Company. The Alifuru of Negeri Kairatu and others had 
declared earlier that they had had no dealings with the rebels and promised 
to come to Ambon to make a formal submission.39 
In the middle of 1782, the Government of Ambon recommenced the 
sending out of punitive expeditions. A number of pancalang and sloops, 
including the Bataviase Welvaren, a two-masted arumbai belonging to the 
Governor, were prepared with the support from the military posts of 
Saparua, Haruku, Hila, and Larike (Ambon). Their crews were strengthened 
by a lieutenant, four sergeants, eight corporals, and sixty-four men-at-arms 
under the command of Merchant William Beth. However, before all the 
elements of the Ambon hongi fleet could unite, sixty-four vessels of the 
rebels attacked them off the island of Babi. Three vessels of the hongi were 
captured. The young raja of Nusa Laut – probably from Titawai – and his 
men were killed in the fray and their vessel and weaponry were seized. The 
Gnatahoedij Mardika, Raja of Soya40 and of his twenty-nine men were 
drowned, killed, or captured by the raiders. When the arumbai belonging to 
Orangkaya Hutumuri (Ambon) sprang a leak, his life was saved by an arumbai 
sailing close by. Fortunately for the Dutch, the post at Luhu was secured in 
time. The Governor decided it was worthwhile to continue protecting this 
post because it was the broodkamer (bread-basket) of the Ambonese. The 
other vessels, the Bataviase Welvaren, the pancalang the Delft, and the Beschermer 
sailed back to Saparua and Haruku. Within approximately two and half 
months, the hongi fleet succeeded in driving away the raiders and preventing 
them from harassing the centres of clove production in the Ambon-Lease 
group. Villages in the higher areas whose inhabitants had allegedly been 
supporting the rebels were plundered and burned. A great number of sago 
and coconut palms, which were considered to be a source of the raiders' 
food supply, were also destroyed.41  
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Governor Van Pleuren had no wish to halt the campaign until Seram and 
all its adjacent islands were well and truly under his control. From 29 
October to 22 December 1782, another hongi expedition was sent to cruise 
the area to reinforce the authority and power of the Company among the 
West, South, and East Seramese. The local people and their leaders were 
simplistically categorized as friend or foe by Van Pleuren who set about 
punishing all those belonging to the latter category. In West Seram, for 
example, Raja Kaibobo, Abraham Kuhuwael and his son were apprehended 
because, despite the pardon that they had received, they had once more 
taken up arms against the Dutch. These people and leaders of Waisamu who 
had refused to submit and had abandoned their village were also dealt with 
ruthlessly by the Dutch who incinerated their village. Orangkaya Hatusua, 
Elias Tetehuka, who had deserted his village and people was removed and 
replaced by a new orangkaya, Jonas Matiari. In South Seram, the main leader 
of the uprising, a man from Amahai called Jacob Stevens, was detained and 
banished to Batavia. To escape punishment, Raja Werinama and Raja 
Tanafora disappeared, but Orangkaya Kamarian, Nikolas Pesirerun was 
arrested. Nevertheless, those who successfully convinced the Governor that 
they were not guilty were freed. Among them was Orangkaya Haia, Saliau 
Wailisa who had been captured by the raiders, and was released and retained 
his position. The people of Latu, Iha, and Hualoi (south-west Seram) were 
also forgiven. The Governor successfully reconfirmed their status as loyal 
Dutch subjects.42 
Most of the leaders who had begged the Governor of Ambon for a 
pardon explained that they had been afraid of confronting the rebel, as they 
had been petrified by fear. They had no choice but either to join the rebels 
or flee from their villages. Indeed those who had not joined the rebels were 
attacked by them.43 The protection the Dutch could offer in this vast Seram 
area was quite limited, because, through no fault of their own, they often 
arrived too late. These confessions made to the Dutch may have been 
genuine, but there were still some leaders who refused to submit. They had 
taken a refuge when the hongi came. Their reasons for throwing in their lot 
with the rebels are not clear. Were they also afraid of opposing the rebels or 
did they have a stake in joining them?  
The open involvement of the West and South Seram people in the Nuku 
rebellion dried up at the end of 1782. It would seem that a lack of internal 
consistency is the explanation for their short-lived participation. Looking at 
those who were either detained and punished or rewarded and forgiven, a 
pattern emerges. On Tanunu, Orangkaya Terson Heireri joined Nuku but its 
raja opposed him. In Kaibobo, its raja, Abraham Kuhuwael, chose Nuku’s 
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side but Orangkaya Matius Patiratu was pro-Dutch. In Sahulau, the raja and 
his supporters were helping Prince Nuku’s troops, but another group of the 
people of the negeri was not. In Hatusua and other negeri, a similar pattern 
emerges. Only in Waisamu did all the heads and their people wholeheartedly 
support the rebels, hence they all had to leave the village when the hongi 
approached their negeri.44 It is worth noting that the West and South 
Seramese who decided to ally with the rebels were not organized into one 
big alliance. As the examples above show; one village was usually divided 
between pro-Nuku and pro-Dutch groups.  
Was this lack of consistency derived from particularistic politics such an 
internal rivalry between, for example, the raja and the orangkaya in one 
village? Analysing the West Seramese in the seventeenth century, Knaap 
argues that the village was the most important political unit and the political 
situation revealed a great deal of particularism. Rivalry and animosity 
between village leaders may easily have resulted in small-scale warfare. The 
main leader who was only a primus inter pares was regularly challenged from 
within. It was customary for one faction to involve an outside party when 
making a federation to fight for its specific cause.45 This same explanation 
may also apply to the situation at the end of eighteenth century. The 
evidence presented shows that in every single village there was almost always 
a division between two parties. Confronted with the great force assembled 
by Nuku, , besides obviating the fear of being victimized by the rebel, some 
groups decided to take advantage of the presence of the rebel force to fight 
against their fellow villagers or their neighbours who had once been their 






Valentijn and Rumphius describe the area called North Seram as stretching 
from Tanunu, Tanuru, Hatiwe, Lisabata, Seleman, as far as east as Hote. 
Seleman was a small negeri, located half a mile on the western side of Hatiwe. 
Its people used to sail on one kora-kora with the people of Sawai during the 
hongi expedition. Sawai itself was a big negeri and lay one mile to the west of 
Hatiwe at the head of a small bay. Both were under the leadership of a raja.46 
At the time of Gerrit Demmer (1642-1647), Lisabata had nine soa or 
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settlements populated by various immigrants. At the end of the Ambon 
War, in 1655, a remaining group of 600 pro-Majira Makassarese troops fled 
to this area, where they were hunted down and massacred by the VOC 
soldiers and its native troops.47 Lisabata had a reputation for being 
aggressive to its neighbours. Its population was also keen to impose its 
power on the inhabitants of Sawai and Seleman, loot their harvest, and force 
them to deliver tribute.48 The other head negeri in North Seram was Hatiwe 
which had two soa: Nurulatu and Nurubesi. Its inhabitants were composed 
mostly of a mixed Papuan-Seram population. Rumphius says that the people 
of Hatiwe submitted themselves voluntarily to the authority of the Dutch. 
They regularly joined the Ambon hongi expedition.49 As was Hatiwe, Kara 
had reputation of being a hiding-place of Papuan and Tidoran traders and 
raiders.50 Papuan (Salawati, Misool) and Halmaheran (Weda) trade was 
thriving on Permata, Ipaputi, Laulata, and Tulusei. Captives and birds of 
paradise were the main commodities. The Patanese conducted their business 
in Hatileng and Tulusei which were also rich in sago. Hote was known as a 
colony and a vergaderplaats or ‘assembly point’ of Misool.51  
In 1780s, in the opinion of Governor Van Pleuren of Ambon, the 
people of North Seram had shown themselves more rebellious than those of 
South Seram. During the rebellion of Nuku, many of the North Seramese 
showed an inclination to support the prince.52 Trying to map the political 
division presents a real conundrum. Inhabitants of Nuniali often had to 
move to escape the grip of their orangkaya who was very oppressive. Those 
Lisabatans who lived in between Sawai and Nuniali, and co-operated with 
Prince Nuku and the Papuan raiders often attacked the inhabitants of both 
places. During the hongi expedition in 1784, they fled to Seleman and to the 
island of Kelang off the western side of Seram and remained loyal to the 
rebels. The inhabitants of Seleman were also unswerving in their loyalty to 
Prince Nuku.53 The Muslim Lisabatans were different. They entertained a 
good relationship with the people Boano – an island just off the north-
western coast of Seram - and had settled in Maluang. At other times they 
collaborated with Tidoran and Papuan raiders. The people of Hatiwe, 
Pasanea, Besi, and Sawai were stigmatized as het slegste zoort van volk ‘the 
worst kind of people’ by the Dutch because they invariably collaborated 
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with the Bacanese and Tidorans. Despite this notoriety, the Dutch post-
holder in Sawai succeeded in keeping some of them loyal to the Dutch 
rather than have them turning their support to Prince Nuku. Hote was 
infamous as the basis of operations of the Papuan raiders. In order to avoid 
being recruited for a hongi, they invariably retreated to Misool. Their raiding 
activities increased after they allied themselves with Prince Nuku. The 
Alifuru of Kara were an exception. They were on a very friendly footing 
with the Boano people whom the Governor considered to be good and, 
above all, co-operative towards the Dutch.54  
The Papuan raiders, especially those from Misool, invariably called at 
Hote when they needed such provisions as sago, firewood, and water. The 
Government of Ambon constantly forbade the inhabitants to provide help 
to the Papuan raiders, but the latter paid no heed whatsoever. The people of 
Hatileng and Hote refused to consider relinquishing their co-operation with 
the Papuans of Salawati and Misool, or that with the south-east 
Halmaherans of Maba, Patani and Weda, risking punishment for their 
support of the raiders. In their meetings with Governor Van Pleuren, the 
raja, kapiten, orangkaya, and their elders argued that when these raiders came 
and asked for help, the people were not prepared to refuse because they did 
not have enough weapons and gunpowder to be able to contemplate 
offering any resistance. They could not expect the Dutch post at Sawai to 
help them as it was manned by very few soldiers and was located too far 
from their villages. They even complained that their own villagers had also 
been captured but that their families had not received a subsidy to buy them 
free. The Governor found these reasons unacceptable and warned that if 
they helped the enemy of the Company again, they would also find 
themselves stigmatized as an 'enemy' of the Company. The people, the 
Governor insisted, should defend themselves with their bows and arrows 
and fight off the Papuan raiders.55  
Governor Van Pleuren did not accept the reasons adduced by the people 
of Hote because he was aware the Papuan raiders were not equipped with 
modern weapons or ammunition. These too were armed only with arrows, 
bows, and machetes. Consequently, in a fair contest, the respective negeri 
should have been able to put up a decent defence. So far, the Dutch had 
seen no proof they had really offered any resistance to the Papuan forces. 
The Governor, however, did concede that the speed and skill of the Papuan 
rowers who attacked like lightening and retreated just as quickly were likely 
to strike terror into the hearts of the people, robbing them of their fighting 
spirit.56 Hatileng used to be friendly to the Ambon Government. Because of 
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this, the Papuan raiders had attacked its people during a recent expedition. 
Many were massacred. One hundred and thirteen people were captured and 
taken into captivity in Salawati. The orangkaya of Hatileng managed to escape 
into the forest.57 The Governor of Ambon also confirmed during the hongi 
surveillance that there was no convincing proof that Hatileng had supported 
or assisted the Papuan raiding fleet.58  
The people of the Palansui River, near Hote, complained bitterly to the 
Governor Van Pleuren that for many years they had been victims of 
violence perpetrated by Papuans originating from Onin. Consequently they 
had moved upriver where they were eking out a meagre existence. They had 
had no option but to seek refuge in the forest from their old negeri on the 
other side of the river after suffering the repeated assaults by the Papuan of 
Onin. They only dared to show themselves when free burghers from 
Ambon came to their place to exchange cloths for sago. Later they had 
moved back downstream and settled in their present village near the coast 
where they hoped to be able to live in safety. To supply the rest of their 
needs, they fished and hunted wild animals. They dried or baked the fish 
which they exchanged for tobacco and vegetables with the Alifuru of Leimu 
and others who came twice a year. Entertaining them on board, as a mark of 
his esteem, Van Pleuren gave the kapiten and the local priest a few presents: 
a bag of rice; one bottle of arak and one of wine. Satisfied with the gesture, 
they left for their village.59  
Broadly speaking, the people in North Seram could be said to have 
enjoyed a better relationship with Tidore and the Papuans. Despite their 
denials to the contrary to the Governor of Ambon, the people of Hote, 
Lisabata, Seleman, Sawai, and Nuniali sympathized with the rebels and the 
raiders. The description sketched above reveals some elements of inter-
village conflicts. In all this, the contest for power and control between the 
Dutch and the Nuku’s forces was apparent. In this area Nuku enjoyed some 
real advantages because it was situated not far from his headquarters on 
Waru and Rarakit. Proximity apparently made it easier for the rebel prince to 
maintain his sphere of influence in this area, either by threats or cajolery. 
Importantly, the majority of the Papuan raiders who were dominant in the 
area were strong adherents of Nuku. As far the Dutch were concerned, 
North Seram was a remote periphery which required long and costly 
expeditions to keep an eye on. The post at Sawai seems to have been 
ineffectual, given the involvement of the Sawai in the rebellion. On balance, 
the involvement of the North Seram people in Nuku’s rebellion was not as 
blatant as that of the people of East Seram. It seems that their main 
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Since at least the sixteenth century the East Seramese had been maintaining 
well-developed trading networks. De Brito reveals that at the end of that 
century the East Seramese enjoyed a certain level of prosperity. The 
presence of the VOC Governments in Maluku - Banda, Ambon, and 
Ternate - threatened a large section of their trading networks and this 
economic damage marked the onset of a process of impoverishment. The 
Dutch spice monopoly not only terminated most of the trade in spices by 
the East Seramese, but also ushered in a limitation on shipping movements, 
especially to the west and later in any area outside the Seram Sea. Proven 
superiority of armed and naval forces was always followed by a conquest 
and confirmed by a contract. Most of the contracts concluded between the 
Dutch Government and the Seramese were decidedly in the interest of the 
VOC. They were not the result of free negotiations between two parties. 
They simply represented what the VOC would like to happen in Seram, 
depriving the Seramese of most of their interests. Yet the contracts were 
almost impossible to enforce because of the tyranny of distance.  
The state of the relationship between the East Seramese and the Dutch 
in the seventeenth century shows that the East Seramese had no option but 
to sign contracts, because, besides having to deal with the endemic local 
rivalry among themselves, they would have been subject to even more 
aggression had they not complied with the Dutch directives. As was outlined 
earlier, the East Seramese showed no compunction about breaking the 
contracts imposed on them, but whenever possible did their utmost to avoid 
the punitive oppression meted out by the VOC forces. Throughout the two 
centuries of the rule of the VOC, Dutch never had enough power to enforce 
the contracts fully, especially after the second half of the eighteenth century 
when VOC power declined significantly. The control grew even more 
attenuated when Prince Nuku moved in to the area with his adherents and 
encouraged the East Seramese to join his rebellion. 
It is almost impossible to trace how effective the authority Tidore 
exerted in East Seram was. In many ways, East Seram was independent. 
With or without Tidore, the people continued to maintain their trading 
networks. From the scattered evidence, I think it fair to conclude that the 
relationship between East Seram and Tidore flourished significantly during 
the rebellion of Prince Nuku. Alongside the princes of Tidore, Nuku’s most 
prominent kapiten laut were recruited from among the East Seramese traders. 
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We can find only two East Seramese heads - Kapiten Baukan and Orangkaya 
Kana-Kana - who consistently supported the Dutch. As a result of their 
loyalty, these two heads lost the support of their own people. Despite the 
risks of being involved in the rebellion, Prince Nuku’s presence in East 
Seram encouraged and protected the trading networks which had been 
under threat for a considerable period of time as the East Seramese had long 
been in ‘enmity’ with the Dutch Governments in Ambon and Banda.  
Nuku’s support from the South and West Seramese did not last long 
because their areas lay within too a short distance from the centre of VOC 
power in Ambon. in this case distance was the factor which prevented Nuku 
from maintaining his influence on this area. The headquarters in which he 
spent most of his time, Waru, was located in East Seram, far enough away 
from South Seram where the VOC could wield a degree of influence. It was 
another story again with the people in North Seram. The North Seramese 
support for Nuku was inextricably linked to the involvement of the Papuan 
raiding forces. It seems that Nuku did not develop any specific strategy to 
nurture the support of the North Seramese. As long as the main force of the 
Papuan raiding parties could be controlled by Nuku, the North Seramese 









This chapter revolves around two principal themes: The ways by which 
Prince Nuku and his supporters strove to gain English assistance in their 
fight against Dutch power in Maluku and, as a corollary to this, the impact 
of English Government policy on his protracted struggle. It recounts the 
long and arduous road followed by Prince Nuku to win English sympathy 
and favour in order to gain victory in his war against the Dutch and succeed 
in his endeavour to become the Sultan of Tidore. In this latter ambition 
naturally he wanted to be superior to the Ternate Sultanate. He not only 
availed himself of the English presence and its potential use to him, he also 
shrewdly manipulated the fear of the Dutch and the longing of his 
dependencies for foreign assistance by creating rumours of an English 
arrival in the islands. He used cloves and nutmegs, spices which were 
abundantly available in Maluku and the adjacent islands, first to attract and 
then persuade the English - both the country traders and the English East 
India Company (EIC) - that an alliance with Prince Nuku would reap their 
trade enormous benefits. In exchange, he hoped to collect armaments and 
then to enjoy their assistance to win his war and to achieve recognition of 
his power from both Malukan rulers and European powers.  
 
 
English Interests in Maluku 
 
The High Government of the VOC in Batavia tended to support the Sultan 
of Tidore in upholding his control of the areas in the Raja Ampat and the 
island of New Guinea and its vicinity because of its fear of the insidiously 
increasing English threat to the Dutch spice monopoly, which had had a 
cautious beginning almost a century earlier.1 In 1697, 160 English merchants 
were enraged after having been expelled from Bantam. A year afterwards, in 
1698, a squadron of five warships under the command of Captain Warren 
                                               
1 A. Haga. Nederlandsch Nieuw-Guinea en de Papoesche Eilanden: Historische Bijdrage, 1500-1883, 
vol. I (Batavia: W. Bruining & Co, 1884), 18. 
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was made ready for an expedition to the Great East to obtain spices. Most 
of these ships did not reach their destination, but the Resolution did appear in 
Ambonese waters, between Boano and Asahudi, and immediately set course 
for Kisar. The crew members landed on the island of Pisang but were driven 
away by the inhabitants.2 In 1700, Dampier landed on the island of Sabuda 
and spent several days at the entrance to the McCluer Gulf. The English 
menace had been conceived as real as early as 1701, when the Gentlemen 
Seventeen in Holland learnt that a quantity of spices had been exported to 
Chili without them having any idea about their origin. They probably 
assumed that the spices had been collected somewhere on the New Guinea 
coast. On 31 December 1705, the Dutch took pre-emptive action by 
arresting Dampier when he dropped anchor at Bacan, and took him to 
Ternate.3 Striving to protect the spice monopoly against intervention by 
other Europeans, the Company was eager to extend its control and power 
over the eastern part of the Archipelago. Suiting actions to words, by dint of 
making contracts it pushed the local rulers to help it control these areas. 
The English interest in Maluku during the second half of the eighteenth 
century was indissolubly connected with the growing need of South-East 
Asian products as an alternative form of payment in Canton. As Nicolas 
Tarling explains, the English EIC had difficulty in finding money to finance 
its expanding exports of silk and tea from Canton, and sought to limit its 
enormous shipments of silver to China by using South-East Asian produce, 
much sought after in China, as an alternative form of payment. Therefore 
the EIC industriously looked for ways to assist English China-bound ships 
in finding a source of spices and a steady supply of jungle and marine 
products; conversely also opening markets for the sale of Indian textiles and 
opium.4 In order to achieve this objective, the English EIC developed a 
number of schemes to establish an entrepôt or a settlement in the Eastern 
Seas. One of the most favoured schemes for an eastern entrepôt in the 1760s 
                                               
2 Ibid. 150-2; In between Asahudi and Boano, a free skipper, Jan Bonk, outward-bound 
from Ternate around 10 May, met the big English ship. Arriving on their ship’s boat, six 
men came on board his vessel requesting provisions and alcoholic beverages. See Coolhas, 
VI, Generale Missiven, 116, 122. Governor Balthasar Coyett of Ambon, (1701-1706) 
reported that in the same year during the clove-harvesting season, a small vessel with 
Englishmen on board was detained. No spices were found. It is not clear whether Coyett 
was referring to the same event as no names of persons or the vessel were mentioned. See 
MvO Balthasar Coyett in G.J. Knaap (ed.), Memories van Overgave Ambon, RGP 62 (1987), 
295.  
3 W.G. Miller, The Mollucas under the British (M.A. Thesis, University of Hull, 1974), 41-2; 
William Dampier reportedly even remained in New Guinea for about four months. See 
Coolhaas, VI, Generale Missiven, 329, 382. 
4 N. Tarling, Anglo-Dutch rivalry in the Malay World 1780-1824, (Australia: Cambridge UP 
and Queensland UP, 1962), 4-5. 
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originated from Alexander Dalrymple.5 He considered a settlement in the 
Sulu Archipelago and participated in the temporary British occupation of 
Manila in 1762-1764.6  
Parallel with this, the English endeavoured to promote the Bengkulu 
factory in West Sumatra by enticing indigenous traders to bring products 
such as cloves and nutmegs from Maluku. The President of Bengkulu, Roger 
Carter, was urged to attract the spice trade as a means of augmenting local 
revenues and offsetting the costs of the settlement which was running at a 
deficit. In 1764, Carter hit on the scheme of buying cloves at $100 per pikul 
on the Company’s account. His brainchild was not a success. One of the 
major causes of the failure was the stepping up of Dutch vigilance in 
Maluku. In 1765, an Ambon hongi expedition under the command of 
Captain Hendrik van den Brink attacked many of the villages in East Seram 
from where contraband cloves were transported. At least fifteen vessels, 
including two big Makassarese vessels, were destroyed.7 The English 
reported forty vessels destroyed, five of which belonged to Edward Coles, 
the English Company’s warehouse keeper.8 
The chances of an effective English intrusion into the Dutch-
monopolized Spice Islands intensified when Captain Wilson discovered a 
new course from Batavia to China via Maluku by ‘accident’. At the end of 
1758, this skipper of the Pitt arrived in Batavia on his way to China. Finding 
it too late to proceed along the usual route, seized by the spirit of adventure 
he attempt to accomplish his voyage by sailing eastwards from Batavia, 
through the Malukan Islands and along the northern coast of New Guinea 
into the Pacific Ocean, only then veering northwards round the Philippines 
and steering a course between Luconia and Formosa to Canton. His 
business concluded, he returned the same way. This route took less time 
than was usually required in the South China Sea when ships were too late to 
                                               
5 Dalrymple was a brilliant eighteenth-century chart-maker and hydrographer at the British 
Admiralty. In 1752 he worked for the East India Company and was posted at Madras as a 
writer. While with the EIC he became interested in the possibilities of trade with the East 
Indies and China and subsequently negotiated a treaty with the Sultan of Sulu and visited 
Canton. In 1765 he returned to London where he was elected a fellow of the Royal 
Society.  
6 See D.K. Bassett, British trade and policy in Indonesia and Malaysia in the late Eighteenth century 
(Hull: Centre for South-East Asian Studies, 1971), 1. 
7 G.J. Knaap, Memories van overgave van gouverneurs van Ambon in de zeventiende en achtiende eeuw 
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1987), 401. The Dutch never realized that five of the vessels 
destroyed belonged to the English employee. 
8 Bassett, British trade and policy in Indonesia, 9-11. 
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take the usual route and had to sail against the monsoon. Once he had set an 
example, other English Company ships also used the same passage.9 
Aware of the machinations of the English, the Dutch increased their 
vigilance. In this situation, the stretch of water known as Pitt’s Passage, 
which passed between the islands of Gomona and Obi so much nearer to 
the Dutch settlements than usual, fanned Dutch suspicions and gave them 
great offence.10 As a consequence, the Dutch sent a snow and a sloop 
literally to dog Captain Wilson’s wake. When Wilson anchored, the master 
of the snow prevented the launching of any boats from Wilson’s vessel. As a 
result of this, Wilson protested to the Dutch Governor-General in Batavia. 
He insisted that the English had undoubted right to sail wherever they 
wanted.11 Three years later, on 2 October 1761, the Dutch reaction was even 
more stringent. The English Company ship Warwick, homeward-bound 
from China, was boarded in the vicinity of Maluku - between Misool and 
Popa (Kofiau) Island. The Secretary of the Dutch settlement on Tidore 
informed the supercargo and captain of the Warwick that he had orders to 
forbid all English ships to sail these seas because the entire area fell under 
the aegis of the VOC under the terms of a treaty between the Sultan of 
Tidore and the Company. The Dutch followed this admonition with a 
written protest in the Dutch language, signed by the Governor of Ternate, 
with the same purport, accompanied by another document in the Malay 
language from the Sultan of Tidore. In contrast to this, the Raja of Salawati, 
a subject of Tidore, was reported to have gone on board the English ship 
and received gifts.12  
Salawati presents an interesting case in the history of rivalry between the 
Dutch and the English. The Dutch knew that their protest would be 
ineffectual in preventing the English from pursuing their enterprises in 
Maluku. Their anxiety grew greater when they heard rumours that the 
                                               
9 IOR/H/97, From the East India House to the Right Honourable The Earl of Halifax, 
16 January 1764 
p. 9-10. 
10 IOR/H/97, From the East India House to the Right Honourable The Earl of Halifax, 
16 January 1764 
p. 11. 
11 IOR/H/97, Appendix No 1, Copy letter from Captain Wilson The Pitt to the Dutch 
Governor-General Jacob Mossel in Batavia, 24 December 1758, 19-20. See also the Dutch 
response to the protest, copy letter from the Dutch Governor-General Jacob Mossel at 
Batavia to Captain Wilson The Pitt, 25 December 1758, 21. 
12 IOR/H/97, From the East India House to the Right Hon’ble The Earl of Halifax, 16 
January 1764, See also the testimony of Mann Horner of the late Supra Cargo and Captain 
James Dewar late commander of the ship Warwick in London the 2nd July 1762, 12; and 
copy letter From the Governor at Ternate Jacob van Schoonderwoert to the English, 31 
August 1761 25; See also ANRI Ternate 84, Secret letter from Ternate to Batavia, 1 July 
1762. 
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English were settling in Salawati and they were prepared to obstruct the 
‘usurpers’ by force.13 On 19 June 1761, Governor-General Van der Parra 
held a secret meeting and decided that all the Papuan Islands (Raja Ampat) 
were to be considered under Tidore’s authority. The spices which lured the 
English to the vicinity were allegedly supplied from south-east Halmahera, 
namely Maba, Weda, and Patani. The recognition that Salawati could be a 
potential centre for spice trading elicited the suggestion during the meeting 
that a force needed to dislodge the English from Salawati be provided. To 
execute this plan, Batavia provided one warship, three barques, two 
pancalang, provisions for one year’s warfare, and an army force: one captain; 
two lieutenants; four vaandrigs (ensigns); 150 European soldiers and auxiliary 
troops of both the Sultans of Tidore and Ternate, consisting of 150 men 
(English sources mentions 200 to 300 men). The provisions were estimated 
to be enough to hold out for nine months. The expedition sailed at 
beginning of the year 1762. Instead of encountering the English in Salawati, 
as had often happened before, the expedition suffered from a lack of water 
and many men fell ill. Later it became apparent that the English had not 
made, nor had thought of making, any such settlement.14  
While the Dutch were primarily nervous about an English intrusion, a 
French adventurer also posed a dangerous threat to the spice monopoly. 
The French botanist Pierre Poivre conceived a plan to establish a spice 
plantation on Isle de France and acquired nutmeg seedlings. In December 
1753 he arrived in Port Louis, Isle de France, with five of the original thirty-
two nutmeg plants surviving. In May 1754, on board La Colombe, he left 
again for Zamboanga, in Mindanao in the Philippines. From Governor 
Oscotte, he obtained a small bag containing mature cloves and some 
nutmegs. In 1769 Poivre ordered Provost to set sail for Maluku on a ship le 
Vigilant. In January 1770, he left from Manila for Maluku. In North Seram, 
in the vicinity of Sawai, it was learned that the plants had been destroyed by 
order of the Dutch, but the inhabitants provided the precious information 
that the spice-bearing trees grew on Gebe, where he then proceeded and 
collected an enormous quantity of nutmeg seeds and seedlings, and a smaller 
quantity of clove seedlings. Unfortunately for Poivre, the plantation started 
on Isle de France in the garden Mon Plaisir was tended by inexperienced 
                                               
13 ANRI Ternate 89.3, Ternate to Batavia, 25 juli 1766; IOR/H/97, Appendix No 2, copy 
letter from the Governor at Ternate Jacob van Schoonderwoert to the English, 31 August 
1761, 25. 
14 ANRI Ternate 84, secret letters from Ternate to Batavia, end of August 1761, 8 May, 1 
July, end of April, and end of August 1762, n.ff.; See also English sources at IOR/H/97, 
letter from the East India House to the Right Hon’ble The Earl of Halifax, 16 January 
1764, p.12; Haga, Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea en de Papoesche Eilanden,. 241; Miller, The 
Moluccas under the British, 45. 
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Makassarese. One year later, only fifty nutmeg and fourteen clove trees were 
still alive.15 
In June 1771 Provost sailed east again with the corvettes le Nécessaire and 
l‘Isle de France. On 20 February 1772, he arrived at Gebe and was welcomed 
by the same inhabitants whom he had encountered the previous year. The 
heads and their people helped his men find good anchorage and victuals. 
Besides what they had found on Gebe, they also collected a great quantity of 
nutmegs on Patani, where the price was cheaper.16 On 1 April Provost 
received many plants and 400 pounds of sea turtles, for which he exchanged 
only two or three cloths (brasse de toile). On 6 April the two French vessels 
left Gebe and sailed to Isle de France where they arrived on 4 June 1772.17 
Provost’s second visit to Gebe was in fact a great success, and Sonnerat, 
who was a member of the expedition, has written a lively account of the 
operation. The second expedition had cost the Royal Treasury 1,502,741 
livres. In July, Poivre’s agent, Gillot, set out for the Seychelles with plants to 
be grown in the Jardin du Roi. Poivre also sent some plants to Ordonnateur 
Crémont on Bourbon, who planted them in the Jardin du Roi at St Denis. 
Spices were also planted in Cayenne. All this led the way to Zanzibar.18 
 
 
Captain Forrest and Political Turmoil 
 
In January 1773, Balambangan was occupied by the English. According to 
Lord Clive, the Governor of Madras, this island, situated between Maluku 
and the Philippines, and blessed with a safe and commodious harbour, was 
strategically positioned. It could afford shelter and supplies for English ships 
plying the Eastern Seas. It could also facilitate the English obtaining a 
constant stream of information about the actions of any European power 
possessing establishments in the surrounding areas.19 Despite the glowing 
promise, the establishment did not last longer than two years, as the Sulu 
chiefs, with the aid of raiding troops, forced its precipitate abandonment. 
Before the attack, the Chief of Balambangan ordered Captain Thomas 
Forrest to ascertain the truth about whether spices were grown in New 
Guinea and other islands independently of the Dutch20 and to do his utmost 
                                               
15 M. Ly-Tio-Fane (Ed.), Mauritius and the spice trade, the odyssey of Pierre Poivre (Esclapon Ltd: 
Mauritius, 1958), 6, 7, 11, 12. 
16 Ibid. 98. 
17 Ibid. 99-100. 
18 Ibid. 13. 
19 Tarling, Anglo-Dutch rivalry, 62. 
20 Ida Lee, Commodore Sir John Hayes, his voyages and Life (1767-1831), (London: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1912), 141. 
THE ENGLISH AND NUKU 
 
201
to promote the Balambangan establishment.21 From November 1774 to the 
end of March 1775, Thomas Forrest sailed on board the Tartar, 
accompanied by the two kora-kora Banguey and Borneo. Under the guidance of 
Haji Ismael and accompanied by Bacan and Tidoran officers, he set off on a 
voyage around Tomagui, in Waigeo Raja Ampat and along Dorei the north-
westernmost part of the New Guinea coast. He managed to make friendly 
contacts with the inhabitants the Raja Ampat and the north-westernmost 
coast of New Guinea, whom he found were very helpful. At Manaswari, 
close to Dorei, he collected an abundance of warong ‘long nutmegs.’22  
During his voyage, Forrest met a number of important rulers in Maluku. 
On 4 December 1774, Sultan Bacan visited him on Mandioli Island, off the 
western coast of Bacan. The Sultan presented him with twelve baskets of 
excellent sago and fine rice, and then promised him an interpreter.23 In turn, 
Sangaji Salawati, Patani, and Gebe paid him a visit, and in return, he gave 
them some presents.24 He also met Raja Misool and the wife of Raja 
Salawati who told a story about her husband who had been exiled by the 
Dutch.25 Most of these leaders desired English intervention against the 
Dutch. In return, they promised to provide Forrest with spices aplenty. 
Forrest was sure that it would be easy to break the Dutch monopoly.26 On 
Waigeo he also saw that a Dutch-affiliated Chinese sloop visited Haji 
Ismael.27 This made him realize that the Dutch probably knew of his voyage. 
When he called at Misool, an ensign of a large kora-kora belonging to the 
Sultan of Tidore informed him that the Dutch had sent a sloop with 
Europeans to Jailolo, in search of him and his men. Forrest immediately left 
Misool for Balambangan on 30 March.28  
The political significance of Forrest’s visit was that he handed over a 
letter to the Sultan Jamaludin of Tidore. In his book he mentions that he 
sent a handsome present to the Sultan but does not say a word about a 
letter.29 In fact, Forrest alleges his purpose was ‘only to desire he would 
                                               
21 When he called at Sooloo (Sulu), he persuaded the noquedah (anakoda) of a Malukan 
vessel to carry their nutmegs to the English post at Balambangan. T. Forrest. A Voyage to 
the New Guinea and the Maluku, 1774-1776. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press 
(originally published in London 1780), 18. 
22 Ibid. 108. 
23 Ibid. 55, 62. 
24 Ibid. 60, 64. 
25 Ibid. 145, 148. Forrest does not specify the date, nevertheless, as Leupe shows that Raja, 
Kapiten Laut Salawati, and Kapiten Laut Misool were detained in 1762, during the big 
expedition to the Raja Ampat. See P.A. Leupe, “De Reizen der Nederlanders naar Nieuw-
Guinea en de Papoesche Eilanden in de 17de en 18de eeuw.” BKI 21 (1875), 300-4. 
26 Wright, “The Moluccan Spice Monopoly”, 13. 
27 Forrest. A Voyage to the New Guinea, 76. 
28 Ibid. 145. 
29 Ibid. 147. 
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encourage his subjects of Batanta and Salawati, near which our ships often 
pass in their way to China to go freely on board with the refreshments, for 
which they would be well paid.’30 As was quoted by Dalrymple in his 1801 
memoir about Prince Nuku, the Prince mentioned that Forrest’s letter was 
received in 1777. The long span of time between the date of the letter and 
its receipt, Dalrymple concludes, if there was no mistake in the time of the 
receipt, was because the Tidoran official did not return to Tidore 
immediately. The purport of this letter, Prince Nuku claimed, was to declare 
’the wishes of the English to enter into bonds of friendship with the 
Government of Malooka; and that the proposal was conveyed in terms of 
the most cordial, and in a style the most conciliatory.’31 It seems that, in his 
book which was published at that time, Forrest, deliberately avoided 
mentioning the letter so as not to provide the Dutch with evidence which 
would allow them to lodge a formal protest about the intrusion of the 
English into the Malukan polity. It intimates that Forrest, who was even 
then intending to publish his account on his voyage to New Guinea, 
anticipated the reaction of the Dutch and thought that it would be best for 
Sultan Jamaludin if he were to be discreet. 
The contents of the letter indicate that Sultan Jamaludin and his grandees 
were weary of the tyranny of the Dutch and wished to form an alliance with 
the English, of whom they had heard nothing but good.32 He thought of the 
letter as a chance to initiate an alliance with the English and to challenge the 
Dutch domination over his Sultanate. Prince Nuku’s interpretation was that 
’the English were very desirous of becoming allied with the sultan. He 
instantly returned an answer testifying his great joy on this occasion and 
making them an offer of his whole country.’33 Regardless the contents of his 
letter, it is apparent that Captain Forrest received a reply in 1778. Haji Jusuf 
was ordered to meet him and deliver the letter. When Sultan Jamaludin’s 
envoy reached Fau (Fow),34 Captain Forrest had gone. Unfortunately, Haji 
Jusuf still in possession of the letter fell into the hands of the Dutch. The 
                                               
30 Dalrymple quoted this from Capt Forrest Mem’ of Apology, see Dalrymple, “Memoir 
Concerning Keecheel Nookoo Sultan of Teedore,” IOR/L/PS/19/14 date 11 February 
1801, p.3. 
31 Letter from Mahomed Shah Ameer Eddeen Keecheel Nookoo dated 14th Jemedel Awal 
1199 of the Hegira (Hijriah), answering to the 26th March 1785 (This date is certainly 
erroneous because the subject of the Bencoolen Consultation 21 Dec 1784 is introduced. 
See Dalrymple, “Memoir Concerning Keecheel Nookoo Sultan of Teedore,” 
IOR/L/PS/19/14 date 11 February 1801, 2.  
32 Ibid. 5.  
33 IOR/F/4/9/715, Extract of Sultan Nuku’s letter to the Governor General at Bengal 
1795, December 1785 – February 1796. 
34 Fau is a little island with a fine harbour close to Gebe. 
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Dutch Governor of Ternate inveigled Sultan Jamaludin to Ternate, where he 
was seized and carried off to Batavia.35  
Sharing his custody were the Crown Prince, Kaicil Garomahongi, and 
Sultan Bacan. In Batavia they were brought to ‘justice.’ Besides the seditious 
letter captured by the Dutch, the Sultans and the Prince were formally 
charged with a number of misdeeds. The first of these was that they had not 
fulfilled their obligation to extirpate the spice-bearing trees. Sultan Tidore 
stood accused of not preventing or punishing his subordinates - Maba, 
Weda, Patani, and Gebe - for their raiding activities. Thirdly, it was alleged 
that the Sultan and the grandees of Tidore, had conspired with the Sultan of 
Bacan and nurtured evil inclinations to collaborate with the Sultan of 
Mindanao to attack Ternate and expel the Company from the Maluku.36 The 
Company was also aware that Sultan Jamaludin and Sultan Bacan had made 
contacts, exchanged gifts, and sent their men to help Thomas Forrest in his 
expedition to the Raja Ampat and Dorei - the north-west coast of New 
Guinea.37 Unsurprisingly, their detention stirred up unrest in Tidore, which 
increased considerably in 1779. 
In order to lessen the tension and quieten the unrest in Tidore, in fact a 
forlorn hope, the Dutch diverted the Tidoran grandees and people for a 
long time by holding out the promise that Sultan Jamaludin and the Prince 
would be sent back to Tidore. After five years of frustrated waiting, Prince 
Nuku received a letter from the exiled Sultan Jamaludin.38 In his letter to Sir 
John Shore, received in 1796, Prince Nuku wrote ‘My father found means to 
convey a letter to me in his own hand writing to let me know that he was 
imprisoned for life and that my brother was banished to Ceylon.’39 In his 
                                               
35 IOR/F/4/9/715, Extract of Sultan Nuku’s letter to the Governor General at Bengal 
1795, December 1785 – February 1796. See also Dalrymple, p.3. The detainment of Sultan 
Jamaludin is discussed in Chapter III. 
36 Heeres and Stapel, Corpus, vol 6, 435-436. See also E. Katoppo, Nuku: Perjuangan 
Kemerdekaan di Maluku Utara (Jakarta, Sinar Harapan, 1984), p 42-3. 
37 NA VOC 3602, Secret letter from Ambon to Batavia, (?) 1781, 8-9. In December 1774, 
the Crown Prince of Bacan reported to the Governor Valkenaer of Ternate about the 
meeting between Sultan Bacan and Forrest (La Tartare) accompanied by Hadji Oemar 
(Haji Ismail?) who had been famous for his revolutionary zeal. Sultan Bacan gave presents 
and provided men and interpreter. Sultan Jamaludin sent only his envoy to meet Forrest in 
Waigeo. See also Forrest. A Voyage to the New Guinea, 48, 113, and 132. 
38 IOR/F/4/9/715, Extract of Sultan Nuku’s letter to the Governor General at Bengal 
1795, December 1785 – February 1796. 
39 It has been said he was banished to the Cape of Good Hope, where he was found by 
Commodore John Stone in 1781 and sent to India; but this appears to be a mistake, for, 
from the Governor-General of Bengal’s letter, dated 20 December 1785, the person found 
at the Cape seems to have been a relation, and Capt Forrest mentions in his Mem’ of 
Apology seeing a person at Madras, whom he calls Jamaloodine’s nephew. Whether his 
son was actually banished to Ceylon or died in Batavia may be questioned. The translator 
CHAPTER TEN 204
father’s letter, Prince Nuku was apprised that the Dutch tried to take 
advantage of the difficult position of Sultan Jamaludin to diminish the 
Sultan’s authority in Tidore. If Jamaludin had wished to remain as Sultan, he 
would have had to accept the degradation of the status of Tidore Sultanate 
from ally to vassal. Both Jamaludin and his son scornfully rejected this offer 
and preferred to submit to the sentence passed on them, banishment and 
imprisonment for life.40 
The most important message from Jamaludin to his son Prince Nuku 
was his advice never to become an ally of the Dutch, and to do all in his 
power to obtain an alliance with the English. This paternal message from the 
very respectable Sultan deeply affected Prince Nuku. It could be interpreted 
as the last words of someone who was about to die, because the old Sultan 
was banished for life. English power was obviously conceived to be one of 






The date of the first encounter between Prince Nuku and the English 
country traders or any other English sailors is dubious. At the time, 
information on intrusion into Maluku territory by foreign ships was often 
based on rumours or reports from inhabitants which were not always true. 
The Dutch administration usually relied on spies sent to places about which 
it wanted to obtain some information. The Salawati case in 1761 is 
exemplary proof that these spies were often unreliable. It seemed that the 
inhabitants also had an interest in making up fake reports in order to win a 
glimmer of recognition from the Dutch officials and hopefully also have 
some presents bestowed on them. The cause may also have been that there 
was a political conflict or rivalry within a certain area, and consequently 
scores to be settled. Unquestionably, the rumours of an English presence 
not only spread fear and anxiety among Dutch, they also boosted the morale 
                                                                                                                             
of Stavorinus (p. 277 vol 1) quotes Ary Huysers as being ’witness to the deposition of two 
powerful Kings of the Malooka and the hereditary prince of Tidore, one of these died 
miserably near the place of my residence; I saw the venerable old man before his death, he 
was 72 years of age. When I expressed my commiseration at the deep humiliation he had 
undergone, he answered in the Malay Language with a sigh pointing to Heaven, ”It is the 
will of God.”’ See Dalrymple, “Memoir Concerning Keecheel Nookoo Sultan of 
Teedore,” IOR/L/PS/19/14 date 11 February 1801, 4. 
40 Ibid. 5. 
41 IOR/F/4/9/715, Extract of Sultan Nuku’s letter to the Governor-General at Bengal 
1795, December 1785 – February 1796. See also Dalrymple, “Memoir Concerning 
Keecheel Nookoo Sultan of Teedore,” IOR/L/PS/19/14 date 11 February 1801, 5. 
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of people who were involved in Prince Nuku’s rebellion. These supporters 
were given to believe that they had to keep on fighting because the English 
were poised to come and join them. Bearing this in mind, the leaders who 
took advantage of the many rumours were Prince Nuku and his followers. 
One day in 1780, an inhabitant of Manipa, Karahita, whom the raiders 
had captured at Amblau and transported to Salawati, said that he had seen a 
foreign ship. He saw a three-masted vessel, as big as one of those of the 
Company, with two rows of cannon and a red flag with a white-blue cross 
flying from the stern.42 Raja of Misool and Salawati were seen on board 
talking to the captain of the ship who did not know Malay. The captain's 
skin was brown and he wore a red camisole. The other crew members wore 
short skirts, wide hats, and went barefoot. Some of them were white skinned 
(Caucasian). The captain of the vessel collected sago, for which cloths were 
exchanged.43 The Governor of Ambon sent his own spies to check 
Karahita’s report of the presence of foreign ships. On the basis of his spies' 
report, he concluded that Karahita's testimony was false.44  
In 1781, it was reported that Prince Nuku had courted English traders 
and received gifts consisting of twelve pieces of artillery, twenty klambu 
‘mosquito nets’, and a quantity of white wax candles. The emissary promised 
him the support of three English vessels.45 A Chinese trader Tan Senko also 
heard that an English envoy had remained with Nuku for six to seven days 
together and then departed for Sulu on a kora-kora, accompanied by a jogugu, 
a hukum, one of the Prince’s clerks, and a kasisi. They planned to arrive at 
Unjong, the promontory of Patani sometime later.46 The witnesses did not 
mention the name of the Englishman. However vague, it does indicate that 
there was perhaps some communication between Prince Nuku and the 
English. The English country traders, rather than officials of the English 
EIC, were involved in attempting to convince the Company headquarters in 
Calcutta of the commercial value of supporting Nuku. In their dealings with 
Nuku they pretended to be representatives of the Calcutta Government.47  
In January 1783, a boat’s crew of the English ship the Queen which was 
passing through Pitt’s Strait bound or China was captured off the island of 
Salawati. The Papuans of Salawati were thought to have been the culprits. 
With the exception of two lascar captives who were sent to East Seram 
where Prince Nuku resided, the captors let the sailors go. Three months 
later, in April 1783, another English ship the Northumberland, China-bound 
                                               
42 NA VOC 3586, letter From Ambon to Batavia, 29 February 1780, 72-3. 
43 NA VOC 3586, Ambon Council Meeting, 26 May 1780, 41-7. 
44 NA VOC 3586, Ambon to Batavia, 20 September 1780, 125. 
45 NA VOC 3602, Interview with captives, 20 October 1781, 113, 106, 108. 
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via Pitt’s Passage and falling to the leeward of Seram, arrived off the south-
west coast of New Guinea. The captain of the ship, Rees, sent a cutter and a 
long boat manned by the chief mate, the third and fourth mates, as well as a 
carpenter ashore with empty water casks. He then observed the firing of 
muskets from both the long boat and cutter, fending off the Papuans who 
were attacking them. The next day, soon after the long boat had returned to 
the ship, he sent the jolly boat to help the other men. Five lascars had been 
captured in the attack. Then the jolly boat was cut off and three 
crewmembers were killed. John Davies, Thomas Crotty and others who had 
been wounded were taken prisoner.48 
In the meantime, a group of Papuans arrived from Onin, on the 
southern side of the inlet in a prahu to purchase sago on the northern side, 
where they found the boat’s crew being kept captive. On returning home to 
Onin, the Raja of that place sent a messenger to inform Prince Nuku in East 
Seram about what had happened. When Prince Nuku heard that Englishmen 
were being held captive at the Berau (McCluer) Gulf), he sent twenty-four 
vessels, under the command of a distinguished officer Mohamad Saleh to 
recover them.49 In his efforts to liberate the English crew, Mohammad Saleh 
adopted conciliatory measures. He first assisted the Papuan captors in an 
attack on another district in the Berau Gulf, but ultimately succeeded in 
bearing off the English and their companions, sending them first to Onin, 
and from there onwards to East Seram.50 
One of these captives, the already mentioned Thomas Crotty, carpenter’s 
mate on the Northumberland, testified to what had happened to him in his 
contacts with Prince Nuku in East Seram. Prince Nuku fitted out a prahu to 
send him and his surviving fellow captives, accompanied by Mohamad Saleh 
as his ambassador, to Bengkulu. Before Crotty’s departure from East Seram, 
one of the other captives, a lad named John Corderoy, went on a voyage to 
the Raja Ampat with Mohamad Saleh who put him back on board the Queen, 
when he fell in with the ship homeward-bound from China in Pitt’s Strait, 
on 31 July 1783. Prince Nuku’s letter to Bengkulu was ‘an address 
expressing his solicitation to be admitted to the friendship of the King of 
England.’ What happened to the letter or to Corderoy upon their arrival 
back in England is shrouded in mystery.51 
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This account of Prince Nuku’s friendly behaviour towards the English in 
1783 is I believe more reliable than the previous two reports.52 The rescue of 
the crew of the Northumberland is cited repeatedly in a number of English 
sources. The Governor-General of the EIC in Bengal also took note of the 
story and showed his appreciation and feelings of gratitude towards Prince 
Nuku, the ‘sultan.’ The rescue operation must have transformed Nuku into a 
reliable partner in the eyes of the English. 
 
 
Envoy to Bengkulu and Bengal 
 
Thomas Crotty and his fellows remained in Seram for a few months and 
were looked after well before Prince Nuku fitted out a prahu to carry them 
to Bengkulu. Unfortunately, two crew members William Holmes and John 
Davies died of their wounds while still in East Seram. Two more members 
of the crew had died in Onin, before their group reached East Seram. As 
just stated, Prince Nuku decided to send Crotty and the other survivors to 
Bengkulu in the company of Mohamad Saleh and Jurutulis Marjal, whom he 
dispatched as his envoys with a retinue of a number of his supporters. 
Claiming to be Sultan of Tidore, he wrote a letter offering an alliance with 
the English Government in Bengkulu. After a tedious, disastrous voyage 
plagued by bad weather and a want of provisions and water, as a 
consequence of which many of the Nuku’s people died, the vessel reached 
Cawoor (?) on the west coast of Sumatra but was no longer seaworthy 
enough to proceed any further. Finally most of the people managed to reach 
Bengkulu overland.53 
Determined to follow up the opportunity of forging an alliance with the 
Malukan rulers, on 21 December 1784 the Government of Bengkulu 
decided to send the envoy Mohamad Saleh and seven selected Malukans to 
Bengal. This was accordingly done in April and Mohamad Saleh arrived in 
Bengal by the end of May 1785.54 He and his men returned to Bengkulu 
                                               
52 The reason for my supposition is that in 1783 Orangkaya of Ondor told this story. He 
had witnessed that Orangkaya Kwaus, Kana-Kana speaking Malay to the captain of an 
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Gorom he received information that the English vessel had anchored at Negeri 
Roemakaij. NA VOC 3737, Interview with Orangkaya Ondor, 10 June 1783, 64-5.  
53 “Memoir Concerning Keecheel Nookoo Sultan of Teedore,” IOR/L/PS/19/14 date 11 
February 1801, 11; Jurutulis Marjal is not mentioned in the English sources. His name is 
available in the Dutch sources. See ANRI Ternate 85, Separate letter from Ternate to 
Batavia, 6 September 1787.  
54 Ibid. 11. 
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almost a year later on 16 April 1786 accompanied by Captain Forrest.55 The 
Governor-General and Council in Bengal had ordered Forrest to accompany 
these emissaries to their native country, but instead of following orders, he 
sailed to Padang on a private trading voyage and left Mohamad Saleh and his 
people stranded in Bengkulu protesting vehemently.56 On some frivolous 
pretext, Forrest ultimately returned to Bengal to the dismay and 
dissatisfaction of the Tidore people. His thoughtless, discourteous behaviour 
completely expunged any memory of the attention the Supreme Council had 
paid to them.57 Mohamad Saleh never returned to East Seram or Tidore. He 
remained in Bengkulu working on a nutmeg plantation for 20 dollars per 
month, and remarried there. The letter from Governor-General of Bengal 
never reached Prince Nuku.58 
At the time Mohamad Saleh and his company were on the point of 
sailing to Bengal, the Government of Bengkulu decided to send the other 
crew members who remained at Bengkulu home and their vessel was 
repaired for the voyage. The Governor also wrote a letter to Prince Nuku to 
thank for the humanity he had shown towards the English crew, who had 
been saved from the hands of the Papuans, and to inform him of his 
intention to send his envoy onwards to Bengal, where the Governor-
General had the power and means to decide about initiating a close and 
permanent alliance with Prince Nuku. This letter was sent with a present of 
broadcloth, green and yellowish-scarlet, five barrels of gunpowder, and 
twenty muskets.59 
On the way back to Seram, the vessel called at Badung (Badom) in Bali. 
The captain of the vessel failed to make clear the purpose of his voyage 
when he was interrogated by the local authorities there, and was placed in 
some kind of confinement. Shortly afterwards, the vessel ran on to a reef of 
rocks and was wrecked. The English presents fell into the possession of the 
ruler of Badung. According to Forrest, as a Hindu this Raja ill-treated the 
Malukans because they were Muslims. Ten of them subsequently died. The 
ten remaining crewmembers were sent back in to Bengkulu on a chartered 
                                               
55 It was later reported by the Dutch post on the western coast of Sumatra that the English 
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vessel, with a letter of apology. What ultimately became of these men can no 
longer be traced.60 
As a consequence of this series of disasters, the efforts made by Prince 
Nuku to build an alliance with the English failed miserably. And to make 
matters worse, all this coincided with the signing the Peace Treaty of Paris in 
1784. The initial response of the Governor-General in Bengal had been 
friendly, but he was in no hurry to accept the proposal of the prince to 
become an ally unreservedly. It was explained that, because they were at 
peace again with the Dutch, the English could not promise him any 
assistance in his struggle. On the contrary, Prince Nuku was even advised to 
make peace with the Dutch on terms which were safe and honourable to 
him. The Bengal Government offered to write to the Dutch Governor-
General in Batavia addressing Prince Nuku’s cause, but this letter did not 
reach him until twelve year later, in 1796.61  
 
 
John McCluer and John Hayes 
 
John McCluer sailed from Bombay on 24 August 1790 in command of two 
EIC vessels, the Panther and the Endeavour, Captain John Prochter.62 
McCluer had been ordered to inform the King of the Palau Islands of the 
death of his son, Prince Lee Boo. On the initiative of his father, this prince 
had been sent to England where he succumbed to smallpox on 27 
December 1784.63 McCluer was also instructed to survey the coast of New 
Guinea, and to ascertain whether ‘there was a navigable passage to the 
north-east of Aru Islands which might be suitable in the contrary winds.’ On 
22 January 1791, the two ships arrived at the Palau Islands and after a brief 
sojourn of three weeks, he proceeded to Macao. On 10 June they were back 
again at the Palau Islands.64  
On 27 June 1791, McCluer commenced a survey of the northern part of 
the coast of New Guinea. Calling at Ambon for two weeks to obtain 
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provisions,65 he afterwards complained to the Dutch that he had not been 
treated properly as an English subject but as a spy.66 No clear report has 
survived of the survey trip which continued until December. A Makassarese, 
Lieutenant Ibrahim, spotted the English ships near Salawati in August and 
Anakoda Ayuba also happened to see them near Ass (?). McCluer was said 
to have engaged in trade with the Raja of Misool and a Hatibi of Gebe. For 
this transgression, both leaders were punished and exiled to Batavia. The 
involvement of the Hatibi of Gebe was brought to light when John Wilcott 
and Barnaby Boyle — two deserters from McCluer’s crew — who had been 
handed over to the Governor by the old Raja of Salawati, were interrogated 
on Ternate.67 Sailing on to the Berau Gulf, McCluer obtained provisions and 
refreshments. On 29 October, when he returned there, the Papuan 
inhabitants murdered his doctor. From the Berau Gulf, the English headed 
for Kupang, where they arrived on 29 January 1792.68 Whether McCluer 
made any direct contact with Prince Nuku during his survey trip is not 
known.  
In February 1793, Captain John Hayes of the Royal Navy led an 
expedition to obtain spices in the eastern regions of Maluku. He arrived in 
Dorei Bay - present day Manokwari - on 18 September. Here he built a small 
reinforced post named Coronation Fort on 25 October 1793.69 The natives 
of Restoration Bay - some 1,500 of them - welcomed Hayes and his 
comrades in a very friendly manner, and gave the sailors invaluable 
assistance in replenishing their supplies. Hayes found at least 300 trees 
bearing the elongated nutmeg called warong (Myristica fatua) and also true 
Banda nutmeg called keyan (Myristica moschata).70 The Papuans brought him 
nutmegs, clove bark (Caryophyllus aromaticus), massoi bark (Laurus sassafras), 
birds of paradise and other items.71  
Hayes took a cargo of spices back to India in the Duke of Clarence, while 
Captain Court and two other officers, twelve European seamen, eleven 
Sepoys and Lascars remained behind to man Fort Coronation and the ship 
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Duchess, which remained at anchor.72 After Hayes had sailed on 22 
December 1793, the men at Fort Coronation encountered severe problems. 
The stores dwindled and, as the rainy season set in, the climate turned far 
less salubrious. Court’s men fell ill and the whole situation was exacerbated 
when the natives suddenly attacked the garrison, taking several prisoners 
who were sent to Seram where they were sold as slaves. Most of the captives 
were Papuans in Court’s employment, but included two Sepoys who 
afterwards gave an account of their stay in Dorei to the Dutch authorities. 
On the basis of the report of Jan de Orous (Bengali, Sepoy or soldier) who 
had fled from the Fort Coronation, the Dutch wrote a letter of protest to 
the English in the name of Sultan Tidore.73 The Governor-General in 
Calcutta did not deign to justify the whole enterprise in Dorei.74 
In Kirksey’s master’s thesis, he states that Captain Hayes established a 
settlement in Dorei after he had obtained permission from Prince Nuku.75 
He quotes this statement from F. C. Kamma’s book. In fact, in the reports 
of Captain Hayes’ activities in Dorei, there is not a single sentence indicating 
that there was any communication between Hayes and Nuku before the 
establishment of Coronation Fort. A meeting may have taken place later 
when Hayes sailed around Seram on his way to Buru, although there are no 
reports of this. Kamma, who was quoted by Kirksey, gives a general 
reference to Haga without indicating a specific page. Also in Lee’s book on 
Captain Hayes’ expedition, no reference can be found to any kind of 
permission being given by Nuku.76 It also should be noted that the Papuans 
were not invariably hostile when they encountered foreign ships. If their 
welcome were friendly it was an indication that they expected to enter into a 
relationship of exchange and obtain goods from abroad from foreign ships 
peaceably; nor should ideas about the power of Prince Nuku be exaggerated. 
The adherents of Nuku were raiders from many parts of the north coast of 
New Guinea; the Papuans who remained in their villages were not always 
subordinate to or indeed have any direct interaction with the power of 
Prince Nuku.  
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English Country Traders 
 
English ships showed up twice in Torres Strait between 1793 and 1794, but 
the captains and the names of the ships are not known.77 Yet another 
English ship was spotted trading in Waigeo. This may have been Hayes who 
called there before he reached Buru. It was reported that he bartered cloth 
for spices. He called at Bacan as well. The inhabitants were evidently pleased 
with his visit, for they solicited the ships’ officers on several occasions to 
remain and to take over the island.78 Snippets of news about Prince Nuku 
and his followers and their possible intercourse with the English gave the 
Dutch great cause for concern. They were still very much in the dark about 
by how much Nuku’s force had increased. On Tidore, Dutch-appointed 
Sultan Kamaludin realized that many of his subjects had defected and 
chosen to side with Nuku. However, according to Haga, there no large-scale 
attack occurred in 1794.79  
Hayes sold the greater portion of his cargo of spices in Canton for a high 
price.80 He met McCluer there and requested him to take some provisions to 
those left behind at Dorei Bay. McCluer, who was intending to return to the 
Palau Islands again, immediately assented.81 He left Macao for Manila on 24 
July 1794, and sailed on to the Palau Islands, where he took on board his 
family and some natives who wished to make a voyage. He then set course 
for Restoration Bay, where he found Hayes’ colonists in a miserable plight. 
Several had died, and fourteen were so debilitated by illness that they were 
totally dependent on the kindness of the Papuans.82 Sometime between 
August and September, McCluer’s ship, the brig Venus, arrived at Dorei Bay, 
bringing the sorely needed provisions.83 On 25 October 1794, McCluer 
hoisted the British flag on Gebe and took possession of the island in the 
name of King George III. He had been forced to call at Gebe because the 
Venus had sprung a leak.84 On 20 March 1795 McCluer left Restoration Bay 
in the Venus after he had done all in his power to render the Duchess 
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seaworthy again.85 A fortnight later on 5 April 1795, McCluer also called at 
Portuguese Bay located inside the promontory of Nusa Laut.86 Two days 
later, he wrote to the Dutch Governor, Cornabé, requesting a number of 
items to provision and repaired his vessel.87  
After somewhat of a slow start, mutual active political intercourse 
between Nuku’s forces and the English Country traders intensified in 1795, 
although exchanges in commodities had already been occurring since the 
arrival of McCluer and John Hayes. Shortly after Captain Risdon and the 
Duke of Clarence (which had been taken over from Captain Hayes) put in at 
Dorei Bay from India, Prince Nuku was reported to have visited Fort 
Coronation. He invited Captain Court and his men to journey to his 
headquarters at Waru, where he provided them spices in abundance. 
Information gleaned from the examination of one of Court’s men, Robert 
Lander, by the British Resident at Ambon on 24 April 1798 reveals that 
Nuku’s invitation was accepted. Court resided in Waru for six weeks. From 
there they went to Gebe accompanied by Prince Nuku on the ship Duke of 
Clarence and the snow Duchess. The ships offered passage to forty kimelaha of 
Maba, Weda, and Patani, as well as a number of Muslim clerics.88 They 
remained in Gebe about a month. From there, the Duke of Clarence left for 
Bengal carrying letters and envoys from the Sultan to the Bengal 
Government. The Duchess remained behind under the command of Lander.  
When the country traders’ Duke of Clarence left Seram for Bengal in 1795, 
she carried Prince Nuku’s most important minister, the jogugu, as his 
ambassador to hand over a letter to the Governor-General in Bengal. In his 
letter, Prince Nuku recounted a long story of his struggle against the Dutch 
and implored the protection of the British Government. The Governor-
General understood from the envoy that he had no credentials authorizing 
him to conclude any undertakings with the English Government but that his 
master, if encouraged, would depute another agent with plenipotentiary 
powers to negotiate and settle the terms of a future alliance between Prince 
Nuku and the EIC with the Bengal Government. He was also offering to 
supply the English with nutmegs, mace, and cloves produced within his 
dominions in preference to the Dutch.89 
In considering its response to Prince Nuku, the Council at Bengal toyed 
with the idea that the opportunity to participate in the affairs in the Maluku 
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might be advantageous. The main stumbling block was that the Governor-
General did not consider himself authorized to hold out any expectation of 
an alliance between Prince Nuku and the Company, which might induce the 
Prince to expect its protection against the Dutch or any other enemies. He 
therefore suggested affirming the good will and friendship of the Prince by 
supplying him with many of the articles which the latter so greatly desired. 
After having consulted the Commander-in-Chief on the matter, he proposed 
that the Military Board be instructed to deliver four brass carronades, sixteen 
iron three-pounder cannons , 1,000 rounds of ammunition, 200 muskets, 
20,000 musket balls, 200 barrels of gunpowder, four drums, and a company 
flag.90 Despite the military nature of the aid, the Governor-General made no 
promise of assistance, military or otherwise.91  
The envoys were honoured with a farewell audience and received from 
the Governor-General a letter containing a friendly answer, plus the 
weaponry requested, the Company’s flag and a golden seal, engraved with 
the name and titles of Nuku as ‘sultan’ for Nuku himself. The presents were 
shipped on board three merchantmen: the Duke of Clarence, Captain William 
Bellamy Risdon; the Sultan, Captain Thomas Watkin Court; and the Phoenix, 
Captain Samuel Stewart. During January and February 1796, these ships, 
with Nuku’s envoys as passengers, sailed from Calcutta on trading voyages 
to Maluku by permission of the Government of Bengal, to purchase spices 
from the ‘subjects of the Sultan of Tidore and Ternate’.92 The ships 
proceeded to Maba, on the south-east coast of Halmahera. Meanwhile 
Lander had explored different parts of the island, on which he found round 
nutmegs and other spices growing. Risdon made several voyages to the 
Spice Islands, and Indian newspapers recorded the dates of his sailings and 
returns. He left Calcutta for the third time in the Duke of Clarence on 7 
December 1796.93 Lander remained on Gebe for eight months co-ordinating 
the collection of spices for the ships sailing to Bengal.94 
The evidence confirms that the presence of the English country traders 
around 1795 was significant. It augmented Nuku’s already boosted optimism 
and that of his followers. The rebel group now exerted a greater attraction 
for new supporters. Nuku felt assured that with the ever-swelling ranks of 
his warriors, the support of the English country traders, and the ammunition 
from Bengal, he could manage to conquer at least Bacan and Tidore. On 9 
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September, a Tidoran soldier who had arrived from Patani confirmed that, 
besides having spoken to the Prince Rebel himself, he had witnessed that the 
people of Maba and Weda had presented forty bags of nutmegs to Prince 
Nuku and the English country traders. Prince Nuku swore an oath before 
the people of Maba and Weda that, with the support of the English, his fleet 
would overwhelm Tidore. The Governor of Ternate who had also sent a 
Tidoran envoy, Kapiten Gula Manis, to Gamkonora and Maidi confirmed 






In 1793 the war between French and the English broke out again. Now the 
Dutch Republic was allied with the English. When the French Revolutionary 
Army occupied the Netherlands in 1795 and the Batavian Republic was 
proclaimed, the Stadtholder, William V, fled to England. He instructed the 
Government in Batavia to surrender and place itself under English 
protection. Once again the political situation in Europe influenced the policy 
in the East Indies.96 On 17 February 1796, the English Navy under the 
command of Admiral Rainier took Ambon from the Dutch with no 
opposition. Governor Cornabé ‘had given up every idea of resistance.’ After 
the ratification of the treaty of surrender, the troops marched through the 
gates of Fort Victoria above which an inscription in Dutch could be seen, 
‘Obtained by blood, and so to be defended.’ Under the English occupation, 
it was agreed that the private property of each individual and the 
continuance of their pay would be secured. As the English report puts it, 
’The Dutch called themselves our friends and we treated them entirely as 
such.’ The admiral himself came ashore the next day. Governor Cornabé 
welcomed him and escorted him to the fort. Most of the Dutch-appointed 
local leaders dressed in full suits of black and wearing swords and the 
Chinese officers were present and shook hands with him. There was some 
plundering in the town, chiefly by the Dutch soldiers who were expelled 
from the fort to make room for English troops. A fortnight later, on 9 
March 1796, Admiral Rainier occupied Banda. The Dutch flag was hauled 
down on Fort Nassau and Castle Belgica.97 
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The news of the English occupation sped to Prince Nuku immediately. 
Two months later, on 15 May 1796, a large kora-kora dressed with various 
flags and pennants, with drums beating and escorted by about seventy other 
vessels under the command of Prince Ibrahim Al-Mukaram appeared at Hila 
within sight of Admiral Rainier’s fleet. One day later, at the invitation of 
Captain Lennon, Prince Ibrahim and the chief persons came on board. 
Introducing himself as the nephew of ‘Sultan’ Saifudin Syah (Prince Nuku) 
on an embassy to the English Command-in-Chief at Ambon, he was treated 
with respect. He informed Lennon that he had come from Waru where 
Prince Nuku had been about five weeks before. He boasted that his uncle 
was the ‘true sovereign’ of Tidore, Ternate and all of the Spice Islands. The 
news of the English occupation of Ambon and Banda had been obtained 
from three English Country traders who had been bartering on friendly 
terms with the forces of Prince Nuku at Maba and Gebe.98  
The Admiral and the envoy breakfasted together for about two hours.99 
‘Sultaun Ibrahim earnestly wished to establish a friendship and intimacy with 
the English, whom he seemed to have the utmost confidence in, and to 
regard in the sincerest manner.’ The chief purpose of the embassy was to 
convey a request from Nuku for assistance in conquering Tidore and 
Ternate and to seek recognition of Nuku as Sultan. In his private 
conversation with Captain Lennon, he explained that Prince Nuku had sent 
him to congratulate the Admiral on the conquest of Amboina and Banda. 
And he was availing himself of the opportunity to request the aid of the 
English to attack Tidore, which would restore him, the rightful heir to the 
Sultanate, to govern over it. In return, he would secure absolutely the 
friendship of all the Islands pertaining to the Sultanate; unite their interest 
with that of the English in the best and safest manner. Prince Ibrahim failed 
to achieve his objective because Admiral Rainier prudently avoided 
committing himself to assisting in the capture of Tidore and Ternate.100  
Prince Ibrahim also had his own interest in some day becoming a sultan 
on Ternate. During the meeting, he spoke in his own name rather than in 
that of his uncle, Prince Nuku. ‘He asserted in the most positive terms, that 
if he was supported by the English, the present king of Ternate and sultaun 
of Tydore would willingly acknowledge him as their lawful Sovereign, and 
promised that if the Admiral assisted him to expel the Dutch from Ternate, 
he would ensure them the entire monopoly of all the spices and the 
exclusive privilege of trade throughout all the islands and countries 
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belonging to him.’ Ibrahim also offered Rainier assistance in suppressing the 
disturbance stirred up by Hitu people — who were in uprising — and 
assured him that he could accomplish this in three days. Rainier declined 
Ibrahim’s offer. He pleaded that it was not in his authority to accept the 
offer of assistance.101 Lennon personally thought that Admiral Rainier lent 
too ready an ear to the suggestions of the Dutch: he paid very little attention 
to the embassy, and positively refused all aid or intervention on the subject 
of assistance. it seems that the Admiral conceived a prejudice against Prince 
Nuku, by which means the Dutch were able to put the government of 
Tidore upon its guard against Nuku.102  
The envoys left the meeting at 10 o’clock with no result. Admiral 
Rainier, who was still suspicious of these envoys, ordered HMS Resistance to 
escort Prince Ibrahim’s fleet until he had passed the Hitu Peninsula.103 This 
was because it had been reported that one month before Ibrahim’s arrival, 
on 3 April 1796, several villages on Hitu on the western side of the island of 
Ambon had rebelled against the Ambon Government when they heard of 
the defeat of the Dutch by the British forces. Those Dutch who remained in 
Ambon with whom Admiral Rainier consulted were sure that Prince 
Ibrahim’s original intention was to join forces with the Raja of Hitu, but 
finding Admiral Rainier there, and the Raja in prison, he converted his 
expedition into an embassy. It was not true that the envoys did not know 
the presence of the English. They had obtained the news from the English 
country traders who were at the moment in East Seram with Prince Nuku. 
For his part, Ibrahim assured Captain Lennon that he could point out those 
negeri which were averse to the English Government, and that they never 
would be totally reconciled while the Dutch remained there. At Lennon’s 
request, he seized the most warlike of the rebels, Ulupaha, kapiten of Negeri 
Seit, and chief warrior of the Hitu Raja, and delivered him, with two other 
rebels, to Captain Chalmers at Hila. Later Ulupaha was executed by the 
English.104  
The second ‘incident’ took place again in Negeri Seit and Lima. On 25 
June 1797, the people under the command of Kapiten Wakkal, Bukhari,, and 
Adam had risen up and murdered their orangkaya, and Lieutenant MacRae, 
the commander of the port of Hila.105 A detachment, of Indian Sepoys and 
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twenty Europeans were immediately ordered to Hila.106 While marching to 
the village of Seit, about four or five miles from Hila, they were fired upon 
by people who then retreated into the jungle, and none of the attackers 
could be captured. Some of the soldiers were also wounded by sharp 
pointed pieces of bamboos stuck in the ground. The overgrown 
mountainous, terrain of this island rendered the pursuit of the natives into 
the hills virtually impossible. Moreover, the rainy season had been the worst 
time of the year to send in troops.107 In Negeri Seit the English detachment 
experienced considerable opposition from the local people, and four or five 
of its men were wounded. Eventually, the English were able to defeat their 
adversaries after having cleared the negeri; houses, boats, and nets all being 
totally destroyed.108 Before the rebel party escaped to Hitulama, it murdered 
the Raja of Mamala who had refused to renounce his allegiance and join the 
rebels.109 
All the troubles in Hitu were finally overcome in November 1797.110 
Rainier’s report describes it in these terms: ’It appears from every account 
that tho’ their aversion to the Dutch might be ever so great or just, and tho’ 
the delay in paying for the spices might have occasioned some 
apprehensions amongst them, their declared hatred to all Christians was one 
of the leading motives; and the hope of recovering from the present change 
of government the exclusive dominion of the peninsula of Hitu, the memory 
of which they still celebrate in their songs and at their feasts, where they are 
sure to madden themselves with opium and bang, is the chief cause of the 
present insurrection.’111 Despite the impression that Prince Ibrahim had 
                                                                                                                             
a consequence. In Negeri Lima there had existed a party against the orangkaya which 
probably wished to take advantage of the disturbance to put him to death. The only reason 
assigned for the murder of Lieutenant MacRae is that he had overworked the people 
baking some sago bread for the Company, and that having given out cloths, in the negeri of 
Seram???. They had killed him for the sake of putting an end to any further demands by 
his death. The sago bread was required for Banda, and the cloths were advanced to 
Lieutenant MacRae from the stores by Resident Ambon, for the purpose of obtaining it. 
The amount was Spanish Dollars 402,11. IOR/P/241/74 M Pub C, 15 September 1797, 
Resident Moluccas, William Jones to Governor in Council Lord Hobart, Madras, 4 July 
1797, 3027-8. See also IOR/P/242/1 M Pub C, 15 December 1797, Jones to Lord 
Hobart, 1 September 1797, “Proclamation” 3874. 
106 IOR/P/241/74 M Pub C, 15 September 1797, Resident Moluccas, William Jones to 
Governor in Council Lord Hobart, Madras, 4 July 1797, 3024, 3041) 
107 IOR/P/241/74 M Pub C, 15 September 1797, Resident Moluccas, William Jones to 
Governor in Council Lord Hobart, Madras, 4 July 1797, 3027. 
108 IOR/P/241/74 M Pub C, 15 September 1797, Resident Moluccas, William Jones to 
Governor in Council Lord Hobart, Madras, 13 July 1797, 3042. 
109 IOR/P/242/1 M Pub C, 15 December 1797, Jones to Lord Hobart, 1 September 1797, 
3847. 
110 Miller, The Moluccas under the British, 72. 
111 Walter Caulfield Lennon, “Journal of an expedition the Molucca Islands,” 292. 
THE ENGLISH AND NUKU 
 
219
made upon English captain by seizing a number of Hitu rebel leaders, the 
former had to leave Ambon without any encouraging news for Prince Nuku. 
The Ambassador therefore returned with his mission unaccomplished.112 
On 13 February 1797, Jurutulis Bagus, the secretary to Raja Muda Zainal 
Abidin and Prince Ibrahim, accompanied by Paiman, Raja of Keliluhu, and 
Libervale, Raja of Kilwaru - villages on Keffing-Seram Laut - arrived on 
Banda. These important supporters of Prince Nuku paid a visit to Vice-
Resident Farquhar bearing a letter from Prince Ibrahim dated 27 January 
1797, in which he asked for English assistance in the capture of Ternate and 
Tidore. Farquhar told his visitors that the powers of this Banda Government 
were entirely subordinate to the Government of Ambon. He urged the 
envoy to return to his country immediately. Farquhar himself seemed rather 
irritated by the repeated visits.113 Responding to the report, Farquhar’s 
superior Resident Jones in Ambon even suggested that the visits of the 
‘Seramese Princes’ should be discouraged as much as possible.114 
Despite the fruitless attempts to supplicate the support of the English 
Government, Prince Nuku and his main leaders persisted in their efforts to 
approach all levels of authority. From the moment of the capture of 
Ambon, the English Government in Maluku was never free from pressing 
solicitations by Prince Nuku to assist him against the Dutch. Those 
applications for aid as an old ally of the English were always favourably 
received by the different persons in authority in Ambon; they as well as the 
Supreme Government in Bengal promised help against the Dutch directly or 
indirectly.115 When he failed to rouse the assistance of the English 
Government forces on Ambon and Banda, Prince Nuku decided to go 
ahead and occupy the island of Tidore with his own forces and the limited 
support of the English country traders. On 12 April 1797 he managed to 
take over the island without meeting any significant resistance. The Dutch-
appointed Sultan Kamaludin of Tidore simply left the island and took refuge 
with the Dutch Governor on Ternate.116  
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After his victory on Tidore, Nuku flew the English flag and continued to 
seek a closer relationship with the English Resident in Ambon.117 He 
reiterated his intention to conquer Ternate with the help of the English. 
Although Resident Jones in Ambon did not give any positive response to 
Nuku’s proposal, he believed that it was necessary to come to some 
arrangement with Prince Nuku who, since April 1797, was de facto Sultan of 
Tidore. Jones was convinced that such an arrangement would prevent 
Nuku’s ‘adherents engaging in the clandestine trade of spices, or troubling 
these islands with predatory incursions.’118 Again at the end of 1798, Sultan 
Nuku sent envoys to Banda, Raja Muda Zainal Abidin, his heir apparent, 
and Prince Ibrahim, from his ‘palace’ on Tidore. They were treated with 
great respect and showered with every possible attention upon their arrival. 
Their visit seems have been motivated by their inclination to give the 
English fresh assurances of their friendship and good faith, than by any 
other motive. Nevertheless, the envoys also expressed their disappointment 
that the British Government had concluded no treaty. Farquhar would not 
venture any farther than informing them that his authority did not enable 
him to give them any reply, but told them to proceed to Ambon and consult 
Mr Jones on this or any other political subjects. Dissatisfied with Farquhar’s 
response, Prince Zainal Abidin and Prince Ibrahim requested he forward 
letters to the Government in Madras. In these letters, they reminded the 
English Company that they were desperately waiting for an answer. They 
again stated that their hope rested solely on the British Company.119  
The frustration of the Tidoran leaders, especially Prince Ibrahim, had 
already been vented in the middle of 1798. It was reported that Sultan Nuku 
had sent Ibrahim to deliver a letter to Lieutenant Court, the English officer 
commanding Manado. When the commander informed the ambassador that 
all plans for the conquest of Ternate had been dropped, the latter 
immediately left greatly disappointed.120 Apparently he afterwards proceeded 
along the southern coast of Seram, where he called at certain negeri and left 
orders for them no longer to obey the English Government. At the 
beginning, Resident Jones thought that the enemies of Sultan Nuku were 
trying to put the envoy in an unfavourable light, but a letter bearing his seal 
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left at the negeri of Kulor, opposite the island of Saparua, seemed to lend 
authenticity to the report.121 It is not clear whether Sultan Nuku was behind 
Prince Ibrahim’s move. There is a very good chance that he was unaware of 






Prince Nuku had been determined to seek an alliance with the English and 
fight against the Dutch power in the Maluku since the early years of his 
rebellion. One of the most important reasons for his stance was that his 
father, who had been banished to Batavia for life, advised him never to 
become an ally of the Dutch and to do all in his power to obtain an alliance 
with the English. For the son, the message from a father whom he would 
never meet again, assumed the status of a wasiat, the last words spoken by 
someone on their deathbed. This affected Prince Nuku deeply and was 
justification enough in his eyes for his hostile actions against the Dutch.  
Constant intercourse with the English, chiefly with the country traders, 
was one of decisive factors in Prince Nuku’s success as he persisted in his 
struggle for more than twenty years, ultimately achieving his goal, the Tidore 
Sultanate. Prince Nuku even took advantage of using English assistance 
when the English presence was still only a rumour. He manipulated the fears 
of the Dutch and sent fake reports to the Dutch Governments in Ternate, 
Ambon, or Banda through local people. By fanning the rumour of the 
arrival of the English forces, he could maintain the morale of his adherents 
at a high level. 
His great efforts to save the life Thomas Crotty and his fellow 
crewmembers when they were captured by the Papuans in 1783 was a great 
symbolic investment in building a friendship with the English. His envoys to 
Bengkulu in 1784 and to Bengal in 1785, despite their failure to obtain 
formal support from the British Government in India, were treated with 
honour and cordiality. When the British Governor-General decided to 
supply Prince Nuku with guns and ammunition in 1796, he did so because 
of the help which the English had received in 1783. At this point, Prince 
Nuku had managed to build very strong good will with the English. 
Mutual, active intercourse between Prince Nuku’s forces and the English 
country traders intensified in 1795. Prince Nuku visited Fort Coronation, 
and Captain Court and his men were invited to visit Nuku’s headquarters in 
Waru, East Seram. There were at least four English ships (Duchess, Duke of 
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Clarence, Phoenix, and Sultan) operating around East Seram and Gebe at that 
time. Subsequently an enormous amount of spices was traded. In return, 
Prince Nuku collected a small arsenal of guns and ammunitions. It was on 
the basis of this intercourse, it was decided to send envoys to Bengal in 
1796.After this embassy, Prince Nuku received even more ammunition and 
guns from the British Governor-General in India. Parallel to this, the 
support of the local leaders and communities went from strength to 
strength. At this point, with the help of the country traders, the rising 
number of guns and munitions, and the increased support of the local 
leaders, the Prince no longer found himself in a defensive position. He 
already planned to occupy Tidore, Bacan, and Ternate. The seizure of Bacan 
and the take-over of Tidore in 1797 were the crowning phase in the 






This chapter is a continuation of the discussion of the relationship between 
Tidore under Sultan Nuku and the English, beginning with the English 
administration in 1797 and ending with the last breath of Nuku’s successor, 
Sultan Zainal Abidin, in 1810. It elucidates the troubles of the English 
administration in maintaining the spice monopoly it inherited from the 
Dutch. Its biggest obstacle was the increase in the ‘illicit’ trade of cloves in 
the production centre. This contraband involved Ambonese planters, East 
Seramese traders, Tidoran grandees and members of the elite, and the 
English country traders. It delves into how Tidore, under Sultan Nuku, and 
the English in Maluku, under Resident Farquhar, managed to establish an 
alliance which was sufficiently powerful to conquer the Dutch on Ternate. 
Despite their successful victory over Ternate and the signing of a treaty 
between Tidore and English, the conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens in 
1802 was what finally ruined all the achievements for which Nuku had 
struggled for more than twenty years. All the efforts of Prince Nuku were 
played out against the background of the vicissitudes in the rivalry and co-
operation between the European powers. Consequently, interest in and 
policies concerning the affairs in Maluku were consistently subordinated to 




The Clove Monopoly Contested Again 
 
The British occupation actually opened up an opportunity for East Seramese 
and the people in the region of the Amboina Islands to ‘smuggle’ cloves 
from the production areas. In 1797, the East Seramese and their merchant 
friends were busy pursuing their trade all over the region. Taking advantage 
of the unstable political situation, local ‘rebels’ joining people from East 
Seram had surrounded the fortress at Haruku during the night and forced 
the sergeant to fire upon them. When a guard was sent in pursuit of the 
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rebels’ prahu which happened to be passing by, he was fired upon by the 
prahu which carried swivel guns, and compelled to retreat. This in 
conjunction with other reports of more prahu assembled in that 
neighbourhood and yet more information from Saparua that eighty prahu 
had assembled at another part of Seram, fuelled suspicions that some sort of 
concerted plan for an attack on the Islands was being hatched.1 At the time 
of the insurrection, when the attention of the English resident and his forces 
was being directed towards the people of Hitu, cloves which had been 
withheld from delivery to the stores and kept hidden awaiting a convenient 
opportunity, were shipped away, the bulk of them from the negeri on Haruku 
and Saparua.2 On 24 January 1797, an English brig picked a fight with a 
large Makassar vessel, but had to veer off when it ran out of ammunition.3  
A third incident occurred in the area off Nusa Laut at the end of July 
1799, when thirty vessels, plus three or four large paduakang, suddenly made 
their appearance and assembled at Negeri Amahai. They informed the 
orangkaya that they had come to secure the remainder of the cloves 
concealed on Nusa Laut. These vessels, Resident Farquhar averred, had 
been chartered by the groups of traders from Waru, a settlement on East 
Seram where Prince Nuku’s headquarter had formerly been located.4 
Afterwards an English officer on Saparua, Lieutenant Slingsby, captured the 
Raja of Amet, one of leaders on Nusa Laut, when he came across him 
trading spices with the East Seramese. Feeling he had been humiliated by the 
officer the Raja, who was sent to Ambon, ordered two men—Pieter Sawaitu 
and Pesega - to assassinate the man who had putatively disgraced him, 
promising them a reward of 100 Spanish Dollars.5 When this conspiracy 
came to light, the Raja was executed and his close relatives were banished to 
Madras.6 
This third incident is proof that the East Seramese also did not shun the 
use of force to intimidate the local heads who remained loyal to their 
European rulers, the British. They terrorized any of the local heads, 
orangkaya or raja, who declined to sell them their spices. This scheme had 
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clearly been orchestrated by some groups of traders from East Seram. Waru 
was mentioned specifically, but probably it involved various leaders from 
other settlements in east and south-east Seram as well as the elite of the 
Tidore Sultanate. It seemed that Raja Amet was also part of the conspiracy. 
‘Smuggling’ intermingled with village politics can also be seen as a strategy 
for creating opportunities to open up the way to transport cloves to East 
Seram and its vicinity. Some areas such as Haruku and Nusa Laut benefited 
from the situation, revealing the relationship between the Seramese and 
other traders, notably the Makassarese, Sultan Nuku and other Tidoran 
grandees.  
Later, it was discovered that the spice trade was flourishing in both East 
Seram, and East Halmahera; it was even rife in the Raja Ampat when the 
English Resident William Jones visited these areas between March and May 
1798. On Geser he observed that the country trader ship, the Diana, under 
Captain Lynch, was loading a hundred pikul of cloves against a rate of five 
pieces of blue serampore cloth per pikul. Calling at the house of one of the 
chiefs, Abdul Kadir, he found some of four hundred pikul of cloves heap on 
the ground/floor, reputedly all from Ambon. When he put in at Negeri 
Kilmuri, one of the heads informed him that two Makassarese vessels were 
lying at anchor there ready to load spices. As Jones could obtain neither 
firewood nor water, he continued to Waru where he met the Tidoran Prince 
Saintalo, who told him that two of his vessels were collecting spices from 
the islands of Saparua and Haruku on the orders of Sultan Nuku and Prince 
Mangoffa. The prince likewise informed him that about a fortnight before, 
the ship the Duke of Clarence, under Captain Risdon, and the schooner the 
Tweed, under Captain Duncan, both heavily laden with spices, had sailed 
from that place for Pulau Penang.7  
In Salawati, in Negeri Sailolof to be precise, Jones wanted to barter his 
commodities in exchange for food supplies. However, the Kapiten Laut of 
Salawati preferred to trade in spices. Its vessels were plying back and forth 
constantly from Tidore to Bacan. On 9 April a vessel, commanded by 
Salantar Jeef who had collected all the spices in Maba, arrived in Salawati 
where it was told to await some ships, but the names of these ships and their 
commanders were unknown. When Jones failed to procure the food 
supplies he desired, he proceeded to Negeri Namopope in Misool where he 
found the ship Thetis, commanded by Captains Court and Stuart, which had 
arrived a few days before him, and had just completed loading its cargo of 
spices. Afterwards, in May, he tried to obtain food supplies on Gorom but 
the inhabitants of three or four different settlements told him that his 
commodities were not worth exchanging. They would prefer to sell him 
                                               
7 IOR/P/242/8 M.Pub.C. 26 October 1798, Resident Jones, Ambon, to Madras, 9 July 
1798, 3505-9. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 226
spices, showing him goodly supplies of cloves, nutmegs, and mace, besides 
quantities of the long nutmeg. Understanding that obtaining food from 
them was going to be impossible, he decided to leave on 10 May and set 
course for Banda.8 
John Currie, one of the English country traders, had been in Waru since 
6 June 1799. He had come to East Seram on the Duke of Clarence, under the 
command of Captain Risdon, bringing with him cloths worth 13,000 dollars. 
Abdul Kadir from Kiliwaru, acting as his local manager, distributed the 
cloths as advance payments on a sum of 2,800 dollars. Raja Muda Zainal 
Abidin owed Abdul Kadir 1,000 and Currie 4,000 dollars.9 With a flotilla of 
five to six vessels carrying seventy to one hundred pikul (forty sacks) of 
cloves and thirty sacks of nutmegs from Banda, Abdul Kadir had left the 
island for Gorom the night before the arrival of the British hongi expedition, 
led by Resident Farquhar.10 Another account says the spices were not taken 
to Gorom but concealed in a forest on the island of Seram Laut. Currie and 
Kadir made an agreement that six or seven days after the departure of the 
hongi, those spices would be carried down by Abdul Kadir.11 The cloves 
originated from negeri on the southern part of Seram as far away as Tobo and 
Hatumeten. The Kapiten of Seram Laut, Babresi Kanesi, personally confessed 
that he had sent his vessel to Saparua and Nusa Laut to pick up cloves. 
These he sold to Currie on Seram Laut at 70 Spanish dollars per pikul, but 
paid for in cloths. All negeri without exception were said to be involved in the 
spice trade. Currie also sold muskets and ammunition to Abdul Kadir, who 
in turn sold them to the people.12 
The Raja of Nusa Laut, Lelivet, recognized the authority of the English 
Government on Ambon when John Currie told him that he came with the 
authority of Raja Muda Zainal Abidin in Waru and by authority of Bengal 
Government. Zainal Abidin ordered the Raja to sail to Seram Laut and co-
operate with the Englishman, in particular assist him in procuring cloves. To 
the Raja Currie claimed that his authority was equal to that of the Resident 
in Ambon. He hoisted the English flag everyday if he saw ships 
approaching. Worried by this, as a pretext, the Raja said that he was afraid to 
turn these ships away because of the power of the Raja Muda of Tidore. He 
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also admitted that he too was also involved in purchasing cloves on the 
southern coast of Seram. A proportion of the cloves purchased went 
towards paying off his debt to Abdul Kadir and the remainder was sold to 
the English. The price was 70 Spanish dollars per pikul. Currie paid for the 
charter of Abdul Kadir’s vessel with a swivel gun, three muskets, a barrel of 
gunpowder, a number of rounds of ammunition, plus seventy lengths of 
white cloth. In his turn, Abdul Kadir sold them to East Seramese. Raja 
Lelivet also admitted that he had been ordered to lie to Resident Farquhar, 
by saying that he had been there to build a vessel and to purchase long 
nutmegs.13 
In 1798 after being inspected on Pulau Buru, the captain of the country 
trader ship, Phoenix, Hugh Moore, and a member of his crew William Collins 
swore an affidavit at the request of Commercial Resident William Jones, 
saying that the approximately forty-five pikul of cloves on board had not 
been purchased at any of the EIC-controlled Spice Islands, but on islands 
eastwards of them, from people who considered themselves ‘free and 
independent’. They asserted that they exchanged goods with the natives in a 
fair and honest way, and paid them in cash for every pikul of cloves at the 
rate of 75 Spanish Dollars per pikul.14 In another case, Resident Jones 
examined Captain Lynch of the Diana—also a country trader—who was 
allegedly involved in the ‘illicit’ trading of spices. The captain stated that he 
had purchased the cloves from subjects of Sultan Nuku.15 Even though 
Moore and Collins did not specify these islands exactly, the Resident 
believed that the cloves had been purchased on Gorom and Seram Laut. He 
also established that there had been prahu or bigger vessels cruising around 
the Ambon Islands during the clove season. All the cloves which were sold 
on Seram Laut or Gorom had actually been collected from Ambon.16 The 
upshot was that the amount of spices delivered to the British Government 
from production areas, especially from Hila and Haruku, was much smaller. 
The cloves sold to the traders on Seram Laut and other areas had allegedly 
been transported from Saparua and Nusa Laut.17 He concluded that spice 
‘smuggling’ had reached its highest level during the two seasons since the 
English had held the Islands. The country traders from Bengal who had 
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been cruising around Halmahera and Seram were secretly dealing with 
Sultan Nuku who was seen a troublemaker by the administration of these 
islands, all the more so because his adherents continued ‘smuggling’ spices.18 
The openness and the hospitality shown by the people of East Seram, 
Halmahera, and the Raja Ampat towards William Jones implied that they did 
not make any distinction between the private English country traders and 
the English EIC. Resident Farquhar, who had replaced Jones in 1799, 
explained that these country traders deliberately made ’themselves looked 
upon as delegates from the Supreme Government and being thereby treated 
with respect and obedience assume such liberties and arrogate such powers 
in the name of Government as only ensure them success in their smuggling 
views and private operations.’19 The affidavit sworn by Hugh Moore and 
William Collins makes no bones about the fact that the people in the 
respective areas opportunely waved the English flag as if their conduct of 
trade had been ‘legitimate’. On the face of it, it would seem that on the 
arrival of Jones, the local heads, even the Tidoran prince, did not think to 
bother concealing the information about the spice trade or hiding their 
spices as they had been done during the occupation of the Dutch. There is 
also a possibility that Resident Jones did not inform the local leader about 
who he really was. Later, when the Seramese heads realized the ‘danger’, 
they did keep their council and no longer told the Resident about the 
principal authors of trade spice. They did no more than intimate that these 
were in Ambon, but they did not reveal their names or ranks. Prince 
Saintolo, for example, only told him in Malay that the principal leaders 
masterminding the spice trade were the Toewan Toewan Walanda, ’the Dutch 
gentlemen.’20  
The people of Saparua were also active in the trade. They had made 
some advanced agreements to supply the East Seramese with cloves, which 
they expected to be transferred on East Seram or the adjacent islands and 
then carried away by the Bengal ships in the same or some similar manner. 
This was evident from the papers found on board the brig the Tweed, the 
property of James Scott and Company at Pulau Penang. The crew of the 
Tweed was active in the trade on East Seram, and came to Ambon in 1798, 
evidently intent on the same business because the letter of instruction to the 
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captain from the supercargo said that he was to purchase cloves at the rates 
agreed on the year before.21 Sultan Nuku, via his adherents on Seram and 
the islands east of it, exchanged cloves for the commodities which the 
natives of these islands wanted.22  
There is pretty strong evidence to draw the conclusion that the upsurge 
in the spice trade in these areas bore a strong correlation to the English 
occupation after 1796, but this trade had possibly already begun to pick up 
momentum before the occupation of the English when Dutch Government 
was severely debilitated and the power and control of Prince Nuku was on 
the rise in East Seram, Halmahera, and the Raja Ampat, which had been the 
case since 1792. Even then increasing numbers of English country traders 
were pouring in, although not as many as during the English occupation. 
During the first British occupation, the control and surveillance of the 
centre of cloves production had inevitably slackened. The English officers in 
charge of the security of the area had neither the power nor the experience 
of the Dutch to pursue this task properly. Pragmatically, the people of the 
central production areas saw this as an opportunity to sell their spices to 
English country traders in East Seram, Halmahera, and the Raja Ampat at 
much higher prices. For the Seramese in particular, the benefits of this trade 
were far greater than in the Dutch time.23  
Wright concluded that after the capture of Amboina and Banda in 1796, 
the global prices of cloves and nutmegs had fallen because the English 
Company did not control supplies with an iron hand and failed to prevent 
the Ambonese and Seramese from selling spices to other parties. Jones’ 
successor, Farquhar, estimated that the Company had already ‘lost’ 
£400,000. In continental India, cloves were cheap and in abundant supply 
because of sales by the EIC in Madras and imports by the country traders. 
Given this situation, the most important issue in efforts to preserve the spice 
monopoly was how to deal with the Seramese, the English country traders, 
and Sultan Nuku’s power over and claim to East Seram.24 Resident Jones 
was confident that Sultan Nuku had no claim whatsoever to Seram itself, let 
alone the Seramese. In this affair, any rights the Seramese may have had 
were out of question, completely ignored. He ‘only’ considered that there 
had been a treaty concluded between Sultan of Tidore and the Dutch VOC 
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in the year 1769. He wrote, ’The English being the protector of the 
Amboyna Islands and the exclusive traffic certainly belonging to the 
Company, the laws relative to the smuggling spices of course remain as they 
formerly did.’25  
He was convinced that the English ’subjects‘ in contravention of the 
laws on ’smuggling’ spices here ought to be punished, yet the danger of 
seizing property, unless on very sure ground, was enough to deter him from 
arresting these people.26 Jones promulgated a placard stating that ’the 
Company had claims to the Islands of Seram and those eastward of it and 
would punish those who engaged in the contraband traffic of cloves.’ The 
placard was read publicly in the presence of the heads of Werinama, 
Hatumeten, and Tobo, who were in his eyes ‘notorious’ for the spice 
trafficking. Raja Tobo, reportedly a staunch adherent of Sultan Nuku, was 
handed copies of the placard for distribution. These were given to him on 
the understanding he was to distribute them to other negeri at the eastern end 
of Seram. The Raja promised to forward it to them. The Resident told him 
that, if the traders on East Seram did not receive a copy, the Raja should 
return them to him in Ambon.27 
Jones believed that there should be an absolute prohibition on English 
private traders coming to these islands. Coastguard vessels would be 
stationed during the clove season to ensure that the produce of the islands 
would not be lost to the Company and fall prey to adventurers. He was 
certain that this strategy would stop the leakage of cloves, as no capital equal 
to that of the English merchants would be risked. Balinese, Buginese, and 
other Malay vessels which might try their hand at the traffic should be 
chased away or destroyed.28 In this way, the monopoly of the spice trade 
could be secured although at heavy expense because of the enormous cost 
                                               
25 IOR/F/4/74/1617, Second Memoir Concerning Keecheel Nookoo Sultan of Teedore, 
7 February 1801, A. Dalrymple, Bengal Political Consultation, letter of Resident Jones to 
Bengal, 23 November 1798. 
26 IOR/P/242/11, M.M.Pol.C., February 1799, From Resident Jones, Amboyna, to 
Madras, 23 November 1798, 485-7. 
27 IOR/P/242/10 M Pub. C, 15 February 1799, Resident Jones to Madras, 27 November 
1798, 348-9. 
28 IOR/P/242/11 M Pub C, 23 February 1799, Jones to Lord Mornington, Governor 
General in Council, Bengal, 23 November 1798, 482-3. See also IOR/F/4/74/1617, 
Second Memoir Concerning Keecheel Nookoo Sultan of Teedore, 7 February 1801, A. 
Dalrymple, Comment on the above-quoted letter of Resident Jones to Bengal, 18 March 
1799. “The Dutch with all their severe laws and great expense in armaments, were never 
able to prevent the trade of cloves; which were brought from Ceram to Bencoolen, 
Sooloo, Mannilla etc by the Macassar prows. Nor is it possible to monopolize them, as it is 
totally impracticable to root out from such an immense extent, the natural production 
such as cloves as the repeated expeditions of the Dutch for that purpose demonstrate 
although those expeditions were very limited in extent.” 
THE ENGLISH MONOPOLY & ANTI-CLIMAX IN NUKU STRUGGLE 
 
231
of supporting and supplying the coastguards with stores and necessities. 
Even so he was not sanguine. He feared that, while the Company bore the 
burden, a few adventurers would reap a great part of the profits under 
pretences fabricated to deceive the Government.29 
Jones’ suggestions and bitter complaints were ignored by the Supreme 
Government.30 At the end of 1798 the ship Brisk, commanded by Captain 
Francis Lynch, arrived from Bengal with a pass from the Supreme Council 
for Amboina, Banda, and Eastern Parts. She was accompanied by the brig 
Tender from Pulau Penang, with a pass to the same effect from the 
superintendent there. In a frustrated tone, Jones wrote, ’Every precaution in 
my power will be used to prevent the clandestinely carrying away of the 
spices but without the prohibition of ships coming to trade in them, all our 
precautions will be, in a great degree, nugatory.’ At the close of 1798, Jones 
handed in his resignation as Resident of Maluku.31  
Jones was replaced by Robert Townsend Farquhar who shared the same 
view about enforcing English spice monopoly.32 The difference was that 
Farquhar was more resolute and decisive. In 1799 he undertook an 
expedition to Seram. On the eastern coast, he arrested Prince Ibrahim of 
Ternate and Raja Muda Zainal Abidin of Tidore on a charge of ‘smuggling’ 
and sent them into banishment in Madras. An Ambonese headman who was 
suspected of leaking cloves was sent to Bengal in chains. He even 
apprehended a European called John Currie and confiscated his stores.33 
During this expedition he also discovered the roles of Sultan Nuku, the East 
Seramese, and the English country traders. The interrogation of a number of 
captives revealed that the adherents of Sultan Nuku left on East Seram had 
been obliged to engage in the spice trade with Ambon to support him in his 
endeavours to conquer Ternate.34 
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The English Residents and the Capture of Ternate 
 
On 17 February 1797, Eduard Pakenham commander of HMS Resistance 
sailed to Ternate, accompanied by the frigate Bombay and the brig Amboyna. 
Pakenham delivered a letter demanding Governor Budach surrender.35 For a 
while confusion reigned since nobody understood English. Stepping into the 
breach, a French-speaking man undertook to try to guess the meaning. The 
letter implied that should the Ternate Government accept the offer of 
protection, its people would enjoy freedom and their private property and 
goods and chattels would not be touched. All employees would retain their 
positions and continue to be paid their salaries, as in Ambon and Banda. 
Governor Budach decided to refuse any ‘protection’ and to do everything 
possible to defend the precious possessions of the Company.36 Instead of 
attacking Ternate, Pakenham and his fleet then sailed to Manado which was 
taken over without any significant resistance. Resident Durr, who had been 
in authority, explained to Budach that at the time of the appearance of the 
English fleet, he had only twenty-four men and that the Alifuru, who were 
supposed to defend for the area, had fled into the forest carrying their 
weapons with them.  
This news was quite worrying for Ternate because the bulk of their 
supply of rice came from Manado. Budach asked the help of Sultan Ternate 
in an effort to obtain sago from his dependencies. Captain Pakenham 
explained that the seizure of Manado reaped the profit of forty men37 and 
the trifling sum of 8,000 Rix Dollars annually, which would defray the whole 
expense of its present establishment, not even half of what had to be paid 
for the freight of a ship from Bengal. He calculated that Manado produced 
from 500 to 600 last of rice, 400 last of maize, a great quantity of gold dust, 
hogs, tobacco, wax, oil, and other refreshments in great abundance 
annually.38About the same time, Captain Selby captured a small fort at 
Gorontalo, another Dutch settlement in North Sulawesi, and delivered it to 
the native chiefs, on condition it be held for the English Government.39 
Around the month of June 1797, he had taken Kupang but that time he had 
been less lucky. There were no supplies there. Moreover, when having the 
ward off the resistance of the Dutch and the natives there, several of his 
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men were killed. Finally, he destroyed the ‘works’ and offered a small 
copper–bottomed brig captured at Kupang for sale.40 
In January 1798, as Miller indicates, there was evidence of British naval 
officers moving closer to active and open co-operation with Nuku, despite 
the official policy of avoiding either involvement with him personally or the 
annexation of Ternate. Captain Ballard of HMS Hobart, after having received 
the news about the pressure Nuku was exerting on Ternate, asked the army 
commander, Lieutenant-Colonel McNeile, for troops to capture the island. 
But McNeile refused to collaborate. Nevertheless, Ballard left for Ternate 
and arrived there on 27 January 1798. He sent a summons to the Governor 
to ‘safeguard’ Ternate against seizure by Nuku offering him British 
protection. Lieutenant Frost, on board the Bombay, who had been at ‘Gaba’ 
(perhaps Gebe) on Halmahera and had heard about the impact of Nuku’s 
blockade on Ternate, also summoned Budach to capitulate enclosing a letter 
of capitulation and a letter from Sultan Nuku promising not to attack 
Ternate if the British flag were flying over the settlement. When Budach 
again refused to pay heed to these summonses, the Hobart and the Bombay 
anchored off Tidore, the first evidence of contact of Royal Navy and EIC 
ships with Nuku. A friendly atmosphere developed between the Navy and 
the people of Tidore. On 31 January, Nuku was given a thirteen-gun salute 
when he paid a visit to the Bombay, and Major Ceylon, Kaicil Gomarahongi, 
was similarly honoured with a five-gun salute. On 1 February, the ‘Sultan of 
Gilolo’, an ally of Nuku, visited the Hobart and was also saluted. HMS Hobart 
remained at ‘single anchor at Tidore’ until the morning of 2 February. The 
Hobart finally weighed anchor and departed for Ambon.41  
Indeed there was internal disagreement between Captain Pakenham and 
Captain Ballard of the Royal Navy and William Jones, the EIC Commercial 
Resident of Ambon, and Lieut. Col. McNeile of the Army. Resident Jones, 
for example, believed that there was little advantage in capturing Manado 
because all it produced was wax and gold dust of inferior quality and paddy, 
which would not soon be ready for harvest. He objected to reserving a 
garrison for Manado, even more so because Captain Selby of the Bombay had 
already left twenty marines there. This meant that the English lacked 
sufficient forces in Ambon to take proper charge of the security.42 Lieut. 
Col. McNeile, commanding officer of the garrison, did not agree either but 
for different reasons. The absence of all the ships during the entire clove 
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season left the centre of the production area exposed to hordes of 
‘smugglers’, who came from other islands in armed fleets day and night. To 
thwart their actions effectively, he needed to detach as many Sepoys as 
possible because there were not enough guards remaining in the garrison. At 
the height of the nutmeg season, Banda was equally exposed to any armed 
ship, with a consequent rise in the chances of cases of ‘smuggling.’43  
Contemplating the suggestion of capturing Ternate, Resident Jones was 
equally convinced that the Sultanate might be a burden to the British. It 
would embroil them with Nuku who might expect to possess the island 
himself and, portentously had the power to cause the British a significant 
degree of trouble. Another perturbing consideration was the protection of 
the Dutch inhabitants at the time of the ‘surrender’ and the possible 
difficulty of dealing with Nuku if, at the end of the war with France and the 
Netherlands, the island would have to be returned to the Dutch.44 In short, 
Nuku and his power were perceived as a hampering factor and a source of 
difficulties in relation to any attempt to conquer Ternate. Jones himself was 
not certain about his own authority. Commenting on Captain Ballard’s 
proposal to capture Ternate, he wrote, ‘If the place surrenders to Captain 
Ballard, and any charge of it should be offered to me, I shall certainly feel 
myself under some degree of embarrassment, so far as may regard your 
Lordship’s authority given to me in civil matters, over any conquests made 
amongst the Moluccans, but I apprehend it was not the intention that I 
should be obliged to accept charge of places, that may be taken without any 
concert on my part, or without my being consulted.’45 The commander of 
the garrison in Ambon, Lieut. Col. McNeile, shared the view that the 
capture of Ternate would be an encumbrance. His main point was that, 
strategically speaking if troops were split up into small groups this would 
endanger the defence of Ambon. Therefore he informed Captain Pakenham 
that he would not send his troops to garrison Ternate if it fell to the British. 
As Miller puts it in his study The Moluccas under the British, the united 
disapproval of the naval, military, and commercial sections of Government 
was indicative of the ‘clumsiness of the triumvirate.’46 In the second half of 
1798, all these problems began to weigh heavily upon Resident Jones, who 
felt concerned about the increase in ‘illicit trade’ in Seram, and he began to 
contemplate co-operating with Nuku. ‘If we are to continue longer in 
possession of these Islands, I think it would contribute to our advantage to 
have possession of Ternate also, and I should suppose Nooko would be 
willing to let us have it, on much the same terms as the Dutch, that is letting 
him have the title (of Sultan), and paying him a subsidy; whether 
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circumstances admit of an expedition being sent against it is a matter which 
I cannot of course pretend to judge of.’47 
Right from the outset of his administration, Robert Townsend Farquhar, 
who had replaced William Jones as Resident Ambon on 1 February 1799, 
was more determined than his predecessor to seize Dutch Ternate. He 
underlined the economic benefits which would accrue from the abundance 
of spices in its vicinity. ‘By the possession of Ternate we should acquire that 
extensive knowledge of the Spice Islands which would prove of lasting 
benefit to our trade in these seas for from all the information. I have been 
able to trace, the produce of spices on the dependencies of Ternate is much 
more luxuriant and rapid than at Amboyna, and Banda spices indeed were 
first brought from thence and introduced afterwards in these Islands to 
facilitate the monopoly. The clove and nutmeg trees grow wild as far as the 
interior parts of New Guinea, which also appertains to Ternate, and so 
susceptible is the soil that the trees sprout up spontaneously faster than the 
Dutch can root them up…’ Besides economic advantages, Farquhar also felt 
a conviction that the British would improve their political control if they 
could steal a march and capture Ternate before Nuku did. ‘We become 
acquainted fully with the navigation and harbors thereabouts, the quantity of 
the produce, the manners, and customs of the natives and cultivate a 
friendship with them while we have it in our power which Newko, after he 
had once got possession would be equally tenacious of permitting us to 
obtain as the Dutch Newko’s possession of the Island I am convinced 
would turn out but of small, if any advantage, to the English.’48 
Obviously Farquhar equated capturing Ternate with putting a check on 
the expansion of Nuku’s power. If Nuku conquered Ternate, he would 
acquire far more influence over the native Malukans. ‘The Ternateans would 
become his slaves in a certain degree and he was sufficiently powerful to 
have an absolute will of his own.’ In view of his personality, there was a 
good chance that after seizing large acquisitions of military stores, 
ammunition, and boats from Ternate, Nuku’s formerly courteous and 
friendly disposition to the British might undergo a sea change. Were he to 
                                                                                                                             
44 IOR/F/4/74/1617, Second Memoir Concerning Keecheel Nookoo Sultan of Teedore, 
7 February 1801, A. Dalrymple, Quotation from a letter of Resident Jones to Bengal, 11 
January 1798. 
45 IOR/P/242/4 M Pub C, 27 April 1798, Resident Jones, Ambon to Madras, 11 January 
1798, 936. 
46 IOR/P/254/18 MMC, 25 May 1798, Lieut. Col. McNeile to Madras, 1 April 1798, 3460. 
See also Miller, The Moluccas under the British, 83. 
47 IOR/P/242/9 M Pub. C, December 1798, Resident Jones to Madras, 24 August 1798, 
4076. 
48 IOR/P/242/14 M Pub C, 31 May 1799, Resident Farquhar, Amboyna, to Madras, 5 
April 1799, 2184-2185. 
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become more independent, this would definitely mean plenty of trouble for 
the British. Farquhar was convinced that Nuku’s supporters consisted of 
‘deserters, pirates, smugglers, and every kind of despicable outcasts.’49 He 
was perfectly well aware that the adherents of Nuku based on Seram had 
been obliged to undertake ‘illicit’ trade to support Nuku in hostile operations 
against Ternate.50 If Nuku managed to capture Ternate, the survival of 
monopoly would be jeopardized. 
Farquhar also observed that Governor Cranssen might not be averse to 
making a rapprochement with Nuku. In a meeting with Nuku’s envoy 
Hukum Ismael, he was informed that the Dutch Government of Ternate 
had made Sultan Nuku tentative peace overtures. He said that Governor 
Cranssen had promised to double the yearly allowance to the Sultan, and to 
create a Sultan of Jailolo, in compliance with Nuku’s wishes. Cranssen 
stressed that he would do his utmost to make the new alliance as profitable 
as the Sultan might possibly desire. He also promised he would furnish 
Sultan Nuku with cloths and all kinds of other merchandise on credit, to be 
paid for in one, two, or three years. For this purpose, Sultan Nuku and Raja 
Jailolo were even invited to visit the Dutch Government on Ternate. 
Farquhar reported that the Hukum had said, ’However advantageous these 
proposals were for the Tidoreans, he was empowered to declare, that if the 
English would undertake the capture of Ternate seriously, which Admiral 
Rainier had promised, as far back as the year 1796, they would immediately 
break off the existing negotiations with the Dutch; or that if the Resident 
would give them any prospect of our cooperation at any fixed period, they 
would decline the offer of the Dutch, who they could never look upon in 
any other light, than the most cruel and unfaithful of European Nations; but 
that the support of some European power was indispensable that they had 
been accustomed to it for centuries, and had flattered themselves that the 
English would have afforded them their support, for the last six years; and 
that now they would be reduced, by necessity, to accept of the Dutch terms, 
unless the English would come to some definite resolution.’51 Farquhar 
                                               
49 IOR/P/242/15 M Pub C, August 1799, Resident Farquhar to Commander of the forces 
at the Moluccas, Lieut. Col. McNeile, 22 June 1799, 2998. See also IOR/F/4/74/1617 
Memoir concerning the capture of Ternate, Alexander Dalrymple, 31 March-11 April 
1801, no page. 
50 IOR/P/242/15 M Pub C, August 1799, Resident Farquhar to Commander of the forces 
at the Moluccas, Lieut. Col. McNeile, 22 June 1799, 3007. 
51 Add. Mss. 13869, Farquhar Defence on his conduct in the Moluccas, 28 February 1802, 
“Conference held in the Government house at the Fort Victoria, present RT Farquhar 
Esquire, Resident, Lieut. Aldridge, Malay Interpreter, and the Hoekoem Ismael, 
Embassador from Prince Newco, and three chiefs of Tidore” 27 October 1800, 87-88. See 
also Add. Mss. 13869, Farquhar Defence on his conduct in the Moluccas, 28 February 
1802; a copy deposition from Hookum Ismael, Senghadji Marieko, and Djurutulis Abdul 
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perceived that the friendly relationship between Sultan Nuku and the British 
would not last unless the British fulfilled their ‘promises’ to assist him in his 
war against the Dutch. He thought it was quite natural that Sultan Nuku 
should be disgusted with the manner in which the British had repeatedly put 
him off.52  
Despite his determination to seize Ternate, Farquhar could not afford to 
allow his attention to wander from the problem of dealing with the private 
traders in East Seram, who were thought to be acting in a way harmful to 
the British interests. The private trade in East Seram and Seram Laut 
involved the English country traders, Nuku’s men, and princes of Tidore 
and Ternate. A number of people connected with the trade were 
interrogated. The property of John Currie was seized.53 Farquhar also 
arrested Prince Ibrahim and Raja Muda Zainal Abidin because the princes 
had allegedly intercepted Nuku’s annual revenues from East Seram and New 
Guinea.54 Until the arrival of new military commander Colonel Burr in 
November 1800, Farquhar was not able to execute his planned expedition 
against Ternate because Burr’s predecessor, Lieut. Col. McNeile, was 
opposed to the plan, which tied Farquhar’s hands, making it impossible for 
him to mobilize the British troops.55   
On 22 January 1801, the fleet consisting of HMS La Virginie and Hobart, 
and the Company armed vessels the Ternate and the Splinter, the galley Success 
and the transport vessel the Henrietta departed from Amboyna. The ships 
arrived in the Ternate roads on 10 February, and Captain Boles, 
accompanied by Captain Aldridge and Lieutenant Rylee of the La Virginie, 
was dispatched under a flag of truce with a summons to the Governor 
demanding the surrender of the fort and its dependencies. When Governor 
Cranssen rejected the demands hostilities broke out. On that same day, a 
fleet of prahu and kora-kora loyal to Sultan Nuku appeared in the roads under 
the command of the Prince Major, who had orders from Sultan Nuku to 
join forces with the British. However Burr, who had been ordered by 
                                                                                                                             
Gaffar, commissioned from the Court of Tidore for the conclusion of a peace and 
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52 Add. Mss. 13869, Farquhar Defence on his conduct in the Moluccas, 28 February 1802, 
89. “Conference held in the Government house at the Fort Victoria, present RT Farquhar 
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53 IOR/P/242/22 M Pub C, 11 July 1800, Resident Farquhar to Madras, 20 February 
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54 IOR/P/242/22 M Pub C, 11 July 1800, Farquhar to Bengal, 20 December 1799, 2140. 
55 IOR/P/254/18 MMC, 25 May 1798, Lieut. Col. McNeile to Madras, 1 April 1798, 3460. 
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Farquhar to dispense with Nuku’s services, declined the offer accordingly. 
The Prince Major kept his distance during the whole of the attack but, as 
Burr put it, was ’perfectly ready to act in case he should be called upon.’56 
During the attack, a disagreement occurred between the Commander of 
HMS La Virginie, Captain George Astle, and Colonel Burr commanding the 
troops on the eastern part of the Island. Consequently the attack failed and 
most of the forces retreated to Ambon.57 
A second attack was soon prepared. On 2 April the fleet had been made 
ready.58 Learning from the failure, Farquhar and Burr seemed to realize that 
the British needed more assistance from the country traders bolstered by the 
co-operation of Sultan Nuku.59 Farquhar wrote a letter to Francis Lynch 
requesting him to go to Tidore and prepare fourteen to twenty big kora-kora, 
capable of carrying large-calibre guns, chiefly nine-pounders.60  
The British fleet reached Tidore on 23 April. It took a week for the 
Tidoran fleet to join the combined forces. Captain Brougham was 
dispatched to Governor Cranssen with a summons.61 By the time Brougham 
returned with a negative answer, the fleet had already arrived at Ternate. The 
ships had spent this period lying at anchor waiting for Sultan Nuku’s vessels 
to arrive and preparing a plan of operations. Burr intended to attack the 
town with the assistance of the Sultan’s boats, but the Tidorans did not obey 
Burr’s order to row in close to the shore when the British troops attacked. 
Therefore the plan to take the town in one fell swoop was not 
accomplished.62  
On 5 May, Captain Walker disembarked with his European and native 
troops. They simply cleared away the jungle to set up a battery for the attack 
on the redoubt Kayu Merah (Kalamata). Burr and his men joined them three 
days later. In the end any fighting was superfluous because Captain Aldridge 
was able to gain possession of the strong redoubt Kayu Merah shortly after 
                                               
56 IOR/P/254/74 MMC, 2 June 1801, Burr to Madras, 28 February 1801, 4066-4068. 
57 IOR/P/254/74 MMC, 2 June 1801, Burr to Madras, 28 February 1801, 4057-4058. See 
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midnight with the help of a Dutch deserter.63 This was followed by the 
assault on the hill battery of Talangnani. After a bombardment by the Swift, 
the Tidorans tried to storm the hill but were repulsed. Thereupon Burr 
hacked a road through the jungle and hills to take up a commanding 
position at the rear of Talangnani. A detachment of 100 men, and two field 
pieces, plus the pioneers, lascars, and 300 Tidorans, set out for the final 
attack under the command of Captain Brougham on the morning of 15 
May. The hill battery was taken on that same evening,64 after the 
surrounding batteries had been captured. 
The Swift and Star launched another attack on Fort Oranje and the town 
on 16 May. The blockade by the British ships aroused widespread 
resentment among the local inhabitants of Ternate who bewailed the 
constant danger to which they were exposed during the bombardments. 
Many inhabitants began to cross over to the British, complaining about their 
situation ’in very ominous and despairing terms’ about the present occasion 
and imploring the protection of the British.65 They were collected together 
on a neighbouring island and provided with a daily ration of rice, chillies, 
and salt sufficient to keep them alive.66 Observing the superiority of his 
power and the demoralized attitude of the Dutch garrison, Commander 
Burr again sent Captain Brougham to Fort Orange to repeat the offer of 
’protection’ or surrender. The reply was again negative.67 
On 20 June a deserter arrived with the intelligence that Governor 
Cranssen had been arrested by the inhabitants and placed in confinement. 
This report seemed to be verified by the fact the Dutch had ceased firing 
during the day and was finally confirmed in the evening by the arrival of 
four commissioners under a flag of truce. They said that Governor Cranssen 
of Ternate had been relieved of his office and that they had been duly 
authorized by the members of the Dutch Council to discuss the terms of 
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capitulation.68 The Dutch suggested surrendering on 23 June, but Burr 
wanted this done immediately. Despite Governor Cranssen’s steadfast 
refusal, on 21 June, Ternate officially surrendered. The capitulation was 
performed symbolically when the Dutch soldiers marched out and laid down 
their arms.69 On 6 July Governor Cranssen, his officers and soldiers were 
sent to Batavia with their families on the brig the Kraay—owned by a 





Colonel Burr was disappointed by the lack of fighting spirit displayed by his 
Tidoran allies, but he appreciated their help in supplying troops. Without 
their aid, said Burr, it would have been impossible for the British soldiers to 
venture away from the beach. The Tidorans furnished the British troops 
abundantly with local products and lived in the greatest harmony with 
them.71 More than 500 Ambonese had volunteered their services (among 
whom 150 were employed under their own raja) and behaved themselves ’in 
the most zealous, gallant, and faithful manner.’ To show his gratitude 
Farquhar presented Anthony Petrus Manusama, the Raja of Ouw, with a 
medal in ‘testimony and admiration of the Radjah’s zeal in the British cause, 
strikingly displayed, by his leaving his native country, at the head of 150 
Amboyneese and greatly contributing by his heroic intrepidity to the success 
of the British arms at Ternate.’72  
In general, Resident Farquhar also showed his regard for and gratitude to 
Sultan Nuku praising the attachment he had shown the British, and sending 
him a number of presents with the Princess Charlotte.73 After Ternate had 
been conquered, Farquhar subsequently occupied himself with the collection 
of spices. Not until mid-October 1801 did he arrive at Ternate to discuss the 
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contents of the treaty between the English Government and the Sultanate of 
Tidore with Sultan Nuku. This treaty, which consisted of eighteen articles, 
was signed on 12 November 1801. On this day, as Resident Farquhar 
expressed it, ’Newco was solemnly crowned in Fort Orange Sultaun of 
Tidore an honor which he had been fighting with the Dutch to obtain for 20 
years. It must have been an inexpressible satisfaction to the old man 66 years 
of age perfectly decrepid from persecution and continued hardships to have 
still accomplished the darling object of his heart before his death and the 
pleasing reflection will no doubt contribute in a powerful degree to render 
his latter days a scene of happiness to himself and grateful thanks givings to 
the English.’74 This coronation was important to Sultan Nuku. He had even 
specially requested that a day be appointed for the ceremony. Although he 
had reigned the Sultanate of Tidore for almost four years, to be crowned 
and confirmed by a European power was important recognition for him.75 
He was no longer a ‘prince rebel’ but a ‘Sultan’, at least in the eyes of the 
English. 
In the treaty articles, Tidore was now referred to as an ally, no longer as a 
vassal. In the preamble it was stated that Sultan Nuku of Tidore was in 
‘uninterrupted and unshaken fidelity, amity and alliance to his Imperial 
Majesty George the Third.’ Sultan Nuku, as he had wished for such a long 
time, now obtained a position superior to that of the Sultan of Ternate, 
receiving higher compensation money, and enjoyed a different atmosphere 
in his relations with the English. He would receive 6,000 Spanish Dollars 
recognition money annually from the British Government. All the treaties 
which the Tidore Sultanate had concluded in the past were annulled and no 
new treaties were allowed with other nations. Therefore, under the terms of 
this treaty, Tidore became an independent state. Nuku relinquished his claim 
to Banda, which was put under the direct administration of the British. 
Article 5 was the most important to the British: all spices (nutmegs, mace, 
and cloves) had to be delivered to the EIC at Rds 30 per pikul for mace and 
Rds 15 per pikul for cloves.76 To guarantee the enforcement of the delivery 
of the spices in the following Article, 6, it was stated that ‘smugglers’ among 
the common people would be sentenced to death, whereas trespassing 
nobles or ministers would be banished to wherever the EIC might think it 
proper.77When it was all said and done, the EIC took over the VOC spice 
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monopoly. The treaties and the reports of Farquhar’s arrangements on 
Ternate did not reach Madras until June 1802.78 
In Sultan Nuku’s past battles against the Dutch, the possession of Seram, 
especially East Seram, had been an important bone of contention. He had 
insisted that the cession of Seram by his father Sultan Jamaludin to 
compensate the ‘debt’ of Sultan Tidore had only been made for a fourteen-
year term, not in perpetuity.79 During the negotiations with Farquhar, his 
representatives also asserted that the land of Great Seram should be restored 
to them because those territories were the most ancient dominions of the 
Sultanate of Tidore. Despite these claims, Farquhar was prepared to defend 
the British right to control Seram. In his face-to-face talks with Sultan Nuku, 
it seems that he managed to persuade him: ‘…after some conversation with 
his Majesty [it] was decided in favour of the Company, and Newco very 
handsomely agreed to relinquish all claims whatever to Ceram and the 
circumjacent small Islands to the eastward of it in favor of the Honorable 
English East India Company.’ It was clear that the English had to keep 
Seram under ‘the sole and undivided authority’ if they were to suppress 
smuggling effectively.80 This was certainly a setback in Nuku’s struggle.  
The revival of the ‘Jailolo Sultanate’ was another one of the ideas pivotal 
to Nuku’s attempt to restore the four kingdoms in Maluku.81 In his 
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other valuable dependencies which had belonged to the Sultauns of Ternate and Tidore, 
they deemed it politic to destroy the sovereignty of Gilolo and to divide its territories 
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abdicating other possessions. But when Prince Newco seized upon the throne of Tidore 
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the whole of Gilolo and the more effectually to accomplish this end and to weaken the 
power of the Dutch or what was the same thing that of their ally the King of Ternate…” 
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negotiations with Farquhar, Nuku made every attempt to elicit Farquhar’s 
recognition of the claims of the pretender known as ‘Raja Jailolo’ to that 
throne. Farquhar was not willing to honour the joint request submitted by 
Nuku and Raja Jailolo because he believed that this was a part of Nuku’s 
scheme to weaken Ternate’s power in Halmahera (Jailolo), and that of the 
Dutch as well. If the Sultanate of Jailolo were restored, all the Halmahera 
Islands would then fall under Nuku’s influence. The restoration of the 
Jailolo Sultanate would indubitably give a real boost to Nuku’s power, as the 
present ‘Raja Jailolo’ held significant sway over Halmahera which was now a 
portion of Ternate territory. Farquhar anticipated that Nuku would become 
much more powerful than the Ternate Sultanate. He argued that it was 
important to keep the balance of power between Ternate and Tidore. But he 
was careful not to reject Nuku’s request too bluntly. He prudently 
compromised by showing his gratitude to Raja Jailolo for his assistance 
rendered during the siege of Ternate. He granted him a ‘certain sum for his 
service during the siege’.82  
 
 
Anti-climax in Nuku’s struggle 
 
The English Government in Madras judged that the reduction of Ternate 
would run counter to the policy which it had been expressed in its 
despatches to the former commercial Resident, William Jones, and to the 
Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel McNeile, expressing the 
inexpediency of the enterprise. When the Madras Government heard about 
the first attack against Ternate, an order was immediately sent to delay any 
second such aggression, but the letter arrived too late.83 The Government in 
Madras roundly condemned the actions of Farquhar and Burr: ‘The 
Government in council was unprepared to expect the danger to be 
apprehended from the absurd and unjustifiable measures recently adopted 
by the civil and military authorities on the spot.’84 Therefore they decided to 
relieve both of their office, Farquhar as Resident of Ambon and Banda and 
Colonel Burr as Military Commander in Maluku. On 16 January Colonel 
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Oliver was appointed to take charge of the entire civil and military 
administration in these Islands.85  
On 25 March 1802, only two months after Colonel Oliver had replaced 
Farquhar, the Treaty of Amiens was concluded between the French 
Republic, the King of Spain, and the Batavian Republic on one side and His 
Majesty the King of the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland on 
the other. The treaty stipulated that the evacuation and restitution of the 
conquered places in the East Indies should be made within six months of 
the ratification of the said treaty.86 As soon as he was informed of this, the 
Dutch Governor-General in Batavia appointed commissioners who were to 
sail immediately to the Malukan Islands in a Dutch frigate. A force of 1,000 
men, under the command of the Frenchman Colonel De Jet, prepared to 
repossess all the settlements in the Malukan Seas.87 Meanwhile, the orders of 
the Governor in Madras to evacuate the Maluku were issued in Madras on 9 
February 1803. The Governor-General in Bengal appointed Farquhar the 
British Commissioner.88 
In May 1802, there had been friction between Sultan Nuku, some 
country traders, and the Company when the Acting-Administrator in 
Ternate, Webber, learned that Nuku had agreed to supply a country trader, 
Captain Court of the ship Sultan, with spices at a purchase price 100 per cent 
higher than that paid by the Company. Initially Webber thought that 
deliveries had already been made, but understood later that Nuku was in 
Court’s debt. After Nuku had informed him that the spices due for delivery 
to the Company were not yet ready,89 the Resident Colonel Oliver reminded 
Nuku about his obligation to sell spices only to the Company. The Sultan of 
Tidore replied that ‘he had already issued strict injunctions thro’ his 
dominions to that effect, and should anyone be found to act the contrary, he 
assured Colonel Oliver that he (would) cause the smuggler to be beheaded’. 
Nuku may have been incapable of curtailing the smuggling among his 
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Farquhar, 18 March 1803, 175-195. 
89 IOR/P/255/12 MMC 15 October 1802, Henry Webber, Ternate, to Col. James Oliver, 
Ambon, 12 May 1802, 6736-6737. See also Miller, The Moluccas under the British, 162. 
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subjects, but it is also possible that he was simply shrewdly selling to the 
highest bidder.90  
In political his negotiations Nuku had also displayed an insistent and 
independent attitude towards the British. During the talks between Nuku 
and Colonel Oliver about the cession of Gebe and Fau91 to the British, 
Nuku showed himself more uncompromising than he had been in his past 
negotiations. He demanded certain conditions if the cession were to be 
made: first raising the price of nutmegs to 50 Spanish Dollars per pikul, a 
price much higher than that agreed in the treaty. Oliver rejected the price, 
which he calculated would amount to an annual tribute to Nuku far above 
the payment of Sp $ 3,000 or 4,000 he was willing to pay outright for the 
Island. Furthermore, Nuku insisted that the inhabitants of Gebe should 
remain under his authority, even though the Island would be under British 
rule.92 Oliver was furious. Responding to Oliver’s rancour, Nuku replied by 
asserting that the inhabitants of Gebe ‘must all be assembled in his (Nuku’s) 
court on Tidore, for a decisive answer’.93 Moreover, Nuku also again raised 
the issue of the recognition of the Sultan Jailolo, which he had allowed to 
lapse after his negotiations with Farquhar.94 The relationship between the 
British and the Sultan of Tidore seemed close to breaking point when Nuku 
refused to visit Webber on Ternate to discuss the issues. This adamantly 
independent attitude adopted by Nuku may not have been unconnected 
with the rumours of peace emanating from Europe.  
Indubitably, the Treaty of Amiens was bad news for Sultan Nuku. He 
had heard from Farquhar on Ternate that peace had been made between the 
English, French, and Dutch. He had stated that, with the exception of the 
English, he would never until Doomsday consider any European nation his 
friend, and begged that he might be looked upon as strictly attached to the 
British interests. Sultan Nuku averred that if the French or the Dutch were 
to regain possession of Maluku, he would not come to any terms of amity or 
alliance with them, but was determined to fight against them ‘until his 
                                               
90 Miller, The Moluccas under the British, 163. 
91 The English were interested in possessing Gebe and Obi as harbours to serve as 
victualling stations for their vessels. But this idea was soon abandoned because of the 
signing of the Peace Treaty of Amiens in 1802. See the cancellation in IOR/P/316/121, 
M Pol C, 3/5/1803, Bengal to Madras, 15 March 1803, 339. 
92 IOR/P/255/12 MMC 15 October 1802, Col. James Oliver, Ambon to Madras, 6 July 
1802, 6728; IOR/P/255/12 MMC 15 October 1802, From Sultan Nuku to Col. James 
Oliver, 12 May 1802, 6738. 
93 IOR/P/242/45, M Pub C, 8/10/1802, from Sultan Nuku to Oliver, n.d (around August 
1802), 3978; IOR/P/255/12, MMC, 15/10/1802, From Oliver to Madras, 6 July 1802, 
6728. 
94 IOR/P/255/12 MMC 15 October 1802, From Sultan Nuku to Madras, n.d., 6745. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 246
dominions sink.’95Consequently, after the restitution of the Maluku to the 
Dutch by the English, Sultan Nuku was unrelenting in his hostile attitude 
towards the Dutch, and continued to raise the British flag. This action 
certainly provoked the Dutch Commissioners to send a letter to the English 
Commissioner inquiring whether the British Government had authorized 
the Tidorans to use its flag and whether there were any English possessions 
on the Islands.96  
The various treaties between Resident Farquhar of Ambon and Ternate, 
Tidore, Bacan were also rescinded when the Governor-General in Bengal 
was apprised that stipulations of the treaties concluded by Farquhar with 
rulers in the Maluku could no longer be executed should there be an 
unreserved and unqualified restitution of the Dutch settlements and 
privileges in the Malukan Islands. Not only did the Governor-General in 
Council consider the agreements with Nuku to be abrogated, he categorized 
the Sultan of Tidore who had taken up arms against the Dutch as a ‘rebel’ 
against and a ‘public enemy’ of the Dutch. Accordingly, in the eyes of the 
Governor-General, the legality of Sultan Nuku could no longer be 
recognized. This abrogation was extended to the arrangements for the 
cession of the Gebe Islands. He stated: ’The assertion of our right to the 
Island of Geby might sanction a principle which eventually might prove 
extremely hazardous to the security of the British possessions in this quarter 
of the globe and the possible consequences of admitting such a principle 
with reference to our Tributaries and Dependants in India might greatly 
over balance any advantages which the British Government could derive 
from the possessions of the Island of Geby.’97 Consequently, after the 
evacuation of Maluku by the British, Nuku had no choice but to deal with 
the Dutch under the leadership of his old enemy Governor Cranssen. Until 
his death in 1805, no treaty of peace had been concluded between Sultan 
Tidore, Nuku, and Governor Cranssen.  
 
 
Tidore-English Relations in post-Nuku politics 
 
The Treaty of Amiens was short-lived. In 1803 the war broke out again. This 
affected the attitude of Tidore towards the Dutch. It transpired that peaceful 
negotiations with Nuku were going to be extremely thorny as the enmity still 
smouldered. On 16 October 1804, the English Governor-General 
                                               
95 IOR/P/255/12 MMC 15 October 1802, From Sultan Nuku to Madras, 6745. 
96 IOR/P/242/55, M Pub C, 21/10/1803, From Dutch Commissioners, 23 June 1803, 
4090. 
97 IOR/P/316/121, M Pol C, 3/5/1803, Bengal to Madras, 15 March 1803, 341, 342, 345-
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dispatched an envoy (Francis Lynch), responsible to Farquhar who had been 
appointed British Commissioner, to maintain contact with Tidore. Whether 
this visit by the British Navy to Tidore was a stratagem of British policy to 
retain contact with Tidore is difficult to ascertain.98 There is certainly no 
doubt that Nuku’s successor, Sultan Zainal Abidin, who had to fight against 
the Dutch in the early months of his reign, enjoyed unexpected assistance 
from British Navy when the warship HMS Greyhound under the command of 
Captain Elphinstone, attended by the brig Harrier, arrived in the Ternate 
roadstead on 6 July 1806. After capturing the Dutch Brig Christian Elizabeth 
in Manado on 4 July, the British Navy captured another Dutch brig the 
Belgica at Ternate. The captured brig was brought by Elphinstone to Tidore, 
where Zainal Abidin welcomed the British captain with a military salute. 
They exchanged visits and on the basis of this cordial relationship, a deal 
was struck. The Belgica was sold to Zainal Abidin for 2,000 Rds.  
In April 1807, an English private vessel, under Captain Elkelek (?), 
appeared off Gebe and Patani. Zainal Abidin sent Kapitan Laut Weda and 
Secretary Achmad on board with the information that Sultan Zainal Abidin 
was residing in Patani because Soasio, where Sultan used to live, had been 
destroyed by the Dutch. The ship called at Maba first to take on fresh water 
and here Prince Mossel arrived and came on board. He was saluted with 
canon shots and received a present of clothes, drinks and some more goods. 
Three days later the ship arrived in Patani, where Sultan Zainal Abidin came 
on board and requested assistance to defeat the Ternatan force which was 
stationed in Weda. He was given no firm commitment and the portents were 
bad: The captain did not salute him in the appropriate manner when he was 
leaving the ship. From Patani, the English ship proceeded to Weda and then 
sailed on Gorom. On Gorom, the crew was attacked by the East Seramese, 
infuriated by an attempt to harass a Seramese woman sexually by the English 
captain.99 At the end of the year 1807, when the Dutch extended their 
control along the east coast of Halmahera, Zainal Abidin had to flee even 
further east to Misool.100  
On 3 January 1808, another expedition of twenty-five soldiers and a fleet 
of ten Ternatan kora-kora, under the command of Lieutenant Herder, were 
dispatched to the east coast of Halmahera (Maba).101 Zainal Abidin was 
lucky because he received assistance from an English country trader’s ship, 
the Lord Minto, which also happened to be in Maba. During February-March 
1808, a protracted and tiring battle was waged between the Dutch soldiers 
                                               
98 Haga, Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea, 437; see also Miller, The Moluccas under the British, 185, 
204. 
99 ANRI 89.2, Report of Patani and Weda heads, n.d. 1807. 
100 Miller, The Moluccas under the British, 207. 
101 ANRI 89.2, Apart Letter to Batavia, 6 April 1808, n.p. 
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and a Ternatan force opposing Zainal Abidin assisted by the English ship 
the Lord Minto, armed with eight twelve-pounder and two six-pounder 
cannons, plus seventy-six soldiers most of whom were Muslims. In the 
resultant tug-of-war, neither side was able to gain supremacy.102 On 9 April 
1808, Zainal Abidin and his wife sailed on the Lord Minto to Wosso - close 
to Maba - where he established his new base. In April-May 1808, Zainal and 
the Lord Minto unsuccessfully attempted to defeat the people of Patani who 
remained loyal to the Dutch. On 14 August 1808, Captain Grieg of the Lord 
Minto left behind two guns and as much ammunition as he could spare and 
departed. Zainal’s secretary, Muslim, was on board, bearing a letter to the 
Governor-General in Calcutta, demanding 200 barrels of gunpowder, 300 
muskets, ten six-pounder cannon, and twelve swivel guns.103 
The Governor-General in Calcutta fulfilled all of Zainal Abidin’s 
demand. He even expressed his extreme concern about the unhappy 
condition to which the Sultan had been reduced. Carrying the presents and 
the requested munitions from the Governor-General, Captain Grieg of Lord 
Minto returned sometime around May-June 1809. All of a sudden Zainal 
Abidin’s forces increased significantly. When the Dutch attacked again in 
June, they were surprised by the improved defences and the superior firing 
power of Zainal Abidin’s men. In April-May 1810, two months after the re-
occupation of Ambon by the British Navy, Zainal Abidin still was fighting 
the Dutch and Ternate, managing to force the Ternatans to retreat to Kau 
Bay. But before he was unable to return to his Sultanate and died on Tidore. 
Jamaludin, his young son, was appointed to succeed him as Sultan by the 





During the English occupation, Tidore and Nuku found that the English 
EIC Government had no intention of relinquishing the reins of ‘Colonial 
Overlord.’ The English persisted with the Dutch claim to possess the right 
to the monopoly on spices. In their attempt to enforce the monopoly, they 
ran into difficulties with Sultan Nuku and the East Seramese. Hampered by 
inadequate forces and lack of experience, the English were unable to prevent 
the ‘smuggling’ conducted by the local people in the centre of production, 
who willingly co-operated with the traders of East Seram and the Tidoran 
                                               
102 ANRI 89.2, Apart Letter to Batavia, 6 April 1808; n.p. see also Miller, The Moluccas under 
the British, 209.  
103 Miller, The Moluccas under the British, 209, 210, 212 
104 Haga, Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea, 450, 453; see also Miller, The Moluccas under the British, 
212, 213, 219. 
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elite. To make matters worse, the English administration also had to deal 
with the Country Traders who maintained good relations with the traders 
both in East Seram and in Halmahera and the Raja Ampat. These Country 
Traders also received political back-up from certain high officials within EIC 
itself. The colonial administration strove to have Nuku regularly provide the 
amount of cloves at the agreed fixed price, but Nuku would eagerly break 
the agreement if he was able to deal with the Country Traders who were 
ready to purchase the cloves at a higher price. 
The policy of the Resident Farquhar of Maluku to reduce Ternate and to 
conclude a treaty with Sultan Nuku was the greatest victory which Sultan 
Nuku was ever able to achieve during the presence of the English. Once 
Ternate was conquered, Tidore was referred to as an ally, no longer as a 
vassal. From that time politically Tidore enjoyed independence and a 
superior position to Ternate. Moreover, the treaties, which the Tidoran 
Sultanate had previously concluded with the Dutch were abrogated. In 
return, the British Government acquired the monopoly rights. Unfortunately 
this treaty was dissolved by the superior British Government in India in 
1802. It marked the anti-climax in the long struggle of Nuku to achieve an 
Independent Maluku. In the end, the story of the relationship between 
Prince Nuku and the British Government tragically showed the 
powerlessness of small states in Southeast Asia in their relationships with 
European powers.  
Increased trade with China and the need for exploration had enticed the 
English to the Maluku. A growing stream of country traders visited the area. 
The English occupation of Ambon and Banda in 1796 was actually one 
episode in a long story of rivalry between the English and the Dutch. The 
English had no formal policy concerning the affairs of Tidore. The absence 
of such a policy was exacerbated by the lack of knowledge on the nature of 
Malukan internal politics. It gave the ‘men on the spot’ in Maluku the room 
to develop internal policies on the basis of their own judgements and 
common sense. However, when the English had to deal with wider political 
matters, their policies were determined by their larger interests in European 
diplomacy, chiefly in terms of their rivalry with the French. If the European 
theatre made it possible to win over the Dutch from the French camp, the 
English were prepared to make concessions to them elsewhere in the world, 







Wanneer men toch kennis gemaakt heeft met de gegevens omtrent de geschiedenis van 
dezen prins in het oud archief voorhanden, dan kan men in Noekoe onmogelijk een 
gewonen avonturier zien, zooals de Molukken er zo veele hebben opgeleverd; men komt 
integendeel tot de overtuiging, dat hij een staatkundig man was, die met ernst naar de 
grootheid en onafhankelijkheid van zijn Vaderland—de Molukken—streefde.1 
 
The high profits which the trade in spices promised to those who could gain 
control of their production and distribution in the Maluku Archipelago were 
an irresistible lure to traders from the West. The success of the Iberians in 
gaining mastery of the islands during the sixteenth century and that of the 
Dutch in the centuries which followed owed much to their formidable ships, 
armaments, and organization, in other words their naval supremacy. The 
Malukan rulers, whose military power was inferior to that of the European 
invaders, were presented with little choice in how to protect their own 
benefits and those of their people. The spices could not really to said have 
belonged to them because they could not muster enough power to protect 
these precious resources from systematic ‘seizure’ by powerful others. The 
negotiations which followed such depredations and the treaties concluded 
between the local rulers and the Europeans never conceded a fair share to 
the Malukans. No single society in this world can secure its property 
permanently if it has no power to defend it, and the Malukans formed no 
exception to this rule. 
In the era of their ‘Golden Age’ the Dutch Republic was one of the most 
powerful trading nations in the world, not least because of the crucial 
contribution to the national economy made by the VOC. The Company 
servants exploited the power of their naval and military supremacy in 
Maluku to control the local production of and the subsequent international 
                                               
1 “Nevertheless, when one has become acquainted with the facts pertaining to the history 
of this prince in the old archives available, one cannot possibly see in Nuku the usual kind 
of adventurer of whom Maluku has produced so many; on the contrary, one reaches the 
conviction that he was a statesman, who strove seriously/zealously for the greatness and 




trade in spices. The conquest of Banda and the harsh, protracted fighting in 
the Ambon Wars during the first half of the seventeenth century marked the 
foundations of this military domination. Thereafter, the contracts made with 
local rulers – both voluntarily and forcibly – and the threats of a visitation by 
the hongi expedition maintained their ‘armed peace’ and control of the 
Malukans. The different approaches adopted to tackling the sensitive subject 
of local government employed by the VOC in Banda, Ambon, and Ternate 
show that, although the decision making of the VOC authorities on the spot 
was decisive, they were vitally aware that they still had to adapt their policies 
to the logic of the local situation. Whether one likes it or not, the success of 
maintaining a permanent spice monopoly for about 150 years was a 
significant achievement. It was the result of a combination of a well-armed 
police force, a well-organized trading administration, a flexible attitude to 
local politics, a superior information network, tempered by a good dose of 
considerable patience and perseverance.  
The local culture of dualism which had evolved between Ternate and 
Tidore and similar kinds of particularism which dominated the life of local 
states or smaller traditional groups propelled these polities into protracted 
mutual enmity, easily erupting into local warfare, which made it nigh on 
impossible for them to join forces whenever they were confronted with 
outside threats. The sultans, the raja, the orangkaya and other local rulers or 
leaders were entrapped in the web of their own manipulative politics and 
constrained by their own narrow interests in their own realms. This situation 
opened the door wide to outside intervention and finally to foreign 
domination. Consequently, the local rulers and their peoples were deprived 
economically and politically. Any uprising against Dutch domination could 
be suppressed by exploiting the lack of unity and co-operation among the 
local leaders. Pertinently, the Dutch were almost always successful in 
breaking down any resistance precisely with the help of other local leaders. It 
appears that independence and power in globalized politics resemble two 
sides of a coin. Neither can be attained by those who are not able to 
overcome their particularism and hence are condemned to remain prisoners 
of their own culture and ideological reasoning. Unfortunately, they are never 




One and a half centuries ago, the Dutch historian Haga already 
acknowledged that Prince Nuku was neither the traditional prince, nor the 
ordinary adventurer of the types usually found among the Malukans. In 
Chapters Four to Nine, I have shown the strategies and leadership evinced 




transcending the ‘traditional’ Tidore realms and utilizing the presence of the 
English. Maintaining the command and the loyalty of Tidoran subjects and 
also succeeding in involving Ternate subjects in his struggle even though 
exposed to the unrelenting pressure of the Dutch hongi expeditions seemed 
an almost impossible task. His adherents were multi-ethnic groups speaking 
different languages. Communications with all these allies must have been an 
extremely difficult challenge. The role of local interpreters and the 
importance of Malay as the lingua franca may have been very decisive. 
Moreover, as this thesis has related, Nuku did not communicate only with 
people of the area, he also reached out to the wider world by seeking to 
make contact with the English.  
Battling the unhealthy climate and the long distances between Tidore, 
East Seram, the Gamrange areas, and the Raja Ampat, Nuku and his 
adherents succeeded in maintaining co-operation and communication 
among the leaders of the rebellion. During the more than twenty years the 
rebellion lasted, there is scarcely any report about internal conflicts within 
his forces, although allies occasionally walked out on him when they felt 
forced to do so under Dutch pressure. This is testimony to the fact that his 
strategies surpassed the common particularism as this existed in Maluku at 
the time. Nuku was able to overcome rampant divisions among his subjects 
and left little room for the Company to infiltrate its policy of divide and rule 
which had been so successful in the earlier period. As Haga concludes, ’He 
was a statesman who fought with earnest for the greatness and 
independence of his Fatherland—Maluku.’ 
The last decades of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth 
century formed an axial age in global history. The American, French, and 
Industrial Revolutions sent shock waves all around the world, changing the 
balance of power among the nations. One of the first to feel the impact of 
change was the once proud trading power of the Dutch Republic, which 
sank back to the status of a second-rank nation in Europe and saw its 
mighty VOC decline in the face of the mounting power of the English East 
India Company in Asia. The Anglo-Dutch war of 1780-1784 crippled the 
VOC activities in Asia and this eventually revealed itself most devastatingly 
in the Indonesian Archipelago when Holland was occupied by the French 
Napoleonic army in 1795 and relations between the Dutch Republic and its 
overseas territories were virtually severed.2  
During the eighteenth and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
the Dutch had to contend with a number of princely rebellions in the 
Indonesian Archipelago. Nuku’s rebellion was not an isolated instance, 
                                               
2 Leonard Blussé, ‘Changes of Regime and Colonial State Formation in the Malay 
Archipelago, 1780-1830: an Invitation to an International Research Project’, Working 




although as I have shown it was an exceptional one. In South-West Sulawesi, 
in Wajo’ to be precise, Arung Singkang (1737-1741) revolted against the 
dominance of Bone supported by the VOC, eventually gaining 
independence from its powerful neighbour for his realm.3 In the Kingdom 
of Mataram in Java, Mangkubumi (1746-1755) challenged the Dutch-
supported Pakubuwana II. His actions resulted in the partition of Mataram 
into the principalities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta, ultimately strengthening 
the Dutch grip on Java.4 More than fifty years later, in the same region 
Prince Dipanegara launched an uprising against the Sultanate of Yogyakarta 
and the Dutch culminating in the Java war (1825-1830), which lasted five 
years.5 In terms of the logic of the political situation, there are similarities 
between these two instances. Arung Singkang was fighting against the 
oppressive intervention by the adjacent kingdom of Bone, which was 
shielded by the patronage of the Dutch. Mangkubumi was in revolt against 
his own ruler, Pakubuwana II, who was also ruling under the payung 
‘umbrella’ of the Dutch. The same applies to Dipanegara who was goaded 
into resisting the chancellor Danurejo and the nobles of Yogyakarta who 
were proxies of the Dutch power.  
Despite the fact that Nuku never ceased to reiterate that the Dutch were 
his sole enemy, he also fought his own Sultan — the Dutch-protected Sultan 
Tidore - and the latter’s principal rivals, the Sultan of Ternate and the Sultan 
of Bacan. What set Nuku apart from all these other greater and lesser 
                                               
3 Arung (Prince) Singkang had been elected Chief King of Wajo’ in South-West Sulawesi 
in 1737. Under his leadership Wajo’ occupied an unprecedented position of power in 
South-West Sulawesi. He liberated Wajo’ from the oppressive interventions of such 
adjacent kingdoms as Bone which had become the most powerful kingdom in South-West 
Sulawesi under Dutch patronage, after the conquest of Makassar in 1669. In 1739 he even 
dared to attack the Dutch fort in Makassar. The Dutch retaliated two years later but failed 
to subjugate the kingdom , after which Wajo’ remained outside the sphere of Dutch 
influence for nearly a century and a half. See J. Noorduyn, “Arung Singkang (1770-1765): 
How the victory of Wadjo’ began,” Indonesia 13 (April 1972), 62-68. See also the same 
writer, “Een Boeginees geschriftje over Arung Singkang,” BKI 109 (1953), 144-152. 
4 Prince Mangkubumi’s rebellion (1746-1755) was motivated not only by his personal 
ambition, he saw his cause as an ethical issue concerning the nature of royal authority 
which had been violated by Sultan Pakubuwana II when he agreed to cede the pasisir areas 
to the Dutch without consultation with the princes. When Pakubuwana II surrendered the 
kingdom of Mataram to the Dutch, he declared a new kingdom in Yogyakarta on 11 
December 1749. The new kingdom was finally recognized by the Dutch in 1755 and he 
became Sultan Hamengkubuwana I. But after that Java was divided into two kingdoms. 
He allied with the Dutch to fight his ex-ally Mas Said. Mangkubumi’s main enemy was not 
the Dutch, but always his Javanese opponents. See M.C. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta under Sultan 
Mangkubumi, 1749-1792: a history of the division of Java (PhD thesis: Cornell University, 1973), 
67, 76, 87-89. 
5 M. Adas, Prophets of Rebellion: Millenarian Protest Movements against the European Colonial Order 




pahlawan ‘heroes’, was that he looked beyond the confines of his own social 
and political world, and in doing so sought an ally to confront the dominant 
Dutch in the English East India Company. In contrast to the other ’rebels’, 
Prince Nuku understood he was living in a changing world. Instead of 
implicating himself in self-defeating strategies and mystical scenarios, he 
reached out for the assistance which could be rendered him in a globalizing 
world. I hasten to add the reason that Arung Singkang, Mangkubumi, and 
Dipanegara did not have an eye for global opportunities was in part the 
result of the fact that in the period of the first two protagonists the balance 
of power as well as international agreements among the European nations 
made any such option quite futile.  
Dipanegara has to be placed in a different category. The millenarian 
character of the man and of his rebellion was absolutely unmistakable. 
Although the son of a Sultan, Dipanegara had been raised outside the palace. 
Surrounded by religious teachers, he grew up a deeply religious prince 
imbued with highly mystical ideas. Among his supporters Dipanegara, who 
was genuinely deeply convinced of his role, was revered as the Ratu Adil, the 
long-awaited saviour-king, the central figure in a syncretic complex of 
millennial beliefs which had been invoked by Javanese rulers and rebels for 
centuries.6 In Nuku’s case, these millenarian traits are very subdued, even if 
Andaya does argue that Nuku possessed a kind of mana7 as he was called 
Jou Barakati among the Malukans. 
 
In his lifetime Nuku was known as Jou Barakati, or ‘Lord of Fortune.’ He was one 
of those rare individuals who spring up in Southeast Asian history imbued with a 
certain spirituality, an aura which people recognize and hence follow. It is these 
figures possessed of mana…who transformed the old and provide the basis for a 
reconstruction of a new order. Nuku’s activities would have been readily 
comprehensible in Maluku because they followed a well-trodden path.8 
 
Andaya argues that the belief Nuku possessed supernatural power 
stimulated the Malukans to provide him with almost ‘total’ support. People 
were convinced that Nuku would be able to transform their old, dismal life 
into a new age of prosperity and tranquil orderliness.9 In Nuku’s rebellion, 
                                               
6 Adas, Prophets of Rebellion, 94, 97-8. 
7 Mana is deeply embedded Austronesian concept often associated with Pacific Island 
societies referring to those individuals favoured by the Almighty. It is similar to the 
concept of guna which is a Malay word meaning ‘fortune’, used of individuals to indicate 
their possession of a special quality found only in those destined for greatness; a common 
term associated with those of ‘prowess’, those who become culture heroes. L. Y. Andaya, 
The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1993), 282-3. 
8 Andaya, The World of Maluku, 239. 




the millenarian motif, I argue, only appeared later. This kind of brilliant, 
eulogistic title was most likely not used until Nuku’s return from his self-
imposed flight, his victory over Bacan and Tidore in 1797, and his growing 
power during the English occupation. This is suggested in Governor 
Cranssen’s characterization of Nuku in 1800. 
 
... dat Prins Noekoe bij de meeste Molucsche volken, word genaamd Tuhan Barkat of 
gezegenden Heeren! Dit, en alles wat in vorige brieven geschreven is, moet voldoende zijn om de 
HR en Heeren XVII er van te overtuigen, dat zo men in de Molukkos van een bestendige en 
geduurzame rust wil jouisseren, eerste Noekoe tot vreedzame oogmerken moet worden gebracht, 
om daar door die natien die hem zo veele jaren gevolgd en aangekleefd hebben, eindelijk eens 
wederom te brengen onder gehoorzaamheid van de Compagnie.10  
 
Nuku’s extraordinary achievement in unifying so many of the disparate 
groups of Malukans during his long struggle was seen as confirmation of the 
idea that the royal house was blessed with a special gift. After having proved 
himself by almost twenty years of fighting the Dutch, the North Malukans 
believed that Nuku was genuinely endowed with supernatural powers. The 
status was associated with and fitted into the idea and worldview of Maluku 
that royal individuals were of foreign origin and possessed supernatural 
power. This belief can be traced in the myths of origin of the Malukans.11 
According to folk etymology, the word for king, kolano, is derived from, or 
is related to ngongano which means the ‘entrusted one’. If this interpretation is 
correct, Lapian argues, then it can be speculated that the power exercised by 
the king was a mandate from above (Heaven, the Almighty).12 However, the 
idea that Nuku was jou barakati was a status achieved by his victories rather 
than an ascribed status derived from his descent and consequently assumed 
to be the reason for his success. 
Whether Prince Nuku was endowed with supernatural powers or not is a 
matter of interpretation. The fact is that he was one of the rebels who did 
not finally surrender, nor was he defeated or arrested as Dipanegara was. He 
                                               
10 ’Prince Nuku is called Tuhan Barkat or the Blessed Lord by most of the Malukan people. 
This, and everything that has been written in the previous letters, should convince the 
High Government and the Gentlemen XVII that, if a permanent and durable peace is to 
be achieved, Nuku should first be appeased so that all those nations who have followed 
him and have been loyal to him for so many years, can be finally brought back to the 
allegiance of the Company.” ANRI Ternate 89.1, J.W. Cranssen to Mr. P.G. van 
Overstraaten, 30 September 1800. 
11 Lapian, A.B., 1984, 'The diversified unity of Maluku-kie-raha; it's historical development' 
in: K. Tsuchiya ed., "States" in Southeast Asia: From "Tradition" to "Modernity" (Kyoto 
University: Center for Southeast Asian Studies), p. 176-7. See also Legende… 1917. 
Legende en geschiedenis van Ternate. In Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlandsch Bestuur, Batavia, 
vol. 51, 310. 




was also one of the rebels who succeeded in returning to his home island by 
becoming a sultan with no significant resistance. The ideas which motivated 
his long rebellion are clearly revealed in the clauses of his draft of the treaties 
he proposed to the English and the Dutch. He fought for the political 
independence of Tidore from the Dutch and the English and for the 
superiority of Tidore above the other sultanates in Maluku. 
Prince Nuku was highly appreciated by the English who met him in 
person in his refuge in Waru, East Seram. Captain Lennon who commanded 
one of the British ships under Admiral Rainier in Ambon in 1796 testified, 
’Nookoo is, by every account I could hear, a much more enlightened 
character than most of the Malays’. He was described as a man who had ‘the 
greatest good humour and uprightness’. Dalrymple depicts him as a man of 
very active disposition, and not averse to waging war against his enemies, the 
Dutch, and their local allies. He was known to be very brave and was 
endowed with special martial prowess, personally leading his own people on 
war expeditions. 
 As a husband Nuku did not behave as the other Sultans of Tidore and 
Ternate who had many wives; as he had only one wife. As Dalrymple put it, 
’he was true and just to his wife’. And he kept no concubines. In his dealings 
with his own people, he was known to be just and wise. The English sailor 
Thomas Crotty who was saved by Nuku in 1783, noted, ’Their Majesties 
keep their public meeting in the King’s Palace (in Waru) both night and day, 
if anything of importance is to be done: They administer justice to everyone; 
let them be rich or poor: Every one must appear to his own cause, there is 
no need of attorneys and the suit is soon dispatched.’13  
As often found in history, behind a great man, there is a great woman. 
Nuku’s only wife always accompanied him to wherever his refuge was: in 
Waru, Salawati, and Patani. His wife’s real name was not known, but Nuku 
used to call her Geboca. She was an important advisor to her husband in 
many affairs, or as Crotty depicts it probably with a bit in exaggeration, ‘He 
is ruled by Her in the greatest of his affairs. She is his Counsel in the greatest 
affairs of his territories, even between life and death. She is King, Queen, 
and Lord over all.’ Without doubt this grateful Englishman described her as 
a very sensible woman because he could not forget the nursing he had 
received from Nuku’s wife. He recalls that during his illness, when he was 
on the brink of death,  
 
The Sultan’s wife, Geboca, sat by me, both night and day, supplying me with 
Malay medicines of her own making, and she crying the same as a mother would 
do for her own son; but by the great attention she gave towards me, I very soon 
                                               
13 Dalrymple, “Memoir Concerning Keecheel Nookoo Sultan of Teedore,” IOR/L/PS/ 




recovered my health again. The Sultan (Nuku) attending me, and praying to God 
that I might get my health again, that I might go to my own country, for the 
benefit of myself, and for the good of him (Nuku), and his people.14  
 
If these biographical notes on Nuku are to be complete, we should not 
ignore the other, less flattering sides of his character. Apart from his signal 
greatness and ‘humanity’ as a leader of the whole Maluku, he was, 
fortunately I am tempted to say, also a man beset by his own weaknesses 
and fears. A Makassarese, who had fled from Tidore to Ternate, told the 
Dutch the following about his everyday behaviour:  
 
Dat Prins Noekoe sterk arak drinkt, en is dagelijks dronken, dat Prins Noekoe in 
‘t fort te Tidor woonde, en heeft dagelijks twaalff schildwagten met schild en 
swaard bij hem, vermits hij alle Tidoreesen weinig vertrouwen. Dat Prins Noekoe 
sekere Ngofamanjira van Macquian, van de negorij Ngofakiaha Dalam genaamt 
voor de tromp van een kanon, welke met scherp en een stuk lalary hout geleden 
was, heeft vast laten binden, en vervolgens los gebrand, waar om ‘t lighaam van 
dien man in gruis van elkanderen gescheurd was, en overal verspreid is 
geworden.15 
 
His long experience of rebellion during which he had constantly had to 
deal with threats and treachery transformed Nuku perhaps into an 
overcautious man and certainly into a sometimes very ruthless one. The 
application of violence was also part of his armoury and strategy, his way of 
life. He was prepared to punish severely any of those subjects he considered 
treacherous and disloyal as an example to others and did this simultaneously 




Finally by carefully comparing VOC and English EIC sources with the 
existing oral and written tradition of Maluku, in its broader sense, this 
monograph in which the phenomenal career of Prince Nuku has been 
reconstructed deserves some remarks. It would seem that Nuku’s faits et gestes 
transcended the more or less traditional frame of mind of the pahlawan of 
                                               
14 Ibid. 
15 ‘…Prince Nuku drinks strong arak and gets drunk every day. During the time he spent 
in the Fort (Tahula) on Tidore, he was surrounded by twelve bodyguards armed with 
swords and shield, because he had little trust in all Tidorans. Prince Nuku ordered a 
certain Ngofamanjira of Makian to be tied to the mouth of a cannon, which was loaded 
with ammunition and a piece of lalary wood, and had it fired. The body of the 
Ngofamanjira was torn to pieces and scattered to the four winds.’ See ANRI Ternate 89.1, 




whom present Indonesian historiography seems to be so fond.16 Part of 
Nuku’s genius can be explained by his capacity to put events and 
developments into a wider conceptual perspective. When he realized that 
trading routes in the eastern region of Indonesia were shifting in response to 
the new developments in global trade and that new-comers were visiting the 
region, he gladly availed himself of the new opportunities on offer. By 
engaging in salvaging opportunities and sending letters and envoys to 
Bengal, he was able to win the British over to his side. 
He is still relevant. In the area of the national history of modern 
Indonesia, the Indonesian Government has had trouble legitimizing its 
territorial claims to the waters around Maluku and Papuan West New 
Guinea (Irian Barat or nowadays Papua).17 If Indonesian historians in 
Soekarno’s time had studied the rich sources of the Dutch VOC and the 
English EIC more carefully, they would have been able to show 
convincingly the close historical ties between the Maluku and the coastal 
areas of Papua. Thereby they might have been able to present more 
credentials to counter much of the Dutch quasi-anthropological political 
reasoning claiming that, owing to its different cultural roots, ‘Netherlands 
New Guinea’ should have been allowed a politically independent future of 
its own.18 For centuries local ritual and economic ties bound Maluku to 
Papua. The irony of Nuku’s career is that so far nobody has successfully 
pointed out that, thanks to this Papuan connection, he was able to beat the 
Dutch at their own game. He did so by skillfully making use of the English 
just as the Soekarno Government made use of the United States in 1962 and 
the United Nations in 1963.19   
                                               
16 Bambang Purwanto, Gagalnya Historiografi Indonesiasentris?! (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2006), 
23-7. 
17 See Questioning the Unquestionable: An Overview of the Restoration of Papua into the Republic of 
Indonesia (New York: Permanent Mission of the Republic Indonesia to the United Nations, 
2004), passim. 
18 P. J. Drooglever, Een daad van vrije keuze (Amsterdam: Boom, 2005), 124-5. 
19 This refers to the New York Agreement 1962 between Indonesia and the Netherlands. 
The agreement was the result of the U.S. pressure on the Dutch Government to cede the 
West New Guinea into the hands of the Republic of Indonesia. See C. L. M. Penders, The 










List of Sultans of Tidore  
 
 
1. 1495-1512  Ciliati (Jamaludin) 
2. 1512-1526  Mansur (died 1526) 
3. 1529-1547  Amirudin Iskandar Dalkarnin 
4. 1547-1569  Kie Mansur 
5. 1569-1586  Iskandar Sani 
6. 1586-1599  Gapi Baguna 
7. 1599-1626  Mole Majimu 
8. 1626-1633  Ngora Malamo 
9. 1633-1653  Gorontalo 
10. 1653-1657  Magiau (Saidi) 
11. 1657-1689  Saifudin (Golafino) 
12. 1689-1700  Hamzah Fahrudin 
13. 1700-1708  Abu Falalal Mansur 
14. 1708-1728  Hasanudin 
15. 1728-1756  Malikilmanan (Gape)  
16. 1756-1780  Jamaluddin  
17. 1780-1783  Badarudin (Patra Alam) 
18. 1784-1797  Kamaludin 
19. 1797-1805  Amirudin (Nuku) 
20. 1805-1810  Zainal Abidin 




List of Sultans of Ternate  
 
1. 1486-1500  Jainal Abidin 
2. 1500-1523  Abu Lais (Liliatu)  
3. 1523-1535  Boheyat  
4. 1535-1570  Hairun (Hayur) 
5. 1570-1584  Babullah  
6. 1584-1610  Saidudin (1606 banished and died in Manila 1610)  
7. 1606-1610 Hidayat (Viceroy)  
8. 1610-1627  Modafar (Muzaffar) 
9. 1627-1648  Hamzah 
10. 1648-1675  Mandarsyah 
11. 1675-1690  Sibori  
12. 1692-1714  Toloko 
13. 1714-1751  Raja Laut 
14. 1751-1754  Oudhoorn Insah  
15. 1754-1763  Sahmardan 
16. 1763-1777   Zwaardekroon 
17. 1777-1780  Arunsah 
18. 1780-1796  Aharal 
19. 1796-1801  Sarkan  
20. 1801-1807  Mohammad Jasin 
21. 1807- …  Mohammad Ali 
APPENDICES 263
Appendix 3  
 
List of Dutch Governors in Ternate 
 
1. 1610-1612  Paulus van Caerden 
2. 1612-1616  Pieter Both 
3. 1616-1621  Laurens Reaal 
4. 1621-1623  Frederik Houtman 
5. 1623-1627  Jacques le Fèbre 
6. 1627-1629  Gilles Zeijst 
7. 1629-1633  Gijsbert van Lodestein 
8. 1633-1635  Johan Ottens 
9. 1635-1640  Jan van Broekom 
10. 1640-1642  Anthonij Caen 
11. 1642-1648  Wouter Seroijen 
12. 1648-1653  Gaspar van de Bogaerde 
13. 1653-1656  Jacob Hustaerdt 
14. 1656-1662  Simon Cos 
15. 1662-1667  Anthonij van Voorst 
16. 1667-1669  Maximilian de Jong 
17. 1669-1672  Abrahan Verspreet 
18. 1672-1675  Cornelis Franks 
19. 1675-1676  Willem Korput 
20. 1676-1677  David Harthouwer  
21. 1677-1682  Robbert Padtbrugge 
22. 1682-1686  Jacob Lobs 
23. 1686-1689  Johan Henrik Thim 
24. 1689-1692  Johannes Cops 
25. 1692-1696  Cornelis van der Duin 
26. 1696-1701  Salomon Le Sage 
27. 1701-1706  Pieter Rooselaar 
28. 1706-1710   Jacob Claaszoon 
29. 1710-1715  David van Petersom 
30. 1715-1720  Jacob Bottendorp 
31. 1720-1723  Anthonij Heinsius 
32. 1723-1724  Jacob Cloeck 
33. 1724-1728  Johan Happon 
34. 1728-1731  Jacob Christiaen Pielat 
35. 1731-1735  Elias de Haeze 
36. 1735-1737  Paulus Rouwenhoff 
37. 1737-1739  Martinus Storm 
38. 1739-1744  Marten Lelievelt 
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39. 1744-1750  Gerrard van Brandwijk van Blokland 
40. 1750-1754  J.E. van Mijlendonk 
41. 1754-1758  Abraham Abeleven 
42. 1758-1766  Jacob van Schoonderwoert 
43. 1766-1767  Hendrik Breton 
44. 1767-1771  Hermanus Munnik 
45. 1771-1778  Paulus Jacob Valckenaer 
46. 1778-1780  Jacob Roeland Thomaszen 
47. 1780-1793  Alexander Cornabé 
48. 1793-1795  Johannes Ekenholm 
49. 1795-1799  Johan Godfried Budach 
50. 1799-1803  Willem Jacob Cranssen 
51. 1803-1804  Peter Adrianus Goldbach 
52. 1804-1809  Carel Lodewijk Wieling 
53. 1809-…  R. Coop à Groen 
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List of Portuguese Governors in Ternate 
 
1. 1522-1525 Antonio de Brito 
2. 1525-1527 Garcia Henriquez 
3. 1527-1530 Jorge de Meneses 
4. 1530-1532 Gonçalo Pereira 
5. 1532-1534 Vicente de Ponceca 
6. 1534-1536 Tristao de Ataide 
7. 1536-1540 Antonio Galvao 
8. 1540-1544 Jorge de Castro 
9. 1544-1547 Jordao de Freitas 
10. 1547-1549 Bernaldim de Souza 
11. 1549-1550 Christovao de Sa 
12. 1550-1552 Bernaldim de Souza 
13. 1552-1555 Francisco Lopez de Souza 
14. 1555-1559 D. Duarte D’Eca 
15. 1559-1561 Manoel de Vasconcellos 
16. 1561-1564 Henrique de Sa 
17. 1564-1566 Alvaro de Mendoça 
18. 1566-1571 Diogo Lopes de Mesquita 
19. 1571-1574 Alfaro de Ataide 
20. 1574-1575 Nuno Pereira de Lacerda 
 






List of Governors of Ambon 
 
1605-1611  Frederik de Houtman 
1611-1615  Jasper Janz. 
1615-1618  Adriaan Block Martensz. 
1618-1625  Herman van Speult 
1625-1628  Jan van Gorcum 
1628-1631  Philip Lucasz. 
1631-1634  Artus Gijsels 
1634-1635  Anthonio van den Heuvel 
1635-1637  Jochum Roelofsz. van Deutecom 
1637-1641  Johan Ottens 
1641-1642  Ad interim Simon Jacobsz. Dompkens 
1642   Ad interim Anthonio Caan 
1642-1647  Gerard Demmer 
1647-1650  Arnold de Valming van Oudshoorn 
1650-1651  Ad interim Simon Cos 
1651-1654  Willem Verbeeck 
1654-1656  Ad interim Simon Cos 
1656-1662  Jacob Hustaerdt 
1662-1664  Simon Cos 
1664   Ad interim Maximiliaan de Jong 
1664-1665  Johan van Dam 
1665-1666   Ad interim Maximiliaan de Jong 
1666-1667  Pieter de Marville 
1667-1669  Ad interim Anthonio Hurdt 
1669-1672 Jacob Cops 
1672-1678  Anthonio Hurdt 
1678-1682  Robert de Vicq 
1682-1683  Ad interim Jeremias van Vliet 
1683-1687  Robert Padtbrugge 
1687-1691  Dirk de Haas 
1691-1696  Nicolaas Schaghen 
1696-1697  Ad interim Cornelis Stull 
1697-1701  Willem van Wijngaarden 
1701-1706  Balthasar Coyett 
1706-1720  Adriaan van der Stel 
1720-1721  Ad interim Rochus Hollaar 
1721-1725  Pieter Gabrij 
APPENDICES 267
1725-1727  Stephanus Versluys 
1727-1733  Johannes Bernard 
1733-1738  David Johan Bake 
1738-1743  Jacob de Jong 
1743-1748  Nathaniël Steinmetz 
1748-1750  Cornelis Rosenboom 
1750-1752  Nicolaas Jongsma 
1752   Ad interim Goderd Ludolf van Beusechem 
1752-1757  Gerard Cluysenaar 
1757-1763  Meyert Johan van Idsinga 
1763   Ad interim Goderd Ludolf van Beusechem 
1763-1764  Ad interim Josias Alexander de Villeneuve 
1764-1767  Willem Fockens 
1767-1770  Hendrik Breton 
1770-1775  Johan Abraham van der Voort 
1775-1785  Bernardus van Pleuren 
1785-1788  Adriaan de Bock 
1788-1794  Johan Adam Schilling 
1794   Ad interim Balthasar Smissaerd 
1794-1796  Alexander Cornabé 
 
Source:  
G.J. Knaap (ed.), Memories van Overgave Ambon, RGP 62, ‘s-gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 







1. Unpublished primary sources 
Nationaal Archief (NA), The Hague 
Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) 
Ingekomen Briven en Papieren: Ternate, Ambon, Banda 
VOC 3577 (n.d),  3586 (1779), 3595 (1780), 3602 (1780), 3603 (1781), 3620 (1782), 
3622 (n.d.), 3627 (1781), 3646 (1783), 3676 (1784), 3698 (1785), 3704 (1785), 3705 
(1785), 3729, 3737 (1786), 3738 (1785), 3756 (1783), 3763 (1783), 3764 (1783), 8074 
(1705), 8075 (1706) 
Oost-Indische Committée (OIC) 
OIC 64 (1796), 65 (n.d.), 65A (1794), 79 (1793), 80 (1794), 81 (1794-1795), 86 
(1793), 90 (1792-1793), 91 (1794)  
 
Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI) 
Arsip Daerah Ternate (Ternate) 
Ternate 34 (1798), 18 (1769), 22, (1781), 24 (1786), 32 (1796), 8 (1794), 84 (1761, 
1762, 1763, 1765), 87 (1794, 1797), 89.1 (1795), 85 (1787, 1788), 89.1 (1795, 1800), 
89.2 (1806, 1807, 1808), 91 (1782), 92 (1785), 92 (1785), 96 (1771), 102 (1809), 103 
(1807), 105 (1808), 107 (1808), 108 (1809, 1810), 127 (1806), 138 (n.d.)  
 
British Library, London 
India Office Record (IOR) 
Bengal Foreign Consultations (BFC), 1801 
Bengal Political Consultations (B Pol C), 1797, 1809-1818 
Bengal Public Consultations (B Pub C), 1805 
Bengal Secret Consultations (BSC), 1796-1797, 1805 
Bengal Secret Political Consultations 
Madras Military Consultations (MMC), 1796-1804 
Madras Military Political Consultations (MM Pol C), 1799 
Madras Public Consultations (M Pub C), 1797-1805 
Madras Political Consultations (M Pol C), 1802-1803, 1810-1811 
Madras Political Military Consultations (M Pol MC), 1796 
Madras Secret Consultations (MSC), 1803 
 
IOR F/4/305/7011 (1809), F/4/56/1302H (1797-1799), F/4/74/1617 (1798, 1801), 
F/4/9 Political No 112 (n.d.), G/21/10 (n.d), F/4/9/715 (1785 –1796), H/97 (1758, 
1761, 1764), P/119/19 B Pol C (1810), P/165/76 BFC (1801), P/241/72 MMC (1797), 
P/241/74 M Pub C (1797), P/242/1 M Pub C (1797), P/242/5 M Pub C (1798), 
P/242/10 M Pub C (1799), P/242/11 MM Pol C (1799), P/242/13 M Pub C (1799), 
P/242/14 M Pub C (1799), P/242/15 M Pub C (1799), P/242/22 M Pub C (1800), 
P/242/23 M Pub C (1800), P/242/31 M Pub C (1801), P/242/35 M Pub C (1801), 
P/242/39 M Pub C (1802), P/242/4 M Pub C (1798), P/242/41 M Pub C (1802), 
P/242/42, M Pub C (1802), P/242/45 M Pub C (1802), P/242/55 M Pub C (1803), 
P/242/8 M Pub C (1798), P/242/9 M Pub C (1798), P/253/57 M Pol MC (1796), 
P/254/01 MMC (1797), P/254/18 MMC (1798), P/254/74 MMC (1801), P/254/75 
MMC (1801), P/254/79 MMC (1801), P/255/08 MMC (1802), P/255/11 MMC (1802), 




Pol C (1803), P/316/124 M Pol C (1803), P/A/63 BSC (1782), P/Sec/Mad/14 MSC 
(1803), P/Sec/Mad/15 MSC (1803), IOR/L/PS/19/14 (1801), Add. Mss. 13869 (1802)  
 
 
2. Published sources  
 
Aa, Robide van der, ‘Een tweetal bijdragen tot de kennis van Halmahera’, BKI 19 (1872), 
233-239.  
Anonym, ‘Aanteekeningen, gehouden op eene reis aan de noord- en westkust van 
Halmahera’, TNI 18 (1856), 209-228. 
ANRI., “Ternate: MvO Bosscher and Tobias,” (Jakarta, 1980). 
Bik, A.J., Daagverhaal: eener reis, gedaan in het jaar 1824 tot nadere verkenning der eilanden Keffing, 
Goram. Groot en Klein Kei en de Aroe eilanden. (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1928). 
Cambier, J. P. C, ‘Rapport over Tidoreesch- Halmahera’, in Robide van der Aa, een 
tweetal… etc. 
Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando Indicum: verzameling van politieke contracten en verdure verdragen door 
de Nederlanders in het Oosten gesloten, van privilegebrieven aan heen verleend, enz., 6 vols, ed. 
J.E. Heeres and F.W. Stapel (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1907-1955).  
Crab, P. van der, De Moluksche Eilanden: Reis van Z.E. den Gouverneur-Generaal Charles 
Ferdinand Pahud door den Molukschen archipel, (Batavia: Lange, 1862).  
Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel  Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts 
India, 31 vols. (Batavia en 's-Gravenhage 1888-1931) 
Dalrymple, Alexander, Memoir Concerning the Passages to and from China (London: East India 
Company, 1782).  
____ Memoir Concerning the Passages, at a Late Season, from India to China (London: East India 
Company, 1788).  
Dampier, William, Dampier’s voyages, 2 vols, ed. John Masefield (London: E. Grant 
Richards, 1906). 
Generale missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der verenigde Oost-indische 
Compagnie. 11 vols., ed. W. Ph. Coolhaas, J. van Goor, J.E. Schooneveld-Oosterling 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960-2004).  
Hart, C. van der, Reize rondom het eiland Celebes en naar eenige der Moluksche eilanden gedaan in den 
jare 1850, door Z.M. schepen van oorlog Argo en Bromo, onder bevel van C. van der Hart. (’s-
Gravenhage: Fuhni, 1853).  
Hockin, John Pearce Rev., A supplement to the account of the Pelew Islands; compiled from the 
journals of the Panther and the Endeavour, two vessels sent by the Honourable East India 
Company to those islands in the year 1790; and from the oral communications of Captain H. 
Wilson (London, ‘Printed for Captain Henry Wilson by W Bulmer’, 1803).  
India Office, A catalogue of manuscript and printed reports, field books, memoirs, maps etc. of the 
Indian surveys deposited in the map room of the India Office (London: W. H. Allen, 1878).  
Jacobs, Hubert S. J., Documenta Malucensia, Vol. II, 1577-1606 (Rome: Jesuit Historical 
Institute, 1980) 
Jacobs, Hubert Th. M., (ed.),  A treatise on the Moluccas (c. 1544) (Rome, Jesuit Historical 
Institute, 1971).  
Keate, George, An account of the Pelew Islands situated in the Western part of the Pacific Ocean, 
composed from the journals and communications of Captain Henry Wilson and some of his officers, 
who, in August 1783, were there shipwrecked in the Antelope, a packet belonging to the 
Honourable East India Company… (London, ‘Printed for Captain Wilson and sold by 




____ An account of the Pelew Islands, eds. Karen L. Nero and Nicholas Thomas (London-
New York: Leicester University Press, 2002). 
Knaap, G.J., (ed.) Memories van overgave van gouverneurs van Ambon in de Zeventiende en achtiende 
eeuw (The Hague: Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën (RGP) 62, 1987). 
Lennon, Walter Caulfield. 1908. “Journal of an expedition to the Moluccas Islands under 
the command of Admiral Rainier with some account of those islands at the time of 
their falling into our hands, and likewise suggestion suggestions relative to their 
future better management in case of being rotained in our permanent possession… 
in Heeres, J.E. “Eene Engelsche lezing omtrent de verovering van Banda en Ambon 
in 1796 en omtrent den toestand dier eilanden groepen op het eind der achttiende 
eeuw, uitgegeven en toegelicht door J.E.H. BKI. 60 (iii-iv); pp. 249-368.  
Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek, 1602-1811, ed. J. A. van der Chijs, 17 vols (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1885-1900). 
Vlamingh van de Oudtshoorn, A. de. 1650-51. Verhael of daghregister, gehouden bij…op 
zijn voijage…van Batavia naar de Moluccos….H 742, KITLV Library, Leiden. 
 
 
3. Secondary sources 
 
Adas, Michael, Prophets of Rebellion: Millenarian Protest Movements against the European Colonial 
Order (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979). 
Andaya, Leonard Y, ‘Local Trade Networks in Maluku in the 16th, 17th, and 18th 
Centuries’, Cakalele: Maluku Research Journal, Volume 2 No. 2 (1991).  
____ The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1993).  
Arfan, Hud, ‘Peranan Pemerintahan Tradisional di Kepulauan Raja Ampat Waktu Dulu’, 
Seminar Halmahera dan Raja Ampat (Jakarta: Leknas-LIPI, 1981). 
Aveling, H, ‘Seventeenth Century Bandanese Society in Fact and Fiction: Tamberra 
assessed’, BKI 123 (1967), 347-65. 
Ballard, Chris, ‘The Centre cannot hold: Trade Networks and Sacred Geography in the 
Papua New Guinea Highlands’, Archeological Oceania 29 (1994). 
Bassett, D. K., British Trade and Policy in Indonesia and Malaysia in the Late Eighteenth Century. 
(Zug: Interdocumentation Company, 1971).  
Blussé, Leonard, ‘Changes of Regime and Colonial State Formation in the Malay 
Archipelago, 1780-1830: an Invitation to an International Research Project’, 
Working Papers Series 41 (2005), Singapore, Asia Research Institute (ARI) National 
University of Singapore (NUS). 
Bor, L., Amboinse oorlogen, door Arnold de Vlaming van Oudshoorn als superintendent, over d'Oosterse 
gewesten oorlogaftig ten eind gebracht (Delft, 1663). 
Bourdieu, Pierre, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977). 
Bourdieu, Pierre and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, Réponses: Pour une anthropologie reflexive (Paris: 
Editions de Seuil, 1992). 
Bousquet, J., ‘Verovering van Ternate door Engelschen in 1810’, in TBG. XVI (2) (1867); 
87-90.  
Boxer, C. R. and P.Y. Manguin, ‘Miguel Roxo de Brito’s narrative of his voyage to the Raja 
Ampat, May 1581-November 1582’, Archipel 18 (1979).  
Braudel, Fernand, Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century Volume 3: The Perspective of the 




Buijze, De generale lant-beschrijvinge van het Ambonse gouvernement…door G.E. Rumphius, (Den 
Haag, 2001) 
Coolhaas, W. Ph., ‘Kroniek van het rijk Batjan’, Tijdschrift Bataviaasch Genootschaap, 63 
(1923), 474-512. 
Curtin, Philip D., Cross-Cultural Trade in World History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984). 
Dasuki, A., Nuku Pahlawan Tidore yang Mengalahkan Belanda (Bandung: Sanggabuwana, 
1976). 
De Clercq, F. S. A., ‘Het Gebied der kalana fat of vier radja’s in westelijk Nieuw-Guinea’, 
De Indische Gids 11 (1889), 1297-351. 
____ Bijdragen tot de kennis der residentie Ternate (Leiden: Brill, 1890). 
Dijk, Toos van, Gouden eiland in de Bandazee: Socio-kosmische ideeën op Marsela, Maluku 
Tenggara, Indonesië (Leiden: CNWS Universiteit Leiden, 2000).  
Drooglever, P. J., Een daad van vrije keuze (Amsterdam: Boom, 2005). 
Duyvendak, John Philip, Het Kakean-Genootschap van Seran. (Almelo: Hilarius, 1926).  
Ellen, Roy F., ‘Conundrums about Panjandrums: on the use of titles in the relations of 
political subordination in the Moluccas and along the Papuan coast’, Indonesia 41 
(1986). 
____ ‘Ritual, identity, and the management of interethnic relations on Seram’, Time Past, 
Time Present, and Time Future: Essays in Honour of P.E. de Josselin de Jong, ed. D. S. Moyer 
and H. J. M. Claessen, Verhandelingen van het KITLV 131 (Dordrecht-Holland, 
Providence-USA: Foris, 1988)  
____ ‘On the contemporary uses of Colonial history and the legitimation of political status 
in archipelagic Southeast Seram’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 28 (1997), 78-102. 
____ On the edge of the Banda zone. Past and Present in the Social Organization of a Moluccan 
Trading Network’, (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2003). 
Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië, Vol IV, ed. D. G. Stibbe (‘s-Gravenhage, Nijhoff, 1921).  
Farquhar, Robert Townsend, Suggestions arising from the abolition of the African slave trade for 
supplying the demands of the West India colonies with agricultural labourers (London: 
Stockdale, 1807) 
Forrest, Thomas, A Voyage to the New Guinea and the Moluccas, 1774-1776 (Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1780 [1779]). 
Fraassen, Ch. F. van, en H. Straver, G.E. Rumphius: De Ambonse eilanden onder de VOC; Zoals 
opgetekend in De Ambonse Landbeschrijving (Utrecht, 2002) 
____ ‘Ternate, de Molukken en de Indonesische Archipel; van soa-organisatie en 
vierdeling; een studie van traditionele samenleving en cultuur in Indonesië, 2 vols. 
(Diss., Leiden University, 1987). 
____ ‘De Molukken: Koloniale beeldvorming en historische werkelijkheid’, Semaian I  
(1989) 74-106. 
____ ‘Ternate and it's dependencies’, in L. E. Visser (ed.), Halmahera and Beyond: Social 
Science Research in the Moluccas (Leiden: KITLV, 1994). 
____ ‘Maluku: Ternate en de wereld van de vier bergen’, (Utrecht, unpublished paper, 
1999). 
Gaastra, Femme S., De Geschiedenis van de VOC (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2002).  
____  ‘VOC Organization’, www.tanap.net. (2005). 
Gelpke, J. H. F. Sollewijn, ‘The report of Miguel Roxo de Brito of his voyage in 1581-1582 
to the Raja Ampat, the MacCluer Gulf, and Seram’, BKI 150 (1994), 123-145. 
Goodman, Tom, ‘The Sosolot Exchange Network of Eastern Indonesia during the XVII 
and XVIII Centuries’, Perspectives on the Bird’s Head of Irian Jaya, Indonesia (Leiden: 




Haga, A., Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea en de Papoesche Eilanden: Historische Bijdrage, 1500-1883, 2 
vols (Batavia: W. Bruining & Co., 1884)  
Hall, D. G. E., Historians of Southeast Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). 
Hanna, W. A. and Des Alwi, Ternate dan Tidore: Masa Lalu Penuh Gejolak (Jakarta: Pustaka 
Sinar Harapan, 1996). 
____ Indonesian Banda: Colonialism and Its Aftermath in the Nutmeg Islands (Philadelphia: 
Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1978).  
____ and Des Alwi, Turbulent times past in Ternate and Tidore (Banda Naira, 1990) 
____ Banda: A Journey through Indonesia's Fabled Isles of Fire and Spice (Banda: Yayasan 
Warisan dan Budaya Banda, 1997).  
Hasselt, F. J. F. Van, ‘De legende van Mansren Mangoendi’, BKI 69 (1914), 90-100.    
Heeres, J. E., ‘Ambon in 1947’, BKI 47 (1897), 510-95.  
Heine-Geldern, Robert, Conceptions of state and kingship in Southeast Asia. (Ithaca: Cornell 
University, 1958)  
Held, G. J., The Papuas of Waropen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957).  
Henley, David, Jealousy and Justice: the Indigenous Routes of Colonial Rule in Northern Sulawesi 
(Amsterdam: Vrij Universiteit UP, 2002).  
Jacobs, Elisabeth Maria, Koopman in Azie: de handel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie 
tijdens de 18de eeuw (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2000).  
James, William. 1837. The naval history of Great Britain, from the declaration of war by France in 
1793, to the occasion of George IV. London, Bentley, 2 vols. 
Jansen, H. J., ‘Gegevens over Geser, Boela, Gorong-of Gorom-eilanden’, Adatrechtbundels 
36 (1928), 490-4. 
Jansen, M. J., ‘Indigenous classification systems in the Ambonese Moluccas’, in Josselin de 
Jong (ed.), Structural Anthropology in the Netherlands, KITLV Translation Series, vol. 17 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 100-15. 
Jones, R., ‘Ten Conversion Myths from Indonesia’, in Conversion to Islam (New York en 
London, 1979), 129-158 
Jonge, Nico de, and Toos van Dijk, Forgotten Islands of Indonesia: The Art and Culture of the 
Southeast Moluccas (Singapore: Periplus Editions, 1995).  
Jusuf, Jumsari et.al., Katalog Koleksi Naskah Maluku (Jakarta: Museum Nasional, 1980).  
Kamma, Freerk Ch., ‘de verhouding  tussen Tidore and de Papoesche eilanden in legende 
en historie, II’,  Indonesie 1 (1948).   
____ Koreri: Messianic Movements in the Biak-Numfor Culture Area (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1972).  
____  Dit wonderlijke werk, Vol. 1, (Oegstgeest: Raad voor de Zending der Ned. Hervormde 
Kerk, 1977). 
Kartodirdjo, Sartono, The Peasants Revolt of Banten in 1888 (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1966).  
Katoppo, Elvianus, Nuku: Perjuangan Kemerdekaan di Maluku Utara (Jakarta, Sinar Harapan, 
1984).  
Kemp, P.H. van der, ‘Het herstel van het Nederlandsch gezag in de Molukken in 1817 
naar oorspronklijke stukken’, BKI. 65 (1911), 337-557, 559-736; 66 (1911), 1-167. 
____ De teruggave der Oost-Indische kolonien 1814-1816 naar oorspronkelijke stukken (’s-
Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1910).  
____ Het Nederlandsch-Indisch bestuur in 1817, tot het vertrek der Engelschen; naar oorspronkelijke 
stukken (‘s-Gravenhage, Nijhoff, 1913).  





Knaap, G. J., ‘Crisis and failure: war and revolt in the Ambon Islands, 1636-1637’, 
Cakalele, 3 (1992), 1-26.  
____ ‘The Saniri Tiga Air (Seram) : an account of its ‘Discovery’ and interpretation circa 
1675- 1950’, BKI 149 (1993), 250-273. 
____ and G Teitler (eds.), De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie: tussen oorlog en diplomatie 
(Leiden: KITLV, 2002). 
____ Kruidnagelen en christenen: de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie en de bevolking van Ambon 
1656-1696 (Leiden: KITLV, 2004). 
Lapian, A.B., ‘Beberapa pokok penelitian sejarah daerah Maluku Utara’, in E.K.M. 
Masinambow, Halmahera dan Raja Ampat: Konsep dan strategi penelitian (Jakarta: Leknas 
–LIPI, 1980), 277-83. 
____ ‘The Diversified Unity of Maluku-kie-raha; It's Historical Development’, in K. 
Tsuchiya (ed.), ‘States’ in Southeast Asia: From ‘Tradition’ to ‘Modernity’ (Kyoto, 1984), 
171-208. 
____ ‘Orang Laut-Bajak Laut-Raja Laut, Sejarah Kawasan Laut Sulawesi Abad XIX’, 
(Diss. Yogyakarta: Universitas Gajah Mada, 1987). 
____ ‘Bacan and the early history of North Maluku’, in L.E. Visser (ed.), Halmahera and 
Beyond: Social Science Research in the Moluccas (Leiden: KITLV, 1994). 
Lasker, B, Human Bondage in Southeast Asia (Chapel Hill: University of California Press, 
1965).   
Lee, Ida, ‘A forgotten navigator, Captain (afterwards) Sir John Hayes, and his voyage of 
1793’, The Geographical journal, 38 (6) (1911), 580-590. 
____ Commodore Sir John Hayes, his voyage and his life, 1767-1831, with some account of Admiral 
D’Entrecasteaux’s voyage of 1792-3 (London: Longmans, 1912).  
Leeden, A.C. van der, ‘The Raja Ampat Islands: a brief general description’, in 
Masinambow (ed.), Halmahera dan Raja Ampat: Konsep dan Strategi Penelitian (Jakarta: 
Leknas-LIPI, 1980). 
Leirissa R.Z., ‘Notes on Central Maluku in the Nineteenth Century, Prisma: The Indonesian 
Indicator (22 September  1981.), 53-66. 
____ ‘Factors Conducive to the Raja Jailolo Movement in North Maluku (1790-1832)’, The 
Fourth Indonesian-Dutch History Conference (Yogyakarta: University of Gajah Mada, 
1983). 
____ ‘The Idea of a Fourth Kingdom in Nineteenth Century Tidorese Maluku’, 
(Unpublished paper, 1993). 
____ ‘Changing maritime trade patterns in the Seram Sea’, in G.J. Schutte (ed.), State and 
statecraft in the Indonesian archipelago (KITLV Working Papers 13) (Leiden: KITLV, 
1994), 99-114. 
____ ‘The Bugis-Makassarese in the Port-towns Ambon and Ternate through the 
Nineteenth Century, BKI 156 (2000): 619-654. 
____ Halmahera Timur dan Raja Jailolo: Pergolakan Sekitar Laut Seram Awal Abad 19, Jakarta: 
Balai Pustaka, 1996.. 
Leupe, P.A., ‘Beschrijvinge van de eijlanden Banda, van de Molucse eijlanden en van de 
westcust van Sumatra’, BKI 3 (1855), 73-141.   
____  ‘Iets over eenige gedenkpenningen en andere vereeringen, door of van wege de 
Oost-Indische Compe. Gedaan’, BKI 11 (1864), 197-214. 
____ ‘De verdediging van Ternate onder den Gouverneur Johan Godfried Budach 1796-
1799, eene bijdrage tot de geschiedenis onzer Oost-Indische bezittingen’, BKI 12 
(1865), 262-363. 
____  ‘Stukken betrekkelijk de verdediging van Ternate door den Gouverneur Willem 




Engelschen op den 21 Junij 1801, door den raad van Politie aldaar’, BKI 17 (1870), 
215-338. 
____ ‘De Reizen der Nederlanders naar Nieuw-Guinea en de Papoesche Eilanden in de 
17de en 18de eeuw’, BKI 21 (1875.), 3-162.  
____ ‘Captain John McCluer en zijn verrichtingen om de oost, 1790-1795’, BKI 25 (1877), 
250-278. 
____ ‘Overname van Ternate van de Engelschen in 1803’, BKI 27 (1879.), 202-223. 
Lombard, D., ‘Regard nouveau sur les ‘Pirates Malais’: 1ère moitié du XIXe siècle’, Archipel 
18 (1979), 231-50. 
Ludeking, E.A.W., ‘Lijst de Gouverneurs van Amboina, zoo ten tijde der Portugezen als 
onder de Nederlansche heerschappij, met aanteekeningen, loopende van 1605-
1864’, TBG. XIV (1864),  524-553. 
Ly-Tio-Fane, Madelaine (ed.), Mauritius and the Spice Trade, the Odyssey of Pierre Poivre 
(Mauritius: Esclapon Ltd., 1958). 
Mackenzie, I., Eastern Archipelago Pilot, Vol. III (London: Admiralty Lords Commissioners, 
1921).  
MacKnight, C.C., The Voyage to Marege: Macassan Trepangers in Northern Australia (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1976). 
Manusama, Z. J., ‘Sekelumit Sejarah Tanah Hitu dan Nusa Laut serta Struktur 
Pemerintahannya sampai Pertengahan Abad Ketujuhbelas’, in Paramita R. 
Abdurrahman et.al., Bunga Rampai Sejarah Maluku (1) (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian 
Sejarah Maluku, 1973). 
____ Hikayat Tanah Hitu (Diss., Leiden University, 1977). 
Meilink-Roelofsz, M.A.P., Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago 
between 1500 and about 1630 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962).  
Mijer, Pieter, Geschiedenis der Nederlandsch Oost-Indische bezittingen onder de Fransche heerschappij 
(Batavia: n.p., 1939).  
Miller, W.G., The Mollucas under the British (M.A. Thesis, University of Hull, 1974).  
Morsea, Hosea Balou.. The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635-1834, 5 
vols. (Oxford: Oxford U.P, 1928-1929). 
Naidah, ‘Geschiedenis van Ternate, in Ternataanschen en Maleischen tekst’, with 
translation and remarks by P. van der Crab, BKI 4? (1878), 381-493. 
Needham, R., ‘Sumba and the Slave Trade’, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Working 
Paper No. 31 (Melbourne: Monash University, 1983). 
Niemeijer, Hendrik E., ‘Research Notes on the Gouvernement of Ternate (A.N.R.I. 
Koleksi Arsip Ternate)’, (Jakarta: Unpublished, 1997).  
____ ‘Dividing the Islands: the Dutch Spice Monopoly and Religious Change in 17th 
Century Maluku’, in Alijah Gordon (ed.), The Propagation of Islam in the Indonesian-
Malay Archipelago (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 2001).  
Noorduyn, J., ‘Arung Singkang (1770-1765): How the victory of Wadjo’ began’, Indonesia 
13 (April 1972), 62-68.  
____ ‘Een Boeginees geschriftje over Arung Singkang’, BKI 109 (1953), 144-152. 
Ohorela, G.A., Perlawanan Nuku di Tidore (1780-1805) (Semarang: Departemen Pendidikan 
dan Kebudayaan Indonesia, 1990).  
Ricklefs, M.C., ‘Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi, 1749-1792: a History of the 
Division of Java (Diss. Cornell University, 1973) 
Parkinson, C. Northcote, Trade in the Eastern Seas, 1793-1813 (Cambridge: U.P., 1937)  
____ War in the Eastern Seas, 1793-1813 (London, Allen and Unwin, 1954). 
Penders, C. L. M., The West New Guinea Debacle (Leiden: KITLV, 2002).   




Platenkamp, J.D.M. 1988. 'Myths of life and image in northern Halmahera', in: H.J.M. 
Claessen and D.S. Moyer ed., Time past, time present, time future; perspectives on Indonesian 
culture. Essays in honor of Professor P.E. de Josselin de Jong (Leiden) pp. 148-167. 
Platenkamp, J.D.M., Tobelo: Ideas and values of a North Moluccan society (Diss. Leiden 
University, 1988) 
____ De waarde der dingen: Ceremoniêle geschenken van de Tobelo (Den Haag: Museon, 1990) 
Polman, Katrien, The North Maluku: an Annotated Bibliography (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1981).  
____  The Central Maluku: an Annotated Bibliography (Leiden: KITLV, 1983).  
Purwanto, Bambang, Gagalnya Historiografi Indonesiasentris?! (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2006). 
Rainbow, S.G., ‘English expeditions to the Dutch East Indies during the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars’, (M.A. Thesis, University of London, 1933).  
Reid, Anthony, ‘Introduction: Slavery and Bondage in South-east Asian History’, in id., 
Slavery, Bondage, and Dependency in Southeast Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).  
Resink, G. J., Indonesia’s History between the Myths; Essays in Legal History and Historical Theory 
(The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1968).  
Roo, L.W.G. de, ‘J.W. Cranssen te Ternate, 13 September 1799-18 Junij 1801’, TBG. XVI 
(1867), 503-535. 
Rumphius, G.E. “De Ambonse historie behelsende...”, BKI 64 (1910). 
____ De Generale Lantbeschrijvinge van het Ambonse Gouvernement ofwel De Ambonsche Lant-
beschrijvinge. Transcriptie, noten, woordenlijst en een nieuwe bibliografie door W. 
Buijze (Den Haag, 2001.) 
Rumphius, G.E. De Ambonse eilanden onder de VOC: zoals opgetekend in de Ambonse 
landsbeschrijving. Utrecht: Landelijk Steunpunt Educatie Molukkers. 2002. 
Rutherford, Danilyn. Raiding the land of foreigners (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2003) 
Sen, S.PIndian textiles in south-east Asian trade in the seventeenth century. Journal of 
Southeast Asian History, 3 (2) (1962), 92-110. 
Sollewijn Gelpke, J. H. F., ‘The Majapahit dependency Udama Katraya. BKI 148 (1992), 
240-246. 
____  ‘On the origin of the name Papua’, BKI 149 (1993.), 318-322. 
____ ‘The report of Miguel Roxo de Brito of his voyage in 1581-1582 to the Raja Ampat, 
the MacCluer Gulf and Seram’, BKI 150 (1994): 123-145. 
Southall, Aidan W., Alur society; a study in processes and types of domination (Cambridge: Heffer, 
1953). 
Sutherland H. and D. S. Brée, Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to the study of Indonesian 
trade: The case of Makassar. (Rotterdam: Rotterdam School of Management, 1987). 
Sutherland, H., ‘Eastern emporium and company town: trade and society in eighteenth 
century Makassar’, in Frank Broeze (ed.), Brides of the sea: Port cities of Asia from the 
sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, 97-128 (Kensington: New South Wales University 
Press, 1989). 
Sutherland, H., ‘Tripang and wangkang: The China trade of eighteenth century Makassar, 
c.1720s-1840s’, BKI 156 (2000), 451-472. 
Spyer, Patricia, ‘The Memory of Trade: Circulation, Autochthony, and the Past in the Aru 
Islands (Eastern Indonesia)’, (Diss. University of Chicago, Illinois, 1992).  
Stapel, F.W., ‘Cornelis Janszoon Speelman’, BKI 94 (1936.), 1-221. 
Tambiah, S.J., ‘The galactic polity: The structure of traditional kingdoms in Southeast 




Tarling, Nicholas, ‘The relationship between British politics and the extent of Dutch 
power in the Malay archipelago, 1784-1871’, The Australian Journal of Politics and 
History 4 (1958), 179-192. 
Tarling, Nicholas, Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World, 1780-1824 (Cambridge: U.P., 
1962). 
Valentijn, F., Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indiën. 5 vols. (Dordrecht en Amsterdam 1724-1726; 
reprinted J.C. van Kesteren & Zoon 1862, Franeker 2002-2004) 
Veen, E. van, Decay of defeat? An inquiry into the Portuguese decline in Asia 1580-1645 (Leiden: 
CNWS, 2000). 
Villiers, J., ‘The cash-crop economy and state formation in the Spice Islands in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries’, in J. Kathirithamby-Wells and J. Villiers eds., The 
Southeast Asian port and polity, rise and demise (Singapore 1990), 83-106. 
Wallace, A.R., Menjelajah Nusantara, Ekspedisi Alfred Russel Wallace Abad ke-19 (Bandung: 
Rosda, 2000). 
Warren, James Francis, The Sulu Zone 1768-1898: the Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and 
Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State (Quezon City: New 
Day Publishers, 1985). 
Wessels, C. S. J., De Katholieke missie in de Molukken, Noord-Celebes en de Sangihe-eilanden 
gedurende de Spaansche bestuursperiode 1606-1677 (Tilburg, 1935). 
Wouden, F. A. E. van, Types of Social Structure in Eastern Indonesia (trans. by R Needham), 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968). 
Wright, H.R.C., ‘The Moluccan Spice Monopoly, 1770-1824’, JMBRAS II (4) (1958). 
Hoëvell, W. R. Van, ‘Aanteekeningen, gehouden op eene reis aan de noord- en westkust 





Fijne en zeldzame specerijen waren de voornaamste reden voor de 
Europeanen om handelsposten in Azië op te richten. Na de oprichting van 
de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) in het begin van de 
zeventiende eeuw namen de Nederlanders de macht over in de Molukken, 
het huidige Maluku Utara (Noord-Molukken). Het gebruik van geweld en 
diplomatie om de rivalen in de handel te verdrijven—de Portugezen, 
Spanjaarden en hun bondgenoten—was van het begin af aan voorzien.  
De vestiging van het gezag van de VOC in de Specerij eilanden van Oost-
Indonesië verschilde van plaats tot plaats. Op de Banda eilanden werd de 
gehele politieke en economische structuur uitgewist met de uitroeiing en 
gedwongen evacuatie van de Bandanese bevolking. In de Ambonse eilanden 
vestigde de VOC een direct bestuur over de inheemse bevolking, maar 
duurde het wel zestig jaar voordat de controle van de VOC zekergesteld 
was. In Ternate, toentertijd de belangrijkste staat in de Molukken, paste de 
VOC indirect bestuur toe, waarbij men leunde op het gezag van de sultans, 
die kort werden gehouden door streng toezicht op de opvolging en het naar 
voren schuiven van eigen favorieten voor de troon.  
Tussen de Compagnie en Tidore, de op een na belangrijkste staat in de 
Molukken, deden zich van tijd tot tijd conflicten voor vanwege de 
rooftochten van Papua’s en het in 1667 afgedwongen beleid van de 
uitroeiing van de specerijen. De sultan en zijn groten waren geneigd het 
beleid van de Compagnie te saboteren omdat zij belang hadden bij het 
toelaten en het voortduren van de rooftochten. Het beleid tot uitroeiing van 
de specerijen bedierf de relaties tussen alle partijen, maar was vooral een 
zware last voor de lokale bevolking die de menskracht voor de expedities 
had te leveren.  
Vanaf het begin van de achttiende eeuw ondernam de VOC regelmatig 
expedities om een einde te maken aan de rooftochten, de gehoorzaamheid 
van de onderdanen van Tidore af te dwingen, de specerijbomen uit te roeien 
en de mogelijkheid tot een eventueel binnendringen van buitenlandse 
handelsrivalen te verhinderen. In weerwil van de aanhoudende pogingen van 
de opeenvolgende Nederlandse gouverneurs zetten de sultan van Tidore en 
zijn onderdanen hun subversieve acties voort, zij het niet openlijk. Twee 
belangrijke gebeurtenissen, het door Tidore afstaan van Oost-Seram aan de 
Nederlanders in 1768 en de verbanning van sultan Jamaludin in 1779, 
betekenden het begin van een nieuwe ontwikkeling: in 1780 begon een 
Tidorese prins, genaamd Nuku, een van de langdurigste en meest effectieve 
opstanden tegen de Nederlandse hegemonie in de Molukken.  
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Het eerste deel van deze studie handelt over de vraag wie Nuku was, 
waarom hij de opstand begon en hoe hij daar meer dan vijftien jaar leiding 
aan gaf. Daarbij zal blijken dat het geheim van Nuku’s voortdurende 
machtspositie te danken was aan zijn meesterlijk gebruik van 
bondgenootschappelijke relaties.  
Vervolgens wordt in het tweede deel van de studie de blik gericht op de 
bondgenoten van de prins: de Papuase en Halmaherase rovers, de Oost-
Seramse handelaren met hun uitgebreid handelsnetwerk en, tenslotte, de 
Engelse East India Company (EIC) en de Engelse country traders, die op 
het einde van de achttiende eeuw in Molukse wateren waren verschenen.  
 
De opstand van prins Nuku van Tidore 
Het dispuut over de afstand van Oost-Seram was het begin van de 
vastberaden oppositie van prins Nuku. Zijn oppositie verhardde toen zijn 
vader en broers naar Batavia werden verbannen. Na de Nederlandse aanval 
op Toloa in 1780, stelde Nuku zich aan het hoofd van de belangrijke 
Tidorese leiders in de opstand. Hoewel zijn strategie aanvankelijk nog 
aftastend was, slaagde hij er toch in adequaat een groeiend getal aanhangers 
te mobiliseren en te recruteren, terwijl hij tegelijkertijd in contact bleef met 
de Tidorese leiders thuis.  
In 1780, het jaar waarin de Nederlanders een nieuw verdrag aan Tidore 
opdrongen, dat de sultan feitelijk reduceerde tot de status van een vazal, 
vormde Nuku een alternatieve gezagsstructuur als ‘de sultan in ballingschap’ 
van Seram en Papua. Hij had niet veel tijd nodig om strijdkrachten te 
mobiliseren in de periferie van Tidore. De Papua’s van de Raja Ampat 
eilanden, de Gamrange van Zuidoost-Halmahera en de Oost-Serammers 
waren snel verenigd. Thuis in Tidore behield Nuku steun onder de groten. 
Het ‘verraad van de Tempel’ en de plotselinge aanval op Gane en Saketa in 
1783 waren duidelijke voorbeelden van zijn succesvolle strategie. Bovendien 
toonde de ‘Tidoreesche Revolutie’, hoewel prematuur, zijn succes in het 
verenigen van diverse opstandige Tidorese groepen, zowel op het thuisfront 
als in de ballingschap. 
Prins Nuku had niet alleen te maken met de Compagnie, maar ook met 
diens trouwste bondgenoot op Tidore, de sultan, wiens positie door de 
opstand op het spel stond. In tegenstelling tot de zwakke Patra Alam (1780-
1783) was sultan Kamaludin (1784-1797) een formidabele tegenstander, die 
zijn positie goed wist te consolideren door de opstandelingen op afstand te 
houden. Rond 1790 wankelde het gezag van Nuku, maar kort daarna slaagde 
hij er weer in zijn positie te herstellen. De steun van Noord-Halmahera en 
de terugkeer van de aanhangers van Raja Ampat en Gamrange was in dit 
opzicht doorslaggevend. Gedurende de regering van Kamaludin werd Nuku 
ook gesteund door de jogugu, de ‘eerste minister’, in het sultanaat die hem 
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heimelijk informeerde over de plannen van Kamaludin en de Nederlanders. 
De terugkeer van de verbannen prins Zainal Abidin van Ceylon in 1796 
versterkte de positie van Nuku verder. Nuku slaagde er ook in hulp van 
buiten te betrekken. In 1796 bereikte zijn positie, dankzij de samenwerking 
met Engelse country traders, een hoogtepunt. 1796 was ook het jaar dat de 
Nederlandse positie ernstig verzwakt werd vanwege het verlies van Ambon 
en Banda aan de EIC. Toen Nuku’s vloot in 1797 de wateren van Tidore 
binnenvoer, werd van de kant van sultan Kamaludin geen belangrijk verzet 
meer vernomen.  
Prins Nuku besloot nu dat de tijd gekomen was zijn plan uit te voeren om 
de gehele Molukken te verenigen. Ternate met het haast onneembare 
Nederlandse fort Oranje was nu zijn belangrijkste doelwit. Sinds 1796 
werkte hij samen met prins Ibrahim van Ternate; hij wist zelfs sultan Aharal 
van Ternate over te halen zich bij hem te voegen. Nuku’s doel de 
Nederlanders op Ternate te verslaan werd uiteindelijk in 1801 gerealiseerd 
met de medewerking van de Engelsen. Bacan was ook belangrijk voor Nuku, 
omdat het deel uitmaakte van zijn ideaal de vier oorspronkelijke 
koninkrijken van de Molukken te herstellen. Als onderdeel van dit ideaal 
richtte hij het sultanaat Jailolo opnieuw op. Het was duidelijk dat Nuku een 
groots visionair droombeeld had. Als (Noord-)Moluks leider strekte zijn 
macht zich uit ver voorbij de grenzen van Tidore. Hij droomde van een 
Tidore dat het machtigst was onder de vier Molukse koninkrijken en dat de 
ruggengraat zou vormen van een Molukken vrij van buitenlandse machten.  
Hoewel Nuku, samen met de Engelsen, er in slaagde het sultanaat 
Ternate en fort Oranje te veroveren, werd zijn doel om Ternate te 
controleren nooit gerealiseerd. Zijn droom de Molukken te verenigen bleef 
een luchtspiegeling. De Vrede van Amiens van 1802 betekende de terugkeer 
van het Nederlandse gezag in de Molukken en deed het verdrag tussen Nuku 
en de Engelse resident ter plekke teniet. Desondanks bleef Nuku tot zijn 
overlijden op het einde van 1805 vol zelftrouwen. Hij behield de 
onafhankelijke houding ten opzichte van de Nederlanders tot hij zijn laatste 
adem uitblies.  
Nuku’s opvolger, Zainal Abidin (1806-1810), was zwak. Als sultan was hij 
niet in staat op te treden als een krachtige en visionaire figuur, die het 
respect van andere leiders kon afdwingen. Zijn grootste zwakte was zijn 
egoïsme, waardoor hij de loyaliteit van zijn volgelingen niet behield. Zijn 
politieke houding werd gekenmerkt door vaagheid en besluiteloosheid. Ten 
opzichte van de Nederlanders was zijn positie weinig doortastend en 
ontbrak het hem aan een duidelijk beleid. De Engelse steun voor Tidore, die 
tot zijn dood in 1810 voortduurde, werd zodoende niet benut. De meest 
pijnlijke tekortkoming was zijn onkunde van de veranderende politieke 
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verhoudingen tussen de Engelsen en de Nederlanders. Hij faalde geheel in 
de controle over zijn rijk.  
 
Nuku’s Papuase bondgenoten en hun rooftochten-systeem 
De roversgroepen van de Papuase eilanden en van Halmahera waren al 
actief voor de komst van de Europeanen in de Molukken in de zestiende 
eeuw. Hun roverij hing samen met de lokale gewoonten en was daarnaast 
ook een element in een alternatief handelssysteem. In de zestiende eeuw was 
het doel van de rooftochten mensen gevangen te nemen en die weer los te 
laten voor een losprijs. Indien de gevangenen niet werden losgekocht, 
wachtte hun de dood. Dit patroon veranderde vanaf het begin van de 
zeventiende eeuw. Degenen die niet werden losgekocht werden, in het geval 
het mannen waren, gebruikt als slaven en, in het geval van vrouwen als 
mogelijke huwelijkspartners naar de woonplaatsen van de rovers gebracht. 
Het nootmuskaatbedrijf op Banda had altijd slaven nodig. Onin en Kobiai, 
gebieden op de westkust van Nieuw-Guinea, alsmede Raja Ampat en 
omgeving waren belangrijke leveranciers van slaven. De omstandigheid van 
de slavernij stimuleerde de roof-activiteiten. 
Niettegenstaande het beperkte economische nut en het voortdurende 
risico inherent aan roof-activiteiten, bleven veel rovers vasthouden aan hun 
gewelddadig beroep. Deze overzeese ondernemingen waren voor Papua’s en 
bewoners van Halmahera ook van belang voor de accumulatie van 
buitenlandse goederen, die niet slechts economische waarde hadden maar 
ook van politiek-culturele betekenis waren. Buitenlandse goederen waren 
belangrijk bij de  ceremoniële uitwisseling van geschenken, bij de betaling 
van boetes, bruidsschatten etcetera. De rooftochten werden daarom ook 
beschouwd als manieren om buitenlandse macht te verkrijgen. De rovers en 
de goederen die zij verwierven werden respectievelijk gezien als personen en 
zaken die over magische buitenlandse krachten beschikten. Tidore was in 
hun ogen de bron van buitenlandse macht. Met andere woorden: diegenen 
die goederen vandaar hadden verkregen door deelname aan rooftochten 
genoten prestige, autoriteit en macht. Dat stelde hen op hun beurt in staat de 
eigen gemeenschap te domineren. 
Gedurende de opstand van prins Nuku vertoonde het bedrijf van de 
rooftochten nieuwe dimensies. De aan te vallen doelen werden nu meer 
selectief bepaald. De rovers vielen in eerste instantie mensen aan die werden 
gezien als Nederlandse onderdanen en bondgenoten en verder diegenen die 
afwijzend stonden tegenover deelname of steun aan de opstand. Door hun 
rooftochten droegen de Papuase en Halmaherase rovers belangrijk bij aan de 
versterking van de opstand. Gedurende de opstand fuctioneerden de 
handels- en roversvloten van de Papua’s in feite als Nuku’s indrukwekkende 
navale en militaire macht.  
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Nuku’s Oost-Seramse bondgenoten en hun handelsnetwerk  
Sinds de zestiende eeuw stonden de Oost-Serammers bekend als 
koopvaarders. Zij  produceerden sagobrood en verhandelden dat voor 
nootmuskaat en foelie op Banda. De Oost-Serammers verbonden hun 
westelijk netwerk, dat gebieden als Timor (sandelhout), Bali (slaven, kleden), 
Bima (goud), Java (rijst) en Sulawesi omvatte, met hun oostelijk netwerk 
rond de MacCluer Golf (massooi, slaven) en Raja Ampat. Zij genoten in die 
tijd een zekere mate van welvaart. Met de vestiging van het Nederlandse 
specerij-monopolie werden de Serammers beroofd van hun meest 
winstgevende handelsgoederen. De door de Nederlanders geëiste 
beperkingen van de scheepvaart ondermijnde verder een groot deel van hun 
westelijk en oostelijke handelsnetwerk. Om een en ander af te dwingen sloot 
de Compagnie contracten met de Oost-Serammers, vaak voorafgegaan door 
gewelddadige confrontaties, maar op de langere termijn werden deze 
contracten niet nageleefd.  
De hongi-expeditie, de meest gewelddadige institutie van de Nederlanders, 
was een instrument van surveillance en repressie, gericht op de Serammers 
in het algemeen. De Oost-Serammers waren geregeld het doelwit van de 
hongi-tochten. Velen van hen werden verjaagd en/of gedood. Huizen en 
vaartuigen werden verbrand, boomgaarden vernietigd en het grootste 
gedeelte van de bezittingen geplunderd door de krijgers van de hongi. Er 
restte hen bijna niets meer nadat een strafexpeditie was voorbij gekomen, 
behalve dingen die vooraf ergens verborgen waren in het bos of die nog op 
de vlucht waren meegenomen. De overlevenden moesten hierna geheel 
opnieuw beginnen. Gedurende twee achtereenvolgende eeuwen hadden de 
Oost-Serammers zodoende met een proces van verarming te maken.  
De Oost-Serammers slaagden er niettemin in hun handelscontacten te 
behouden door met anderen samen te werken, vooral met handelaren van 
Makassar. Vaak werden vaartuigen en goederen geleend van Makassaren. De 
Oost-Serammers fungeerden als tussenpersonen en  onderhielden de 
traditionele handelsnetwerken, in het bijzonder die in oostwaartse richting 
op de kusten van Nieuw-Guinea en de Raja Ampat. Naar het schijnt hadden 
de Nederlanders niet genoeg middelen om de Seramse handelsnetwerken uit 
te roeien. Dat zou ook zeer duur zijn geweest. Dat gold in het bijzonder in 
de tweede helft van de achttiende eeuw, toen de macht van de VOC toch al 
tanende was. De Nederlandse controle op de situatie werd nog geringer toen 
Nuku en zijn aanhangers het strijdperk betraden en de Oost-Serammers 
aanmoedigden zich bij de opstand aan te sluiten. 
Oost-Seram was in veel opzichten onafhankelijk van Tidore. Met of 
zonder Tidore, de Oost-Serammers gingen voort hun handelsnetwerken te 
onderhouden. Uit de schaarse gegevens  die voorhanden zijn, kan worden 
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geconcludeerd dat de verhouding tussen Oost-Seram en Tidore beduidend 
opbloeide gedurende de opstand van prins Nuku. De meest prominente 
kapiten laut van Nuku waren Oost-Seramse handelaren. Er waren slechts 
twee Oost-Seramse hoofden, kapiten Baukan en orangkaya Kana-Kana, die 
hun steun aan de Compagnie voortzetten. Prins Nuku’s aanwezigheid op 
Oost-Seram stimuleerde en beschermde de inheemse handelsnetwerken, die 
zo lang onder vuur hadden gelegen. Het netwerk van de Oost-Serammers, 
die lang in vijandschap met de VOC hadden geleefd, was er een daarvan. 
Vanuit Waru als hoofdkwartier konden Nuku en zijn strijdkrachten enerzijds 
Oost-Serammers naar zich toetrekken en anderzijds diegenen bedreigen die 
weigerden met hen samen te werken. 
 
De Engelse East India Company en de Engelse country traders als bondgenoten 
Sinds het einde van de zeventiende eeuw probeerden de Engelsen weer 
specerijen van de Molukken en Nieuw-Guinea te verkrijgen. Pas in de 
tweede helft van de achttiende eeuw intensiveerden zij hun inspanningen. 
De pogingen werden gestimuleerd door de groeiende behoefte aan 
producten van Zuidoost-Azië als alternatief voor zilver bij de betaling van de 
zich uitbreidende inkoop van zijde en thee in Canton. In 1774 slaagde een 
Engelse koopman, Thomas Forrest, er in Raja Ampat en Noordwest-Nieuw-
Guinea te verkennen. Hij verzamelde specerijen en had enig contact met de 
sultans van Bacan en Tidore. 
Met uitzondering van de sultan van Ternate waren de Molukse vorsten 
geneigd de Engelsen als bondgenoot te zien. Sultan Jamaludin van Tidore 
schreef zelf een brief aan Thomas Forrest en bood hem een 
bondgenootschap aan. Evenals zijn vader was prins Nuku vastbesloten om 
een bondgenootschap met de Engelsen te sluiten. Het redden van de levens 
van de bemanning van een Engels country traders’ schip in 1783 was een 
belangrijke stap voorwaarts in de opbouw van vriendschappelijke relaties 
met de Engelsen. Nuku’s gezanten naar Benkoelen in 1784 en naar Bengalen 
in 1785 werden hartelijk en met alle honneurs ontvangen. In 1796 besloot de 
Britse gouverneur-generaal Nuku wapens en ammunitie te leveren.  
Prins Nuku slaagde er in een sterk imago te creëren wat betreft zijn 
bereidheid met de Engelsen samen te werken. Het contact met de Engelsen, 
hoofdzakelijk met de country traders, was een van de doorslaggevende 
factoren bij de meer dan twintigjarige strijd van Nuku. Nuku wist zelfs zijn 
voordeel met de interventie van de Engelse strijdkrachten te doen, toen hun 
aanwezigheid nog niet meer was dan een gerucht. Hij manipuleerde de angst 
van de Nederlanders en zond valse berichten door middel van lokale 
spionnen naar de Nederlandse besturen in Ternate, Ambon of Banda. Door 
de geruchten van de komst van de Engelsen aan te wakkeren, kon hij ook 
het moreel onder zijn aanhangers hoog houden. 
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De wederzijdse contacten tussen de strijdkrachten van prins Nuku en de 
Engelse country traders intensiveerden vanaf 1795. Vervolgens werden grote 
hoeveelheden specerijen verhandeld in ruil voor wapens en ammunitie. De 
Engelse country traders brachten ook Nuku’s gezanten naar Bengalen in 
1796. De toename van de bewapening verbeterde de slagkracht van Nuku’s 
strijdkrachten aanmerkelijk. Als gevolg daarvan nam zijn aanhang onder de 
lokale leiders en bevolkingen nog verder toe. De verovering van Bacan en de 
overname van Tidore in 1797 was het resultaat van de samenwerking tussen 
Nuku en de country traders. 
 Met betrekking tot de situatie in Tidore hadden de Engelsen geen 
duidelijk plan. Hun gebrek aan kennis omtrent de aard van de interne 
Molukse politieke verhoudingen gaf ruimte aan de lokale residenten in de 
Molukken om naar eigen inzicht te handelen. Echter, wanneer de Engelsen 
te maken hadden met zaken van groter politiek gewicht, werd hun beleid 
toch bepaald door de verhoudingen in Europa, in de eerste plaats door hun 
rivaliteit met de Fransen. Als het in Europees verband mogelijk was de 
Nederlanders uit het Franse kamp los te maken, waren de Engelsen bereid 
concessies aan de Nederlanders te doen elders in de wereld, bijvoorbeeld in 
Zuidoost-Azië. 
 Tijdens de Engelse bezetting ondervonden de Tidorezen en Nuku dat de 
EIC zich ook als een  ‘koloniaal overheerser’ gedroeg. De Engelsen 
continueerden de Nederlandse aanspraak op het monopolie op de 
specerijen. Dit leidde tot conflicterende belangen tussen de Engelse resident 
enerzijds en sultan Nuku en de Oost-Serammers anderzijds. De 
strijdkrachten die de Engelsen tot hun beschikking hadden waren echter niet 
voldoende om de ‘smokkelhandel’ van de mensen in de productiegebieden 
met de handelaars van Oost-Seram en de Tidorese elite te verhinderen. Dat 
de EIC-dienaren ook nog te maken hadden met Engelse country traders, die 
goede relaties hadden met handelaren in Oost-Seram alsmede in Halmahera 
en Raja Ampat maakte de zaken er niet gemakkelijker op. De country traders 
hadden ook de steun van bepaalde hoge bestuurders in de EIC zelf. De 
Engelse Compagnie streefde er naar om Nuku kruidnagelen voor een 
vastgestelde prijs te laten leveren, maar laatstgenoemde was maar al te graag 
bereid de overeenkomst niet na te komen als hij een deal kon maken met 
country traders, die de kruidnagelen voor een hogere prijs wilden inkopen. 
 Het beleid van resident Farquhar om de positie van Ternate te minder 
belangrijk te maken en een verdrag te sluiten met sultan Nuku was de 
grootste overwinning die Nuku behaalde gedurende de aanwezigheid van de 
Engelsen. Tidore werd nu als een bondgenoot aangeduid, niet langer als een 
vazal. Politiek gezien was Tidore onafhankelijk en had het een superieure 
positie ten opzichte van Ternate. Tijdens het Nederlandse bestuur was dit 
lang anders geweest. De verdragen die het sultanaat Tidore in het verleden 
SAMENVATTING 284
met de Nederlanders had gesloten waren teniet gedaan. In ruil daarvoor had 
het Britse bestuur de monopolierechten. Ongelukkig genoeg werd dit 
verdrag niet goedgekeurd door de Engelse hogere regering in India in 1802. 
Het eind van het verhaal van de relatie tussen Nuku en de Engelsen toonde 
de tragiek van het gebrek aan kracht van kleine staten in Zuidoost-Azië vis à 
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